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ABSTRACT 
Rory M. McGovern:  George W. Goethals: Life and Change in the U.S. Army, 1876-1919 
(Under the direction of Joseph T. Glatthaar) 
 
In the culminating achievements of a lengthy career in the U.S. Army, George W. 
Goethals led the construction of the Panama Canal and managed the effort to sustain an army of 
approximately four million soldiers during the final year of the First World War.  At the outset of 
that career, neither he nor the U.S. Army was prepared to meet such challenges.  Using 
biography as a vehicle to examine a larger problem, this dissertation follows Goethals’s career in 
order to understand the nature of change in the U.S. Army during the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries as it transitioned from a frontier constabulary and coastal defense force to a 
modern army capable of projecting power abroad and meeting the challenges of twentieth-
century warfare.  Goethals’s story reveals that the legacy of the Civil War and the army’s failure 
to keep pace with changing social norms and practices in training, education, and perceptions of 
professionalism created a traditionalist culture that did not embrace the new structures imposed 
by the Root Reforms at the turn of the century, but sought to apply them to comfortably 
traditional norms, values, and practices.  At the same time, the army’s embrace of the managerial 
revolution and its experience of the First World War provided the impetus and momentum for 
cultural change.  Reform was actually a decades-long process that was not complete until the 
army’s culture shifted to realign with its new structures.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
June 12, 1912 brought pleasant weather to the Lower Hudson Valley, allowing West 
Point’s graduation ceremony to be held outdoors.  Overlooking the Hudson River at the north 
end of a grassy plain that served as the cadets’ drill ground, the official party—consisting of the 
superintendent, the graduation speaker, and a handful of alumni and aged veterans of the Civil 
War—gathered around the main stage.  At ten o’clock sharp, the band struck up a martial tune 
and the corps of cadets marched with crisp precision from their barracks toward the official 
party.   Ninety-six graduating members of the class of 1912 took their seats in front of the stage 
while cadets from the classes of 1913-1915 stood in formation, ready to cheer as their friends 
made the transition from cadet to lieutenant.1   
After a laudatory introduction from the superintendent, Colonel George W. Goethals took 
the stage.  He was nervous.  He had harbored a hatred of public speaking since his teenage years 
and was acutely aware that this was only the second time that West Point had invited an officer 
who had not yet held a general’s rank to be the graduation speaker.  Looking out at a multi-
generational audience that included officers who long before had helped defeat the Confederacy 
and cadets who would soon help lead the rapidly modernizing U.S. Army, he may have felt 
reassured about his decision to focus his remarks on how to succeed as a military officer during 
times of change and uncertainty.  “The duties and problems which confront the army officer in 
                                                          
1 “West Point Cadets Cheer War Veterans,” New York Times, June 13, 1912, 22. 
 
2 
 
recent years are more numerous, more varied, and complex than in former days,” he began.  
They key to success, Goethals explained, was to have the strength of character to be fully 
dedicated to any assigned mission, to recognize that they had much yet to learn, and to accept 
practical experience as the best possible tutor.  After all, he reminded the assembled cadets, the 
program of instruction and training at West Point had provided them not with the full extent of 
all knowledge and abilities required to succeed, but with “the foundations of a structure yet to be 
raised.”2 
Goethals derived these themes from his own career.  As a quiet and unaccomplished 
teenager, he had reported for duty at West Point as a new cadet in 1876.  At that time, the army 
was organized for and accustomed to its traditional role of guarding the coast and policing the 
frontier.  Moreover, the army Goethals entered lacked formalized and robust systems of training 
and education to prepare its rising leaders for high command and modern warfare.  Neither 
young Cadet Goethals nor the army he entered was prepared or equipped for the challenges that 
lay ahead.3  When invited to speak at West Point in 1912, however, Goethals was two years 
away from opening the Panama Canal to commercial traffic and six years away from 
successfully leading the War Department’s efforts to build and sustain an army of nearly four 
million soldiers during First World War.  Retiring in 1919 at the end of an accomplished career, 
Goethals was a changed officer departing a changed institution.  This dissertation examines how 
                                                          
2 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Address of Col. George W. Goethals, United States Army, at the 
Graduation Exercises of the Class of Nineteen Twelve, United States Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 
Wednesday, June 12, 1912, 62nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1912, H.Doc 904 (Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office, 
1912), 5-8.  The quotations are on pages 5 and 6, respectively, and Goethals references being the only the second 
graduation speaker to not be a general on page 5.  For Goethals’s aversion to public speaking, see George W. 
Goethals to Lewis Sayre Buchard, June 11, 1927, Folder 6, George W. Goethals File, City College of New York 
Archives and Special Collections, New York, NY. 
3 The organization, function, and culture of the U.S. Army that Goethals entered in 1876 is thoroughly examined in 
Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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the institution evolved in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries by tracing and 
analyzing Goethals’s life within it during that same period.   
Many scholars have considered this question before, but few have approached this 
institutional problem from an individual perspective.  Goethals spent the majority of his life 
serving in the army, wearing the uniform from the conclusion of Reconstruction to the 
conclusion of the First World War.  Over the course of that career, he experienced the entire 
trajectory of reform within the U.S. Army during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era.  A 
detailed examination of that experience offers the chance to reexamine from a new and unique 
angle the well-traversed ground of the army’s transformation from a force dedicated to defending 
the coast and policing the frontier to a modern army with a global reach, organized and equipped 
for twentieth-century warfare.  Such an examination also promises to enhance our understanding 
of the dynamics of change and adaptation in national institutions more broadly.  
By examining Goethals’s career, it becomes clear that the army’s culture was at odds 
with the spirit of military reform in the late-nineteenth century and the program of reform crafted 
by Secretary of War Elihu Root and supported by a cadre of likeminded officers in the wake of 
the War with Spain in 1898.  The Root Reforms were structural in nature and were intended to 
mold an army capable of meeting the demands of the twentieth century by creating formal 
systems of military education, rationalizing the command structure, and establishing a general 
staff corps responsible for both developing war and mobilization plans well in advance of any 
crisis and coordinating the execution of those plans as crises arose.4  Successful officers of 
                                                          
4 For overviews of Root’s reforms, see Otto Nelson, Jr., National Security and the General Staff (Washington, DC: 
Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 39-72 and James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara, Army Organization and 
Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 6-12. 
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Goethals’s generation advanced despite the absence of formal and rigorous systems of training 
and education.  Generally, they interpreted their success as a validation of the unsystematic 
process of experiential learning that the army relied upon to develop its officers throughout the 
nineteenth century.  This influenced an institutional culture that extolled the virtues of self-
development and self-education, which in turn produced officers who hesitated to adapt in the 
absence of crisis and valued more highly the ability to improvise than the ability to plan.   
Goethals’s experience demonstrates that the gulf between the army’s structural reforms 
and its institutional culture generated internal resistance and diluted the effect of the Root 
Reforms.  The full potential of those reforms would not be realized until the Second World War, 
with the ascension of a new generation that embraced the ideas and values at the heart of the 
reforms, thus completing a long and slow change in the army’s institutional culture.  Among the 
more prominent officers of this younger generation were Dwight D. Eisenhower and Omar N. 
Bradley, who, as members of West Point’s class of 1915, happened to be in formation listening 
to Goethals’s address on that sunny June morning in 1912.  Prior to their generation’s rise to 
preeminence within the army, the Root Reforms themselves were only “the foundations of a 
structure yet to be raised.” 
The long cultural evolution that is at the heart of this narrative of army reform cannot be 
considered independently of the changes and evolutions that American society experienced in the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.  Practitioners of “new” military history have done 
much valuable work in the past several decades demonstrating that armies reflect the societies 
they serve.5  This dissertation shows that the pace at which armies adapt to broader social 
                                                          
5 A succinct historiography of field of military history and analysis of military historians’ adoption of social and 
cultural historical methods can be found in Wayne E. Lee, “Mind and Matter: Cultural Analysis in American 
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changes is considerably important.  In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the U.S. 
Army failed to keep pace with the shifting values, standards, and norms in training and education 
within American society.  At the same time, the army kept abreast of American society in 
changes to managerial and organizational theory and practice that emerged during the managerial 
revolution that was a hallmark of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era.  Falling behind in one key 
area provided the army with the means to resist reform, while keeping pace in another key area 
provided the impetus to complete reform.  Ultimately, the army’s interactions with and responses 
to broader social change had an indelible impact on the institution itself.  Understanding 
institutional reform in the army in this way offers valuable insights into the dynamics of change 
and reform in any national institution. 
***** 
Military reform in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was the product of 
evolving conceptions of professionalism and a redefinition of the role and purpose of the army.  
These, in turn, were heavily influenced by the closing of the frontier and the changing 
conceptions of the proper role of the United States in the world, Progressivism, and the 
managerial revolution.  Any examination of reform and institutional culture in the U.S. Army 
around the turn of the century must account for these trends and their impact upon institutional 
culture and military reform. 
The United States Census Bureau declared the frontier to be closed in 1890.  Scholars 
have since struggled to define the frontier and explain its effect on the United States.  Frederick 
Jackson Turner offered the first interpretation when he presented “The Significance of the 
                                                          
Military History, A Look at the State of the Field,” Journal of American History 93 (2007): 1116-1162.  He 
introduces “new” military history on p. 1117. 
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Frontier in American History” to the American Historical Association in 1893.  In what became 
the standard interpretation for nearly a century, Turner argued that the American frontier was a 
westward-moving place and a process that encouraged the development of American democracy, 
spurred individualism, and fostered egalitarianism.6   
The centennial of the Turner’s frontier thesis inspired intriguing rebuttals.  Some rejected 
the use of the term “frontier” altogether as a nationalist and racist construction that ignored the 
broader history of the region we now know as “the West.”7  Others, however continued to see 
value in considering frontiers along a somewhat Turnerian conception, while moving past 
Turner’s racialized and nationalistic bias.  Such scholars perceive the frontier to have been both 
place and process, emphasizing the effects that the experience of the frontier had on various 
cultures and sub-cultures in North America.8  This is the perspective from which this dissertation 
approaches the frontier, its “closing,” and its effects on the United States Army.  The frontier 
was both a place and a process that continued to affect the army’s institutional culture long after 
it ceased defining such a large part of the army’s mission and reason for being.   
As the United States consolidated its continental power, it became more active on the 
world stage.  Many scholars have concluded that an active and imperialist American foreign 
policy in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was the product of political, economic, 
and social ideologies that collectively formed both a rationale and a broad base of support for 
                                                          
6 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Henry Holt, 1920), ch. 1. 
7 See especially Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1987). 
8 Robert Hine and John Faragher have been at the forefront of this interpretation.  See Robert V. Hine and John M. 
Faragher, The American West: A New Interpretive History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000) and 
Robert V. Hine and John M. Faragher, Frontiers: A Short History of the American West (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2008). 
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expansionist policies.  Such policies shaped American interventions in Latin America and Asia 
from the War with Spain onward.9  Such a drastic increase in American activity abroad shaped 
Woodrow Wilson’s approach to foreign policy, conditioning him and the American people to 
believe that the United States could and should shape and lead a new world order.  This, in turn, 
heavily influenced both policy and public opinion on American involvement in the First World 
War.10 
Some scholars have asserted that imperialism was also the prime cause for military 
reform in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.11  Others, however, take a different 
view.  While denying that reform was intended solely for imperial expansion, they implicitly 
connect a more active foreign policy with early-twentieth century military reform by pointing to 
perceived threats by European powers and a rising Japan as principal motivations and 
inspirations for reform.12  Both of these interpretations fall somewhat short.  While the latter 
                                                          
9 See William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing 
Company, 1959); Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1963); Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of 
U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: 
Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).  Eric 
Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire: 1875-1914, reprint edition (New York: Vintage, 1989) provides an analysis that 
places economic motivations for imperialism within the context of multipolar efforts to export corporate capitalism 
on a global scale. 
10 On Wilson’s decision for war, see David F. Trask, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Lawrence, 
KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1993), 1-4; John Milton Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (New York: 
Vintage, 2009), 374-385 and Justus D. Doenecke, Nothing Less than War: A New History of America’s Entry into 
World War I (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2011).  For a new and compelling examination of the 
American public’s perception of its role in the world and in the war, see Michael S. Neiberg, The Path to War: How 
the First World War Created Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
11 Ronald J. Barr, The Progressive Army: U.S. Army Command and Administration, 1870-1914 (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998). 
12 James L. Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Great Military Power (New York: 
Free Press, 1981). 
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more accurately describes the principal cause of reform, the army’s experiences abroad had a 
substantive impact on the process of reform.   
Military reform was also heavily shaped by the reformist spirit of the Progressive Era.  
Responding largely to the consequences of urbanization and industrialization in the late-
nineteenth century, progressive reform swept the United States beginning in the 1890s.  Scholars 
have struggled to provide a coherent interpretation of the Progressive Era.  Major debates have 
arisen over whether Progressivism was a unitary movement or a pluralist movement, and from 
whence the impetus for reform sprang.  Recent scholarship has shown that Progressivism was 
either a singular, middle-class-based movement that advanced upon multiple, sometimes 
contradictory fronts, or a collection of multiple movements that drew strength from diverse and 
sometimes contradictory bases of support.13  Understanding the variable nature of Progressivism 
                                                          
13 The classic articulation of the unitary interpretation Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform:  From Bryan to 
F.D.R. (New York: Vintage, 1955), which contended that Progressivism was a singular movement driven by a 
middle class that felt threatened by a perceived loss of social status.  Pluralists began to push back against the 
unitary interpretation in Filene, Peter G. "An Obituary for ‘The Progressive Movement.’" American Quarterly 22 
(Spring 1970): 20-34 and Daniel T. Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism.”  Reviews in American History 10, no. 4 
(December 1982), 113-132, questioning the value of Progressivism as a concept when there were so many 
progressive movements.  While Filene questioned the utility of the term “progressive” Rodgers categorized three 
distinct strains of Progressivism: antimonopolism, the rise of social cohesion over individualism, and social 
efficiency.  The pluralist interpretation gained significant traction, receiving articulate support in Arthur S. Link and 
Richard L. McCormick, Progressivism (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1983) and John Whiteclay Chambers II, 
The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920, second edition (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2000).  The first edition of the latter appeared as The Tyranny of Change: America in the 
Progressive Era, 1900-1917 in 1980.  Chambers argues that “new interventionism” may be a more useful construct 
than Progressivism because “‘modernization’ resulted not only from the actions of people who called themselves 
progressives but also from initiatives taken by other groups, including many radicals, nonprogressive reformers, and 
advocates of conservative reforms.”  Continuing, he states that “all were willing to intervene in the economy and 
society, and sometimes world affairs, on an unprecedented scale.”  See Chambers, 136.  The pluralist challenge 
advanced, but did not completely resolve the debate.  Michael McGerr recently offered a strong case for the unitary 
interpretation of a middle-class based Progressivism, but his interpretation allows for a more idealistic and 
humanistic middle class than Hofstadters, and identifies “four quintessential progressive battles: to change other 
people; to end class conflict; to control big business; and to segregate society.”  See Michael McGerr, A Fierce 
Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870 - 1920 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), xv.  In contrast, a strongly-articulated recent argument for the pluralist interpretation asserts that 
McGerr’s conception of “progressive battles” is incorrect.  Instead, it contends that there were four main 
Progressivisms:  political, economic, social justice, and foreign policy, and that these Progressivisms occasionally 
contradicted each other, but did not necessarily operate to the exclusion of one another.  See Maureen A. Flanagan, 
America Reformed:  Progressives and Progressivisms, 1890s-1920s (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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is vitally important to understanding military reform during the Progressive Era.  It 
contextualizes why military officers accepted and boldly pushed for some aspects of reform, and 
conservatively resisted others.  It explains why some historians have pointed to Progressivism as 
the causal factor for military reform, but have come to vastly different conclusions about the 
military reformers’ desired ends.14  Most importantly, it helps explain how a national institution 
could impose structural reforms upon itself while fostering an institutional culture at odds with 
its new structures.    
The army’s culture and structures were both dramatically influenced by the managerial 
revolution during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.  The concept of the 
managerial revolution has been promulgated by historians whose work frames the 
“organizational synthesis.”  This refers to an interpretation of the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries as the general point of transition between a time when local and informal 
groups were central to American life and a new age in which such groups were supplanted by 
much larger, formal, and bureaucratically-structured organizations.  According to this 
interpretation, efforts to systematically bureaucratize political, economic, and entrepreneurial 
systems of management constituted a logical adaptation in response to the problems of mass 
industrialization and urbanization.15  
 A landmark work of this school of thought is Alfred D. Chandler’s The Visible Hand: 
The Managerial Revolution in American Business, published in 1977.  Chandler traces the 
                                                          
14 A thesis that presents reform as a means of acquiring an overseas empire is outlined in Barr, The Progressive 
Army versus a thesis that contends reform was a means of balancing against perceived threats from Europe and 
Japan in Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century. 
15 Louis Galambos, “The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History,” The Business History 
Review 44, no. 3 (Autumn 1970), 279-290. 
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evolution of small, local firms to large national corporations throughout the nineteenth century 
and into the twentieth.  He focuses especially on the railroads, which made the transition the 
earliest and affected developments in industries that produced or traded in goods related to the 
railroads by the last few decades of the nineteenth century.  These organizations ballooned so 
rapidly that they were forced to become pioneers in finding new ways to manage their operations 
efficiently.  Through trial and error, these corporations self-organized, creating a distinct and 
conscious class of managers—technical experts in their own fields with their own hierarchies, 
whose motivations and methods differentiated them from both owners and workers.  The 
managers grew more powerful, eventually becoming “the most influential group of economic 
decision makers” within firms constituting a managerial enterprise that was in turn becoming 
“the most powerful institution in the American economy.”16 
 The significance of Chandler’s thesis is twofold.  First, it identifies a specific application 
of concepts of what was then referred to as “scientific management” of people and resources that 
became widely popular in the late nineteenth century and were applied with increasing regularity 
to social problems outside of the business community.  Such informed the military’s approach to 
reform and shaped the new institutional structures it created.  Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, the transmission of managerial enterprise from the railroads to other business 
sectors that Chandler depicts arguably marks the point where American society began to accept 
modern conceptions of professional expertise and specialization based on rigorous training and 
education.  By the end of the nineteenth century, closely paralleling the rise of managerial 
                                                          
16 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. The Visible Hand:  The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA:  
Belknap Press, 1977).  Quotations from page 1. 
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enterprise that Chandler depicts, many occupations were adapting to this new conception of 
professionalism, including medicine, law, education, journalism, and social work.17   
Shifting from a conception of professionalism based on personal identification and self-
study to one based on expertise and specialization grounded in formal training and education, 
American views on the value and purpose of education underwent a profound change.  For most 
of the nineteenth century, education was considered as Horace Mann had argued it should be:  
widely accessible and intended not only to disseminate knowledge, but also to produce 
upstanding and moral citizens.  As the economy expanded late in the century, that view of 
education was attacked on several fronts.  An unlikely alliance of interest groups advocated for 
and influenced significant reform in American education.  Where traditionalists continued to 
believe that the moral effect and mental discipline derived from education was more important 
and lasting than the knowledge imparted by education, reformers came to value more highly the 
transmission of knowledge itself.18 
Scholars continue to debate the root cause of education reform in this period, pointing 
alternatively to businesses interested in producing both managers conversant in the latest theories 
of scientific management and efficient vocationally-trained workers, progressives who advocated 
for reform as a means of improving the condition of the lower class, and progressives who 
viewed education reform as a means of “Americanizing” newly arrived immigrants.19  
                                                          
17 McGerr, 128-129, Wiebe 113-127, and Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 
1890-1916 (New York:  Cambridge Univesity Press, 1988), 431-432; Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of 
American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry (New York: Basic 
Books, 1982), ch. 3. 
18 David B. Tyack, Turning Points in American Educational History (Waltham, MA: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 
1967), 121-180; Laurence Veysey, The Emergence of the American University (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982), chapters 1-4. 
19 For the business interest interpretation, see W. Norton Grubb and Marvin Lazerson, “Education and the Labor 
Market: Recycling the Youth Problem,” in Work, Youth, and Schooling: Historical Perspectives on Vocationalism in 
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Regardless of its origins, educational reform in this period introduced within American society 
new curricula, new systems of pedagogy, and a sense that education could be simultaneously 
practical and intellectually rigorous.  In this respect, society outpaced the army, whose views on 
education remained stubbornly traditional, despite the efforts of some forward-thinking 
reformers.  Falling behind in this respect profoundly affected the course of military reform. 
The closing of the frontier and the concurrent loss of the army’s frontier mission, the 
development of new conceptions of the proper role of the United States in the world, the 
emergence of Progressivism, the managerial revolution, and advances in the practice and theory 
of education influenced both the army’s institutional culture and the course military reform in the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.  Many then and since characterized military reform 
as a process of professionalization.  In order to fully examine military reform, then, it is 
necessary to consider conceptions of professions and professionalism within the context of the 
U.S. Army in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. 
***** 
Historians of the U.S. Army have long debated when, how, and why the army became a 
legitimate, autonomous profession.  The traditional interpretation that long dominated the field 
holds that it was not a profession until reforms in the early twentieth century established a 
general staff capable of crafting and coordinating war plans and created a formally 
institutionalized system of training and education to produce competent, well-trained officers 
capable of leading at the most senior levels of the army.  Adherents of this school of thought 
                                                          
American Education, ed. Harvey Kantor and David Tyack (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 110-
141.  For the social justice interpretation, see Lawrence Cremin, The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in 
American Education, 1876-1951 (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1961).  For the Americanization interpretation, see 
Tyack, as well as Patricia Albjerg Graham, Schooling in America: How the Public Schools Meet the Nation’s 
Changing Needs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), ch. 1. 
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have referred to the last decades of the nineteenth century as a “Military Renaissance” in which a 
small body of far-sighted reformers emerged to initiate a period of professionalization.  
According to this interpretation, the army began to move out of its pre-professional dark ages 
with individual initiatives that collectively helped set conditions for transformational reforms 
during Elihu Root’s tenure as Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904.  The career officer and 
sometime historian William A. Ganoe first formulated this thesis in The History of the United 
States Army (1924).  Ganoe’s interpretation was subsequently ratified three decades later by 
historian Walter Millis in his examination of the evolution of U.S. military policy since the 
American Revolution, Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History (1956).20 
One year after Millis’s work was published, Samuel Huntington’s widely influential The 
Soldier and the State (1957) codified the military renaissance thesis as accepted wisdom.  
Huntington, a political scientist, theorizes that the essential elements of professionalism are a 
corporate identity, a sense of responsibility, and expertise—and that expertise is best developed, 
refined, and exercised in a distinct military sphere that is relatively isolated from society and 
subject to minimal interference from civil government.  He places the beginning of the army’s 
professionalization in the late-nineteenth century.  Huntington believed the army’s frontier 
mission provided the physical and psychological isolation necessary to allow officers to 
construct a distinct body of expertise and a military sphere with which they personally identified 
at a time when American society was becoming increasingly conditioned to accept occupational 
                                                          
20 William A. Ganoe, The History of the United States Army (New York: Appleton, 1924), 355-418; and Walter 
Millis, Arms and Men: a Study in American Military History (New Brunswick, NJ:  Rutgers University Press, 1986), 
131-210.  Arms and Men was originally published in 1956. 
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specialization and expertise.  This set off a period of change culminating with the Root reforms, 
which Huntington interprets as “the creation of the American military profession.”21 
 Military historian Russell F. Weigley offered the first notable modification of this 
interpretation in 1967 in The History of the United States Army.  While he supports the notion 
that reforms of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries represented a military 
renaissance of sorts, Weigley places the origins of the American military profession in the period 
between the years 1820 and 1840.  Framing military professionalism rather narrowly as expertise 
derived from the study of history, strategy, and certain fundamental principles of warfare, 
Weigley argues that it originated in Europe in response to the increasing complexity of warfare 
wrought by the development of massive citizen armies during the Napoleonic wars.  This nascent 
military professionalism was then transmitted to the army when officials at the U.S. Military 
Academy imported Prussian theories and French practices to reform the curriculum at West 
Point.   
Weigley contends that although this military professionalism spread throughout the 
antebellum army in the form of professional journals and the periodic formation of short-lived 
technical schools, the immediate effect of military professionalism was blunted by social trends 
in Jacksonian America that resisted occupational specialty, mistrusted professional autonomy, 
and restrained professional consolidation.  He contends that the professionalization of the 
military served to further isolate it from society, providing the psychological isolation that he 
                                                          
21 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 7-18 and 222-269.  “The Creation of the American Military Profession” is the title of 
chapter 9. 
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perceives to be a condition that helped spawn a late-nineteenth century military renaissance.22  
By portraying professional reform as something that can only take place in isolation, Weigley 
sustains a significant and highly problematic component of Huntington’s argument. 
The notable difference in this case, however, is that Weigley’s conception of the military 
renaissance marks not the origin of the American military profession, but the rebirth and 
reapplication of older ideas of how to make the army and its officers more expert in the theory 
and practice of warfare.  Like Huntington, Weigley points to a society better conditioned by 
Progressivism to accept occupational specialization and professional autonomy as an explanatory 
factor of why the reforms of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries had a more lasting 
effect.  Unlike Huntington, he points to the emergence of the United States as a global power in 
the wake of the War with Spain, and the nearly disastrous mobilization for that war, as equally 
significant factors.23   
Weigley’s interpretation of these reforms as a new application of an old conception of 
professionalism, rather than as the generating source of professionalism, sets up his other major 
departure from Huntington and previous formulations of the military renaissance thesis.  He 
argues that the Root Reforms were incomplete, and that their only unqualified success was the 
establishment of an effective institutional system of military education for its officers.  
According to Weigley, the other major development of Root’s tenure, the General Staff, was 
hampered by internal resistance within some quarters of the army, Congressional resistance, and 
an improvisational nature rooted in the fact that none of the officers appointed to the new body 
                                                          
22 Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, Enlarged edition (Bloomington, IN:  Indiana University 
Press, 1984), 144-172 and 265-294. 
23 Weigley, History of the United States Army, 299-312 
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had any experience in or knowledge of general staff functions and operations.  He suggests that 
this resistance prolonged the processes of change.  Unfortunately, Weigley was satisfied with 
having blurred to some extent the bold line that his predecessors had drawn to categorically 
separate the old and the new army.  He did not probe the nature of resistance to the General 
Staff.24   
Weigley’s interpretation was not immediately popular among military historians.  
Timothy K. Nenninger’s groundbreaking examination on military education in the turn-of-the-
century army acknowledges that the roots of military professionalism took hold between the War 
of 1812 and the Civil War, but argues that “with the exception of the service academies, all the 
permanent characteristics that identify the American military as a profession originated in the 
years between the Civil War and the First World War.”25  Around the same time, Edward M. 
Coffman began work on his seminal two-volume social history of the army, tellingly titled The 
Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (1986) and The Regulars: 
The American Army, 1898-1941 (2004).  In these works, Coffman stakes out the position that 
while its seeds were planted early in the nineteenth century, American military professionalism 
truly began to develop in the late-nineteenth century.  He argues that Elihu Root harnessed the 
ideas and initiatives of late-nineteenth century reformers and lessons learned from the War with 
                                                          
24 Weigley, 313-341 
25 Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army:  Education, Professionalism, and the Officer 
Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918  (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1978), 6-7.  The quotation is on 
page 7. 
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Spain, and packaged them into an effective program of reform that fundamentally transformed 
the army.  “Elihu Root,” he concludes, “fixed the course for the twentieth century.”26   
This reflected what was at that time generally accepted wisdom.  Most scholars continued 
to interpret reform in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries as the beginning of 
military professionalism in the U.S. Army.  Much of the debate then shifted away from questions 
about timing and toward questions about motivations for professionalization.  Peter Karsten 
argued that professional reform in the army, like reform in the navy, sprang from self-interested 
and ambitious junior officers rebelling against the lack of opportunity and upward mobility in the 
peacetime military.27  Unconvinced, James Abrahamson pointed instead to military threats 
perceived by the officer corps.  He argued that army officers shaped their agendas of reform in 
order to more effectively balance against the military capabilities of potentially hostile foreign 
powers.28  Later, Ronald J. Barr posited that professionalization was a tool of expansionist-
minded officers and politicians eager to build a military better suited for an imperialist agenda.29  
Although these three points of view are strikingly different, they all spring from the common 
assumption that the period of reform in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was 
fundamentally transformational, bringing the army into a new professional age. 
The ground has begun to shift in the last three decades.  Military historians have seized 
upon implications of two aspects of Weigley’s interpretation to carry the point further and mount 
                                                          
26 Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army:  A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1986); and Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004).  The quotation is from Coffman, The Regulars, 415.  
27 Peter Karsten, “Armed Progressives: The Military Reorganizes for the American Century,” in Building the 
Organizational Society: Essays on Associational Activities in Modern America, ed. Jerry Israel (New York: Free 
Press, 1972), 197-232. 
28 Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century. 
29 Barr, The Progressive Army. 
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a more direct challenge to the military renaissance thesis.  One of these pushes beyond Weigley’s 
suggestion that the Root Reforms were incomplete and questions whether they had any real 
impact on military thought and practice.  The other focuses upon Weigley’s antebellum 
periodization of American military professionalism, suggesting that other interpretations have 
unfairly analyzed past degrees of professionalism according to modern standards. 
 Those who have recently questioned the significance of turn-of-the-century reform base 
their conclusions on an apparent consistency and continuity in military thought and practice 
within the army in the decades preceding the First World War.  In Modernizing the American 
War Department: Change and Continuity in a Turbulent Era, 1885-1920 (2006), Daniel R. 
Beaver argues that despite radical changes in structures and technology, there was more 
continuity than change in the functional behavior of the various parts of the War Department 
throughout the period of reform.  In defense of the conduct of the administrative bureaus of the 
War Department during the War with Spain and prior to 1917, he suggests that human nature is 
inclined to resist change, and that altering ingrained behavior would naturally be more gradual 
and incremental than adopting new technology and reshaping organizational structures.30   
One year later, Brian Linn published The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War, which 
argued that there has been a significant degree of continuity in military thought throughout U.S. 
history.  Linn argues that American military thought has always been defined by the interplay of 
three dominant schools of strategic thought: “Heroes,” who typically form aggressive, offensive 
strategies and emphasize the human element in war; “Guardians,” who prefer defensive 
strategies that rely upon the effective use of technology; and “Managers,” who perceive efficient 
                                                          
30 Daniel R. Beaver, Modernizing the American War Department: Change and Continuity in a Turbulent Era, 1885-
1920 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006). 
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organization and utilization of resources to be the key to victory.  With this framework, Linn 
interprets reform in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries not as a function of 
professionalization, but as the result of a temporary rise of the “Managers” to institutional 
preeminence in the continuous ebb and flow of competition and collaboration between the three 
archetypes.31  
While at times guilty of overgeneralization, both Beaver and Linn have made a 
significant contribution to the debate about reform and professionalization in the army by 
emphasizing a point that has for too long been ignored.32  They rightly call attention to the 
human element of institutional reform. Patterns of thought and behavior which have existed long 
enough to become habit do not change as quickly or as easily as organizational and institutional 
structures, which can be created, destroyed, or altered in only the amount of time it takes to write 
and sign the necessary orders. 
Another notable recent challenge to the military renaissance thesis comes from three 
authors who argue persuasively that American military professionalism originated in the 
antebellum period.  William B. Skelton’s An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer 
Corps, 1784-1861 (1993) stakes the claim that although it lacked robust educational and 
developmental systems and institutions beyond the United States Military Academy at West 
Point, the army of the nineteenth century had important professional features.  The most 
important of these, which Skelton regards as the key to military professionalism at that time, was 
                                                          
31 Brian M. Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).  
Late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century reform is covered in pages 93-115. 
32 Linn is forced to argue in very general terms to assert intellectual continuity over more than two centuries of 
military experience.  Beaver, on the other hand, speaks in general terms when presenting his conception of the 
collective motivations of a number of senior leaders of the administrative bureaus known for their resistance to 
reform. 
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a stable officer corps that deeply identified with the army and was committed to lengthy careers 
of military service.33  In his 1998 Journal of Military History article, Mark R. Grandstaff agrees 
that professionalism had been fully established in the antebellum army, but makes the important 
observation that the Civil War had so completely altered the demographics of the officer corps 
that subsequent professional reform had different stimuli, motivations, and characteristics, and 
should therefore be regarded as a second phase in professionalization.34  Most recently, Samuel 
J. Watson’s sweeping two-volume study of the army’s officer corps between the War of 1812 
and the Mexican War reaffirms the origins of the American military profession in the antebellum 
period after 1820, but differs from Skelton by centering it on the development of a collective 
sense of responsibility and subordination to civil government among a stable, cohesive, and 
expert officer corps.35 
Collectively, these three authors call attention to the dangers inherent in using modern 
conceptions and definitions of professionalism to evaluate degrees of professionalism in the past.  
Watson makes the case most strongly and succinctly when he states, “Like most complex human 
phenomena, professionalism is a shifting, relative, constructed phenomenon, not an 
unconditional or permanent one.”36  This position is strongly supported by scholars who have 
identified forms of military professionalism rooted in personal identity and self-study as early as 
the late-eighteenth century that parallel similarly-framed and similarly-dated forms of 
                                                          
33 William B. Skelton, An American Profession of Arms: the Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861 (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 1992). 
34 Mark R. Grandstaff, “Preserving the ‘Habits and Usages of War’: William Tecumseh Sherman, Professional 
Reform, and the U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1865-1881, Revisited,” Journal of Military History 62 (July 1998): 521-
545. 
35 Samuel J. Watson, Jackson’s Sword: The Army Officer Corps on the American Frontier, 1810-1821 (Lawrence, 
KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012); and Samuel J. Watson, Peacekeepers and Conquerors: The Army Officer 
Corps on the American Frontier, 1821-1846 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2013). 
36 Watson, Jackson’s Sword, 11. 
 
21 
 
professionalism identified by sociologists who have studied the development of civilian 
professions within American society.37  Such work persuasively demonstrates that 
professionalism is a social and cultural construction. 
Most recently, J.P. Clark has made an invaluable contribution to this debate with 
Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815-1917 (2017).  He examines 
shifting conceptions of purpose, practice, and professionalism in the army by tracing a century’s 
worth of arguments about how best to prepare for war within four successive generations of 
army officers.  He labels these as the foundational, Civil War, composite, and progressive 
generations, and defines them by the consensus they each arrive at about war preparation and 
military professionalism.  There is much to be commended in this approach.  Clark’s 
generational model moves beyond demonstrating that military professionalism is a social and 
cultural construction and shows how the construction itself changed incrementally from one 
generation to the next.38   
Because professionalism is a social and cultural construction that—like society and 
culture themselves—is subject to generational adjustment, it is impossible to understand 
professional reform in the army during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries without 
understanding how military officers perceived professionalism, professional competence, and 
reform.  Such perceptions were at the bedrock of the army’s institutional culture.  This 
                                                          
37 See Ira D. Gruber, Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC:  
University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 3-64; Don Higginbotham, George Washington and the American Military 
Tradition (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1984); and Starr, 30-78. 
38 J.P. Clark, Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815-1917 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2017).  At the same time, such a model risks placing too much emphasis on generational transition 
as the most important impetus for cultural change.  Generational transition alone does not guarantee cultural change; 
other factors must be considered as well.  As will be shown in this study, external shock is at least as significant an 
impetus for cultural change as generational transition. 
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dissertation examines the relationship between military reform and the army’s institutional 
culture through the lens of an officer’s career that spanned nearly the entire period of reform. 
George W. Goethals provides a unique vantage point to examine reform in the army.  He 
was a lieutenant and a captain during the post-Reconstruction years of debate about reform and 
the future of the army.  He was a major when the most significant reforms were created, and 
helped with their implementation.  As a major general during the First World War, he crafted and 
implemented a significant part of the army’s adaptation to resolve crises in the mobilization 
effort caused largely by years of internal resistance to reform.  Following Goethals’s career and 
analyzing reform from his perspective will continue to shift the focus away from the intent 
behind reform and toward the effects of the interaction between society, reform, and institutional 
culture.    
***** 
Surprisingly little has been written about Goethals.  Joseph Bucklin Bishop and his son 
Farnham wrote the only published book-length biography of George W. Goethals between 1928 
and 1930.  The elder Bishop, a journalist by trade, served under Goethals in Panama as the 
secretary to the Isthmian Canal Commission.  Originally placed on the commission as President 
Theodore Roosevelt’s personal spy, he quickly came to respect and admire Goethals, becoming 
one of his most steadfast and vocal supporters.  Bishop began working on this biography when 
Goethals passed away in 1928, but died soon thereafter.  His son, also a journalist, managed to 
complete the manuscript and send it to his publisher only weeks before his own untimely death.  
While a monument to loyal friendship, this work is far from an impartial scholarly appraisal of a 
significant life.   Intended to praise a recently departed friend, it is at times polemical and 
hagiographical.  Written so soon after its subject’s passing, Goethals: Genius of the Panama 
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Canal (1930) is in many instances inaccurate.  It records as fact the hearsay and legend that 
surrounded a relatively famous figure.  As its title suggests, this book is most concerned with 
Goethals at Panama and generally pays only cursory attention to other periods in Goethals’s 
life.39   
Whether out of fear of meeting the same sad fate as the Bishops or not, no scholar has 
attempted a full biographical study of Goethals.  Walt Griffin came the closest in a Ph.D 
dissertation completed in 1988.  This is a work of admirable scholarship in which Griffin 
interprets Goethals’s managerial philosophy as being founded upon a generally constant effort to 
centralize executive power under one responsible person at the top of a rationalized 
organizational hierarchy.  As its title implies, however, Griffin’s dissertation analyzes Goethals 
almost entirely in the context of the Panama Canal.  Other parts of Goethals’s life appear briefly, 
only as a factual prelude and postscript to his years leading the effort to construct the Panama 
Canal.  Griffin makes little effort to discern how Goethals developed this managerial ethic, or to 
examine the broader implications of Goethals’s career beyond the years he spent at the Panama 
Canal.40  Phyllis A. Zimmerman also produced a monograph on George W. Goethals’s service 
during the First World War.  While her research is notable, her conclusions demand modification 
as she misinterprets and undervalues the long-term impact of Goethals’s work within the War 
Department.41 
                                                          
39 Joseph Bucklin Bishop and Farnham Bishop, Goethals: Genius of the Panama Canal (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1930). 
40 Walt Griffin, “George W. Goethals and the Panama Canal,” (PhD diss., University of Cincinnati, 1988). 
41 Phyllis A. Zimmerman, The Neck of the Bottle: George W. Goethals and the Reorganization of the U.S. Army 
Supply System, 1917-1918 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1992). 
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This dissertation uses the biography of George W. Goethals as a method of examining the 
broader problem of the relationship between the course of reform and the army’s institutional 
culture.  Such an approach follows the example of Drew Gilpin Faust, whose James Henry 
Hammond and the Old South: A Design for Mastery (1982) amply demonstrates that a close 
study of a representative individual can shed considerable light on the social and cultural 
dynamics of a larger group.  Although specific events and biographical details are unique to 
Hammond’s life experience, Faust demonstrates that his general patterns of behavior, 
relationship with his slaves, and political philosophies reveal as much about South Carolina’s 
antebellum planter class as they do about Hammond himself.42  Goethals’s experiences, military 
thought, managerial philosophy, conceptions of professionalism, and attitudes about training and 
development are similarly applicable on both individual and collective levels.  Where Goethals’s 
experiences and attitudes can be applied on the collective level, they frame the army’s 
institutional culture and reveal his generation’s relative ambivalence about reform.  
Institutional culture is central to this dissertation’s entry into the debate about army 
reform during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.  Institutional culture is the 
“habitual practices, default programs, hidden assumptions, and unreflected cognitive frames” 
that constitute a “repertoire . . . of habits, skills, and styles” which serve to inform decisions and 
behavior of and within an organization established for political or social purposes.  It is 
influenced by the broader culture of the society the institution serves, and is transmittable within 
                                                          
42 Drew Gilpin Faust, James Henry Hammond and the Old South: A Design for Mastery (Baton Rouge, LA: 
Louisiana University Press, 1982).  For a similarly exemplary work, see Thomas Alexander Hughes, Over Lord: 
General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II (New York: Free Press, 1995), 
which effectively uses Quesada’s biography to trace the evolution of close air support and air-ground integration 
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25 
 
the institution from generation to generation through socialization, indoctrination, teaching, 
imitation, actions, and symbols.43  While it is subject to evolution over time, the pace of change 
tends to be relatively slow because cultural change necessarily involves questioning and 
adjusting established habits and traditions, a process which invites resistance.44 
 This dissertation examines the institutional culture of the U.S. Army from the perspective 
of George W. Goethals’s generation of officers.  In general, these officers entered the army 
between 1870 and 1890, and their careers spanned the vast majority of the period of reform from 
the last decades of the nineteenth century until the close of the First World War.  This generation 
bridged the gap between the old army, organized to function as a frontier constabulary and 
coastal defense force, and the modern army, organized for expeditionary warfare in the twentieth 
century.  Yet change did not happen in a vacuum.  The generation that built the bridge between 
the old army and the new as the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth did so with familiar 
tools and materials.  Those who implemented the new reforms did so in terms of old concepts 
that they knew well and still believed to be sound, generally consistent with the prevailing 
institutional culture.  This profoundly affected the course of reform.45 
                                                          
43 This definition is derived from Wayne E. Lee, “Warfare and Culture,” in Warfare and Culture in World History, 
ed. Wayne E. Lee (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 3; and Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: 
Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 2.  
The first quotation appears in both; the second is taken from the former. 
44 This is drawn from Mark Grimsley, “Success and Failure in Civil War Armies: Clues from Organizational 
Culture,” in Warfare and Culture in World History, ed. Wayne E. Lee (New York: New York University Press, 
2011), 115-141.  Grimsley suggests that the habits and traditions of organizational culture prevented commanders 
who inherited previously existing field armies, with the exception of Robert E. Lee, were consistently unable to 
influence their commands’ character and culture as fully and as quickly as they intended.  See especially pages 122-
134.  Although Grimsley deals with organizational culture of field armies—large parts of a larger whole—his ideas 
are equally valid at the institutional level. 
45 This view of Goethals’s generation complements J.P. Clark’s interpretation of what he labels the “composite 
generation.”  See Clark, Preparing for War, 7-8. 
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 Analyzing institutional culture and the course of reform from the perspective of Goethals 
and his generation of officers is an adaptation of the “history from the middle” as advocated by 
Paul Kennedy.  Kennedy argues that the traditional practice of writing military history from the 
top-level perspective of commanding generals and statesmen and more recent trends of analyzing 
military history from the bottom, focusing on the experience of soldiering and combat, are 
valuable but provide incomplete perspectives.  He holds that analyses of causality and change 
must account for the existence and identification of a problem, the creation or discovery of a 
solution, and the application of the solution.  The latter two, according to Kennedy, are the most 
critical aspects to narratives of causality and change.  Because the creation or discovery of a 
solution and its subsequent application usually fall within the purview of individuals at neither 
the highest nor the lowest ends of military hierarchies, they often cannot be adequately addressed 
in top-down or bottom-up analyses.  Kennedy urges historians who encounter problems with 
noticeable gaps when analyzed from the top and from the bottom to change course and approach 
from the middle.46 
 Kennedy’s model has its share of limitations.  The most glaring is that its applicability 
depends on the existence of an empowered “middle.”  Typically, military historians consider 
general officers to constitute the top, and everyone else to constitute the bottom.  This is the case 
because traditionally, general officers make the plans and policies and everyone else executes the 
plans and adheres to the policies.  This began to shift in the late-nineteenth century when 
industrialized warfare became complex enough to require sizable planning and coordinating 
                                                          
46 Paul Kennedy, “History from the Middle: The Case of the Second World War,” Journal of Military History 74 
(January 2010): 35-51.  This article provides the theoretical model and a single demonstrative case study.  The full 
use of the model is better demonstrated in Paul Kennedy, Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned 
the Tide in the Second World War (New York: Random House, 2013). 
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bodies within military organizations.  As militaries recognized this need and adapted 
accordingly, they created bodies of mid-level officers responsible for developing and shaping 
plans and policies to a significant degree.  Thus was born an empowered “middle,” defined not 
only by rank, but also by function.  Consequently, Kennedy’s model appears to be suitable only 
for problems in military history situated during and after this development. 
Army reform in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries is a problem whose 
chronological and analytical difficulties point to the utility of a from-the-middle approach.  
Scholarship calling attention to functional continuity within the War Department in spite of 
reformist policies suggests that there are unresolved analytical gaps in top-down histories from 
the perspectives of both leading reformers and also leading sources of resistance to reform.  The 
view from the bottom in this case is irrelevant.  Enlisted soldiers in this period had no voice in 
how the army was organized and run, and had no part in the most significant reforms of the 
period. 
To advance the debate, the problem must be approached from the middle as it existed at 
the turn of the century—from the perspective of officers who did not decide upon creating the 
General Staff or formal systems of education and development, but were nevertheless ordered to 
help design and implement such reforms.  Goethals’s generation of officers who entered the 
army between 1870 and 1890 is the appropriate focus of a from-the-middle analysis of army 
reform.  These officers were, for the most part, the captains and majors who manned the first 
General Staff and graduated with the earliest classes of the Army War College.  In effect, they 
were the engineers who built the machines of reform after receiving the necessary orders and 
guidance from their superiors.  
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Their responses to this process and the attitudes they developed about these new 
institutional structures were critically important.  These officers continued to shape the course of 
reform as they advanced to higher positions within the army’s hierarchy.  The captains and 
majors of the early 1900s eventually became the generals of 1917-1918 who were responsible for 
charting the course of both the war effort and the still-evolving army.  The attitudes that these 
officers developed as captains and majors informed their decisions as generals.  At the end of the 
narrative, then, this turns into history from the top.  This is a hybrid approach that recognizes the 
natural feedback loop within institutions that produce their own leaders.  Once at the top, these 
leaders did not make decisions in a vacuum.  Their decisions were informed to a significant 
degree by experiences and observations from their rise through the ranks.  This adaptation of 
history from the middle is particularly well suited for studying change over a long period of time 
within institution like the U.S. Army that promote from within. 
Biography lends itself to this type of analysis, offering entire careers for examination.  
However, collective biography is ill-suited for the task.  Probing not only the effects of 
institutional culture on officers’ values, practices, and perceptions; but also the effects of 
officers’ values, practices, and perceptions on the shape and course of reform requires intimate 
detail.  While a collective biography would add breadth to the analysis, it would sacrifice much 
in detail.  The more effective approach in this case would be to trade breadth for detail—to 
identify a representative officer from the generation that entered the army between 1870 and 
1890, and study that individual’s career in order to discern the relationship between institutional 
culture and the course of reform.  The key is to find a legitimately representative officer. 
 George W. Goethals is the ideal representative officer of his generation.  Having entered 
the army earlier than most of the significant reform initiatives were enacted, and having left it 
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immediately after the First World War, he experienced the entire trajectory of institutional 
reform in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.  During the period of reform, 
Goethals interacted extensively with both sides of what is now generally interpreted to represent 
the ideological divide over the merits of reform:  the General Staff and the traditional 
administrative bureaus within the War Department.47  In different stages of his career, Goethals 
held assignments in two of the traditional bureaus and the first General Staff, and was assigned 
to the Army War College at its inception.  Most significantly, he never had a readily discernible 
ideological agenda.  Prior to World War I, he had been neither an advocate for nor a denigrator 
of reform.  On the question of reform, Goethals represents the uncommitted center in his 
generation of officers and provides an opportunity to glimpse the interactions of institutional 
culture and reform generally free from ideological burdens.  This is a quality noticeably lacking 
in works that approach reform from the perspectives of leading reformers and in works that rely 
heavily upon the perspectives of leading anti-reformist partisans.48   
Because he was an engineer, some will object to the notion that Goethals can be 
considered a representative officer of his generation.  Compared to the rest of the army, the 
Corps of Engineers was a relatively small and highly technical branch.  The frequent interactions 
with civilians that were part and parcel of its civil engineering projects had the potential to 
produce a unique subculture of engineer officers isolated from the army’s broader institutional 
                                                          
47 Goethals’s assignments and relationships on both sides of this divide will be detailed in chapters 3, 4, 6, and 7 of 
the dissertation.  On tensions between the General Staff and the administrative bureaus, see James E. Hewes, Jr., 
From Root to McNamara, Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center 
of Military History, 1975), 10-50; and Otto Nelson, Jr., National Security and the General Staff (Washington, DC: 
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Soldier’s Story (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006) and T.R. Brereton, Educating the U.S. Army: 
Arthur L. Wagner and Reform, 1875-1905 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000).  The best example of 
the latter is Daniel R. Beaver, Modernizing the American War Department: Change and Continuity in a Turbulent 
Era, 1885-1920 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006). 
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culture.  At first glance, some of Goethals’s experiences seem to reinforce this view.  When the 
class of 1880 graduated from West Point, Goethals was one of only two who were assigned to 
the Corps of Engineers.49  Later in life, he would complain that during his service in the Corps of 
Engineers, some non-engineer colleagues believed that he “was not considered as belonging to 
the army, being then dubbed a ‘mud digger.’”50  But one should neither jump to conclusions 
based on a simple reading of numbers, nor allow of intra-service branch parochialism to mask 
the larger picture.   
It is true that the Corps of Engineers was smaller and more technical than branches of the 
line—infantry, cavalry, and artillery.  But for Goethals and his fellow engineers, similar to their 
colleagues in the line, small amounts of training and a more significant interplay of skill, 
personal connections, and chance defined their career trajectories.  In fact, the only major 
difference in this regard was that line officers were subject to even less formal training and 
interaction with institutional systems than engineer officers, who received such little formal 
training that they considered it to be an insignificant component of their lives as army officers.  
Despite the more technical nature of engineering, institutional systems and structures affected the 
careers of engineers and line officers to comparable degrees.51   
Furthermore, the civil aspects of the mission of the Corps of Engineers did not isolate its 
officers from the mainstream institutional culture.  Engineers like Goethals still weighed in on 
                                                          
49 U.S. Department of War, Annual Reports of the War Department, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., 1880, House Executive 
Document 2, vol. II, Part 1 (Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office, 1880), 1. 
50 George W. Goethals to George H. Morgan, February 6, 1925, Folder 40, George W. Goethals Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 
51 This is a point that will receive significant elaboration in chapters 1-4 of the dissertation.  For a good example of 
the development of a highly successful line officer of Goethals’s generation, see Edward M. Coffman, The Hilt of 
the Sword: The Career of Peyton C. March (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 1-51. 
 
31 
 
the army’s professional debates and reforms of the day, mixed well with their colleagues from 
the line during war and when assigned to continental departments during peacetime, and were 
integrated into both the General Staff and the newly-institutionalized military education system 
after the Root reforms were implemented in 1903.  This preserved not only their identity as army 
officers, but also their acceptance within the larger community of army officers.  As one of 
Goethals’s friends and colleagues remembered shortly after his death about Goethals’s 
relationship with his West Point classmates, “throughout his life he was their leader and the 
center about which the members of the class gathered whenever they held a reunion.”52  After a 
lifetime of service as an artillery officer, division and corps commander, and Chief of Staff of the 
U.S. Army, Major General Charles P. Summerall put it most succinctly when he said, “General 
Goethals was one of the great army figures of our day.”53   
Goethals’s contemporaries certainly did not disqualify him as a representative officer of 
his generation simply because he was an engineer.  Neither should historians.  A thorough 
examination of the course of Goethals’s life and career reveals broadly applicable lessons that 
will advance the scholarly debate about army reform by bringing to the forefront the under-
examined relationship between institutional culture and institutional reform. 
***** 
 Although this dissertation uses biography as a means of examining a larger problem, the 
narrative is not a standard biography.  Rather than providing a strictly chronological narrative of 
George W. Goethals’s life from birth to death, this dissertation uses Goethals’s career as a means 
                                                          
52 Gustav J. Fiebeger, “George Washington Goethals,” Fifty Ninth Annual Report of the Association of Graduates of 
the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, June 8, 1928 (Saginaw, MI: Seeman & Peters, 1929), 
127.   
53 “Army  Men Pay Tribute,” New York Times, January 22, 1928, 30. 
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of analyzing institutional culture and the nature of change in the army between the end of 
Reconstruction and the end of World War I.  Accordingly, while this narrative adheres to 
chronology as much as possible, it values thematic clarity more than chronological orthodoxy.  
Because of this, all of the following thematically-organized chapters involve some amount of 
chronological overlap with at least one other chapter.    
The first three chapters trace Goethals’s career through 1907 as a means of analyzing 
how and why the Root Reforms created a schism between institutional structures and 
institutional culture.  Chapter 1 focuses upon officers’ perceptions of the value and purpose of 
training and education, establishing training and education as its point of departure from the 
society it served.  Chapter 2 considers the effect of the frontier upon the army and its institutional 
culture, arguing that the army’s frontier mission and disposition rendered antiquated views about 
training and education necessary, but that what was born of necessity became enshrined as 
tradition and long outlived the conditions that justified it.  Chapter 3 considers the decade 
surrounding the Root Reforms.  It builds upon the first two chapters to show that the conditions 
that made the Root Reforms possible were not extreme enough to broadly undermine faith in 
traditional systems and practices.  Accordingly, while officers of Goethals’s generation tolerated 
the new structures, they attempted to mold the new structures to fit traditional norms, values, and 
practices. 
The last three chapters examine Goethals’s career from 1907-1919 as a means of 
explaining how and why the army’s institutional culture shifted to realign with the new structures 
imposed at the turn of the century.  Chapter 4 looks at Goethals’s years leading the construction 
of the Panama Canal, using his systems and style of management to demonstrate the extent to 
which army officers at that time subscribed to the managerial revolution.  Chapter 5 focuses on 
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the problems that plagued the American war effort in 1917, arguing that the managerial 
revolution provided a conceptual framework that army officers and the American public alike 
used to diagnose institutional weaknesses within the army.  Chapter 6 examines on Goethals’s 
work in the War Department in 1918, and the short-term solutions that the War Department 
implemented in an attempt to repair a deeply troubled war effort.  These solutions constituted an 
implicit recognition of the problems inherent in the army’s traditional systems, values, and 
practices.  It was this recognition and the debates surrounding it that allowed the next of 
generation of officers—that of George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhowcer—to complete 
the realignment of the army’s institutional culture with its structures as the army entered its next 
major test, the Second World War.
34 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
“No Further Need for Professors, Instructors, and Text Books:”  
Stagnation in Military Education 
Speaking to a journalist early in his retirement from a nearly four-decade-long career in 
the United States Army, George W. Goethals argued that “the best man . . . learns in the only 
school that is worth anything—experience.”  Explaining that position, he said, “No system of 
training will carry an incapable or unfaithful man to success.”  “The world today,” he reasoned, 
“is a practical one, and it demands results.”1  In his musings, Goethals presented a perception of 
the value of formal training and education that was common among his generation of army 
officers.  Reflecting the values imposed upon them by the army’s institutional culture, the officer 
corps of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century army rejected the notion that formal, 
classroom-based education had a significant role to play within the military profession.  On this 
point, however, the army had failed to keep pace with changes in American society.   
American education was fertile ground for reform in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries.  The experience of the Civil War, the expansion and diversification of the 
economy, and the growth of enormous corporations revealed that the modern industrial age was 
defined by problems and issues that were tremendously complex in both size and scope.  Such 
complexity could no longer be met by a society of generalists.  American society began to 
embrace specialization in most walks of life.  Whether one was to be a lawyer or a factory 
                                                          
1 Samuel Crowther, “Don’t Fear to Attempt a Thing Just Because it Looks Big,” American Magazine, January 1922, 
16. 
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worker, Americans generally came to believe that some amount of formal training and education 
had an important and active role to play in qualifying a person for a specific occupational group 
and a life as a productive member of society. 
The U.S. Army’s view of education, however, was more analogous to the theories Horace 
Mann promulgated earlier in the nineteenth century than to new philosophies and practices that 
American educators, universities, and professional associations advanced in the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries.  The army ascribed a purely moral value to education and expected 
its junior officers as apprentices to learn their trade through years of practical experience.  But 
American institutions of higher education, industry, and civil professions within American 
society had for the most part soundly rejected this view of education and training by the turn of 
the century.   Changes to the perceived value of education both coincided with and contributed to 
a gradually changing conception of professionalism that moved beyond personal identification 
and self-study to embrace formal systems of specialized education and training.  
The army and its officers, however, rejected the notion that formal education was an 
important component of the military profession.  Despite some attempts at reform in the late-
nineteenth century, the officer corps held firmly to outmoded beliefs and practices in the sincere 
belief that the methods and systems that produced Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee earlier in 
the century could not be improved.  As officers reared under a system that explicitly favored 
experiential learning over classroom education rose through the ranks, they credited their success 
to the perceived merits of that system.  This self-reinforcing cycle created an institutional culture 
conditioned to resist and dilute attempts to reform the army’s education system in the early-
twentieth century.  The gulf that separated American society and its army over the proper 
purpose and methods of education was perhaps the most important factor that delayed the 
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ultimate fulfillment of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century military reform until the 
interwar years by helping to create an institutional culture within the army that was inclined to 
resist fundamental change. 
***** 
George W. Goethals was the middle child of John and Marie Baron Goethals.  Belgian by 
birth, John had immigrated to Brooklyn from Amsterdam in 1848.  Marie arrived three years 
later.  Although she had also come by way of Amsterdam, they had not met prior to her arrival in 
New York.  The two married and settled into a house on State Street in Brooklyn, with John 
having found secure employment as a carpenter in a well-established shop across the East River 
on 9th Street in New York.  In 1856, John and Marie earned full American citizenship and 
welcomed their first child, a boy named John after his father.  George was born at their home in 
Brooklyn two years later, on June 29, 1858.  A baby girl named Annie was born in 1860, 
completing the recently-established Brooklyn branch of the Goethals family.2 
Goethals led an unexceptional childhood.  He grew up in a working-class neighborhood 
in Brooklyn, with his older brother as his closest playmate.  He was somewhat introverted, a trait 
that he never quite outgrew, and generally followed his older brother’s lead in their youthful 
adventures around Brooklyn.  He displayed a keen fascination with the local volunteer fire 
company and with the soldiers encamped at nearby City Park and Fort Greene during the Civil 
                                                          
2 “Goethals, Canal Builder, a Brooklyn Boy,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 12, 1913, 1; and Bishop and Bishop, 
27.  Very little is known about Goethals’s early family life.  No correspondence between Goethals and his parents or 
siblings survives today.  The relationship was in all likelihood estranged at some point in Goethals’s early 
adulthood, possibly shortly after George entered the Army, when John and Marie moved with Annie to California, 
where they died in 1888 and 1899, respectively.  In later years, George refused to speak to interviewers about his 
family and childhood, and Annie refused to speak to interviewers about George.  George’s older brother John 
granted one lengthy interview to The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, in which he remembers their childhood fondly and 
displays no hostility or ill-will toward his brother. 
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War, who passed at least some of their time by arming the Goethals children with sticks and 
drilling them.  There is no evidence that John Goethals served in the military during the war, and 
the war itself had little impact on the lives of the rest of the Goethals family.3 
As Goethals approached school age, perceptions and practices of education in the United 
States were beginning to change.  Producing good and productive citizens had long been at the 
foundation of American educational thought.  Horace Mann, whose views dominated American 
educational thought for much of the nineteenth century, argued that the true purpose of education 
was to provide students with the means and general awareness they needed to fulfill civic 
obligations as adults.  According to Mann’s position, the specific facts of any given lesson would 
be lost over time, but the value of education lay in the general promotion of literacy and basic 
arithmetic abilities—and, most importantly, in imbuing students with mental and physical 
discipline.  Such an interpretation of the purpose of education suited a society that believed 
providing a person with the means to be a well-functioning adult provided that person with the 
means to lead a reasonably successful life.4  Goethals’s early education was founded upon this 
traditional view. 
Along with his brother, Goethals began his formal education in the fall of 1864 at a 
public school near their home in Brooklyn.  At school, he was studious enough to satisfy his 
parents, but frequently demonstrated a penchant for mischief.  Because they were kept after 
school so often, George and his brother John cut holes in the fence surrounding the school yard 
so they could slip away during the noontime recess to eat a meal at home on days they 
                                                          
3 “Goethals, Canal Builder, a Brooklyn Boy,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 12, 1913, 1.   
4 Barbara Finkelstein “Perfecting Childhood: Horace Mann and the Origins of Public Education in the United 
States” in Biography 13, no 1 (Winter 1990), 6-20. 
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misbehaved in the morning and already knew they would be punished and kept late after school.  
At times the punishment would be corporal, but this did not keep the Goethals boys from acting 
out.  “We had a theory in those days,” recalled John, “that a short hair in the palm of the hand 
would keep the strap from hurting.  The great difficulty was to keep the hair in place.”5 
In 1868, the Goethals family moved across the river to a home on East Fourth Street near 
what is now Manhattan’s East Village so the elder John Goethals could be closer to work and 
avoid the inconvenience and occasional hazards of a daily commute by ferry.  George was placed 
in Public School Number 15 to continue his education, now one grade behind his brother John 
due to his age.  At that school, Goethals matured into a more serious student.  He caught the 
attention of Nathan P. Beers, the school’s headmaster.  Seeing promise in George Goethals, 
Beers advanced him ahead a full year, back into the same class as his brother John, and kept a 
close eye on his progress.6 
He did not begin to become a more serious student out of any newly discovered love of 
learning.  Instead, it had much to do with ambition.  According to his brother John, “At that time, 
George had an idea that he wanted to be a lawyer, and he studied hard.”7  Marie Goethals had 
always worked to stoke the fire ambition in her children, and in their friends for that matter.  A 
childhood friend of the Goethals boys later recalled with reverence more than a half-century later 
that Marie would not only foster and encourage her children’s goals, but also urged him, 
                                                          
5 “Goethals, Canal Builder, a Brooklyn Boy,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 12, 1913, 1. 
6 “Goethals, Canal Builder, a Brooklyn Boy,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 12, 1913, 2. 
7 “Goethals, Canal Builder, a Brooklyn Boy,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 12, 1913, 2. 
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whenever she saw him, to work hard and keep pursuing his dream of attending the U.S. Naval 
Academy.8   
Marie’s efforts began to bear fruit as her children became adolescents and young 
teenagers.  Both George and John did well enough in school to place lofty goals within reach.  
Though driven, the younger Goethals was not focused.  Towards the end of grammar school, he 
abandoned his legal ambitions and began to dream of being a doctor.  But it was not to be.  John 
also had designs on the medical profession, and the family could only afford to fund one son’s 
medical training.9  After graduating in 1872 at the age of fourteen, Goethals spent his summer 
working as a cashier and bookkeeper in a fruit and vegetable market, then matriculated with the 
entering class at the City College of New York.  At the time, City College was free for male 
residents of the city who had attended public school in the city for at least twelve months and 
could pass college’s entrance examination.10 
Goethals applied for admission to City College and took its entrance examination in June 
1872.  The exam was designed to test applicants’ knowledge and aptitude in spelling, reading, 
writing, arithmetic, English grammar, geography, U.S. history, and algebra.  The shy fourteen-
year-old must have been nervous as he prepared to be examined and judged; he allowed the 
registrar to mistakenly record his name as George Washington Goethals without objection or 
correction, if he had even noticed it in that moment.  He had actually been christened George 
William Goethals, but Washington stuck with him for the rest of his life and into posterity.  
                                                          
8 Bishop and Bishop, 28. 
9 Thomas Goethals interview by author, Vineyard Haven, MA, December 21, 2012. 
10 “Goethals, Canal Builder, a Brooklyn Boy,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 12, 1913, 2; for City College’s 
requirements see “Twenty-Fourth Annual Register of the College of the City of New York, 1872-1873,” CCNY, 20-
21. 
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Goethals may not have even been aware of the error until he arrived at West Point.  But as he 
later explained, after the U.S. Army knew him as George Washington Goethals, he had “never 
seen fit to have the records of the War Department changed, as it requires an unnecessary 
amount of red tape.”11 
Goethals’s performance on the entrance examination was thoroughly unexceptional.  He 
fared well enough to be admitted, but not so well as to stand out in any significant way.  
Comparatively, he received marginally acceptable score in English grammar; average scores in 
writing, arithmetic, U.S. history, and algebra; and high scores in spelling, reading, and 
geography.12  He had a strong intellect, as Nathan Beers had previously recognized, but was not 
naturally brilliant or gifted.  Goethals would have to work hard to achieve any greatness inside or 
outside of the classroom.  Ambition had motivated him to become more studious during his time 
in grammar school, yet his ambition had not been sufficiently consistent or focused to motivate 
him to reach his full potential.  City College would provide some of that necessary motivation.   
Goethals entered the world of higher education as it was fundamentally changing.  In the 
years following the Civil War, alternatives to Horace Mann’s theories were increasingly popular.  
More and more, American society perceived an intrinsic value in knowledge itself.  Educators 
began to argue that the true purpose of education was not to build character, but to impart 
knowledge.  As society gradually embraced the notion that there was a practical value to 
                                                          
11 For the initial mistake, see Applicant #118, “Applicants for Admission to the College, June 1872,” in Admission 
1867-1873 book, Box 9, NYCC Office of the Registrar, CCNY.  For Goethals’s subsequent explanation, see George 
W. Goethals to E.B. Barnes, November 13, 1912, Container 17, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
12 Applicant #118, “Applicants for Admission to the College, June 1872,” in Admission 1867-1873 book, Box 9, 
NYCC Office of the Registrar, CCNY. 
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education, innovation and reform transformed the field—especially in higher education and 
professional education.13 
The postwar years were nothing short of revolutionary for American higher education.  In 
a nation remade and redefined by war, American society began to accept a view of education that 
was less rigid and purely theoretical, and more democratic, egalitarian, scientific, technical, 
practical, and open to new pedagogical techniques than before the war.  New colleges and new 
leadership at older institutions emerged, each with a distinct interpretation of what was wrong 
with American higher education.  Deeply-rooted trends and traditions in American higher 
education—including its woeful neglect of women, overly rigid curricula, strict focus on 
character development rather than scholarship, dependence upon rote memorization and 
recitation, and relative inaccessibility for average people—faced challenges from many quarters.   
While no one institution claimed to have solutions for every perceived problem, 
American higher education became a laboratory unto itself, defined in the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries by bold innovation and experimentation.  Land-grant colleges and free 
or inexpensive urban institutions like City College democratized higher education, offering 
unprecedented opportunities to children of workers, small artisans, and farmers.  New 
universities introduced collaborative seminars, developed curricula that combined theoretical 
scholarship with practical training and education, and gave students more leeway to pursue their 
own academic interests through the introduction and refinement of elective systems.  Most 
institutions of higher learning looked resolutely forward, fully embracing and often leading 
                                                          
13 David B. Tyack, Turning Points in American Educational History (Waltham, MA: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 
1967), 121-180; Laurence Veysey, The Emergence of the American University (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
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innovation and change.  As one university president declared, “In this day of unparalleled 
activity in college life, the institution which is not steadily advancing is certainly falling behind.”   
At the time that he enrolled, City College was a vibrant institution that had embraced some, 
though not all, of these reforms.14   
In that environment, Goethals’s scholarly abilities improved somewhat, but his goals 
continued to fluctuate.  While consistently above average, his academic performance varied as 
his ambitions changed.  Early in his time at City College, Goethals gave serious consideration to 
a career as a naval officer and directed his efforts toward preparing for admission to the U.S. 
Naval Academy.  Accordingly, he performed remarkably well in his studies during his first two 
years, finishing his first year ranked thirty-first out of a class of 158, and then ranked eleventh 
out of a class of 104 at the end of his second year.15  After receiving word from the Secretary of 
the Navy that there would be no vacancies for midshipmen from his district, Goethals redirected 
his ambitions toward going into business.  On at least two occasions, he was prepared to drop out 
of City College to pursue potential business opportunities, but ultimately yielded to his father’s 
wishes that he continue his studies.  Goethals’s academic performance suffered somewhat from 
this ambivalence.  He finished his third year ranked twenty-fourth out of a class of seventy-
five.16   
                                                          
14 Frederick Rudolph, The American College & University: A History, Second edition (Athens, GA: University of 
Georgia Press, 1990), 241-372.  See also John R. Thelin, A History of American Higher Education, Second edition 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), 74-204; Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in 
a Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998), 97-98 and 108-110.  The quotation is from Rudolph, The 
American College & University, 329. 
15 At that time, City College followed a five-year curriculum, with the first year being the introductory year and the 
second, third, and fourth years being the freshman, sophomore, junior, and senior years, respectively.  See “Twenty-
Fourth Annual Register of the College of the City of New York, 1872-1873,” Annual Registers, CCNY, 11-15. 
16 Goethals’s changing ambitions are outlined in “Goethals, Canal Builder, a Brooklyn Boy,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 
October 12, 1913, 2; his academic standing during his introductory, freshman, and sophomore years can be found in 
the June 1873, July 1874, and June 1875 Merit Rolls in Box 3 – 1870-1876, Merit Rolls, CCNY. 
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Although he certainly showed potential, Goethals’s collegiate career through 1875 was 
generally unremarkable, a fact that his City College classmates noticed and commented upon 
many years later.  One classmate remembered Goethals only as a “quiet, reserved, almost shy 
boy” who “was one of the group that tried for a high stand.”17  Another described him as “rather 
quiet and reserved, undemonstrative, and not a brilliant or exceptional student; just one among 
many.”18  More tellingly, a third classmate declared, “My recollections of George W. Goethals at 
the College include nothing salient.  He was an average student, just one of us, without any 
special distinction.”19 
As fall turned to winter in 1875, Samuel Sullivan “Sunset” Cox, the Democratic 
congressman representing New York’s 6th Congressional District, announced that his district had 
a vacancy at West Point due to his previous nominee’s academic failure.  The news immediately 
piqued Goethals’s interest.  As the son of an immigrant carpenter, however, Goethals had no 
strong political connections to help him secure the nomination.  He sought advice from his old 
grammar school principal, Nathan Beers, who was not only happy to help, but was in an 
excellent position to do so.20   
The maxim that all politics are local rang true in New York City in 1875.  Beers had 
connections with one of his school’s trustees—a man by the name of Miehling—and a coroner 
named Henry Waltman, who together constituted the most significant political power in Cox’s 
                                                          
17 “Statement of Leigh H. Hunt, ’77,” undated, George W. Goethals File, CCNY. 
18 Frank H. Gilbert to Donald A. Roberts, March 3, 1912, George W. Goethals File, CCNY. 
19 A.H. Man to Donald A. Roberts, March 31, 1928, George W. Goethals File, CCNY. 
20 “Goethals, Canal Builder, a Brooklyn Boy,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 12, 1913, 2.  Beers’s critical role in 
obtaining the nomination for Goethals is also indicated in George W. Goethals to N.P. Beers, May 1, 1876 and O.B. 
Ackerly to George W. Goethals, December 17, 1912; both found in Container 18, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
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district.  Beers pressured Mr. Miehling, who in turn took Goethals’s case to Waltman.  Here 
Goethals’s army career almost failed to launch, as the coroner had already promised the 
nomination to his nephew.  The nephew, however, was the only child of a mother who was 
aghast at the idea of her son in the army.  She persuaded him to decline the nomination.  Beers 
and Miehling then renewed their efforts on Goethals’s behalf.  Waltman relented and sent word 
to the congressman that he had decided that Goethals should have the nomination.  Cox then 
waived his usual competitive examination process and officially extended the nomination to 
Goethals on April 17, 1876.21 Wasting no time, Goethals reported to West Point and was one of 
73 cadets to pass the medical and academic examinations required for admission.  Another four 
would be added to the rolls later in the summer.  He and his classmates were immediately 
processed and sent to begin their military training at their first annual summer encampment at 
West Point.22   
Transferring from City College to West Point in 1876, Goethals was actually moving 
against the grain of progress.  The U.S. Army had not kept pace with the changing perceptions 
and practices of education in American society.  As the gateway to a career as an army officer, 
West Point’s most significant military function was to introduce cadets to the military profession.  
Life at the academy immersed Goethals and like-minded cadets in military culture and imbued 
them with a sense of purpose and responsibility, and a deep personal identification with the 
                                                          
21 “Goethals, Canal Builder, a Brooklyn Boy,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 12, 1913, 2. 
22 George W. Goethals to N.P. Beers, May 1, 1876, Container 18, George W. Goethals Papers, LC and “Official 
Register of the Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., June, 1877,” 23-35, Official 
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faculty in 1922.  See S.W. Rudy, The College of the City of New York: A History, 1847-1947 (New York: The City 
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army.23  Theoretically, such commitment would take the form of self-study, which was in turn 
perceived as the measure of an officer’s level of professionalism.24  Originally an unwritten rule 
inherited from eighteenth-century norms, the army codified this conception of professionalism at 
the end of the nineteenth century by instituting a system of annual efficiency reports for its 
officers that required each officer to submit a summary of their extracurricular reading and other 
efforts to improve their knowledge and expertise in the military profession throughout the course 
of the year.25  
When Goethals arrived, then, West Point was relatively stagnant as an institution of 
higher education.  Other American colleges and universities implemented significant changes, 
including the transition to the elective system, expansion and diversification of curricula, and 
adoption of more inclusive and engaging forms of pedagogy.  But West Point remained 
committed to a highly technical curriculum focused primarily on mathematics and science, and 
conducted instruction through rote recitation and frequent grading through which instructors 
assessed and competitively ranked cadets’ academic performance.  Remaining wedded to 
traditional theories and practices of education was a deliberate policy.  The leadership of West 
Point and the army alike believed that theirs was the best method to condition cadets’ minds to 
                                                          
23 William B. Skelton, An American Profession of Arms: the Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861 (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 1992), 167-180; William B. Skelton, “West Point and Officer Professionalism, 1817-
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24 Ira D. Gruber, Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC:  University of 
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analyze and solve military problems, and that the academic system that produced Generals 
Grant, Lee, Jackson, and Sherman required no adjustments.  Essentially, West Point’s curriculum 
was designed to develop the mental and physical discipline that was believed to foster martial 
greatness.26   
 As it was intended, life at the academy immersed Goethals and his colleagues in the 
military culture and imbued them with a sense of purpose and responsibility, and a deep personal 
identification with the Army. 27  There was, however, an ugly side to this socialization to the 
military profession.  Hazing new cadets had been in practice at West Point since at least the 
1830s, when it had maintained a generally benign and harmless character that was limited only to 
a cadet’s first summer encampment prior to the Civil War.  The postwar years saw a general 
decline in discipline among the corps of cadets as officers assigned to West Point were 
disinclined to enforce policies and regulations that seemed petty and trivial in light of their 
wartime experiences.  The consecutive assignments of two weak and ineffective academy 
superintendents between 1864 and 1871 only exacerbated this trend.  Hazing grew to encompass 
the entire fourth-class (freshman, or “plebe”) year, and ranged in severity from periodic public 
humiliation to significant physical violence.  Despite the efforts of more active and energetic 
superintendents, such hazing continued through Goethals’s cadet years and beyond, until a 
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congressional investigation in the wake of a cadet’s death in 1900 produced legislation barring 
the worst forms of hazing in 1901.28 
The immediacy of the sharp change from a civilian to a military existence and the hazing 
that accompanied it made the transition a harsh experience for all cadets.  Although Goethals had 
as difficult an adjustment to the military as all of his classmates, he adjusted well to life at the 
academy.  In all likelihood, this was because the competitive environment at West Point and the 
clear end of a commission as an officer in the U.S. Army finally provided Goethals with a well-
defined goal on which he could focus his ambitions and energies.  He emerged from his summer 
training in a frame of mind that allowed him to excel in the classroom. 
The introduction to the military profession that West Point provided led Goethals to 
identify deeply with the army and to channel his ambitions toward rising to the top of his class.  
This was no easy feat—West Point fostered an intensely competitive environment.  Accordingly, 
he put all of his energies into his studies.  When “lights out” was sounded at ten o’clock each 
night, Goethals would lie prone on the floor while his roommates draped a large blanket over 
him, taking care to weigh it down along the edges with books at regular intervals, so he could 
continue to study by the undetected light of a kerosene lamp well into the night.29  According to 
his older brother, when their father wrote Goethals to express his concern about too much study 
at the expense of sleep, “George’s reply was that he would not be satisfied to merely plod 
through his studies, that he was there for work and he was going to do all in his power to come 
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out at the head of his class.”30   He very nearly achieved that goal.  He was rated second in his 
class at the end of every academic year.  At the end of his first-class (senior, or “firstie”) year, he 
was still rated second overall, although he was the top cadet in civil and military engineering 
after achieving a perfect score in that department.31   
Goethals also thrived outside of the classroom at West Point.  Although he remained 
somewhat introverted and clung to a long-held fear of public speaking that he would never 
escape, Goethals began to feel more confident and socially at ease in relationships with his 
fellow cadets on an individual basis.32  As he became more comfortable socially, he became a 
very popular cadet.  Gustav Fiebeger, a graduate of West Point’s class of 1879 and one of the 
few close friends that Goethals carried throughout his entire adult life, recalled, “It was not long 
before we discovered in Goethals the qualities which had made him popular with his class.”  He 
explained, “With a winning personality, he was dignified, yet friendly, modest, but self-
confident, honorable and upright, cheerful in disposition, quick at repartee and somewhat 
sarcastic in a pleasant way, military in carriage and neat in dress, never coarse in language or 
thought.”33  Well-liked within the corps of cadets, many of whom referred to him playfully as 
“Goat,” the class of 1880 elected Goethals to be their president and selected him to design the 
class ring.  Years later, Fiebeger would recall of Goethals’s relationship with his classmates that 
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“throughout his life he was their leader and the center about which the members of the class 
gathered whenever they held a reunion.”34   
Ultimately, while West Point had inspired Goethals to excel in and out of the classroom 
because it thoroughly imbued him with strong senses of purpose and belonging, its academic 
impact on him was far less substantial.  Goethals always recalled fondly his time at West Point, 
but he did not value it as an educational experience.  He would later tell the graduating class of 
1912 that West Point had not provided cadets the knowledge and abilities required to succeed as 
officers, but with “the foundations of a structure yet to be raised,” and that their real education 
would be introduced gradually through practical experience.35  He believed that his education at 
West Point had provided only a means to an end, and to his mind, his experience validated that 
perception.  Goethals’s academic success allowed him to become one of only two members of 
the class of 1880 to be commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers.36  After a 
brief stay at West Point to serve as an astronomy instructor, Goethals departed for Long Island 
when the next Engineer School of Application class began in the fall of 1880. 
Postgraduate professional education was not entirely unusual in American society in the 
late-nineteenth century.  It became more popular because of the increasingly widespread belief in 
the intrinsic and practical value of education, and the emerging consensus that occupational 
specialization in the modern industrial age required formal programs of training and education.  
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When Johns Hopkins incorporated individual schools for selected professions into its university 
structure in 1876, other universities soon followed suit.  While universities and colleges 
themselves at first established curricula for specialized training in professions for which they 
opened schools, nationally centralized professional organizations began to exert more authority 
in validating and recognizing universities’ professional schools and programs as legitimate.  
Professional associations such as the American Medical Association and the American Bar 
Association emerged in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and asserted 
considerable authority in reforming and standardizing professional education and training within 
the fields of business, medicine, law, social work, education, journalism, engineering, and 
forestry, among others.37     
Generally, then, the notion that training and education had a legitimate and necessary role 
in occupational and professional specialization became much more popular in American society 
throughout the late-nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries.  This produced a growing consensus 
that education provided critical opportunities for occupational or professional success.  
Accordingly, another aspect of the transformation of higher education in the United States was 
the development of robust programs of specialized vocational and professional education.  The 
army, however, failed to keep pace with the society it served, remaining wedded to antiquated 
philosophies and methods of occupational and professional training and education despite the 
best efforts of forward-thinking reformers. 
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Despite the changes in civil society, education and training played only a minor 
supporting role in an army officer’s career in the late-nineteenth century.  For those of Goethals’s 
generation, formal systems of training and education featured significantly only during the first 
few years of most officers’ careers.  The training officers received in their first years was 
expected to provide a foundational introduction to the profession and, in the case of specialized 
branches of the army, a base of technical knowledge.  Officers expected that practical experience 
would provide all the necessary training and education thereafter.  They continued to see little 
need for more rigorous education or institutionalized training systems. 
To some extent, the army acknowledged the need for some specialized training for 
officers to become introduced to the branches of the army to which they belonged.  Although 
West Point provided an introduction to the profession and a formal education to its cadets, it 
gave budding officers only a limited amount of practical military training.  Recognizing that the 
academy did not produce expert practitioners of all its branches, the army generally entrusted 
lieutenants’ technical training to the units to which they first reported after graduation.  It 
experimented with the concept of schools of application—formal schools with standardized 
curricula to provide branch-specific training to newly commissioned lieutenants—for infantry, 
cavalry, and artillery in the 1820s, and again for artillery from 1857-1861.  These measures were 
limited and temporary due to a lack of interest, resources, funding, and in the latter case, the 
outbreak of the Civil War.  Within three years of the war’s end, the army’s technical branches—
the Corps of Engineers, the Signal Corps, and the Artillery—each opened new schools of 
application.  These evolved in concept and content over time, but remained for the most part 
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incomplete experiments that continued to be refined throughout the late 1880s and 1890s, and 
were not fully trusted within the institution itself for some time thereafter.38    
This acknowledgement of the need for postgraduate military education was not confined 
to the technical branches.  Despite continued confidence in the systems and processes that 
produced the Civil War generation, the army’s high command began to accept that changes in 
tactics, military organization, and technology in the late-nineteenth century called for a better-
trained officer corps.  Ironically, while many officers pointed to the Civil War to justify their 
resistance to reform, some of the leading proponents of new experiments in postgraduate military 
education were general officers from the Civil War.  It was William T. Sherman, then serving as 
Commanding General of the U.S. Army, who ordered the establishment of the School of 
Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas in 1881.  The school’s purpose 
was to train junior officer in small-unit tactics.  Its target audience consisted primarily of the 
most junior officers of the line—second lieutenants.  Instruction and curriculum in the early 
years was haphazard, but by 1889, the school developed a practical program that prepared young 
officers for small-unit leadership within the context of the army’s frontier mission.39 
Goethals experienced a similarly unfinished and haphazard curriculum at the Engineer 
School of Application from 1880-1882.  He made the short trip from West Point to Willets Point, 
New York, a post occupying 136 acres on a peninsula extending into the Long Island Sound in 
northern Queens County.   Henry L. Abbot, a Civil War veteran with a distinguished record, had 
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designed the Engineer School of Application “with a view to meet the actual needs of young 
officers resulting from the fact that while admirably trained in the rudiments of their profession,” 
they still had “much to learn about the use and care of delicate surveying, astronomical, and 
other instruments in constant use by the Corps of Engineers.”40   
From such humble conceptual beginnings, Abbot continually modified the course until 
1885, when it had expanded to a two-and-a-half year long curriculum and earned final sanction 
from the War Department.  At the time Goethals attended, however, the school was slightly less 
than two years in length and still maturing.  In addition to familiarization with specialized 
engineering equipment, Goethals studied survey procedures, military reconnaissance, 
astronomy—Willets Point had a state of the art observatory that discovered a comet in June 
1881—meteorology, field fortifications, military photography, harbor mining, and coastal 
defense.41  
While undoubtedly more helpful to Goethals than sending him straight from West Point 
to his first assignment, precious little of the material was immediately relevant for a junior 
engineer officer.  Not much of the course beyond the familiarization with engineering equipment 
and the instruction in survey and reconnaissance was actually applicable in Goethals’s duties 
during his first twenty years of service.  The Engineer School of Application was still a 
developing concept at that time.  Fortunately for those who came later, the curriculum that the 
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War Department approved in 1884 included more practical instruction in civil and military 
engineering.42  But these changes came too late to benefit Goethals, whose experiences at Willets 
Point had no lasting or meaningful impact on him.  His surviving correspondence contains not a 
single reference to or recollection of his time at the Engineer School of Application.   
Improvements elsewhere in army education were negligible, limited, or slow to 
materialize until the early-twentieth century.  Under the leadership of visionary reformers Arthur 
L. Wagner and Eben Swift, the program of instruction at Ft. Leavenworth expanded in the late 
1880s and 1890s to include more advanced tactics, strategy, logistics, war games, and a standard 
orders process.  Although Wagner and Swift implemented visionary reforms, the near-term result 
was an awkward situation in which a relatively advanced curriculum was thrust upon a student 
body comprised mostly of the army’s most junior officers.  Older regimental commanders looked 
upon the Leavenworth schools with jaundiced eyes and continued to fill vacancies there with 
seemingly expendable lieutenants whose absence would not be sorely missed.  As George C. 
Marshall, who entered the army’s postgraduate schools at Ft. Leavenworth in 1906, later recalled 
that at the turn of the century, “the opposition to any studious preparation of the older officers 
was very decided.”  The Ft. Leavenworth schools did not truly mature until the decade preceding 
World War I, and failed to gain wider acceptance within the army until after World War I.43 
The failure of the officer corps to grasp the possibilities of more robust training and 
education was not due to a complete lack of effort at reform.  Sherman was not the only officer 
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from the Civil War generation who recognized the need for a more structured system of military 
education.  His erstwhile Civil War subordinate, John B. Schofield, shared this view.  In the 
early 1890s, after he became Commanding General, Schofield attempted to institutionalize 
professional study by implementing an officers’ lyceum at each post.  But Schofield’s efforts 
were, to their detriment, based on the waning interpretation that professionalism was defined by 
personal identification and self-study.  Schofield’s plan called for officers to select a military 
topic that interested them and annually produce an essay on it.  That was the extent of 
Schofield’s guidance on the matter. Unsurprisingly, then, Schofield’s lyceum program produced 
little that was useful in the short amount of time that it existed.  Vague and hardly enforceable 
pronouncements of policy stood little chance of inspiring a fundamental shift in the army’s 
institutional culture, which was characterized, in part, by a distinct and persistent strand of anti-
intellectualism.44   
With persistent anti-intellectualism limiting formal systems of training and education, 
Goethals’s time at Willets Point in his first two years out of West Point was actually the last 
formal training he received from the army in a career that lasted nearly four decades.  Although 
he was a member of its inaugural class of 1905, the U.S. Army War College at that time was not 
a truly educational institution.  Goethals’s experiences there reflected more continuity than 
change in an institutional culture that rejected of formal training and education.   
The army’s resistance to the educational mandate incorporated into Secretary of War 
Elihu Root’s sweeping reforms in 1903 illustrated the rigidity of its institutional culture and 
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discomfort with formal education.  From his first year in office as Secretary of War, Root had 
envisioned that the U.S. Army War College would be a dual-purposed institution.  On one hand, 
Root intended it to “direct the instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army, to acquire the 
information, devise the plans . . . and to advise the Commander in Chief upon all questions of 
plans, armament, transportation, mobilization, and military preparation and movement.”  On the 
other hand, he intended it to serve as a school in which officers would “receive instruction . . . in 
the science of war, including the duties of the staff, and in all matters pertaining to the 
application of military science to national defense.”45 Development of the War College concept 
stalled in 1902 and early 1903 as the board designated to plan and organize it functioned almost 
entirely as Root’s personal staff during the effort to secure passage of a bill authorizing the 
creation of the General Staff Corps.  After the bill was passed, the War Department put more 
thought into the college and its relationship to the General Staff and eventually determined that 
because both organizations were at least partly intended to consider and develop war plans and 
mobilization systems, the college would be an adjunct component of the General Staff.  In 1903, 
Root assigned the newly-promoted Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss to serve as the first 
president of the U.S. Army War College.46 
Bliss was an uncommon officer.  He was raised by academics and inherited their 
intellectual nature.  He entered West Point after having already studied for a year at Lewisburg 
University, where his father was a professor of classical languages.  He graduated from West 
Point in 1875 as an artillery officer, and spent only three of the next twenty-three years with his 
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regiment.  He spent the rest of his career in unconventional assignments teaching French and 
artillery at West Point, teaching strategy at the Naval War College, serving as an aide to 
Commanding General John Schofield and Secretary of War Daniel S. Lamont, and serving as the 
military attaché to the U.S. Ambassador to Spain prior to the War with Spain in 1898.  Once the 
war came, he returned from Spain for wartime service, eventually joining the First Army Corps 
in its expedition to Puerto Rico as the chief of staff of one of its divisions.  Subsequently, he 
served as the collector of customs for Havana.  His herculean efforts in that position reformed a 
corrupt bureau and increased the revenue for the military-run government of Cuba during the 
postwar occupation.  His service caught the attention of Secretary Root, who in 1902 rewarded 
Bliss with a promotion to brigadier general, despite the fact that he was then only a major in the 
regular army.  Bliss was an intellectual whose career experiences had kept his mind occupied 
with matters on a much higher plane than most of his peers.  Root believed he was the natural 
choice to lead the new War College.47 
It is surprising, then, that Bliss countered Root’s vision for the U.S. Army War College 
with a somewhat anti-intellectual plan of his own.  As president of the new institution, Bliss was 
responsible for all professional education in the army.  When he issued orders in November 1901 
establishing the Army War College, Root helped consolidate a formal, rationalized, and tiered 
system of professional education that began at West Point, progressed to schools of application 
for technical training, continued onward to post schools and lyceums for regimental officers, 
then advanced to the Leavenworth schools, and culminated at the War College.  In formalizing 
this system, Root initiated a fundamental change in the processes of officer development within 
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the army by tacitly acknowledging that formal education was a more legitimate component of 
professionalism and means professional development than self-study.  Despite his deeply 
intellectual nature, nearly thirty years of experience in an army that valued experiential learning 
far more than formal education had conditioned Bliss against a wholehearted embrace of Root’s 
model.  Accordingly, he designed and ran the Army War College as a practical apprenticeship 
for rising General Staff officers.48   
Bliss first broached the subject in a lengthy memo to the Secretary of War in August 
1903.  He opined that “an examination of the curricula of” post schools, schools of application, 
and Leavenworth schools “show that they go, or are intended to go, to the limit in the matter of 
direct theoretical instruction of officers.”  He then reasoned, “It is evident that if instruction is to 
be continued on this general line at the War College, it will involve a repetition of what has been 
given at the other service schools,” and that “manifestly all this will be a waste of time and a 
degradation of the institution from its true function.”  He summarized his case by declaring, 
“When an officer has passed through the course to which he must have been subjected before he 
comes to the War College he must have learned, (unless there be a great fault somewhere) all 
that he needs to know of the theory of the art of war,” and that “from that time on he should learn 
things by doing things.49 
Bliss was either successful in convincing the Secretary of War, or was allowed to carry 
on because Root was preparing to retire in early 1904 and had concluded that his imminent 
departure from office precluded further efforts on behalf of his vision for the War College.  Bliss 
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received no argument from Root’s successor, William H. Taft, when he made a similar argument 
in another report early the following year.  Bliss stated that the components of the education 
system below the War College “go to the limit of useful training by the ordinary scholastic 
methods,” and that “after passing them there is no further need for professors, instructors, and 
text books.”  Continuing, he described collaborative planning with experts from various branches 
as “an essential part of the art of war and which can be learned not from books and professors 
but only by patient and unostentatious labor in doing these things themselves.”  Bliss believed 
the primary purpose of the War College was to serve as a planning and supplemental staff 
agency, with a useful side effect of allowing its members to train on planning and problem 
solving through sheer repetition.  “Thus,” he concluded, “the scholastic work of the War College 
will not consist in the study of general principles but in the application of these principles to the 
details of a specific plan.”50  Accordingly, the U.S. Army War College spent its first few years 
functioning more as an apprenticeship for General Staff officers than as a true educational 
institution.   
Goethals was a member of the War College during its first year.  Under the leadership of 
its president and directors—Bliss, Wagner, and Lieutenant Colonel William W. Wotherspoon, 
respectively—nine officers were detailed as students, and five officers, including Goethals, were 
detailed as War College staff, with another two detailed for administrative duties.51  That he was 
detailed to serve on the War College staff rather than for administration was likely due to his by-
then excellent reputation and a prior working relationship with Bliss in the First Army Corps 
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during the War with Spain.  Goethals’s achievements earlier in his career had shaped his 
reputation for having an inquisitive mind.  As an intellectual, Bliss would assuredly have 
recognized and appreciated this quality, and sought to use it to maximum advantage in the War 
College. 
The first session of the War College proceeded very much according to Bliss’s 
conception of how it should function.  Its officers considered problems, most of which related to 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s active Caribbean policies, including developing plans to prevent 
foreign intervention in Haiti and mobilizing expeditionary forces between 5,000 and 30,000 
soldiers strong for operations in Santo Domingo, Venezuela, and Panama.  Additionally, a series 
of fifteen lectures was established in which officers from the General Staff and the War College 
addressed the War College on current events or their areas of technical specialty within the 
Army.  The ongoing Russo-Japanese War was the topic of seven of these lectures, delivered by 
officers recently returned from assignments as attachés or observers with the belligerent 
armies.52  For his part, Goethals served as a member of the Strategy Board, was the chairman of 
the committee considering problems related to the defense of the Philippines and military 
operations in the Pacific, and was a member of a special committee planning joint army-navy 
maneuvers scheduled for 1905.  Demonstrating the non-academic nature of the War College, 
students and staff alike were declared to be graduates of the inaugural War College class of 
1905.53 
                                                          
52 Samuel Reber, “Memorandum of the Work of the Army War College for the Session Ending May 31, 1905,” File 
AWC 488, Box 2, Entry 294, RG 165, NARA II; Ball, 92-96. 
53 Tasker H. Bliss, “Memorandum,” September 26, 1904, File AWC 290, Box 2, Entry 294, RG 165, NARA II; J.D. 
Leitch to George W. Goethals, April 28, 1911, Box 12, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
 
61 
 
Because the construction of its building at Washington Barracks had not yet been 
completed, officers assigned to the War College between 1903 and 1907 crammed into whatever 
office space they could improvise in a home the army rented from a well-known Washington 
socialite.  The four-story brick townhouse at 22 Jackson Place sat off of the northwest corner of 
Lafayette Square, mere yards down the road from the White House and its more sprawling, 
dourly Victorian neighbor the State, War, and Navy building, where the rest of the War 
Department and General Staff were situated.  Although those who secured workspace in one of 
the townhouse’s rooms whose tall, slender windows gave excellent views of the park outside 
may have been content, the officers of the War College—especially the unlucky four who were 
forced to work in the attic—found that the pleasant home made for an uncomfortably cramped 
workspace.54 
For Goethals, the work environment was especially uncomfortable because it exacerbated 
deeply-held insecurities about his lack of combat experience.  The reformers who organized the 
General Staff Corps, of which the U.S. Army War College was a part, were careful to select only 
those officers who represented the cream of the crop for its first cohort of officers.  As General 
William H. Carter recalled in later years, “The type and character of officers detailed in the 
General Staff . . . was of the highest, and were, I am sure, unexcelled in any other army.”55  
Nearly three-quarters of officers assigned to the first General Staff were officers from line 
branches whose only opportunities to stand out as junior officers were in combat with in the 
                                                          
54 Files AWC 506, AWC 694, AWC 197, AWC 502, and AWC 858, Box 1, Entry 294, RG 165, NARA II are the 
lease documents for 22 Jackson Place.  Cramped conditions are reported in Tasker H. Bliss to Secretary of the 
General Staff, February 2, 1905, File AWC 395, Box 1, Entry 294, RG 165, NARA II.  The building still stands 
today, but the address is now 736 Jackson Place. 
55 U.S. Congress, Senate, William H. Carter,  Creation of the American General Staff, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 1924, 
S.Doc 119 (Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office, 1924), 55. 
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West during the Indian Wars, in Cuba or the Philippines during the War with Spain and the 
subsequent Philippine Insurrection, or in China during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.  Many of 
Goethals’s colleagues within the War College had distinguished combat records.56  Like most 
officers of his generation, Goethals maintained a heroic conception of the ideal officer, heavily 
influenced by their collective memory and idolization of the Civil War generation.  Surrounded 
daily by combat veterans and undoubtedly subject to their stories, reminiscences, and yarns, 
Goethals found his lack of combat experience to be utterly discomforting, even embarrassing.  
He even went so far as to write in his own individual service report in 1903 shortly after 
reporting for duty with the General Staff that he “had participated in no battles, engagements, or 
actions” in a section in which he was supposed to describe his areas of expertise and special 
qualification.57 
Goethals’s insecurity turned out to be unfounded.  If any of his colleagues or superiors 
thought any less of him because of he had not seen combat, they were quickly won over by his 
engineering expertise and his dedicated and energetic work ethic.  Wagner found Goethals to be 
“well informed on all military subjects, and especially in regard to Military Engineering.”58  
Wotherspoon, who would briefly serve as Chief of Staff in 1914, reported in 1905 that Goethals 
                                                          
56 30 of the 42 company and field grade officers detailed to the first General Staff came from the line, in addition to 
all of its general officers – see “Report of the War College Board,” March 9, 1903, printed in Carter, Creation of a 
General Staff, 52-54. The first General Staff included a Medal of Honor Recipient from wars with the Native 
Americans in Brigadier General William H. Carter, and many officers who had been cited for bravery in more recent 
conflicts, including Major General Adna Chaffee, Captain John J. Pershing, Captain Peyton C. March, and Captain 
Joseph T. Dickman, among others.  A listing of all officers on the first General Staff may be found in “Report of the 
Secretary of War,” Annual Reports of the War Department, 1903, insert facing page 68. 
57 “Individual Service Report of Major Geo. W. Goethals,” July 1, 1903, File # 3644-ACP-1880, Box 667, Entry 
297, RG 94, NARA I. 
58 “Efficiency Report of Major George W. Goethals,” June 30, 1903, File # 3644-ACP-1880, Box 667, Entry 297, 
RG 94, NARA I. 
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“had shown marked ability in all the work entrusted to him.”59  In private correspondence, 
Brigadier General James Franklin Bell, another soon-to-be Chief of Staff, included Goethals in a 
list of a select group of individuals “who, by application and industry, have acquired such special 
qualifications that their services are always in demand, because those who want them really need 
their assistance and talent.”60  By 1905, Goethals had more than proven himself and was 
rewarded by being designated to serve as the junior director of the Army War College, with 
Wotherspoon as senior director, for its 1905-1906 session.61 
Goethals moved on to other duties in 1906, but had he remained, he would have seen the 
War College continue to fall short of its educational mandate.  Although Bliss departed for an 
assignment in the Philippines in the summer of 1905, the character of the U.S. Army War 
College did not immediately change.  A limited number of “faculty” worked with a similarly 
limited number of students to produce immediately usable plans, form committees to study more 
complex military problems, and attend lectures of contemporary interest and importance.  The 
class of 1906 created plans for launching an expeditionary force for an intervention in Cuba later 
that year.  Subsequently, Wotherspoon was temporarily relieved from duty at the War College to 
help lead the Cuban Expeditionary Force as its chief of staff.  It fell to the class of 1907 to 
develop the plans to bring that expeditionary force home.62 
In 1907, Wotherspoon returned to the U.S. Army War College as its president.  He did 
much to change the institution.  With notable assistance from Chief of Staff of the Army J. 
                                                          
59 “Efficiency Report of Major George W. Goethals,” June 30, 1905, File # 3644-ACP-1880, Box 667, Entry 297, 
RG 94, NARA I. 
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Franklin Bell, the War College implemented tougher admissions standards, ended the practice of 
placing faculty and students on the same level, brought in instructors from Ft. Leavenworth to 
rehabilitate its courses on applied tactics and strategy, and began the practice of conducting 
theoretical study of military problems associated with Civil War campaigns and applying the 
fruits of their study on staff rides to selected battlefields.  By the 1910-11 academic year, the 
institution had clearly oriented itself more towards individual officer development than towards 
collective experiential learning as a useful but ancillary byproduct of the process of producing 
actual staff plans and papers.63 
 At the same time, however, it continued to fall short of its original mandate.  After 1911, 
the most significant improvements made at the War College were a gradual increase in class size 
and a simultaneously gradual improvement and standardization of admissions standards.  While 
Wotherspoon’s curriculum was a significant improvement, it represented a ratification of the 
applicatory method of officer education that was at the foundation of the Leavenworth schools 
rather than an acceptance of theoretical education.64 
 Although the U.S. Army War College, like the Leavenworth schools, made considerable 
strides in the decade leading up to the First World War, the army’s institutional culture remained 
decidedly anti-intellectual.  Despite the considerable efforts of forward-thinking reformers, the 
army’s institutional culture was unmoved in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.  It 
                                                          
63 Pappas, Prudens Futuri, 54-68; and Ball, Of Responsible Command, 105-108. 
64 Moreover, Wotherspoon’s model was designed to replicate the program in place at Fort Leavenworth’s staff 
college because he could not convince his superiors to make graduation from the staff college a binding requirement 
for admission to the War College.  Overlapping so much of the ground covered at the level of military education that 
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continued to reject the notion that a robust, standardized, and institutionalized education system 
should play a significant role in officers’ careers.  Although the army remained well-connected 
with American society, its attitude toward education remained stagnant, stubbornly and 
persistently wedded to antiquated philosophies and practices.  Structural reforms like the 
introduction of the Leavenworth schools and the U.S. Army War College failed to influence 
officers to change their minds about the role of education in the military profession.  That would 
be delayed until a younger generation of officers internalized the harsh experiences and lessons 
of World War I.  In the meantime, the generation of officers who—like Tasker H. Bliss and 
George W. Goethals—entered the army between 1870 and 1890 and led the transition from the 
old army to the new remained committed to tradition. 
***** 
Formal training and education shaped Goethals’s exceptionally successful career only to 
a very slight extent.  He had, for the most part, learned his trade outside the classroom, and he 
was relieved when his duties in 1906 took him away from duty with the War College and onto a 
board convened by Secretary of War William H. Taft to study the state of the army’s coastal 
defenses.  As with many of those from his generation of officers who were affiliated with the 
U.S. Army War College in its formative years, Goethals’s latest experience with military 
education turned out not to be very educational in nature.  For Goethals, it actually proved to be a 
somewhat stressful source of feelings of inadequacy that reinforced negative opinions of the War 
College itself.   
Like many of his peers, Goethals experienced military education during a time when 
systems of military education were either stagnant or still under development, reinforcing a view 
that formal education had no significant place in the military.  Despite his later experiences with 
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the realities of modern warfare, Goethals clung to this view for the rest of his life.  Three years 
after his retirement from the U.S. Army, he still argued that “the best man . . . learns in the only 
school that is worth anything—experience.”65  Goethals assumed his success under a system that 
rejected formal training and education validated the system itself.  He went into retirement and 
even to the grave clinging to an antiquated conception of the role of education within the military 
profession.   
As officers like Goethals found professional success and rose through the ranks, they 
attributed their accomplishments to the perceived merits of their antiquated system.   The U.S. 
Army’s institutional culture was therefore trapped in a self-generating and self-reinforcing cycle.  
Officers who succeeded in spite of a deficient educational system wrongly interpreted that their 
success was partially due to that system.  As they advanced through the ranks and assumed 
positions of considerable power and authority, they—like Tasker H. Bliss—took steps to 
perpetuate an antiquated and deficient system, or—like Goethals—advocated strongly on its 
behalf, crippling the efforts of military reformers.   
Armies typically reflect the societies they serve.  But in its views on the utility and best 
practices of education, the U.S. Army lagged behind American society in the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries.  As their civilian contemporaries adjusted educational theories and 
practices, and established new, specialized institutions of higher and postgraduate education 
according to a changing conception of professionalism, many army officers remained steadfastly 
anti-intellectual, implicitly endorsing an outdated conception of professionalism based on 
personal identification and self-study.   
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This situation was partly by choice.  The U.S. Army consciously idolized the Civil War 
generation and resisted most attempts to alter the methods and systems that produced it.  It 
smacks of irony, then, to consider that some of the luminaries most closely associated with late-
nineteenth century proposals for military reform —including Emory Upton, William T. Sherman, 
and John M. Schofield—had been Civil War generals.  Despite attempts at reform, cultural 
predilections that had become ingrained in the very fabric of the institution over the course of an 
entire century proved too difficult to break.  The army and its officer corps rejected suggestions 
that it needed to modernize its educational systems and practices. 
But this was also partly the result of circumstance.  The U.S. Army could not completely 
adopt a conception of professionalism based on specialized training and education, and an 
educational system appropriate for that conception, throughout much of the late-nineteenth 
century because of its small size and its disposition on the frontier.  The American frontier was 
both a place and a process that heavily influenced the army’s institutional practices and thought 
on officer development.  The U.S. Army simply could not completely adopt the educational 
philosophies and methods proposed by civil and military reformers until well after its mission 
and disposition were no longer so heavily intertwined with and influenced by the realities and 
perceptions of the American frontier.
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CHAPTER 2 
The School of Experience:  
The Frontier and its Impact on the U.S. Army 
 In 1922, the journalist Samuel Crowther interviewed George W. Goethals.  Success in 
Panama had made Goethals somewhat of a celebrity, and enterprising reporters like Crowther 
would, from time to time, seek interviews with the famed engineer to produce articles that would 
appeal to an interested national audience.  Hoping to explore the challenges associated with 
building the Panama Canal, Crowther may have been a little frustrated when the retired major 
general observed, “The hardest task I ever had . . . was a bridge that I built over the Spokane 
River . . . for I never had built a bridge, and I did not know much about bridge building.”1 
Goethals’s experience as a young lieutenant in 1882 was not uncommon.  It reflected the 
state of officer development in the United States Army during the late-nineteenth century.  The 
army was not an institution that actively developed its leaders.  Rather, it was an institution that 
could identify the need to build a bridge and send an officer utterly lacking expertise and 
experience to build it, either completely unaware of the officer’s lack of qualifications or 
confident that the officer would eventually figure it out.  Although the army trusted that officers 
would learn and develop through their individual experiences, it did very little to control or 
standardize officers’ careers in order to ensure some level of parity in the type and quality of 
experiences from which its officers were expected to learn.  The process by which the army 
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assigned officers to different duties throughout their careers was unregulated and highly 
dependent upon the perceptions and attitudes of the individuals who wrote the orders.  Beyond 
this, officers’ careers were shaped only to a small degree by formal, standardized training.  Such 
an unsystematic means of officer development was a product of the army’s frontier mission, 
structure, and disposition.2   
Nineteenth-century Americans perceived their western frontier in terms of both place and 
process.  As a place, they considered it to be land which they were entitled to possess.  Many 
also saw it an outlet for a national population that increased by at least 25 percent each decade of 
the century.3  Perhaps more importantly, many Americans believed that the expansion to the 
Pacific Ocean was a divinely-ordained process that strengthened the nation by spreading 
democracy and Christianity, improving civic-mindedness, and encouraging a rugged sense of 
individualism and self-reliance.4  Spurred by a complex variety of motivations, Americans 
worked individually and collectively throughout the nineteenth century to acquire and control, 
both physically and demographically, the American west.  George W. Goethals saw that goal 
realized during his lifetime.  In 1870, approximately two million Americans lived west of the 
                                                          
2 The career patterns of nineteenth century officers are well developed in Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army:  A 
Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1986), 42-103 and 
215-286. 
3 Throughout the nineteenth century, the population of the United States increased by a third in each decade prior to 
the Civil War, and by a quarter each decade after it.  See Walter Nugent, Habits of Empire: A History of American 
Expansion (New York: Vintage Books, 2009), 234. 
4 Frederick Jackson Turner, who rhapsodized that the frontier had accomplished just that as he declared it to be 
“closed” in 1893, provided one of the more famed articulations of this view—see Frederick Jackson Turner, “The 
Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in The Frontier in American History (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1920), 1-38.  But this view reflects what one historian equates to a “continuous narrative” that had been 
articulated well before by Thomas Jefferson in his “empire of liberty” speech.  See Nugent, Habits of Empire, xiii. 
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Missouri River.  By 1900, that number had increased to 10.4 million, and Americans generally 
considered their frontier to be a thing of the past.5 
Far from a relic of recent history, however, the frontier experience maintained its 
overwhelming influence upon the United States Army even into the early-twentieth century.  The 
frontier was an all-consuming and deeply habit-forming place and process that indelibly shaped 
its institutional culture.  The army had been central to the national experience of the frontier as 
the federal government’s “most visible agent” of expansion.6  With American expansion over 
vast territory, the relatively small United States Army had to economize its forces, dispersing 
small units among hundreds of small and relatively autonomous forts and outposts.  Its 
disposition forced the army to demand maximum output from its junior officers.  It simply could 
not afford to develop and institute robust systems of training and education that took junior 
officers away from their units for any significant period of time.  Instead, the army dispensed 
with a limited amount of formal training and education at the outset of officers’ careers and 
expected that its officers would learn their craft through experience while seeing to their 
operational responsibilities.   
Over time, however, concepts of officer development grounded in experiential learning 
born of necessity morphed into a cultural preference based less upon need than upon 
institutionalized habit.  Successive generations of officers developed largely without formal 
training.  Those who succeeded under such a system combined natural talents with exceptional 
                                                          
5 Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America (New York: Norton, 
2011), 458.  On perceptions of the frontier being “closed,” see Bruce Cumings, Dominon from Sea to Sea: Pacific 
Ascendancy and American Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 35-38. 
6 Robert K. Wooster, The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783-1900, 
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71 
 
abilities to learn and apply lessons derived from their and others’ experiences, and were fortunate 
to be placed in assignments which provided challenges and opportunities that allowed them to 
learn, grow, and display their talents.  Later in their careers, successful officers came to believe 
they owed their success to the unsystematic model of experiential learning to which they were 
accustomed.  As they assumed positions of institutional leadership, these officers extolled the 
virtues of experiential learning and attempted to further institutionalize it.  Consequently, the 
army’s experiential model of officer development transitioned from an operational necessity to a 
cultural norm that continued to shape the institution itself well after most Americans accurately 
perceived that their western frontier had ceased to exist.7     
***** 
 Fresh out of the Engineer School of Application at Willets Point, New York, Goethals 
reported for duty on the staff of the Department of the Columbia in November 1882, eager to 
play a small role in the U.S. Army’s expansive and complex frontier mission.8  Between the 
American Revolution and 1891, as American expansion sparked conflict with those who had 
long before claimed the land as their own, the U.S. Army waged dozens of campaigns against 
Native Americans from the Atlantic to the Pacific.9  But fighting did not define the army’s 
                                                          
7 This chapter examines George W. Goethals’s experiences in Washington Territory, as well as on the Ohio and 
Tennessee Rivers.  While neither the Ohio nor the Tennessee Rivers were located on the frontier, river improvement 
and canal construction were certainly missions of the frontier army, in that they were means of facilitating 
communications and trade throughout an expanding nation.  It is in that light that I categorize them as part of 
Goethals’s experiences with the frontier army and use them as examples of the theory and practice of experiential 
officer development within the frontier army. 
8 George W. Goethals, “Annual Report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1883,” October 1, 1883, File 3570, Box 
42, Entry 52, RG 77, NARA I, 1. 
9 For a general summary of U.S. Army campaigns against Native Americans, see Robert M. Utley and Wilcomb E. 
Washburn, Indian Wars, Mariner Books edition (Boston, MA: Mariner Books, 2002), chapters IV-XI.  For a study 
more focused upon campaigns after the Civil War, see Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army 
and the Indian, 1866-1891 (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1973), chapters 7-20.  
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frontier mission.  In fact, most soldiers spent far more of their careers on the army’s myriad other 
tasks on the frontier and supporting American expansion.  The army was regularly called upon to 
protect railroads, assist settlers traveling overland, deliver federal mail, conduct explorations and 
geographical surveys, and build the roads and canals that facilitated trade and communication 
throughout the expanding United States.  Still, its principal role on the frontier was to serve as a 
constabulary force, policing the frontier, and sometimes directing their efforts as much against 
rogue settlers antagonizing Indians as they did against the Native Americans themselves.10 
 The U.S. Army’s size did not match its expansive mission.  At the conclusion of the Civil 
War, the army was over 1,000,000 soldiers strong.  Only four years later, however, just under 
37,000 soldiers remained in the ranks.  Those soldiers were widely dispersed among 255 posts 
scattered throughout the western frontier and the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.   And while the army 
continued to trim its ranks—it fluctuated between a high of 28,565 and a low of 24,140 soldiers 
from the day George W. Goethals entered West Point in 1876 until the eve of war in 1898—it 
was not able to shed a proportional number of its posts.  While the army succeeded in closing 
some posts and consolidating some of its units at larger installations in the late 1880s, it 
remained a dispersed army forced into a heavy reliance on small-unit operations.  In 1889, the 
army’s 27,759 soldiers garrisoned just under 140 posts, the largest of which housed only 700 
soldiers.  Dispersed as it was, the U.S. Army’s ability to systematically educate and train its 
ranks was severely limited.11  
                                                          
10 A thorough analysis of the breadth of the U.S. Army’s frontier mission can be found in Michael L. Tate, The 
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Wooster, The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783-1900 (Albuquerque, NM: 
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 This disposition made the U.S. Army’s passive approach to officer development both 
natural and necessary.  As long as the army’s frontier mission and disposition remained 
unchanged, more robust systems of training and education were neither feasible nor advisable.  
Mature systems of military education and officer development could not take hold in an 
environment in which junior officers were decisively engaged in the day-to-day operations of an 
army that functioned largely at the small-unit and junior-officer level.  Junior officers frequently 
commanded units at small frontier outposts, unable to put aside the steady pace of their many 
and varied duties.  Perhaps understandably, the army preferred to maintain those who performed 
exceptionally well and demonstrated potential in their duties.  Rather than relieve them for 
further schooling and development, these junior officers were assigned to more immediate 
mission requirements by superior officers who were equally beleaguered by the breadth of their 
mission and the comparative paucity of their resources.  The army could do little else but hope 
that the experiences officers gained in the course of the execution of their duties would teach 
them all they needed to know to succeed at higher ranks.12 
Goethals’s first such experiences were with the Department of the Columbia, which 
encompassed all of Oregon, Washington Territory, and the district of Alaska, as well as most of 
Idaho Territory.  Since August 1881, Brigadier General Nelson A. Miles commanded the 
                                                          
War College, 1983), 7; and Jason Patrick Clark, “The Many Faces of Reform: Military Progressivism in the U.S. 
Army, 1866-1916” (PhD diss., Duke University, 2009), 61-62. 
12 It is worth noting too that the old army promoted at a glacial rates, and officers could be lieutenants and captains 
for decades.  On life for junior officers in the late-nineteenth century, see Coffman, The Old Army, 215-286.  
Commanding Generals William T. Sherman and John Schofield saw the need to insert more classroom education 
into officers’ careers and experimented with limited programs of reform, most notably Schofield’s lyceum program.  
But their efforts depended upon a broad willingness to change routines and habits that had become ingrained in the 
army’s institutional culture.  Such willingness proved to be largely absent; dulling the effect of Sherman’s and 
Schofield’s efforts.  See Coffman, The Old Army, 271-278; Donald B. Connelly, John M. Schofield and the Politics 
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department.  Famous for his campaigns in the Indian Wars, Miles would become the 
Commanding General of the army by the end of the century.13  Goethals was fortunate to be 
assigned to a functioning frontier department, gaining uncommon exposure to life with line units 
and officers outside the Corps of Engineers.  In 1883, only ten out of the 103 officers of all ranks 
in the Corps of Engineers performed duties in commands that included tactical units and soldiers 
of the line.14  At the same time, this undoubtedly proved to be a challenging assignment for a 
young lieutenant with no experience outside of West Point and the Engineer School of 
Application.  As the only engineer officer assigned to the command, he was by default the senior 
engineer in the department, and Miles expected him to be the resident expert on all engineering 
matters.  Goethals had only a somewhat limited base of theoretical knowledge to rely upon, and 
had no mentor to develop him.  
Additionally, the young lieutenant was not entirely lucky to be assigned to serve on the 
staff of the ever petulant and irascible Nelson Miles.  “Always fearful of conspiracies,” his 
biographer astutely notes, “Miles divided the world into two clearly distinguishable factions: 
those wise enough to agree with him and those mean-spirited enough to allow their jealousies to 
affect their judgment.”15  Surviving service under a commander with an infamously quick temper 
and legendary ability to bear grudges would be a tall order for any officer.  For a new lieutenant 
                                                          
13 Robert Wooster, Nelson A. Miles & the Twilight of the Frontier Army (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 
1993), 133.  For general information about the Department of the Columbia, see Walter R. Griffin, “George W. 
Goethals, Explorer of the Pacific Northwest, 1882-1884,” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 62, no. 4 (October 
1971): 130-133 and Wooster, Nelson A. Miles and the Twilight of the Frontier Army, chapter 8. 
14 For strength and disposition of Corps of Engineers officers, see U.S. Department of War, Report of the Secretary 
of War, 48th Cong., 1st sess., 1883, House Executive Document 1, Part 2, vol. II (Washington, DC:  Government 
Printing Office, 1883), 3-4.   
15 Wooster, Nelson A. Miles & the Twilight of the Frontier Army, 269. 
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finding his way in the army on his first assignment without the benefit of a mentor, it would 
prove to be an impossible task. 
Things started well enough.  Miles, who was on leave in Boston and Washington for the 
first six months of Goethals’s assignment to Vancouver Barracks, had identified regional 
development to support the expansion of railroads and settlements at the top of his department’s 
priorities.16 A considerable amount of land within the Department of the Columbia had not yet 
been adequately explored and mapped.  As the department’s engineer, Goethals spent much of 
his time exploring and mapping, particularly in the northern reaches of the Washington and 
Idaho Territories.  The bulk of his assignment to Vancouver Barracks was spent in the field 
conducting reconnaissance missions and exploration parties, as well as for laying out wagon 
roads, railroads, and telegraph lines.17   
With the same work ethic he demonstrated at West Point, Goethals was completely 
dedicated to his work.  His energetic efforts drew the notice of all who observed him, even at the 
highest levels.  Notably, Miles ordered Goethals to reconnoiter and plan the route for part of 
General Sherman’s tour of the Pacific Northwest in the summer of 1883.  Goethals deeply 
impressed Sherman, who reported to Secretary of War Robert T. Lincoln that Lieutenant 
Goethals was “a most intelligent young Engineer officer.”  Continuing, Sherman noted that 
Goethals had conducted a reconnaissance of the party’s route prior to its arrival, and had 
“submitted to me . . . his report with sketches, which I found most valuable and accurate, so that 
                                                          
16 Wooster, Nelson A. Miles & the Twilight of the Frontier Army, 134-135. 
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I resolved to adhere strictly to his advice though it differed somewhat from my own preference 
based on the best information at Washington.”18  Sherman was so impressed that he told Miles 
that Goethals was “one of the most promising men in the Army,” and forwarded the maps 
Goethals prepared to Lincoln so they could be copied and used in the various War Department 
offices in Washington.19  Miles expressed his own confidence in Goethals by ordering him to 
escort General Sherman’s party for two weeks in August 1883, before diverting him to assist a 
cavalry detachment attempting to locate a pass through the Cascade Mountains.20    
 While most of Goethals’s duties at Vancouver Barracks involved reconnaissance and 
mapmaking, he also gained limited experience in civil and military engineering.  He selected 
sites and planned for the construction of new buildings on post, planned a new post cemetery, 
and constructed roads within the department.21  In October 1883, the Spokane River washed out 
the only bridge that could be used to sustain Fort Spokane, home of the 2nd Infantry Regiment.  
Miles hurried Goethals to the site to consult with the regimental commander and build a new 
bridge as quickly as possible.  Goethals later described the construction of this small bridge as 
“the hardest task I ever had,” in an interview eight years after he completed the construction of 
the Panama Canal.  Relatively unschooled and completely inexperienced in building bridges 
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more intricate than a simple pontoon bridge, and in the unfortunate position of still being the 
most knowledgeable officer present, Goethals set to work.  He learned how to build a bridge on 
the job.  Goethals would recall in 1922 that “it might not have been hard for a bridge engineer,” 
as a bridge engineer “would have known exactly what to do.”  Goethals did not. “I had to find 
out as we went along,” he explained years later.  In order to complete the work, he “had to read 
books all night and give orders all day.”  Despite these difficulties, Goethals succeeded.  “We 
built the bridge,” he boasted, “and on time.”22 
Goethals entered his second year of duty at Vancouver Barracks glowing with 
satisfaction from his work and the praise it brought him, unaware that he was soon to experience 
a perhaps inevitable fall from Nelson Miles’s grace.  Since assuming command of the 
Department of the Columbia, Miles had developed a keen interest in Alaska, unsuccessfully 
badgering both Secretary of War Lincoln and Congress to appropriate funds for him to organize 
an expedition to explore its interior.  Miles eventually took matters into his own hands.  
Inventing the justification of “frequent reports of disturbances of the peace between the whites 
and Indians in Alaska,” he dispatched a seven-man expedition up the Yukon River led by his 
aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Frederick Schwatka.  Although they revealed little that was not already 
known about the region, Schwatka’s subsequent reports reanimated public interest in Alaska and 
encouraged Miles to dispatch additional expeditions.23 
Possibly because of his impressive performance reconnoitering for Sherman’s tour, Miles 
approached Goethals in early 1884 about leading one such Alaskan expedition, a small three-
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man party.  Goethals declined the assignment.  Having somehow found the time to begin a 
courtship and become engaged to Effie Rodman, the daughter of a prosperous whaler from New 
Bedford, Massachusetts and the visiting sister of one of a fellow lieutenant at Vancouver 
Barracks, Goethals had a wedding on his mind.  Lucky to have found and successfully wooed an 
eligible young lady in a remote and barren social setting, Goethals was eager to marry and had 
no interest in interrupting those plans.  His refusal enraged Miles.  Always fearful of conspiracies 
and quick to assume ill-intent, it did not take much for Nelson Miles to banish someone from his 
trusted inner circle.  After this incident, Goethals was most definitely on the outside.  Miles 
hastily sent a letter to the Adjutant General requesting Goethals’s relief.  The request was 
promptly forwarded to the Chief of Engineers for consideration, who decided to transfer 
Goethals to an engineering district in Cincinnati, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel 
William E. Merrill.  The Adjutant General issued the necessary orders, and Goethals departed 
Vancouver Barracks in September, 1884.24  
  The assignment at Vancouver Barracks provided Goethals with the first practical 
experiences of his career.  He learned much about working with troops of the line, 
reconnaissance, and mapmaking—all skills that would prove useful later in his career during the 
War with Spain.  At the same time, while serving on Miles’s staff, Goethals was an 
inexperienced officer in the unenviable position of being the sole expert on all things related to 
engineering in the Department of the Columbia.  While he proved on more than one occasion to 
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be capable of learning on the job and performing his duties well, he suffered from the absence of 
a more experienced engineer officer to serve as his mentor.  By 1884, Goethals had been an 
engineer for four years.  In that time, he had gained no practical experience in constructing and 
maintaining coastal fortifications or planning and directing river and harbor improvements, 
missions to which the Corps of Engineers assigned the majority of its officers when Goethals had 
first reported to Vancouver Barracks.25   
In all likelihood, Goethals was blissfully unaware of the significance of these 
deficiencies.  The army’s habit of entrusting young officers to develop themselves was 
problematic because those officers understandably had little awareness of what they did not 
know.  But Goethals soon found an excellent mentor who was willing and able to mitigate the 
shortcomings in his early professional development.  By a sheer stroke of luck—angering Miles 
to so great an extent that the general requested his relief at the precise moment a duty position for 
an engineer lieutenant was opening in Cincinnati—Goethals fell under the tutelage of a titan in 
the field.  This not only forced the young lieutenant to grapple with his lack of experience, but it 
also took innovative measures to remedy those inadequacies. 
Early in his new assignment with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers First Cincinnati 
District, Goethals conducted the preliminary investigation for a potential river improvement 
project near New Albany Harbor, Indiana.  He dutifully examined the river and its commercial 
traffic and spoke at length with local landowners.  In his report, Goethals wrote, “When the river 
is high enough to cover the bottom lands, it is stated that the force of the current sweeps over 
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these lands from the mouth of Falling Run to Middle Creek, and it is anticipated that in time the 
soil will be entirely cut away, and the channel will then run in this direction instead of crossing 
into the Kentucky shore, as it does now.”26  As Merrill, chief of the First Cincinnati District, 
prepared to forward a copy to the Chief of Engineers in Washington, D.C., he drafted a letter to 
be included with Goethals’s report.  “It has been suggested,” he began, “that there is a 
probability of the river changing its channel, and making a cut-off through Middle Creek.”  
Dismissing the notion, Merrill wrote, “I cannot see the slightest likelihood of such a change, as 
the route by way of Middle Creek is as long as the present channel, and there is therefore every 
inducement for the river to continue through the present open door rather than to batter down the 
side wall to make a new channel, neither shorter nor straighter than that in which it now flows.”  
His inexperienced subordinate had much to learn about rivers and river improvements.27 
Goethals found that the First Cincinnati District was an excellent place to learn.  Its 
responsibilities included river improvements along the Ohio River and several of its tributaries—
including the Monongahela River in Pennsylvania and West Virginia, the Allegheny River in 
Pennsylvania, and the Muskingum River in Ohio.  Projects on the Ohio River demanded the vast 
majority of the district’s time and resources, to such an extent that the Chief of Engineers created 
the Second Cincinnati District in 1880 to take responsibility for several tributaries of the Ohio 
and relieve some of Merrill’s burden.  The engineers in Cincinnati continued a half-century-long 
effort that had begun in 1824.  At normal water stages, navigation was treacherous and 
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problematic at many points along the river.  At lower stages, large swaths of the river were 
impassable.28   
Prior to the Civil War, the focus was on maintaining a channel in the river at least thirty 
inches deep, which would allow easy passage for most types of commonly-used, shallow-draft 
steamers.  Engineers busied themselves with dredging channels in some sections of the river and 
constructing wing dams along river embankments in other parts, attempting to increase the depth 
of the river by concentrating its flow and restricting its width.  They also spent much time and 
effort removing snags in the river caused by the buildup of rocks, trees, and other debris after 
storms and floods.  Their work allowed commerce to flow relatively freely, except during winter 
months when ice flows threatened commercial shipping, especially on the uppermost reaches of 
the river and its northern tributaries.29  
After the Civil War, the Corps of Engineers became more heavily engaged on the Ohio 
River.  In addition to managing improvement efforts, army engineers received orders to operate 
and maintain the Louisville and Portland Canal in Kentucky after Congress purchased it from 
private owners.  Additionally, new technology and shipping techniques were rendering old 
approaches to river improvements obsolete.  By 1870, the heyday of shallow-draft steamboats 
had passed, quickly being replaced by tugboats pushing or pulling several interconnected barges 
at a time.  The new barge-tugboat system was ideally suited for easily transporting bulk goods 
and commodities by river, but the tugs and barges carried a deeper draft.  River commerce now 
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needed a consistent channel depth of six feet—more than the dredging and wing dams upon 
which army engineers had previously relied could provide.30            
In June 1870, Merrill took charge of what eventually became the First Cincinnati District.  
He had graduated at the top of West Point’s class of 1859 and saw service in the Civil War 
shortly thereafter.  After the war, Merrill was assigned to the Mississippi River Commission, 
where he soon gained a reputation as a leading expert on the construction of large railroad 
bridges over inland waterways, and as a soldier with an aptitude for solving complex problems in 
nontraditional ways.  That aptitude and the need to deepen the channel along the upper Ohio 
River to six feet inspired his designs for the Davis Island Lock and Dam.  This was the most 
radical and significant engineering project on the Ohio River in the late-nineteenth century, and 
the endeavor was entering its final year of construction when Goethals reported for duty.31   
The Davis Island Lock and Dam was necessary because Pittsburgh was a hostage of 
climate and geography.  Although its position at the confluence of the Allegheny and 
Monongahela to form the Ohio River imbued it with vast commercial potential and attracted 
industrialists to the area, the water levels around Pittsburgh dropped sharply during dry weather, 
often to a depth of mere inches, bringing all shipping and river trade to a standstill.   Such dry 
spells usually lasted for several months, causing seasonal economic downturns that extended 
downriver to Cincinnati, Louisville, and other burgeoning towns where industries and 
communities depended upon coal shipments from Pittsburgh.32   
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The situation in 1871 was particularly extreme.  The Ohio River became prohibitively 
shallow in May, and did not rise again until the following winter.  Coal and goods earmarked for 
points downriver lingered idly in Pittsburgh’s once bustling warehouses.  Moreover, there was 
no longer a navigable water route to ship the coal mined from the Monongahela River Basin that 
fueled Pittsburgh’s factories and plants to the industrial district on the northern side of the city.  
The coal had to be transported from the landings on the Monongahela in convoys of mule-drawn 
wagons through the heart of downtown Pittsburgh, causing traffic jams and significant damage to 
city streets not designed to bear such a heavy weight.  Reacting to what had become an 
intolerable situation, Pittsburgh’s industrial and business leaders, with the active support of 
businesses and communities down the Ohio River Valley, petitioned the Corps of Engineers to 
develop a permanently navigable harbor on the Ohio River at Pittsburgh.33  
Merrill had already been considering ways to canalize the Ohio in order to increase its 
channel depth to six feet.  He had come to believe that a system of locks and dams was the 
appropriate solution.  When the petition to develop a harbor at Pittsburgh reached his desk, 
Merrill proposed to build an entire system of locks and dams along the Ohio River, beginning 
with a first set five miles downriver from Pittsburgh, near Davis Island.  His plan, however, drew 
strong objections from Pittsburgh’s coal shippers.34   
Utterly confused as to why coal shippers would oppose a measure that would ostensibly 
make shipping easier, Merrill accompanied a coal barge on a trip downriver to investigate what 
they found objectionable.  He learned that locks are especially problematic to towboats guiding 
large numbers of barges.  A boat with several barges connected by a complex system of chains 
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and cables would have to pause in front of a lock, “break tow” to get all barges through, and 
pause again on the far side of a lock to reassemble their barges.  As the coal fleets could only 
move downriver during higher water stages that usually lasted for just three days, forcing the 
fleet to break tow and pass through a lock one at a time would mean that only one-third of 
Pittsburgh’s coal fleet could be used during any given high water stage.35 
Merrill determined that in order to meet the needs of all parties concerned, he would have 
to develop a unique lock-and-dam system with two defining characteristics.  First, the locks 
needed to have larger dimensions than any others that existed at the time in order to allow 
solitary ships and smaller tow-and-barge systems through at any time.  Second, the locks would 
be complemented by novel, not-yet-designed movable dams that could be raised in order to build 
a navigable harbor upriver from the dam at low water stages, and lowered to allow large coal 
shipments to pass through without “breaking tow” during high water stages.  Nothing of the sort 
had ever been attempted in the United States, so Merrill searched abroad for inspiration, 
triggering an unprecedented exchange of hydraulic technology between the United States and 
Europe.36 
Pouring over European models, Chanoine dams then in use on the Seine River caught 
Merrill’s attention.  In the Chanoine design, French engineers employed a series of rectangular 
wooden or metal panels, known as “wickets,” placed side by side.  In the lowered position, the 
wickets lie parallel with the river bottom, resting flat on top of a dam foundation with metal 
supports and mechanical apparatuses that, when activated, raise the wickets upward at steep 
angle to reach the raised position.  In the raised position, the force of the water pushing 
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downriver against the face of the wickets locks the supports into place in the dam foundation, 
thus forming an effective dam.  Merrill planned a system in which a Chanoine dam would 
connect on one side of the river with a lock, which he designed to be 110 feet wide and 600 feet 
long.37   
Initially, construction was limited to one lock and dam at Davis Island.  Merrill believed 
that a system of similar structures would prove to be the most effective solution to the problem 
of creating a consistent six-foot channel in the Ohio River.  At the same time, he understood that 
his concept for the Davis Island Lock and Dam was quite radical and needed to be proven before 
it could be replicated.  Seven years after construction began and only months before it would be 
completed, Merrill wrote that the purpose of the Davis Island project was not only to improve the 
harbor at Pittsburgh, but also, and more importantly, “to demonstrate the only way of radically 
improving the navigation of the Ohio River.”  Merrill “hoped and expected” that his work would 
be “so successful as to lead to a demand for others like it,” but thought it “best not to press the 
matter until the pioneer dam . . . fully demonstrated its usefulness.”38 
 Merrill managed many other projects in addition to the Davis Island Lock and Dam, and 
certainly could not handle his entire mission alone.  Like other engineer district chiefs, his staff 
included civilian assistants and one engineer lieutenant.  His lieutenants came to look up to him 
as an almost fatherly figure as he demonstrated genuine interest in their development as 
engineers and officers.39  Merrill’s approach to officer development was based on an implicit 
recognition that lieutenants at that time did not follow a standardized career path and had unique 
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and distinct bases of knowledge built upon unique and distinct prior experiences.  Accordingly, 
he tailored his approach to each officer’s level of experience. 
 Prior to Goethals’s arrival, Lieutenant Frederick A. Mahan was Merrill’s assistant.  
Mahan had worked under Merrill on the Ohio since 1872.  He was also the son of Dennis Hart 
Mahan, who had served as the chair of West Point’s Department of Civil and Military 
Engineering from 1832 until his death in 1871 and had written the texts still used in the 
academy’s engineering classes.  He arrived with an uncommon breadth of theoretical knowledge 
and practical experience.  Lieutenant Mahan’s vast knowledge led Merrill to develop Mahan by 
challenging him with incrementally increasing levels of responsibility.  Merrill first had Mahan 
assist him in studying foreign concepts of movable dams, and then brought Mahan into the 
planning process for the Davis Island project.  As the plans continued to be developed, Merrill 
placed his talented subordinate in charge of several smaller dam construction and channel 
improvement projects elsewhere along the Ohio River.  With Mahan succeeding in every mission 
assigned to him, Merrill decided that he was ready for a major project.40  
 In 1875, Merrill convinced the Chief of Engineers to extend Mahan’s assignment at 
Cincinnati so that he could assign the lieutenant as the engineer directly in charge of construction 
at Davis Island.  From 1878 to 1884, Mahan oversaw construction at Davis Island, responsible 
for not only the execution of Merrill’s plans, but also the hiring and management of a civilian 
staff and labor force.  Merrill saw to the rest of his district, loosely supervised Mahan, and 
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maintained personal control of higher-level organizational systems and logistics that supported 
the Davis Island project.41 
In 1884, after twelve years of service in the same assignment, Mahan earned a promotion 
to captain and transferred out of the First Cincinnati District, replaced in September of that year 
by Goethals after he made the long journey from Vancouver Barracks.  Merrill learned of his 
new subordinate’s background and knew that he did not have the requisite knowledge or 
experience to manage the Davis Island construction site.  Accordingly, he made arrangements for 
one of his civilian assistants to take charge of the work.  He had other plans to remedy his new 
lieutenant’s lack of experience in inland river engineering.   
Wanting to make a good first impression, Goethals reported to Merrill in an immaculately 
clean dress uniform.  Merrill looked him over and curtly informed Goethals that if he wished to 
continue to wear that uniform, he could remain in the office for clerical duties; but if he wanted 
to learn how to be an engineer, he would thereafter report in clothes more suitable for hard work 
in the field.  Merrill was as much a product of the school of experience as Goethals would 
become, and was an avid proponent of the benefits of experiential learning.  Accordingly, he 
created a controlled and calculated program of practical instruction for Goethals.42   
Frequently wearing overalls on duty, Goethals became a student in Merrill’s improvised 
academy of river improvements.  Some of his education involved conducting the preliminary 
examinations of potential new projects within the division, from which he could learn how to 
discern which projects were necessary and feasible.  Most of his training took place within and 
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among civilian work crews.  He started at the very bottom and worked his way up as he mastered 
the various tasks on each crew, serving first as a rodman on hydrographic surveys, then as the 
chief of a surveying party, then as the foreman of a concrete team, and finally as the chief of 
construction for a small project.  Goethals’s assignments took him not only through the various 
aspects of the Davis Island Lock and Dam project as it neared completion, but also to various 
other construction, repair, and dredging projects along the Ohio and some of its tributaries from 
Pennsylvania to Kentucky.43  
Merrill and his engineers finally completed the Davis Island Lock and Dam in the late 
summer of 1885, and subjected it to two months of tests before it was finally opened for public 
use in early October.  The Ohio River Commission and Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce 
planned a grand opening and dedication ceremony for the occasion, and asked Merrill for a list 
of officers who contributed to the effort, so that they could invite those officers to the ceremony.  
Merrill included Goethals on the list, but Goethals was unable to attend, having been ordered to 
West Point in August 1885 to serve as an instructor in the Department of Civil and Military 
Engineering.44 
In 1889, after four years of drilling cadets in daily classroom recitations of civil 
engineering lessons, Goethals received orders to return river duty in Cincinnati.  This time, he 
was assigned to the sleepy Second Cincinnati District, which had been created to manage routine 
work on several tributaries to the Ohio River while Merrill’s division focused almost exclusively 
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on the Ohio itself.45  He did not have time to settle in before he received new orders.  Another 
engineer lieutenant, Graham D. Fitch, had received orders to transfer from Milwaukee to the 
Nashville District in order to assist Lieutenant Colonel John W. Barlow’s efforts to improve the 
Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.  Prior to arriving in Nashville, however, Lieutenant Fitch 
grew so ill that his ability to continue serving in the army was in doubt.  The Chief of Engineers 
ordered him to Washington to be evaluated by a medical board.  Viewing the projects in the 
Nashville District as critically important, the Chief of Engineers then searched for a lieutenant to 
fill the vacancy in Nashville.  Because he had just arrived and did not have time to become an 
essential part of any work in Cincinnati, Goethals received orders to report to Barlow in 
Nashville.46  This was an important stroke of good fortune for Goethals. Work on the Tennessee 
River would challenge Goethals more than anything in his career to date and provided 
opportunities that proved to be important stepping stones to the Panama Canal. 
Inhabitants of the Tennessee River Valley developed a strong interest in the commercial 
potential of their river when steamboats began plying the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers after the 
steamboat Enterprise made the first journey on that route in 1815.  But there were significant 
hazards impeding navigation of the Tennessee, particularly in its middle section between 
Chattanooga and Waterloo.  The sharp bends below Chattanooga, known in the nineteenth 
century as “the Suck,” were particularly dangerous even for experienced hands.  The real 
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problem, though, lay nearly two hundred miles downriver from Chattanooga, at northern 
Alabama’s Muscle Shoals.47  
 The Muscle Shoals region contained four separate hazards.  Moving downriver from east 
to west, a boat would first encounter an area of wide shallows at the Elk River Shoals just after 
passing Brown’s Ferry.   After negotiating the shallows, the boat would next come upon Big 
Muscle Shoals, a fifteen-mile stretch of rapids and cascades in which the river fell a total of 
eighty-five feet.  The channel here was narrow where it existed at all.  Big Muscle Shoals had 
formed because of the presence of flinty, non-eroding rocks deposited on top of and among the 
limestone and sandstone that is generally prevalent throughout the entire riverbed of the 
Tennessee.  With the river unable to cut a channel through these unyielding rocks, this area 
became a wide, shallow basin full of cascades, reefs, and river islands.  It was so wide, in fact, 
that a fifty-foot rise in the river at Chattanooga would only produce a five-foot rise at Big Muscle 
Shoals.  Three miles downriver from Big Muscle Shoals lay Little Muscle Shoals.  This was a 
four-mile-long, slightly-less-extreme version of its larger cousin.  The town of Florence, 
Alabama lay one mile further downriver, just above Colbert and Bee Tree Shoals, an eight-mile 
stretch of shallows and shoals made up of sand, broken gravel, and rocks in which the river fell 
another twenty feet in elevation.48 
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 While Colbert and Bee Tree Shoals could not be ignored, Little Muscle Shoals, Big 
Muscle Shoals, and Elk River Shoals were more significant problems.  Together, they constituted 
thirty-seven miles of nearly continuous hazards, with Big Muscle Shoals and Elk River Shoals 
being an absolute obstruction to navigation of the river, except during periods of extremely high 
water.  According to engineers who surveyed the area in 1867, there was “no channel at low 
water in this part of the river,” and “in many places a person can walk across the river without 
wetting his feet.”  They reported that “the lightest flatboat cannot descend the shoals without 
being assisted in many places on rollers.”49 
 Muscle Shoals, situated roughly at the midpoint of the river, effectively divided the upper 
and lower Tennessee into two separate rivers for trade and commerce.  A major trade imbalance 
developed between them.  Steamboats could ply the waters between Paducah, Kentucky and 
Florence, Alabama with relative ease, but communities upriver from Florence could only ship 
goods downriver during the two or three months out of the year when conditions were good 
enough to allow flatboats to traverse the shoals.  Otherwise, these communities had to rely on 
small keelboats.  Business owners in Knoxville tried to entice steamers to run the gauntlet at high 
water stages in the 1820s and 1830s, but the journey was more risky than profitable.  On average, 
only one steamer made the attempt per year.50 
 The only viable solution to problems posed by the Muscle Shoals hazards appeared to be 
a lateral canal around the lengthy belt of obstacles.  The first attempt to build a canal was 
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managed by the state of Alabama.  Its plans were ambitious, and proved to be far too expensive.  
Frustrated engineers were forced to scale back their plans, building a canal at Big Muscle Shoals 
just over fourteen miles long, sixty feet wide, and six feet deep, with seventeen locks to mitigate 
the descent of the river.  Although the canal’s design and construction were sound, the decision 
to limit all improvement efforts to Big Muscle Shoals doomed the effort to insignificance and 
oblivion.  The canal opened in 1836 and was nearly useless, unreachable on either end except at 
during periods of peak water levels because its engineers had taken no measures to facilitate 
navigation through the Elk River Shoals above the canal or Little Muscle Shoals below the canal.  
The canal fell into disuse and disrepair after 1838.51   
 Advocacy for river improvement projects at Muscle Shoals increased significantly after 
the Civil War.  Opening the river for commercial navigation from its head to its mouth was 
viewed widely as a way to stimulate the region’s economy and hasten its recovery from the 
war.52  The Muscle Shoals area remained impassable for large vessels, and although 
communities on the upper Tennessee built their own steamboats for local trade, they remained 
unable to ship goods downriver to Paducah and beyond.  This frustrated the rapidly developing 
commercial-industrial sector in Chattanooga, where businesses saw a viable river route as both a 
means of transportation for their goods and a means of checking the rising power and prices of 
the railroads.  In 1871, responding to advocates for renewed Tennessee River improvements, the 
Corps of Engineers established a new district under Major Walter McFarland at Chattanooga.  
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The district was charged with ensuring open navigation of the full river for at least nine months 
per year.53 
 McFarland devoted the bulk of his time to studying the problem and developing plans for 
a new system of improvements in the Muscle Shoals region.  He developed a concept centered 
on restoring and expanding the first canal at Big Muscle Shoals, and addressing the problems at 
Elk River Shoals and Little Muscle Shoals in order to facilitate access to the main canal.  At Elk 
River Shoals, McFarland intended to build a short, two-lock canal and blast a channel through a 
reef that separated the foot of that canal from the head of Big Muscle Shoals.  There, he planned 
to expand, widen, and strengthen the old canal; consolidate its seventeen-lock system into nine 
locks; dam the creeks and ravines that emptied into the canal; and carry the canal over the mouth 
of Shoal Creek by constructing an aqueduct ninety feet long and sixty feet wide.  At Little 
Muscle Shoals, McFarland believed that the channel could be deepened and the rapid current 
managed through dredging and the construction of wing dams along the embankments of the 
river. Ready to proceed, the renewed work at Muscle Shoals hit its first delay when the building 
that doubled as McFarland’s house and headquarters, where the only copies of the canal plans 
were kept, burned to the ground on January 13, 1874.54  
 Work finally began in 1875 under contracted labor, but soon encountered more 
difficulties and delays.  Problems with contractors, disease in the laborers’ camps, and a dearth 
of appropriations caused significant delays.  In 1876, McFarland was reassigned to duty along 
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the Canadian border and replaced by Major William R. King, who led the project for a decade, 
making important enhancements and corrections to the effort.  Despite King’s efforts, 
construction at Muscle Shoals fell behind schedule.  Funding was a perennial problem that 
caused engineers to cut back on their labor force, further slowing the effort.  Also, work paused 
when the notorious Jesse James gang robbed the district’s paymaster while he made his way 
from a bank in Florence to the engineer camp at Big Muscle Shoals on March 11, 1881.  Enraged 
engineers and laborers formed a posse and pursued the robbers until losing their trail on the 
banks of the Cumberland River, effectively putting off any canal work whatsoever until they 
returned from their pursuit.  With delays varying in cause and duration, the work dragged on.55 
 Lieutenant Colonel Barlow assumed control of the district in 1886, just as the Corps of 
Engineers expanded the district’s scope of responsibility to include improvements on the 
Cumberland River as well as the Tennessee River.56  Drawn to the most recent addition to the 
district’s enlarged mission, Barlow devoted more of his time and energy to the Cumberland than 
to the Tennessee.  He envisioned improving navigation on the Cumberland by constructing a 
system of thirty locks and dams similar to Merrill’s brainchild on the Ohio.  As work began in 
1888 a short distance upriver from Nashville on the first lock and dam in the system, Barlow 
moved his district headquarters from Chattanooga to Nashville.  When citizens of Chattanooga 
held a mass meeting to protest the move, Barlow insisted that the work on Muscle Shoals was 
almost complete, and that he was therefore needed more in Nashville—where the Cumberland 
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project was in its infancy and required more attention.  George Goethals reported for duty to 
Barlow at the Nashville District headquarters in October 1889.57 
 Barlow’s reports leave little evidence indicating how he employed or interacted with 
Goethals.  In Goethals’s efficiency report for 1890, Barlow demonstrated a favorable opinion of 
his lieutenant, describing him as “energetic, industrious, prompt, & efficient in performance of 
duty,” and “a true gentleman, an accomplished engineer, and a thorough army officer.”  But this 
report also hints at a lack of familiarity with his subordinate, as some of the remaining comments 
were copied verbatim from the individual report that Goethals had to produce summarizing his 
professional reading and study outside of the normal scope of his duties.58  More generally, 
Barlow’s reports on the district’s operations leave little evidence that he had any military or 
civilian subordinates at all.  Presumably, then, Barlow was either extraordinarily active, taking a 
direct and hands-on approach to managing work on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers and 
delegating little to his subordinates—or he was unhesitant to assume full credit for everything 
that happened in the district without acknowledging those in local control of the division’s many 
projects.59 
 Barlow attempted to shoulder an impossibly heavy load on his own.  As the pace of 
construction on the Cumberland increased, he began to lose control and awareness of work on 
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the Muscle Shoals.  Describing progress made on the canals at Muscle and Elk River Shoals 
between July 1, 1889 and June 30, 1890, Barlow reported that “the eleven locks were completed 
and are in working order.”  Later, in the appendix attached to this report, Barlow indicated that as 
of June 30, none of the nine locks at Big Muscle Shoals, nor either of the two locks at Elk River 
Shoals were operable because all of the locks were still missing the machinery needed to operate 
their gates and valves.  Furthermore, tests of the locks had revealed major structural problems in 
the canal.  He revealed some of these setbacks to a local newspaper in January 1890, which 
reported that “a system of hydraulic engines will have to be put in at each lock, to facilitate their 
working as they are under to[o] high a pressure to be worked readily by hand.”60 
   While Barlow’s reports about Muscle Shoals to his superiors were inconsistent, the 
information he gave to the communities affected by the project was misleading at best.  As early 
as the summer of 1889, the people of Florence, Alabama anticipated the imminent opening of the 
canal.  This community viewed itself as a rising commercial center and looked to the opening of 
the canal as the key to its future power and prosperity.  The issues of the Florence Herald reveal 
much about the town’s relationship with Barlow and his answers to the town’s inquiries about 
the canal.  In June 1889 it reported on a pending grand opening ceremony.  In August, an article 
proclaimed, “It is confidently assured that the Tennessee River will be opened for through 
navigation on September 1,” and that “only a little finishing up remains to be done.”  The 
following spring, the editors were “reliably informed that work on the canal is nearing 
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completion.”  And in May 1890, they “learned that the Muscle Shoals canal would be ready to 
open in June, if no mishap occurred.”61 
 By 1890, work at Muscle Shoals had been in progress for fifteen years, and the 
communities along the Tennessee River, particularly those around and upriver from the shoals, 
were growing restless.  In June, one member of Florence’s Chamber of Commerce complained to 
his congressman that “Col. Barlow told me 18 mos [months] ago that he thought the canal would 
be opened July 1, 1889, but for some reason the work has dragged along from year to year in the 
most unreasonable manner.”62 An enterprising reporter from the Chattanooga Times pressed 
Lieutenant Colonel Barlow on the matter in March.  The resulting non-answer was reported in 
the Florence Herald shortly thereafter: “He said in effect that if the water didn’t go any higher 
and if the masonry stood the present test and if it didn’t take too long to make the repairs now 
necessary, it was probable that in the course of four weeks he might be able to say something.”63 
 Florence had grown quite tired of Barlow’s equivocations.  The Herald fired a broadside 
at Barlow in its issue July 9, 1890 issue. The editors lamented that work on the canal had 
“dragged its slow length for more than a generation . . . a formal opening has been promised year 
after year, the patience of those most vitally interested has been exemplary, and still we have no 
more than promises.”  Demanding a resolution to the problem, they declared that “the time has 
gone by, however, for promises to be satisfactory” because “the growing interests along the 
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Tennessee have, within the last few years, grown too great and strong to be fed on such airy 
meat.”64 
The community’s frustration matched that of Brigadier General Thomas Casey, then 
serving as the army’s Chief of Engineers.  Since the fall of 1889, he had been steadily increasing 
pressure on Barlow to explain the delays and articulate an appropriate plan of action so “a final 
presentation of the matter can be made, and the commercial interests of that section of the 
country know for a certainty what it can depend upon in the future.”65  Tired of the delays, 
concerned about opening the river before anticipated decisions in the fall regarding a potential 
increase in railroad fares, Casey considered drastic options to resolve the problem. 
Hearing rumors of his possible relief, Barlow wrote to Alabama’s powerful Joseph 
Wheeler, an ex-Confederate general and sitting congressman from northern Alabama, asking if 
the rumors were true.  “If such a project is on foot,” he complained, “it must have originated, I 
think, from the pressure brought to bear on the Washington authorities to have the canal opened 
at an early day.”  With a note of indignance, he wrote, “To relieve me just now would to my 
mind imply censure and I don’t think I deserve it” because “it would be like depriving an officer 
of command near the close of the battle, on the eve of victory or defeat.”66  Seeking to save his 
position, Barlow turned to his lieutenant.  Several days after writing to Wheeler, Barlow wrote to 
General Casey, “I have the honor to report that 1st Lieut. Geo. W. Goethals, Corps of Engineers, 
has been assigned—subject to the approval of the Chief of Engineers—to the local charge of the 
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work of improving the Tennessee River, between Decatur, Ala. and Waterloo, Ala.”  Continuing, 
he explained that “the necessity for his services in local charge of this work” had become “more 
urgent than the temporary duty to which he was assigned at Nashville, Tenn.”67 
Willing to wait and see how this new arrangement would work out, Casey agreed to the 
request and allowed Barlow to continue his duties at Nashville.  At the time, Goethals was 
already in the area leading a survey of Little Muscle Shoals.  Barlow ordered him to finish the 
survey, then “establish an office, and take station temporarily at Florence” in order to complete 
and open the Muscle Shoals Canal in time to allow passage through the canal prior to a 
scheduled hearing on railroad rates in Chattanooga that fall.  Goethals complied and assumed 
local control of the Muscle Shoals Canal on August 11, 1890.68  
   He soon discovered that the canal had a number of major structural problems.  Sections 
of the canal walls and embankments failed to retain water when the canal was filled to maximum 
capacity.  The problem was most extreme below the highest lock in the system, where water 
passed freely through the embankment and threatened the structural integrity of the canal’s 
retaining walls.  The necessary repair work had been underway for some time prior to his arrival 
in Florence, but Goethals found that it was not being carried on with a sense of urgency.  He 
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organized two shifts for twenty-four hour operations on the canal and took personal charge of the 
night shift to complete the repairs.69   
By October, the repairs were mostly complete, and tests validated the structural integrity 
of the canal.  Having learned from Barlow’s mistakes the importance of fostering open and 
cordial relations with the interested public, Goethals invited several journalists and residents of 
Florence to tour the canal, and observe preparations to open it for navigation.  To much local 
acclaim, Goethals and his crew of engineers and laborers filled the entire length of the canal 
system from the Elk River Shoals to Big Muscle Shoals on November 8, and opened the system 
for commercial navigation on November 10, 1890.  The same day, the steamer R.T. Cole crossed 
the canal with a shipment of grain bound for Chattanooga.  It arrived before the hearing on 
railroad rates, to the delight of business interests along the middle Tennessee River.70 
The army rewarded Goethals for his efforts.  He took and passed the examination for 
promotion to captain, although he would have to wait until January 1892 to be promoted.71  
More importantly, the Chief of Engineers gave Goethals command of his own district.  On 
March 18, 1891, the Corps of Engineers created an independent engineering district at Florence, 
responsible for maintaining and operating the Muscle Shoals Canal, and for managing all 
improvements on the Tennessee River between Chattanooga and Colbert Shoals.  
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Acknowledging his successful completion of the Muscle Shoals Canal, the Chief of Engineers 
placed Goethals in charge of the district.72 
This was Goethals’s first independent command.  When he first arrived in Florence to 
assume local control over work on the Muscle Shoals in August 1890, he was still a subordinate 
of Barlow’s and a part of the Nashville District.  Having always been subordinate to a nearby 
commander, Goethals’s previous duties had been almost entirely within the realm of technical 
engineering problems.  Now he faced significantly more complex problems of organizational 
leadership—including force structure, administration, logistics, and advocacy.  The experience 
taught him much in all of these areas, providing practical instruction on similar problems he 
would face later in his career in Panama and in Washington during World War I.  In this way, 
Goethals’s duties in Florence closely aligned with the army’s preferred experiential method of 
officer development.73 
By placing Goethals in charge of the Florence District, the Chief of Engineers took a 
significant risk.  Although he had graduated from West Point and accepted his commission 
nearly eleven years before, and although he had already demonstrated proven abilities and 
potential for continued success, Goethals was still a lieutenant with a relatively limited base of 
experience.  Of forty-nine Corps of Engineers districts dedicated to river and harbor 
improvements in 1891, only sixteen were commanded by officers below the rank of major.  And 
only two of these, including the newly-created Florence district, were commanded by 
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lieutenants.  By giving a district to Goethals, Casey not only demonstrated confidence in his 
abilities, but also presented him with opportunities that almost none of his peers shared.  Even in 
1892, after Goethals had been promoted to captain, and after the Corps of Engineers had 
consolidated some of its districts, only fifteen out of forty-five districts dedicated to river and 
harbor improvements were commanded by officers below the rank of major.74 
The challenges of the Florence District presented plenty of opportunities for Goethals to 
learn and grow, both as an engineer and as an organizational leader.  The district managed four 
major project clusters.  Close to Chattanooga, from the area known as “the Suck” downriver to 
Guntersville, Alabama, the district worked to clear natural obstructions from the river and 
improve the channel by blasting and dredging its shallows.  At Elk River and Muscle Shoals, 
engineers and laborers under Goethals busily operated, improved, and maintained the canal 
system.  At Lower Muscle Shoals, Goethals’s crews investigated and recommended a canal 
route, but never received funding for such a project and limited their efforts to channel 
improvement by blasting and dredging the riverbed, and constructing wing dams along the river 
embankments.  Farther downriver, Goethals and his engineers drafted and implemented plans for 
a canal through Colbert Shoals and Bee Tree Shoals.75   
Simultaneously managing multiple projects across more than 250 miles of river provided 
an excellent practical lesson in organizational leadership. Barlow’s negative example 
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demonstrated to Goethals in 1889 and 1890 that a district engineer could not become personally 
involved in all of the minute details of one project without losing sight of the others.  An 
effective leader must be able to identify the critical points that require personal involvement and 
attention, and be willing to delegate direct responsibility for other points—with clear guidance 
and general supervision—to trusted subordinates.  When Goethals first arrived in Florence in 
August 1890, he was extremely involved in minute details, going so far as to oversee the night 
shift personally.  This was entirely appropriate at the time because the project was at a point of 
crisis and he had been sent specifically to see the Muscle Shoals Canal through to a rapid 
completion.  But he could not sustain that approach as a district engineer.   
Like Major King at Muscle Shoals from 1876-86, Goethals subdivided his district.  He 
organized his divisions around each of the district’s four project clusters and placed one of his 
civilian assistants in charge of each division, effectively making one subordinate in charge of 
each of his principal lines of effort.  Such an organizational structure allowed Goethals to 
manage the entire district more effectively and gave him the flexibility to focus his personal 
attention on points of friction as they arose.  Such was the case when plans were drafted for the 
Riverton Lock in the canal around Colbert and Bee Tree Shoals in 1892, and when there were 
significant problems with contractors at that canal in 1893 and 1894.76   
This approach also sparked one of the more meaningful professional and personal 
relationships in Goethals’s life.  Sydney B. Williamson was a civilian engineer who had joined 
the Florence District at the behest of his brother, another engineer who served as Goethals’s 
                                                          
76 Report of the Secretary of War, 52nd Cong., 1st sess., 1891, vol. II, 2306-2310;  Report of the Secretary of War, 
52nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1892, vol. II, 1950-1957; Report of the Secretary of War, 53rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1893, vol. II,  
2426-2427; Report of the Secretary of War, 53rd Cong., 3rd sess., 1894, vol. II, 1826-1831; and Sydney B. 
Williamson, Untitled Manuscript, January 16, 1934, Sydney B. Williamson Papers, 28-30. 
 
104 
 
division chief responsible for improvements between Elk River Shoals and Chattanooga in 1891.  
Williamson proved his worth on a survey upriver, and Goethals brought him into the district 
headquarters to help create plans for the canal at Colbert and Bee Tree Shoals.  On the job, 
Williamson was never happier than when his supervisors allowed him to “do the work in my 
own way except as to the regulations and general policies of the Engineer Department.”  He 
thoroughly enjoyed working for and with Goethals.  In turn, Goethals developed great faith in 
Williamson, entrusting him with the district’s most difficult technical problems.  Thus began one 
of Goethals’s few lifelong friendships and closest professional relationship.  He brought 
Williamson in as a trusted deputy in every major engineering assignment he held in the future.77   
Managing the Florence District also exposed Goethals to problems of logistics and 
personnel administration that he had not previously experienced.  Goethals led a permanent 
workforce of approximately seventy people dedicated to operating and maintaining the canals at 
Elk River Shoals and Muscle Shoals.  The workforce fluctuated periodically when certain 
projects demanded hired labor rather than contracted labor.  Goethals was not only responsible 
for planning and executing the projects within his district, but also for paying salaries; acquiring 
and maintaining tools, boats, machines, and a small railroad; feeding, housing, and looking after 
the health of the workforce; and projecting and managing an annual budget.  Although 
proficiency in administration and logistics is an essential element of high command, most army 
officers in the nineteenth century received no training in these areas.  Those who became 
proficient administrators and logisticians learned through practical experience.  Administering 
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is on pp. 35-36 of the manuscript.  For further evidence of the burgeoning friendship, see “Little Jots and Dots,” 
Florence Herald, June 21, 1894, which indicates that Williamson, his wife, and his sister-in-law lived with Goethals 
in the summer of 1894 while the rest of the Goethals family made their annual summer trek to Massachusetts. 
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and supplying the Florence District was the sole foundational experience that taught Goethals 
concepts, techniques, and procedures that he would employ against much larger administrative 
and logistical problems in Panama and during World War I.78 
Lastly, this independent command provided Goethals with an invaluable opportunity to 
refine his technical knowledge and his project management abilities to levels that ultimately 
shifted the boundaries of what was then considered possible.  Although managing the daily 
maintenance and operation of the canals and channel improvement projects occupied much of 
the district’s time and resources, the most significant project planned and implemented in the 
Florence District between 1891 and 1894 was the canal around Colbert and Bee Tree Shoals—o 
the last notable hazards for river navigation in northern Alabama.  The Colbert and Bee Tree 
Shoals constituted a nearly continuous eight-mile long, low-water hazard that was the natural 
next project for the district after the Muscle Shoals canal opened.  Anticipating this, Goethals 
ordered surveys of the area to be completed in August and September 1890, and developed a 
plan for a seven-foot-deep and eight-mile-long canal.79  
The canal required a system of locks at its lower end, near Riverton, Alabama, to mitigate 
the twenty-foot fall in the river from the head of the Colbert Shoals to the foot of the Bee Tree 
Shoals.  Common wisdom at the time called for a flight of two locks.  Goethals believed it could 
be accomplished through single lock with an unprecedented 25-foot lift.  In consultation with 
                                                          
78 The administrative and logistical overhead of the Florence District are outlined in Report of the Secretary of War, 
52nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1892, vol. II, 1951 and 1956-1958; Report of the Secretary of War, 53rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1893, 
vol. II,  2428-2421 and 2433-2435; Report of the Secretary of War, 53rd Cong., 3rd sess., 1894, vol. II, 1827 and 
1831-1833; see also George W. Goethals to Chief of Engineers, April 16, 1891, File 2514, Box 67, Entry 96, RG 77, 
NARA I.  Goethals was never trained in administration or logistics, and would have no further experience in 
administrative or logistical matters prior to his appointment as Chairman and Chief Engineer of the Isthmian Canal 
Commission. 
79 Report of the Secretary of War, 52nd Cong., 1st sess., 1891, vol. II, 2310-2311. 
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Sydney B. Williamson, Goethals developed a plan and pitched it to his superiors in Washington.  
His audience remained skeptical that such a lock could be built, with nearly double the lift of the 
highest locks then existing in the United States.  In 1892, a centralized board of more 
conservatively-minded officers forced the plan to be changed to two locks separated by a mile-
long pool, with respective lifts of twelve and thirteen feet.  Undeterred, Goethals continued to 
advocate for his plan for a single lock.  By 1893, he had successfully convinced the Chief of 
Engineers.  Construction began at the lock site that summer.80 
The effort did not go smoothly, but it ultimately succeeded.  Excavation of the lock site 
was extremely troublesome because it was mired in quicksand that seemed to have a knack for 
breaking equipment used against it.  Construction fell further behind when the contractor hired to 
build the lock walked off the job.  Finally, Goethals placed Williamson in charge of construction.  
Together, their efforts to design and build the Riverton Lock at the foot of the canal around 
Colbert and Bee Tree Shoals established a precedent for the mega-locks they designed and built 
twenty years later in Panama.81 
Goethals did not stay in Florence long enough to see the completion of the canal and its 
innovative high-lift lock.  By opening the Muscle Shoals Canal, successfully managing an 
independent district for more than three years, then designing and doggedly advocating for the 
25-foot Riverton Lock, Goethals had caught the attention of the Chief of Engineers, Brigadier 
                                                          
80 Report of the Secretary of War, 52nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1892, vol. II, 1950; Report of the Secretary of War, 53rd 
Cong., 2nd sess., 1893, vol. II,  2426-2427; and Sydney B. Williamson, Untitled Manuscript, January 16, 1934, 
Sydney B. Williamson Papers, 28-29. 
81 Report of the Secretary of War, 53rd Cong., 3rd sess., 1894, vol. II, 1826; U.S. Department of War, Report of the 
Secretary of War, 54th Cong., 1st sess., 1895, House Executive Document 2, vol. II (Washington, DC:  Government 
Printing Office, 1895), 2294; George W. Goethals to Thomas L. Casey, June 24, 1893, File 2657/23, Box 41, Entry 
98, RG 77, NARA I; Johnson, Engineers on the Twin Rivers, 138; and Sydney B. Williamson, Untitled Manuscript, 
January 16, 1934, Sydney B. Williamson Papers, 29-30.  The quotation is on page 30 of Williamson’s manuscript. 
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General Thomas L. Casey.  When an officer on his staff in Washington died unexpectedly in 
September 1894, Casey selected Goethals to fill the vacancy.    In early October 1894, Goethals 
received orders that the Nashville District would reabsorb his district, and that he was to report to 
Washington immediately for duty on Casey’s small staff of three engineer officers.82 
 Thus closed an important chapter in George W. Goethals’s career.  His assignments with 
the Department of the Columbia and the First Cincinnati District from 1882-1885, and then with 
both the Nashville District and the Florence District from 1889-1894 were the most significant 
developmental experiences he had in the army.  While West Point imbued Goethals with a sense 
of purpose and a deep identification with the U.S. Army, and the Engineer School of Application 
improved his abilities as an engineer, Goethals learned how to be an innovative engineer and an 
effective officer through practical experience in during these assignments.  Collectively, they 
provided enough opportunities to allow Goethals to make a name for himself within the Corps of 
Engineers and the army more generally, and provided him with the skills he later used to great 
effect in Panama and during the First World War.   
Significantly, however, the army had taken no active measures to ensure Goethals’s 
assignments afforded him with such opportunities.  His assignments were determined not by a 
discerning individual who recognized what experiences Goethals needed to develop properly.  
Instead, they were determined by the confluence of his own talent, personal connections, and 
                                                          
82 Thomas L. Casey to Daniel S. Lamont, September 27, 1894, File 7329, Box 32, Entry 103, RG 77, NARA I; 
Thomas L. Casey to Joseph Wheeler, October 4, 1894, File 8453/4, Box 160, Entry 103, RG 77, National Archives 
and Records Administration I, Washington DC; and Report of the Secretary of War, 54th Cong., 1st sess., 1895, vol. 
II, 3-4, 310, and 2277.  At the time, of 118 officers in the Corps of Engineers, only four were detailed to the Office 
of the Chief of Engineers, including the Chief of Engineers.  The Corps of Engineers maintained an office in 
Florence to oversee the region’s canals – that office reported first to the Nashville District as of October 4, 1894, and 
subsequently to a reinstated Chattanooga District. “Goes to Washington” and “May Not Go,” Florence Herald, 
October 4, 1894; and “No Change,” Florence Herald, October 11, 1894. 
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chance: his crucially important assignment under Merrill on the Ohio was contingent upon him 
angering Miles by refusing an Alaskan expedition at the exact moment that Merrill’s long-
serving deputy was promoted and transferred, creating a vacancy in Cincinnati.  Consider also 
that Goethals was given an independent command—with all its fruitful experiences—because he 
had managed to succeed in a difficult situation into which he was put because poor Lieutenant 
Graham Fitch fell gravely ill and needed to be replaced in Nashville.  Goethals was very lucky to 
receive the opportunities he did.  Because of his talents, he consistently rose to the occasion.  In 
doing so, important people noticed, and began to open doors hiding other particularly valuable 
experiences that were not open to the vast majority of his peers. 
Goethals did not consider that the effectiveness of his own experiential development was 
exceptional and highly contingent.  As he continued to excel within the U.S. Army, he believed 
that his success was the result of the experiential model of officer development that shaped his 
early career, and his faith in that model grew stronger.  Later in his career, even after the 
establishment of the U.S. Army War College and the improvement of the Leavenworth schools, 
he continued to advocate for the experiential model, going so far as to replicate for others his 
own early experiential development.  In 1908, the Corps of Engineers began sending its newly 
commissioned officers to the field to gain practical experience prior to attending the Engineer 
School of Application.  Reporting to the Chief of Engineers on his first group of three student 
officers, Goethals described a curriculum that mirrored his experience on the Ohio, having 
“started them in as chainmen and rodman on preliminary surveys” and then “worked them up.”83  
Writing from Panama in 1910 to his oldest son, then an engineer lieutenant who would soon be 
                                                          
83 George W. Goethals to Brigadier General Marshall, April 19, 1909, Container 8, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
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assigned to the Canal Zone, Goethals outlined his plan for his son’s professional development in 
a manner similarly reminiscent of Merrill’s methods, beginning with railroad management.  “I 
don’t know how long it will take you to master the method employed in operating a railroad,” he 
wrote, “but I shouldn’t imagine that it will require much of your time, after which you can go 
under Mr. Williamson on lock work, starting in as a foreman & working your way up as far as 
opportunity will permit.”84 
***** 
Finding success despite an unstandardized and highly contingent system of development 
that relied upon loosely-controlled notions of experiential development, Goethals became 
conditioned to believe that such a system necessarily breeds success.  He came to place great 
value in learning by experience, which he described in 1922 as “the only school that is worth 
anything.”85  This was not a unique thought; it reflected the views of many of those officers who 
entered the army between 1870 and 1890 and went on to become its senior leaders in the early-
twentieth century.  Such views reinforced older and increasingly outdated attitudes about 
professionalism and officer development that continued to affect the U.S. Army.  As a result, the 
army developed and reinforced an institutional culture within its officer corps that was generally 
conditioned to reject the value of formal training and education, and to resist reforms meant to 
forge a legitimate place for education within the institution. 
                                                          
84 George W. Goethals to “Toodles” [George R. Goethals], February 27, 1910, Container 3, George W. Goethals 
Papers, LC.  Contrary to some contemporary and later critics who described him as a cold and distant person, 
Goethals appears to have had a very warm and loving relationship with his sons.  In all of his correspondence with 
his eldest son, George R. Goethals, he only refers to his son by nicknames, which include “Toodles,” “Dodo,” 
“Dodie,” and “old man.” 
85 Crowther, “Don’t Fear to Attempt a Thing Just Because it Looks Big,” 16. 
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Similarly, the army’s disposition also sharply limited the extent to which its units could 
train and prepare for war.  Spread out among a network of small outposts and at peace more 
often than it was at war, the army rarely had the opportunity to mass units of any appreciable size 
in the same place and at the same time.  Most immediately, this meant that soldiers usually did 
not have the opportunity to participate in large-scale maneuvers against a peer or superior 
opposing force, or operate in cooperation with other branches of the army—infantry, cavalry, 
artillery, engineers, etc.  There were, however, more significant consequences at the institutional 
level.  The army was never able to test its systems for mobilizing and sustaining a large force in a 
time of war, nor provide the vast majority of its officers with any exposure to or experience in 
commanding and coordinating the operations of large bodies of troops.  As one historian has 
rightly noted, the late-nineteenth-century U.S. Army “appeared a place where officers learned all 
about commanding fifty dragoons on the western plains but nothing about anything else.”86   
Consequently, the reduction or elimination of its frontier mission was a necessary 
condition for reform in the U.S. Army.  It was no mere coincidence that the most significant 
elements of military reform in the late-nineteenth century occurred in concert with the “closing” 
of the frontier.  When a reluctant Congress allowed the army to begin closing its smaller outposts 
and consolidating larger units onto larger bases, a few leaders began experimenting with training 
maneuvers on scales not seen since the Civil War.  At the same time, a few energetic and reform-
minded officers began to remold the Leavenworth schools, laying the groundwork for Ft. 
Leavenworth’s rise as one of the nerve centers of military education in the twentieth century.87 
                                                          
86 Weigley, History of the United States Army, 265. 
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But it was also no coincidence that even the most significant elements of military reform 
in the late-nineteenth century were fragmented, ill-coordinated, and unable to effect lasting 
institutional change.  Experimentation with large-scale tactical maneuvers was a fairly limited 
practice in the late-nineteenth century.  And despite notable efforts by Arthur Wagner and Eben 
Swift, the Leavenworth Schools would not fully mature until the second decade of the twentieth 
century.88  While the U.S. Census Bureau declared the American frontier to be “closed” in 1890 
and the last of the army’s campaigns against Native Americans concluded in 1891, the effect of 
the frontier upon the army was more lasting.  It had defined the army’s identity for more than a 
century.  Multiple generations of officers shaped, ratified, and internalized the methods and 
systems the army had adopted because of its disposition and mission on the frontier, making such 
methods and systems institutionalized habits that had become part of the very fabric of the army.  
With the frontier inextricably woven into its identity and its institutional culture, the U.S. Army 
was reluctant to accept the fact that although born of necessity, changing conditions and the 
passage of time had rendered many of its systems and processes unnecessary and arcane. 
 The frontier affected the United States Army well after it ceased to exist in the American 
West.  The army’s institutional culture, defined by its frontier requirements and experiences, 
failed to adapt as conditions outside the institution changed.  But perhaps this is unsurprising.  
Any human institution is subject to human nature, and humans are creatures of habit.  
Furthermore, such habits are made even stronger within institutions that promote and select their 
leaders from within.  The army’s institutional culture failed to keep pace with external conditions 
                                                          
Press, 1978), 21-50; and T.R. Brereton, Educating the U.S. Army: Arthur L. Wagner and Reform, 1875-1905 
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88 Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, 68-107. 
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because its leaders were not only accustomed to the habits of the frontier army, but embraced 
such habits as best practices.  They interpreted their individual successes within the army to be 
validation of the methods and systems of development they experienced as junior officers.  In a 
self-generating cycle, leaders who believed they owed their successes to old habits preserved 
arcane habits that were no longer justifiable in the absence of the conditions that spawned them, 
sharply limiting the effect of an ambitious program of reform undertaken in the wake of the War 
with Spain.
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CHAPTER 3 
Reform and Resistance:  
The Divorce of Institutional Structures and Institutional Culture in the U.S. Army 
February 18, 1907 began ordinarily enough for George W. Goethals.  He arrived at his 
office near the White House at the usual time, but the day quickly took a more interesting turn.  
Late in the morning, he received a message from Secretary of War William Howard Taft asking 
him to come in for a meeting.  Goethals dropped what he was doing and went straight to see 
Taft, who proceeded to quiz Goethals on his background and his previous experiences in the 
army.  This seemed unusual to Goethals.  The conversation revolved around matters that they 
had discussed at great length on their many tours of inspection of fortifications throughout the 
country.  Finally, Taft intimated that President Theodore Roosevelt had accepted the resignation 
of John Stevens.  He and the Chief of Engineers had met with the president and recommended 
that he appoint Goethals as Chairman and Chief Engineer of the Isthmian Canal Commission.  
“He could not assure me I would be selected,” Goethals recalled eight years later, “but I probably 
would be summoned to the White House that evening and should be prepared for such a call,” 
and that “in the meantime nothing was to be said concerning the matter to anyone.”  The call 
finally reached Goethals at his DuPont Circle home shortly before ten o’clock that evening.1   
                                                          
1 Quotations from George W. Goethals, “The Building of the Panama Canal: Success of Government Methods,” 
Scribner’s Magazine LVII, No. 3 (March, 1915): 265.  See also William Loeb, Jr. to George W. Goethals, February 
18, 1907, Box 5, George W. Goethals Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.  “Individual Service 
Report of Geo. W. Goethals, Major, Corps of Engineers,” September 18, 1906, File # 3644-ACP-1880, Box 667, 
Entry 297, RG 94, NARA I lists Goethals’s address as 1903 S St., NW, Washington, DC.  The home still stands 
today at the same address. 
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Thirteen eventful years had passed since Goethals had served as a canal engineer in 
Alabama.  For the United States Army, the period of time from 1894 through 1907 partially 
resolved an institutional identity crisis brought on by the closure of the western frontier.  For 
Goethals, critical assignments in Washington and Newport, Rhode Island set the final conditions 
for him to lead the construction of the Panama Canal.  Goethals’s experiences in these years are 
significant not only for explaining how the assignment in Panama fell to him, but also for 
shedding light on how and to what extent the army changed in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century and the first decade of the twentieth. 
Although the U.S. Army insulated itself from new trends in education and training 
emerging within other professions and American society more broadly, it was not isolated from 
society.  Try as it might to control its own environment, external influences heavily shaped the 
army.  One such influence was the closing of the frontier.  Despite the lasting influence the 
frontier held upon the army’s institutional culture, a drastic change to the context within which 
the army had existed for more than a century necessarily meant that the army had to change.  For 
most of its existence, the purpose of the army had been to defend the coasts and police the 
frontier.  Now that there was no frontier to police, the very purpose of the army was an open 
question.   
Progressivism influenced the way the army addressed that question.  A diverse reform 
movement, “Progressivism” refers to the collective body of public and private responses to 
social, economic, and political problems related to urbanization, industrialization, and 
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modernization in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.2  Buoyed by advancements in 
science, technology, managerial systems and theories, and a rapid exchange of ideas among 
American and European activists grappling with the similar issues, American society adopted 
what one historian has described as a new “interventionism.”  Individual and collective 
intervention represented a reformist impulse that pervaded the United States during the 
Progressive Era.  People and organizations intervened on an unprecedented scale to reform urban 
social conditions, business regulation, business management, government institutions, and 
government oversight.  The reformist impulse so electrified society that even reactionaries were 
moved to channel it toward agendas of social control like the promotion of eugenics and the 
“Americanization” of immigrants.3 
As the army grappled with the completion of westward continental expansion and all of 
its implications, Progressivism and its reformist impulse were in the air.  Paralleling trends in 
civil society, military reform stalled in the absence of a systemic shock.  Just as Jacob Riis’s 
widely-publicized photographs of the urban poor in New York lent significant momentum to 
municipal and social reformers in the 1890s, the War with Spain in 1898 gave military reformers 
an opportunity to implement their ideas.  But that shock ultimately was not severe enough.  In 
the end, army reform was visionary in scope and intent, but faulty in execution.  Like progressive 
activists striving for reform in social, political, and commercial spheres, military reformers 
                                                          
2 This description of Progressivism is derived primarily from pluralist interpretations advanced in Daniel T. 
Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism.”  Reviews in American History 10, no. 4 (December 1982), 113-132; John 
Whiteclay Chambers II, The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920, second edition (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2000); and Maureen A. Flanagan, America Reformed:  Progressives and 
Progressivisms, 1890s-1920s (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2007). 
3 See. Chambers, The Tyranny of Change, ch. 5.  Chambers provides an excellent definition of his concept of “new 
interventionism” on pp. 136-137.  On the impact of a Trans-Atlantic exchange of ideas, see Daniel T. Rodgers, 
Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2000). 
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assumed that structural change within the institution would affect a more general and thorough 
institutional transformation.  By focusing only on institutional structures, reformers 
unintentionally created a schism between those structures and the army’s institutional culture.  
The chasm that separated the two blunted the effect of reform and prevented reformers from 
achieving their goals in the early-twentieth century.  
***** 
After departing Alabama in 1894, George W. Goethals embarked upon a new phase in his 
career.  The next thirteen years exposed him to the larger issues facing the Corps of Engineers 
and the army—issues on a level that made much of his previous work and concerns seem trivial 
and parochial.  By consistently challenging him to think beyond immediate priorities and the 
relatively local problems of one major project, Goethals’s assignments between 1894 and 1907 
broke new ground.  They placed him squarely in the intersection of the external conditions 
forcing change within the army, the parts of the army implementing change, and the army’s 
increasingly outdated institutional culture. 
As a reward for his service at Florence, Goethals reported for duty in the office of the 
Chief of Engineers in October 1894.  That office was the central administrative authority for the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  It programmed and managed Congressional appropriations 
totaling nearly $35 million, and coordinated the efforts of 118 officers throughout the country 
engaged in the construction and improvement of coastal fortifications, river and harbor 
improvements, various bridging and aqueduct projects, and the construction and renovation of 
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public buildings.  It was also the higher headquarters for the army’s only engineer battalion and 
the Engineer School of Application. 4   
Aside from a handful of civilian clerks, only four engineer officers directly assisted the 
Chief of Engineers.  Their duties varied widely.  Some work was completely administrative, 
involving the disbursement of funds, production of orders, and the printing of manuals.  Other 
duties were more technical in nature.  As needed, these officers sat on engineering boards and 
commissions, reviewed plans and contracts, and advised Congressional committees.  Frequently, 
they served as a brain trust for the Chief of Engineers, weighing in informally on special projects 
and questions of general policy. 5  These officers were so exceptionally busy that Brigadier 
General William P. Craighill, who replaced Thomas L. Casey as the Chief of Engineers in May 
1895, successfully lobbied the Secretary of War to authorize an additional engineer officer to be 
assigned to his office staff in 1895.6 
In the fall of 1894, Goethals was the most junior officer assigned to that office.  As such, 
many of Goethals’s duties during his assignment with the Chief of Engineers were menial 
administrative tasks.7  But he also weighed in occasionally on important policy matters and 
                                                          
4 U.S. Department of War, Report of the Secretary of War, 54th Cong., 1st sess., 1895, House Executive Document 2, 
vol. II, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1895), 1-22.   
5 Report of the Secretary of War, 54th Cong., 1st sess., 1895, vol. II, 3; William J. Sewell to Daniel S. Lamont, File 
10828/7, Box 233; Untitled Memorandum, File 11572/4, Box 248; “Memorandum,” December 3, 1895, File 13340, 
Box 283; George W. Goethals to Major Charles Allen, File 15632/37 Box 337; and  George W. Goethals to W.P. 
Craighill, January 28, 1897, File 19019/15, Box 431; all in Entry 103, RG 77, NARA I. 
6 U.S. Department of War, Report of the Secretary of War, 54th Cong., 2nd sess., 1896, House Executive Document 
2, vol. II, (Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office, 1896), 4. 
7 George W. Goethals to Major Charles Allen, September 12, 1896, File 15632/337, Box 337; “Memorandum,” 
December 3, 1895, File 13340, Box 283; and Untitled Memorandum, File 15632/337, Box 337, all in Entry 103, RG 
77, NARA I.  See also “Individual Service Report of Geo. W. Goethals, Captain, Corps of Engineers, for the fiscal 
year ended June 30, 1896,” July 11, 1896, File # 3644-ACP-1880, Box 667, Entry 297, RG 94; Untitled 
memorandum, File 11572/4, Box 248, Entry 103, RG 77; and A. Mackenzie to Inspector General, July 25, 1898, 
File 27681, Box 580, Entry 103, RG 77; all in NARA I. 
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served on a few more significant civil-military boards.  On the strength of his record in Alabama, 
the Chief of Engineers assigned Goethals to provide technical advice to a Senate select 
committee considering the possibility of constructing an interoceanic canal in Nicaragua.  In 
1897, a new Chief of Engineers ordered Goethals to confer with the U.S. Civil Service 
Commission to ensure that civilians hired by the Corps of Engineers adhered to rules and 
regulations established by the commission.  Finally, in April 1898, the Chief of Engineers 
selected Goethals to represent the Corps of Engineers on a board convened by the Secretary of 
War to designate articles that would be prohibited for export as the nation mobilized for war with 
Spain.8   
Each of these duties gave Goethals invaluable exposure to the nature and mechanisms of 
the relationship between the army and civil government—a rare opportunity given to very few 
junior officers in the late-nineteenth-century army.  Despite this, Goethals was dissatisfied with 
his assignment in Washington.  He never enjoyed the nature of the work there.  Like most 
officers of the nineteenth century, Goethals subscribed to a vision of leadership based on a 
romantic perception of Civil War officers marching calmly into danger at the front of their units, 
an image that was frequently at odds with the managerial style that emerged in an increasingly 
industrialized society and economy.  Goethals and many of his contemporaries were reluctant to 
believe that the army required talented officers in an office or a headquarters coordinating 
myriad logistical and administrative requirements as much as it required talented officers in the 
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field inspiring their troops.9  Thus, when others later mentioned his own name as a candidate to 
become the Chief of Engineers as a reward for his work in Panama, Goethals could reply in 
complete honesty, “I am not an applicant, nor do I care of the position, the work not being to my 
liking,” and that “these views are not new, for I held them during my service as Assistant to the 
Chief, and have not changed my mind.”10 
In the fall of 1897, Brigadier General James Wilson knew his most junior assistant was 
getting restless.  The Chief of Engineers then arranged for Goethals to relieve the instructor of 
Practical Military Engineering at West Point when that officer’s assignment expired the 
following summer.  The Secretary of War agreed, and Goethals prepared to depart for West 
Point in several months’ time.11  This transfer did not happen on schedule.  It was interrupted by 
events in Cuba.   
Tensions between Spain and the United States had been rising since the outbreak of the 
Cuban Insurrection in 1895.  While the American public generated vocal and occasionally 
material support for the Cubans, the American government’s official position was neutral.  At the 
same time, the successive Cleveland and McKinley administrations pressured Spain to pacify 
Cuba and grant it political autonomy.  Sensing that the point of victory was near, Cuban 
revolutionaries rejected autonomy, opting instead to fight to win independence.  Violence 
continued.  The ineffective and heavy-handed Spanish response prompted increasing support 
among the American public for the Cuban revolutionaries.  Tensions escalated into a full-blown 
                                                          
9 This can be seen in Goethals’s description of Major General John R. Brooke preparing for battle during the War 
with Spain in 1898.  Transcription of George W. Goethals to “My Darling” [Effie R. Goethals], August 14, 1898, 
Thomas Goethals Private Collection, Vineyard Haven, MA.   
10 George W. Goethals to William M. Black, December 19, 1912, Box 17, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
11 John M. Wilson to Secretary of War, File 22967, Box 492, Entry 103, RG 77, NARA I. 
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crisis in a single week in early February 1898.  First, American newspapers widely published a 
stolen letter, which had been written by the Spanish ambassador to the United States, that 
insulted President McKinley.  Then, the U.S.S. Maine mysteriously exploded while in Havana’s 
harbor.  As the American public clamored for war and Spanish officials convinced themselves 
that a war abroad was the only way to avoid political upheaval at home, policymakers on both 
sides lost the ability to pursue effective diplomacy.  On April 25, 1898, the United States 
declared war against Spain, and its army began to mobilize for war.12 
The army expanded rapidly through a congressional authorization to increase the strength 
of the regular army, a presidential call for volunteers, and broad popular enthusiasm.  Units 
mustered so quickly that the headquarters staffs to command and control them were organized 
haphazardly as they attempted to catch up.  Commanders called for officers with whom they 
were personally acquainted as they realized certain specialties and skill sets were missing from 
their staffs.  In early May, Brigadier General Wilson received a request for a corps engineer from 
the recently designated commander of the First Army Corps, Major General John R. Brooke.  He 
specifically requested Goethals for the post, if it was “agreeable to the Chief of Engineers.”  
Wilson needed no convincing, endorsing the request with a notation that the position of chief 
engineer for a corps was “a position for which [Goethals] is thoroughly qualified by his high 
character, soldierly ability, and scientific attainments.”13  On May 20, 1898, Goethals received 
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orders to report to General Brooke at Chickamauga National Military Park, Georgia for duty.  
The assignment came with a temporary promotion to lieutenant colonel of volunteers.14 
 Goethals’s assignment to the First Army Corps demonstrates that wartime exigencies 
heightened the degree to which personal connections influenced officers’ assignments.  
Individual commanders held more sway over a given officer’s assignment than any centralized 
authority in Washington.  Since 1894, Goethals had developed a reputation that put him in high 
demand.  Shortly after General Brooke secured Goethals’s assignment with Brooke’s corps, the 
newly-designated chief engineer of all armies in the field requested that Goethals be assigned as 
his assistant and sent to accompany the Fifth Army Corps on its campaign in Cuba.15  In June, 
the Chief of Engineers nominated Goethals to serve as a lieutenant colonel in the first of three 
regiments to be raised in a brigade of volunteer engineers that Congress had authorized in the 
middle of May.16  Ultimately, the final decision was left up to Brooke and Goethals. 
Goethals learned of the competing requests shortly after reporting to Brooke at 
Chickamauga on May 30.  In a passive refusal of Ludlow’s request, the Adjutant General replied 
that while Goethals was assigned to the First Army Corps, a transfer to Ludlow’s staff was 
possible only if Brooke agreed and wrote the orders.  Predictably, Brooke was unwilling to let 
him go.17  The Chief of Engineers left the transfer to the volunteer engineer regiment up to 
Goethals himself.  He was torn, commenting to his son that “Genl. Brooke doesn’t want me to go 
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and I don’t reckon what to do.”  Ultimately, he acceded to pressure from Brooke and declined 
the appointment in favor of maintaining his position as Chief Engineer of the First Army 
Corps.18 
Goethals may have regretted that decision almost immediately after arriving at his 
assigned campsite a short distance downhill from a slit trench that was used as a latrine.  “During 
the heavy rains,” he testified after the war, “our sink [latrine] was flooded out, and naturally the 
drainage was toward the tents.”19  Such amateurish and unsanitary mistakes characterized the 
army’s mobilization for the War with Spain.  Poorly sited mobilization camps became pestilent 
breeding grounds of disease.  The First and Sixth Army Corps mobilized at Chickamauga Park, 
which became one of the more notorious mobilization centers of the war as scandalous reports, 
some accurate and some exaggerated, filled the pages of widely-read newspapers that were then 
approaching the heyday of muckraking journalism.20   
To Goethals, experiences at Chickamauga underscored the importance of preventive 
health measures and strict enforcement of sanitation regulations.  To his family, Goethals 
reported only, “It is awfully dirty out here.”21  He was more candid to postwar investigators, 
recalling that rides through the woods revealed “evidences of the men having defecated all 
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through the woods without reference to sinks” and that his “attention was particularly called to 
our own headquarters, which were not in a very good condition as far as policing was 
concerned.”22  Goethals further testified that many commanders at the camp selected bivouac 
sites in unhealthy locations because they deemed healthier locations to be more useful as training 
and drilling grounds.  Such sites became dangerously overcrowded as inexperienced leaders 
failed to comprehend the relationship between dispersion and sanitation.  Units frequently 
encamped in and among their own filth, or upon ground that was too rocky to permit the 
excavation of sufficiently deep latrines.  Beyond this, Goethals’s testimony suggested that 
officials had made a fundamental error in selecting Chickamauga Park as a mobilization site for 
two entire corps, as the sole uncontaminated water supply that was available to provide water to 
the camp could not support both corps if they were fully manned.23 
Goethals found the mobilization at Chickamauga somewhat mundane.  He spent much of 
the month of June working to improve the water supply.  He conducted the necessary surveys 
and ran a line to a supplemental source at a nearby spring, but General Brooke ordered work on 
the water supply to be stopped when he heard a rumor that 15,000 of his soldiers were to be 
diverted to the Fifth Army Corps at Tampa, Florida.24  With newfound downtime, Goethals 
visited nearby Chattanooga and hiked Lookout Mountain.  Seeking to make more appropriate use 
of his time, he began visiting the camps of the various volunteer regiments at Chickamauga and 
instructing their officers on how to conduct reconnaissance.  He continued his improvised 
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training program throughout late June and July.25  Seeing that his reliable assistant from 
Florence, Sydney B. Williamson, had been commissioned as a captain in the 3rd Regiment of 
Volunteer Engineers, which also mobilized at Chickamauga, Goethals persuaded Brooke to 
assign Williamson as his assistant.  Otherwise, he watched the war unfold in newspapers, 
followed the Santiago campaign with great interest, and waited for First Army Corps to receive 
orders.26 
Confusion, disorganization, and muddle characterized the American war effort, 
particularly at higher levels of command.  Goethals and the rest of the First Army Corps staff 
learned that they were to plan and lead the invasion of Puerto Rico not from a War Department 
directive, but from the newspapers.27  Fortunately, Brooke had acted upon rumors suggesting 
such a possibility, and had set Goethals to procuring maps and information concerning Puerto 
Rico.  Goethals sent a request for both maps and information to the Chief of Engineers on June 
29, who promptly forwarded the request to the War Department’s Bureau of Military 
Information.  Receiving no positive response, Goethals telegraphed the Bureau of Military 
Information directly on July 8, and shortly thereafter “received by return mail a copy of a map of 
Puerto Rico, but no information whatever concerning that island.”28  The corps continued to 
prepare blindly until the War Department confirmed in the middle of the month that Brooke 
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would lead a detachment of approximately 5,000 men from the corps in the Puerto Rico 
Campaign.29 
Following the surrender of the defending Spanish forces to General William R. Shafter’s 
forces at Santiago de Cuba on July 17, Secretary of War Alger ordered General Nelson Miles to 
assume command of a previously-planned expedition to Puerto Rico.  Because Shafter’s soldiers 
were too affected by disease to participate in the campaign, the War Department selected a 
conglomeration of units from the First and Fourth Army Corps, encamped at Chickamauga and 
near the ports of Charleston and Tampa, to join Miles and nearly three thousand soldiers who 
had never debarked from their troop transports in Guantanamo Bay.  These orders cobbled 
together a force of approximately 17,000 men in total.  Although the War Department had 
directed Miles to land at Cape Fajardo in the northeast and make a quick strike to the west to 
capture San Juan, Miles elected to change course after sailing out of Guantanamo Bay.  
Suspecting that the Spanish expected him to land as close to San Juan as possible, Miles chose 
instead to land on Puerto Rico’s southern coast.30   
As Miles sailed from Cuba, the War Department coordinated to move the remainder of 
his invasion force to their ports of embarkation and transport them to Puerto Rico.  The portion 
of First Army Corps selected to participate in the campaign departed Chickamauga Park on July 
23, 1898 to await transportation at Newport News, Virginia.  They were fortunate; cases of 
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typhoid fever in the unsanitary Camp Thomas climbed dramatically beginning in late July, and 
doubled by the middle of August.31  But Goethals was unaware of his comparatively favorable 
luck.  When he boarded the U.S.S. St. Louis at Newport News on July 28, he noted that “the 
bedding was foul, very bad; ventilation, none at all, and the meals were simply abominable.”32 
Although a significant portion of the Puerto Rico invasion force, the Brooke’s corps had 
a woefully inadequate understanding of Puerto Rico.  The War Department had failed to send 
anything more than one map of Puerto Rico in response to Goethals’s requests in July.  General 
Brooke, however, noticed that a small detachment of Puerto Ricans who were to serve as scouts 
and guides for General Miles had also embarked on U.S.S. St. Louis.  Brooke sent his engineer to 
interview them.  Goethals spent most of the voyage collecting from them “all the information 
concerning the island, roads, etc., needed by the Commanding General for intelligent 
operations.”33  Rumors, newspaper accounts, a map sent by an apparently indifferent War 
Department clerk, and hurried interviews with a group of expatriates of unknown quality were all 
that Brooke, Goethals, and the rest of the staff had to inform their actions.  Many disastrous 
campaigns have begun with a similar lack of intelligence and preparation.  
Landings commenced on Puerto Rico’s southwest coast at Guánica on the morning of 
July 25, 1898.  After a minor skirmish, American soldiers established a secure beachhead.  That 
beachhead was expanded on July 26, and at the same time Miles landed a division at Ponce, near 
the center of the island’s southern coast.  More reinforcements landed on July 31 at both Ponce 
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and Guánica.  The outnumbered Spanish troops, recently abandoned by Puerto Rican militiamen 
who deserted for their homes or defected outright to the American side, began to retreat inland 
after a few small-unit actions.  When the St. Louis and accompanying transports steamed into 
Ponce on July 31, Miles directed Brooke to collect his forces and prepare to land forty miles to 
the east, near a village named Arroyo.34 
Goethals splashed ashore with the lead elements of the First Army Corps on August 2, 
1898, meeting no opposition.  During the time that it took Brooke to disembark all of his men, 
Goethals’s duties ranged widely.  In the nineteenth century, the engineer on a headquarters staff 
was a genuinely multi-purpose officer, responsible for a wide range of duties including 
intelligence, reconnaissance, relaying messages for the commander, preparation of defensive 
positions, and the establishment or improvement of lines of communication.  For the first two 
days, Brooke placed Goethals in command of the perimeter of outposts securing the 
beachhead.35  As the disembarkation reached its final stages, Goethals, along with Williamson, 
received orders to return to the beach.  For two days, he was “charged with building a wharf to 
facilitate landing supplies—the rough surf was preventing landing supplies on the beach itself.” 
The dock was a relatively simple project and took little time to complete.36    
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By August 5, all of Brooke’s soldiers had landed and supplies were starting to move 
ashore in bulk.  Expanding the base of operations, one First Army Corps regiment had seized the 
nearby town of Guayama after a brief skirmish.  Although now poised to support a general 
offensive, Brooke still required more intelligence about the position and disposition of the 
Spanish.37  With the dock complete, Brooke ordered Goethals to conduct reconnaissance to 
prepare for the pending offensive.  Taking along his trusted friend Williamson, Goethals 
executed several thorough reconnaissance missions, finding that the Spanish had “occupied the 
heights three or four miles inland from the town that commanded the highway leading to San 
Juan.”  It was risky work on both ends of these missions.  Williamson later recalled that “the 
most dangerous feature of the reconnaissance was getting back through our own outpost 
composed of green volunteer troops that were liable to shoot first and investigate afterwards.”38 
Meanwhile, Miles had completed his plan for the conquest of Puerto Rico.  He 
envisioned four assaulting columns converging on San Juan.  In the west, two columns starting 
from Guánica and Ponce would move from south to north, converging at the town of Arecibo on 
Puerto Rico’s northwest coast, and then moving east against San Juan.  In the center of the 
island, one column would move northeast from Ponce against the main Spanish defensive 
position at Aibonito, a village in high ground on the southern end of a mountain range that 
bisects the interior of the island from east to west.  There, 1,300 Spaniards blocked the main 
highway leading to San Juan.  The First Army Corps constituted the fourth assaulting column, 
under orders to support the attack against Aibonito by moving against Cayey from Arroyo and 
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Guyama, then cutting across the highway behind Aibonito, isolating its defenders.  After 
Aibonito fell, Miles intended the two columns to move north along the highway against San 
Juan.39 
The offensive began on August 9, 1898.  The Spanish were ill-prepared to mount an 
effective defense.  Because the Puerto Rican militia had gone home or defected, the Spanish 
mustered only 8,000 defenders, less than half the strength of the American forces under Miles.  
Furthermore, despite their comparatively small force, the Spanish attempted to defend too many 
points at once.  Consequently, they failed to mass enough combat power at any point to 
effectively defend against any of the four assaulting columns.40  
The First Army Corps watched idly as the three columns to its west opened the offensive, 
with the westernmost units making the most rapid progress.  A reconnaissance in force on 
August 8 by the 4th Ohio Volunteer Infantry Regiment ended with a skirmish that indicated 
Spanish forces were entrenched in the high ground near Cayey.41  Brooke spent the next few 
days planning his attack.  He hoped to delay the attack until his corps could be reinforced by an 
additional regiment of volunteers, but opted to take earlier action when he learned that Wilson’s 
column was making unexpectedly rapid progress toward Aibonito.42   
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On the evening of August 11, Brooke issued orders for an advance on to Cayey shortly 
before dawn the following morning.  But inexperienced leaders of the volunteer regiments failed 
to coordinate their movements properly, and his corps began its movement two hours behind 
schedule.  Brooke sent Goethals and Williamson ahead to conduct a final reconnaissance of the 
Spanish line, then relied on them to post the lead battalion of skirmishers.  With this task 
accomplished, and with anxiety mounting as his first taste of combat drew near, Goethals 
returned to his commander, who was positioning a battery of light artillery that he intended to 
use to open the battle.  Brooke directed Goethals and the rest of his staff to observe the artillery 
and adjust it as needed.  In the early evening, the moment of battle had arrived in the early 
evening as soldiers unlimbered the last artillery piece was and hauled it into position.  But the 
moment passed as quickly as it came.  Just then, recalled Goethals two days later, “a messenger 
came galloping up and shouted that he had an important dispatch.”  After reading the message, 
according to Goethals, Brooke “abused the messenger for not caring more for his horse and 
telling him never to ride so hard again, after which he told us there would be no fight as peace 
had been declared.”43  
Goethals felt cheated out of a genuine experience of war.  “Five minutes more,” he 
lamented, “and the first shot would have been fired and then there could have been no stopping 
until after the Spaniards had been driven away . . . thus ends the war, I expect, and I haven’t been 
under Spanish fire at all, I’m sorry to say, for the outpost firing doesn’t count for anything as 
there were only a few shots fired on us.”44  While it seems inconsistent with a rational sense of 
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self-preservation, Goethals’s sentiments were genuine.  His generation of officers had been 
educated at West Point and reared as junior officers by Civil War veterans in a time when 
veterans and society alike were in the midst of constructing an idealized and romanticized 
memory of the Civil War.45  Heavily influenced by that war, Goethals—like his peers—held a 
Victorian sense of war and military service.  Describing Brooke preparing for battle, he wrote to 
his wife in terms reminiscent of the earliest phases of the earlier war: “The General was just 
magnificent; he was in khaki uniform, in the front, and had no fear for anyone but his staff.”46  
Goethals’s interpretation of the aborted battle is telling.  Like most officers of his 
generation, he perceived the ideal officer to be an unconcerned veteran in the thick of the action, 
fearlessly directing a seemingly small task rather than commanding his forces from an area that 
was more suitable for seeing, understanding, and effectively responding to what was happening 
to and around his unit.47  Furthermore, in Goethals’s view, a failure to experience battle 
cheapened his wartime service.  This would be a constant source of insecurity as his career 
progressed.  Collectively, these perceptions frame his generation’s mindset.  That mindset, in 
turn, came to define the incongruity between the army’s institutional culture and its structures as 
it adapted to meet the managerial and logistical requirements of modern industrialized warfare. 
But for time being, Goethals stewed in Puerto Rico with no war to fight and with very 
little to do.  He passed time by touring the island and collecting Spanish stamps and other relics 
of the war to send back home to his sons.  He was not enamored with the inhabitants, whom he 
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viewed in racialized terms, observing to his oldest son that “the little boys and girls about here 
run around naked until they are about 7 or 8 years old—nearly all the men and women go 
barefooted.”  Continuing, he explained, “They are awfully dirty too, and I don’t think there are 
any full blooded whites.”48  When Miles returned to the United States, Brooke assumed 
command of the occupation of Puerto Rico, and brought Goethals with him to serve on his staff 
in this new capacity.  There remained, however, little for Goethals to do.  Always uncomfortable 
with idleness, Goethals wrote home, “Genl. Brooke wants me to stay here with him, but I don’t 
care to unless I have something to do and to keep busy.”49  By the middle of September, he was 
miserable.  “I want to get back very much,” he wrote to his family, “I have no work to do, [and] 
everything is so filthy and dirty that I just cannot stand it here for any length of time.”50 
Goethals did not have to wait any significant length of time.  In the second week of 
September, Wilson, still serving as Chief of Engineers, began setting conditions to move his 
former subordinate to the Department of Practical Military Engineering at West Point, as 
originally arranged prior to the war.51  Brooke opposed losing his engineer, forcefully but 
unsuccessfully protesting the transfer.52  Goethals relinquished his responsibilities in Puerto Rico 
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on October 20, 1898, and was soon on his way back home once again to move his family to the 
United States Military Academy.53 
The Department of Practical Military Engineering was an important part of cadets’ 
military training at West Point.  This department ran exercises that taught cadets how to design 
and dig field fortifications and entrenchments, conduct reconnaissance, execute topographical 
surveys, construct pontoon and simple trestle bridges, operate signaling and communications 
equipment, and employ siege materials.  Because cadets conducted such training outdoors, it was 
generally scheduled between the months of April and October.54 
As the head of the Department of Practical Military Engineering, Goethals had several 
other duties that kept him busy throughout the year.  Having reverted back to his regular army 
rank of captain, he was the commander of Company E of the army’s sole engineer regiment.  
This company provided a daily guard for the garrison, maintained the artillery batteries and their 
emplacements at West Point, and supported field training for the cadets.  In addition, Goethals 
served directly under the superintendent’s command as the post engineer.  In this capacity, he 
increased West Point’s water supply by adding more pipelines and purification systems to handle 
water from additional local sources, and also supervised the renovation of the building that 
housed the academy’s library.55 
                                                          
53 U.S. Department of War, “Report of the Chief of Engineers,” Part 1, Annual Reports of the War Department, 57th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1901, House Executive Document 2 (Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office, 1901), 58. 
54 Lance Betros, Carved from Granite:  West Point Since 1902 (College Station, TX:  Texas A&M University Press, 
2012), 214; U.S. Department of War, Annual Reports of the War Department, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1899, House 
Executive Document 2, vol. I, Part 1 (Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office, 1899), 675; U.S. Department 
of War, Annual Reports of the War Department, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., 1900, House Executive Document 2, vol. I, 
Part 1 (Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office, 1900), 290. 
55 Annual Reports of the War Department, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1899, vol. I, 675-677; Annual Reports of the War 
Department, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., 1900, vol. I, 290-291. 
 
134 
 
Goethals did not linger in New York.  General Wilson ordered him to appear before an 
examination board scheduled to convene in New York City in December 1899.  The board 
examined Goethals on December 6 and recommended him for promotion to major, a promotion 
which took effect on March 6, 1900.56  Because the Department of Practical Military 
Engineering was a captain’s position, Wilson recommended that new Secretary of War Elihu 
Root approve orders to transfer Goethals to the engineer district based at Newport, Rhode Island, 
responsible for the maintenance and improvement of fortifications, rivers, and harbors in Rhode 
Island and southeastern Massachusetts.57 
 Wilson’s decision to send Goethals to Newport sprang from a stubborn adherence to 
outdated forms of officer development.  General Leonard Wood, a future Chief of Staff of the 
United States Army who then commanded the forces still occupying Cuba, had requested 
Goethals’s services on his own staff.  He explained to Wilson, “I want a moderately young man, 
active and thoroughly tactful” to employ in a situation that “is difficult and requires great 
judgment and tact.”  Continuing, he wrote, “I should prefer above all others Major George W. 
Goethals if he is available.”  He then explained that his “next choice would be Captain David 
DuBois Gaillard, then Captain H.F. Hodges, Captain J.J. Morrow, and Captain McKinstry.”  
Wilson replied, “Of the names you sent me, I have selected Capt. Hodges; he has had every class 
of duty nearly, river work, harbor work, fortification work, canal work, and was Lt. Col. of one 
of the Volunteer Engineer regiments during the Spanish war.”58   
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Wilson’s actions demonstrate that the army’s experiential model of officer development 
could have some merits if exercised by perceptive leaders with effective oversight of the 
assignments process.  The general saw a shortcoming in Goethals’s base of developmental 
experience, and deliberately acted to correct it.  Leaders like Wilson, however, were not 
particularly common.  Such active institutional-level measures to mitigate developmental 
deficiencies were not common, as Goethals’s career shows.  Now in the third decade of his 
career, this was the first time that the Corps of Engineers ordered Goethals to a duty assignment 
because it offered specific experiences in an area of engineering to which he had not yet been 
exposed.  Despite the army’s lingering reliance upon the experiential system of officer 
development, it rarely did anything to ensure its officers were exposed to the right experiences.  
Goethals began his duty in Newport on August 31, 1900.59  His new engineering district 
was large and multifaceted, responsible for both fortifications and improvements of rivers and 
harbors throughout Rhode Island and southeastern Massachusetts.  As district engineer, Goethals 
managed simultaneous efforts to establish or deepen anchorages and create more navigable 
channels in and around harbors in Martha’s Vineyard, Nantucket, Cape Cod, Woods Hole, and 
Rhode Island’s Narragansett Bay, as well as dredging river channels in the Taunton River in 
Massachusetts.  In addition to this, routine work in the district included removing unfortunate 
vessels that routinely wrecked or sank and obstructed navigation in channels frequently used by 
fishermen and commercial shipping, especially near Buzzards Bay, Nantucket, Martha’s 
Vineyard, and Block Island.  Contractors did most of the work.  While Goethals and his 
supporting staff—including the ever-present Sydney B. Williamson—monitored progress and 
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disbursed funds for the contracted projects, they directed most of their effort to the coastal 
fortifications near Newport, Rhode Island and New Bedford, Massachusetts.60 
 But in the end, Goethals’s time in Newport was not significant for the opportunity it 
afforded him to gain experience in the construction and maintenance of coastal fortifications.  
Beyond late-nineteenth-century technological improvements that allowed for the use of 
electricity, and “disappearing” guns that could be raised to fire and lowered behind cover to load, 
there was nothing cutting-edge about the U.S. Army’s coastal defense programs.  They were 
always engaged in a losing battle with time and technology.  Systems of coastal defense planned 
before and after the Civil War were based on unrealistic appraisals of available resources and 
funds.  Congress rarely funded fortifications programs to the extent called for by planners, and 
construction could progress only at the rate that available labor and resources allowed.  Plans 
took decades to complete, while naval technology continued to make progress.  Upon 
completion, many new forts were already obsolete, having been designed to face decades-old 
naval threats that existed when the fortification systems were planned.  Although considered to 
be one of the most important missions for the Corps of Engineers in the late-nineteenth century, 
an assignment in coastal fortifications was inherently backward-looking.61     
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Despite this, the Newport assignment allowed Goethals to improve his already strong 
reputation as an energetic officer and a talented engineer.  The army and navy planned to hold 
joint maneuvers near Newport in late September 1900, just one month after Goethals arrived in 
the city.  The navy intended to exercise its North Atlantic Squadron and test tactics for 
penetrating coastal defenses in order to raid a port.  At the same time, the army wanted to test its 
defenses at the mouth of Narragansett Bay and was particularly interested in testing its use of the 
searchlight as a defensive weapon.62  Goethals observed the exercise and sent a lengthy report to 
the Chief of Engineers.  The vast majority of this report focused on possible uses of searchlights, 
strongly recommending that fortifications be equipped with multiple lights.  “That there cannot 
be too many search lights was very evident,” he reported.63  He emphasized the diverse roles 
they could play in the defense.  In addition to searching for ships approaching a minefield, 
Goethals experimented with a more active role for the searchlights.  He used one to blind the 
pilot of the torpedo boat Stiletto, causing the unfortunate sailor to lose his bearings and run the 
ship into a nearby wharf.  According to Goethals, this action led naval officers to “assert that an 
additional light would have been as good as another battery.”64 
General Wilson received Goethals’s report enthusiastically, circulating it widely within 
the Corps of Engineers.65  The recommendations created a complicated problem.  Existing power 
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demands of forts’ artillery emplacements—whose range-finding equipment, auxiliary 
ammunition hoists, and disappearing gun carriages were usually electrically powered—and of 
the buildings within the garrisons themselves consumed all of the generating capacity of the 
forts’ simple power plants.  Engineers had originally designed those plants to provide 
intermittent power only to artillery emplacements when they were actively in use.  Existing 
power generation systems were insufficient to support multiple high-power searchlights at the 
forts.   
To address the problem, Wilson created a board of engineers that included Goethals and 
two other officers.  This put Goethals and his colleagues in an awkward position.  While 
expected and able to innovate, their innovations were taking place within an increasingly 
obsolete mission.  Together, the three officers created a larger central power station that became 
the new standard for coastal fortifications.66  As the board’s leader, Goethals wrote and presented 
a paper entitled “Electricity in Permanent Seacoast Defenses” to the American Institute of 
Electrical Engineers in May 1902.  The paper was well received within both the engineering 
community and the larger coastal defense community, and was reprinted in the Journal of the 
United States Artillery in 1903.67  This improved Goethals’s already excellent reputation at 
exactly the right time.  In the spring of 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of War 
Elihu Root ordered Major General Samuel B. M. Young to convene a board to select forty-two 
officers to be detailed to the army’s first General Staff.  On the strength of his well-known 
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innovations in an inherently backward-looking mission in Newport, Goethals made the cut.  The 
U.S. Army, or at least parts of it, apparently did not interpret the establishment of its General 
Staff as a complete departure from past norms and practices.68 
Power and authority within the army had long been split between the Commanding 
General and the autonomous and influential chiefs of supply and administrative bureaus, such as 
the Adjutant General, Quartermaster General, Chief of Ordnance, Judge Advocate General, and 
Chief of Engineers.  The relative power of the Commanding General waxed and waned 
according to the personalities of successive Commanding Generals and Secretaries of War.  On 
two occasions in the nineteenth century, the relationship of the individuals holding those two 
offices were so poor that the Commanding General went so far as to remove his headquarters 
from Washington, D.C.69   
The bureau chiefs were more constant presences and more consistent forces to be 
reckoned with.  Generally less hierarchical than their colleagues of the line branches—over 
whom the Commanding General reigned supreme—the bureau chiefs were more comfortable 
with a broadly consultative approach to managing the military and jealously guarded their 
respective spheres of expertise, influence, and authority.  The bureau system was mired with 
inefficiency because the scopes of responsibility of the several bureaus frequently overlapped.  
For example, when Goethals worked on the problem of power generation in coastal 
fortifications, different aspects of his work fell under the purview of five different bureaus:  the 
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Corps of Engineers for construction and power generation, the Quartermaster Department for 
lighting the buildings of the forts’ garrisons, the Signal Corps for power requirements of 
communications equipment, the Ordnance Department for power requirements of the 
ammunition hoists, and the Artillery Bureau for power requirements of the gun emplacements, 
range-finding equipment, and battery commanders’ stations.70 
In the three decades after the Civil War, the United States Army approached a critical 
turning point.  Previously, except in times of war, the regular army’s mission was to serve as a 
constabulary throughout the western frontier and as a coastal defense force.  By the end of 
Reconstruction, it was clear that the day was rapidly approaching when there would be no 
frontier to police.  Forced to reconsider the proper role of the army, many officers came to 
believe that the proper role of an army at peace was to prepare for war.  Reflecting the trends of a 
society whose conception of professionalism was evolving, officers began to debate the future of 
their profession in newly organized professional associations and journals. Many looked to 
European nations as potential threats and future adversaries and determined that the army was 
structurally and doctrinally ill-prepared for modern warfare.71   A faction, led by Civil War hero 
and William T. Sherman protégé Emory Upton, pushed for a centralized system of command and 
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administration headed by a chief of staff and a general staff corps, modeled after Upton’s 
understanding of the Prussian military’s system.72 
Upton and those of his followers who carried the argument forward after his death in 
1881 failed in their endeavors to alter the existing system of command and administration.  Their 
ideas did not gain enough traction because they exceeded the parameters of what was considered 
possible and acceptable at the time.  Although American society increasingly accepted the 
consolidation of professional authority in other professions such as medicine and law, it had not 
shaken off its long-held distrust of centralized military authority.  Furthermore, nothing had 
occurred to shake confidence in the bureau system.  For much of the late-nineteenth century, 
officers and political leaders alike basked in the afterglow of the Union victory in the Civil War, 
seeing little reason to modify systems that they believed had led to success.  Compounding this, 
Upton’s ideas met a cold reception from congressmen who viewed traditional army structures, 
systems, and processes as significant sources of patronage.  Crisis is the mother of all motivators, 
and it took a severe one to shift the parameters of what was considered possible and acceptable.73 
That crisis came with the War with Spain in 1898.  Goethals’s experience of a 
problematic mobilization for war was all too common.  Mobilization camps were ill-sited, ill-
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supplied, and ill-supervised, leading to scandalously preventable epidemics of disease.  The War 
Department selected ports of embarkation serviced by limited, sometimes solitary, and generally 
underdeveloped rail lines—leading to congestion and confusion at the ports and troops 
embarking without much-needed supplies.  Much like the experience of Goethals’s First Army 
Corps, most units departing the United States found that the War Department could not supply 
them with even rudimentary information about their objectives or the disposition of Spanish 
forces, or with adequate maps.  Furthermore, war plans were virtually non-existent and events in 
both the Caribbean and the Pacific theaters took on a strikingly improvisational air.  In fact, the 
War Department instructed then-Captain Peyton C. March, who would later serve as Chief of 
Staff of the U.S. Army during World War I, to decide for himself to which theater of the war his 
light artillery battery would be deployed.74   
These real and significant blunders, as well as plenty of fabricated ones, came to light in 
almost real time in the age of muckraker journalism.  Public opinion turned heavily against the 
War Department, leading President McKinley to appoint a commission led by Grenville 
Dodge—a railroad executive who had previously served in Congress and as a Civil War 
general—to investigate the conduct of the war.  Although the Dodge Commission’s report 
balanced criticism of the War Department’s most blatant errors with praise for what it 
accomplished in managing the first substantial American overseas military expeditions, the 
public continued to demand accountability for the department’s mismanagement of the war 
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effort.  In the summer of 1899, McKinley acted, sacking Secretary of War Russell Alger and 
appointing Elihu Root, a corporate lawyer from New York, in his place.75 
That Root would implement the most significant institutional and organizational reforms 
in the army’s history to that date came as a surprise.  McKinley did not select Root to lead the 
War Department to affect substantial change in the army.  Rather, McKinley believed Root’s 
excellent reputation as a lawyer made him well qualified to run a War Department wading into 
unprecedented legal territory, charged with administering the military occupation and civil 
reconstruction of Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam in the wake of the War with 
Spain.  But a close study of the report of the Dodge Commission and a closer association with 
the influential and reform-minded Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin and his assistant Lieutenant 
Colonel William H. Carter made Root a devoted convert to the cause of military reform.  
Significantly, Root recognized that the controversies surrounding the War with Spain and the 
possibilities suggested by various progressive reforms elsewhere in American society had shifted 
the parameters of what both the army and the American public considered possible and 
acceptable, and that conditions necessitated reform.  Perhaps most importantly, his legal 
background and excellent relationships with the nation’s political elite gave him the political 
acumen to manage the legislative effort to turn reformers’ theories into policy.76 
The most important reforms of Root’s tenure were the establishment of the Army War 
College, the overhauling of the militia system in the Dick Act of 1903, and the establishment of 
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the General Staff Corps in the General Staff Act of 1903.  The War College came first, as Root 
discerned that this would be not only the least controversial of the major reforms he had in mind, 
but also one that he could institute without seeking the approval of Congress.  The Dick Act of 
January 1903 represented the first fundamental overhaul of the militia system since 1792.  It 
imposed standardized tables of organization and equipment upon the National Guard, as well as 
established a formal training and support relationship between the regular army and the National 
Guard. The crowning achievement of Root’s program of reforms came a few weeks later with 
the passage of the General Staff Act.77 
Early in his tenure, Root saw that modern warfare demanded a General Staff.  In his 
mind, the most important lesson of the War with Spain was the need for an agency responsible 
for developing war plans and coordinating the complex array of activities and resources required 
to mobilize and deploy the army.  His first attempt at the legislation in 1902 failed due to an 
excess of ambition.  Through this bill, Root not only attempted to create a planning and 
coordinating agency in the form of the General Staff, but also directed the closing and 
consolidating of several of the powerful bureaus.  At the same time that Commanding General 
Nelson A. Miles railed to a sympathetic Senate Military Affairs Committee filled with veteran 
volunteer officers of the Civil War that no general staff was necessary because the existing 
system had succeeded in defeating the Confederacy, the bureau chiefs—with the notable 
exception of Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin—closed ranks and argued that the proposal 
would deprive the army of the benefit of their technical expertise.  Root remained committed to 
the cause and orchestrated an intensive lobbying campaign in support of a second attempt.  
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Securing the support of a critical mass of senior officers and political leaders, and dividing the 
opposition by backing away from his proposal to consolidate the bureaus, Root finally secured 
passage of the General Staff Act in February 1903, despite the continued vocal opposition of 
General Miles, who Root conveniently sent on an inspection tour to the Philippines when 
Congress considered the legislation.78 
In a nod to Miles, the act which abolished the office of the Commanding General, 
replaced it with the Chief of Staff, and established the General Staff took effect on August 15, 
1903, exactly one week after Miles’s retirement.  In the meantime, Secretary Root directed the 
War College Board to prepare recommendations on how to select officers for detail to the 
General Staff.  Although the War College had been formally established a year and a half 
previously, only its administrative board had been established so far, and Secretary Root had 
taken to using it as an informal staff until such time as he was able to formally establish the 
General Staff Corps.  The board recommended that “the personnel of the General Staff Corps 
should be selected with great care and should comprise the most competent officers in the Army 
at large.”  Root was only too happy to accept this recommendation.  He viewed the General Staff 
and a rationalized education system as a means of advancing talented officers through the ranks 
more quickly.  With his excellent reputation, Goethals was widely considered to be among the 
best officers of his generation.  With orders in hand to report for duty as part of the new General 
Staff Corps, George W. Goethals formally transferred charge of the Newport District to his 
successor on May 22, 1903 and moved his family to Washington.79 
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As Goethals could heartily attest, establishing the General Staff did not end the bureau 
system.  After the failed legislative effort in 1902, Root knew that he would have to accept some 
level of coexistence between the General Staff and the bureaus in order to secure support for the 
act within Congress and within the army.  In fact, he came to believe that the coexistence would 
be a good thing, as it would enhance the General Staff’s ability to plan for war by freeing it from 
the minutia of daily administration.  The General Staff Act, as drafted by Root and his advisors, 
and approved by Congress, stipulated: 
The duties of the General Staff Corps shall be to prepare plans for the national defense 
and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war; to investigate and report 
upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the Army and its state of preparation for 
military operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and 
to general officers and other superior commanders, and to act as their agents in informing 
and coordinating the action of all different officers who are subject, under the terms of 
this act, to the supervision of the Chief of Staff; and to perform such other military duties 
not otherwise assigned by law as may be from time to time prescribed by the President.80 
Root intended the General Staff to be a planning and coordinating agency, but the extent to 
which it could coordinate anything largely depended upon the extent to which the bureaus felt 
that they were “subject . . . to the supervision of the Chief of Staff.”  Events in the early years of 
the new organization proved that this was very much a function of the personalities occupying 
the key positions.81   
Root relaxed his grip on the reins after formally establishing the General Staff.  Perhaps 
he recognized that while he had the ability to change the U.S. Army’s systems and organization, 
he could do little to reshape the culture of the officer corps.  Beyond what was specifically 
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stipulated in the law, he would not dictate how the General Staff would organize, operate, or 
relate to the other agencies of the War Department.  The officer corps had to figure out on its 
own how to integrate the new organization into the army.  As William H. Carter later recalled, 
“the General Staff Corps was established and began to function officially, but without 
expectation of reaching its full usefulness in the immediate future,” and the early years of the 
General Staff took on a highly uncertain and improvisational character.82  Accordingly, Secretary 
Root reported to Congress in the summer of 1903 that Goethals and the other General Staff 
officers first assembled in Washington “were then organized as an experimental or provisional 
general staff, and directed to work out a permanent organization and distribution of duties for the 
General Staff Corps, a draft of new regulations, and a revision of old regulations made necessary 
by the new departure.”  Illustrating the bureaucratic tightrope he had to walk, Root said that “this 
work was done upon full consultation with the chiefs of bureaus and taking the opinions of 
general officers commanding departments,” in order to encourage some investment from those 
quarters in the role and scope of the General Staff, “in order that they might become familiar 
with their work, and test by experiment the best methods of accomplishing it.”83 
The newly established General Staff organized into three divisions.  The First Division 
considered problems and policy related to organization, doctrine, and training for the infantry, 
cavalry, and field artillery units; regulations; training maneuvers; and mobilization.  The Second 
Division, also known as the Military Information Division, collected and developed intelligence 
on foreign armies, procuring and producing maps for potential theaters of war, and coordinating 
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the efforts of military attaches stationed abroad.  The Third Division studied possible theaters of 
war and developed war plans, and also dealt with organization and doctrine for the army’s 
technical branches, coast defense, and combined maneuvers with the Navy.  Given his recent 
experience in coast defense, Goethals was assigned to the Third Division, where he was 
simultaneously a member of the section responsible for developing war plans and the section 
responsible for working on issues related to coast defense.84 
In short order, Goethals and the rest of the Third Division became an arm of the Army 
War College.  From his first year in office as Secretary of War, Root had envisioned that the War 
College would be a dual-purposed institution.  One the one hand, Root intended the War College 
to “direct the instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army, to acquire the information, devise 
the plans . . . and to advise the Commander in Chief upon all questions of plans, armament, 
transportation, mobilization, and military preparation and movement.”  On the other hand, it 
would serve as a school in which officers would “receive instruction . . . in the science of war, 
including the duties of the staff, and in all matters pertaining to the application of military 
science to national defense.”85 Development of the War College stalled in 1902 and early 1903 
as its board functioned almost entirely as an informal staff for Secretary Root in the effort to 
secure passage of the General Staff Act.  Afterwards, the War Department put more thought into 
the War College and its relationship to the General Staff, and eventually determined that because 
both organizations were at least partly intended to consider and develop war plans and 
mobilization systems, the War College would be an adjunct component of the General Staff.  
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Given the fact that its scope of responsibility included developing war plans, the Third Division 
was a natural selection to carry out the mission of the War College.  By October 27, 1903, 
Goethals and his colleagues in the Third Division were assigned to the War College.86 
Illustrating the improvisational nature of the General Staff in its early years, Goethals’s 
affiliation with the Army War College did not last long.  By the winter of 1905-1906, a new 
coast defense board took up most of his time.87  Due to his work in the Newport District, 
Goethals was the General Staff’s coastal defense expert.  Under the original plan of organization 
in 1903, he had been designated as the head of a section within the Third Division responsible 
for considering problems and questions related to permanent fortifications and submersible 
mines.  Later, General Tasker H. Bliss assigned Goethals to deliver a lecture to the officers of the 
War College titled, “The Tactics of Coast Defense, with Special Reference to Submarine 
Defense.”88   
In 1904, President Roosevelt halted appropriations for the construction and improvement 
of seacoast fortifications because it had finally become apparent that technological advances had 
rendered crucial aspects of the program recommended by the Endicott Board in 1885 obsolete.  
He ordered the new Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, to convene a board of general 
officers in early 1905 to come up with recommendations for changes to be made in order to 
address the implications of two decades of technological innovation.  When Taft asked the 
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General Staff to provide him an officer to serve as the board’s secretary and recorder, Goethals 
was the natural choice.89 
Working closely together on the National Coast Defense Board, informally known as the 
Taft Board, Goethals and Taft developed a warm bond.  Generally prejudiced against the 
overweight, Goethals may have been surprised to find that he enjoyed the jocular Secretary of 
War’s company so much.  Later in life, he would tell his daughter-in-law that the famously 
rotund Taft “was the only clean fat man he had ever known.”90  The two shared a similar sense 
of humor and found common ground in jokes, often at the Navy’s expense, while on tours of 
inspection of coastal fortifications in 1905 and 1906.91  For his part, Taft was quickly impressed 
by the knowledgeable and hardworking engineer, who in addition to his duties with the board 
wrote and presented a paper on fortifications for the International Congress of Engineers and 
publish it in Transactions of the American Society of Engineers.92 
Accurately gauging Goethals’s abilities and potential, Taft began to see a role for 
Goethals in the nation’s most significant ongoing engineering project.  “I am convinced,” he 
wrote to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Engineers in the summer of 1905, “that Major 
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Goethals can be of great use in the construction of the Panama Canal . . . I desire that he be 
retired from the General Staff and be assigned to this work in any capacity that the [Isthmian 
Canal] Commission may designate.”93  The commission did not request Goethals’s services.  
Only one year later, however, Taft pressed the case again.  Writing to Roosevelt, Taft called 
attention to “Major Goethals, one of the ablest of our army engineers,” whom he wanted to send 
to Panama because the Chief Engineer of the Isthmian Canal Commission, John Stevens, “would 
find him so useful that they could work together, and that Goethals might be Stevens’ 
understudy, should he for any reason fail us.”94  Still, the commission expressed no interest, and 
Goethals was not sent to Panama. 
Only a few months later, however, the commission slid into crisis.  For reasons he never 
fully disclosed, Stevens grew irritable and dissatisfied in Panama in the winter of 1906 and 1907.  
When Theodore Shonts resigned from his position as Chairman of the Isthmian Canal 
Commission on January 22, 1907, Stevens grew more despondent, appearing to crack under the 
strain of his duties.95  On January 30, 1907, he sent a letter to Roosevelt.  “I never sought this 
position,” he complained, “on the contrary, [I] declined it twice, and finally accepted it against 
my better judgment.”  Continuing, he stated that “the idea of being constantly before the public, 
whether in a favorable or unfavorable light, is extremely distasteful to me . . . continually subject 
to attack by a lot of people, and they are not all in private life, that I would not wipe my boots on 
in the United States.”  Stevens went on to complain that his salary was too low, that the job 
required too much time away from his family, and that he was rapidly losing interest in the work.  
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“The ‘honor’ which is continually being held up as an incentive for being connected with this 
work,” he declared, “appeals to me but slightly.  To me, the canal is only a big ditch, and its 
great utility when completed, has never been so apparent to me, as it seems to be to others.”  
Coming to his conclusion after six meandering pages, Stevens stated unequivocally that he was 
“not anxious to continue in the service,” and that there were other “men as competent and far 
more willing to pick up and carry the burden” than he.  “My desire,” he concluded, “is to take a 
rest, and then to re-enter railway service, for which I know I am best fitted by training and 
inclination.”96 
The letter took President Roosevelt completely by surprise.  He had seen Stevens in 
Washington only one month earlier and had told the chief engineer to expect to be named 
chairman of the commission if Shonts stepped down.97  After receiving the letter and digesting it, 
Roosevelt forwarded the letter to Secretary of War Taft, whose department was nominally 
responsible for overseeing all work on the isthmus.  He enclosed a cover letter that simply stated, 
“There is of course no question that Stevens must get out at once,” and “if he should now alter 
his mind, as he has so frequently altered it in the past, and wish to stay, I should not consider it 
for a moment given the tone of his letter.”  He then called Taft to a meeting at the White House 
on the morning of February 13 to discuss the matter further.98  
Roosevelt wanted a drastic change.  The resignations of Shonts and Stevens constituted 
the end of the Isthmian Canal Commission.  This marked not only the demise of the second 
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Isthmian Canal Commission, but also the sudden departure of the second chief engineer from the 
Panama Canal, both in as many years.  Wanting to put the project in charge of people who could 
not quit unless they were fired or relieved, Roosevelt had decided to place a soldier in charge of 
the Panama Canal.  The President relayed his decision to Taft and asked for his recommendation 
on whom to select to serve as both Chairman and Chief Engineer of the next Isthmian Canal 
Commission.99   
While Taft had already tried to assign Goethals to Panama for a year and a half, he asked 
to be excused to consult with Alexander Mackenzie, who by then had been promoted to 
Brigadier General and Chief of Engineers.  Mackenzie held a high opinion of Goethals from their 
service together in the Chief of Engineer’s office from 1894 to1898, and their subsequent service 
together on the first General Staff in 1903.  He echoed Taft’s assessment that Goethals was the 
engineer officer most fit for the job.  The two brought their recommendation to Roosevelt, and 
the matter was settled.  George W. Goethals would be placed in charge of the construction of the 
Panama Canal. 
Goethals left the General Staff and never looked back.  He demonstrated in Panama that 
despite his four-year tour of duty with the General Staff, he was skeptical of the new systems and 
structures that Root had imposed.  Although he had been an integral member of the division of 
the General Staff that was the foundation of the early Army War College, he wasted no time in 
undermining the principles of a tiered and rationalized system of officer education by pushing for 
new engineer lieutenants to undergo a practical course of instruction under his supervision before 
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attending the Engineer School of Application.100  Furthermore, the preponderance of Goethals’s 
correspondence with the War Department during the busiest construction years in the Canal 
Zone was directed around the General Staff rather than to or through the General Staff.  From his 
appointment until the completion of the Panama Canal, Goethals was much more likely to seek 
assistance from a bureau chief or from the Secretary of War himself than from the Chief of Staff 
or a member of the General Staff.101  Even though he had helped to organize and implement the 
army’s new structures, he never wavered in his embrace of the traditionalist mindset that 
doggedly continued to shape the army’s institutional culture.  On an individual level, Goethals 
embodied the schism between institutional structures and institutional culture that defined the 
United States Army in the wake of the Root reforms.     
***** 
Goethals was not the only one whose experiences on the first General Staff failed to 
inspire confidence in the new organization.  Few of the members of the first General Staff were 
eager to return to it.  John J. Pershing, for example, was not at all enamored with the early 
General Staff despite being included in its first cohort of officers.  Analyzing the army’s troubled 
entrance into the First World War years later, and with a significant axe to grind, Pershing 
directed blame squarely at the General Staff.  He found faults in its structure, arguing that even 
by 1917, it “had not yet been properly organized.”  More tellingly, he found that its 
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implementation was fundamentally flawed.  In its first decades, according to Pershing, the 
General Staff “was too much the inarticulate instrument of the Chief of Staff, who often 
erroneously assumed the role of Commanding General of the Army.”102  
Looking beyond Pershing’s motives and biases, there remains an interesting indictment 
of the American General Staff in its earliest years.  Reformers assumed that implementing the 
General Staff was the end of reform.  But they stopped short of proving its efficacy to the army 
itself.  Accordingly, its modes of organization and operation were not standardized, and took on 
an air of improvisation that officers who had already served for decades, and had become 
accustomed to traditional systems and methods of managing the army, found distasteful.  As 
Pershing pointed out, even those who led the new General Staff looked to traditional offices of 
the past as their model. 
Perhaps typically, then, Goethals’s experience of the General Staff was rooted firmly in 
old concepts.  He earned his place on the new General Staff by excelling in the anachronism that 
was American coastal defense in the late-nineteenth century.  Once on the General Staff, he 
served under Tasker H. Bliss in an Army War College that rejected its own educational mandate 
in favor of more traditional forms of experiential learning.  Outside of the War College and the 
Third Division, Goethals once again returned his focus to increasingly obsolete coastal defense 
problems.  With a gaze fixed firmly on a traditional and outdated mission despite his status as an 
original member of the new and ostensibly modern General Staff, Goethals earned much praise 
and the promotion of a lifetime to lead the effort at the Panama Canal.    
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Above all, Goethals’s experience demonstrates that Elihu Root’s reforms created a 
schism between institutional structures and institutional culture within the United States Army.  
Although he directly experienced and recognized the shortcomings of the war effort in 1898 that 
constituted the major stimulus of reform, Goethals did not fully embrace the implications of 
those shortcomings.  He was, in that regard, unexceptional among his generation, which 
remained decidedly traditional in its outlook.  In the end, the promise of reform would remain 
unfulfilled until the army’s institutional culture caught up with its new institutional structures.  
And that required the cumulative effect of years of gradual pressure from external forces and the 
severe shock of the army’s involvement in the First World War.
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CHAPTER 4 
Making the Dirt Fly: 
The Panama Canal, the Managerial Revolution, and the U.S. Army  
 
On August 15, 1914, the greatest engineering triumph of the twentieth century opened 
with little fanfare or acknowledgement.  Although a grand multinational parade of ships had 
been planned for the occasion, events in Europe overshadowed any ceremonies in Panama.  As 
the Belgian garrison at Liège fell to the German army in the opening campaign of the First 
World War, the world hardly noticed that the Ancon, filled to capacity with the longest serving 
canal workers, successfully traversed the Panama Canal and opened it to commercial shipping.  
The Ancon, however, commanded all of George W. Goethals’s attention.  Having led the 
construction effort in Panama for over seven years, the chief engineer watched the Ancon’s 
progress from shore, shadowing the ship in a railcar adjacent to the canal.  Watching the Ancon 
exit the final lock and make its way to the Pacific Ocean marked the culmination of the project 
that consumed all of his thoughts and energies for the better part of a decade.   
Goethals was relieved when the Ancon completed its journey.  There were times when 
the prospect of opening the canal seemed too distant or on the far side of too many obstacles to 
be possible.  Despite the many engineering problems that had to be solved to build the canal, 
Goethals believed the greatest difficulties he had faced were not technical.  He insisted that the 
opening of the canal was more the product of successful management than brilliant engineering.  
This belief was a manifestation of a broader trend that had a tremendous impact upon the U.S. 
Army’s institutional culture. 
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Despite its stubborn traditionalism, the army was well connected to the society it served.  
It was subject to many of the same forces and trends that affected American society during the 
Gilded Age and Progressive Era.  Shaped by a largely middle-class officer corps, the army’s 
institutional culture embraced many—though certainly not all—of the attitudes, ideas, and trends 
that permeated the burgeoning American middle class.  Chief among these was an abiding and 
widespread faith in the power and propriety of the intricately rationalized managerial systems 
and practices that reshaped public and private institutions in American society during the 
managerial revolution of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.1  The popularity of the 
managerial revolution within the U.S. Army was amply on display when it, through Goethals, 
took charge of the construction of the Panama Canal.  Although the Panama Canal was a marvel 
of modern engineering, Goethals thought of it above all as a managerial problem.  That 
perception informed his approach to leading the construction effort in Panama from 1907 until 
the canal opened in 1914.  Similarly steeped in and accepting of modern managerial theory, army 
officers in line and technical branches alike applauded Goethals’s leadership in the Canal Zone. 
Ultimately, the popularity of the managerial revolution within the army made the Root 
reforms at least tolerable despite the fact that the officer corps was inclined to resist Root’s 
conception of a rationalized system of professional education.  The officer corps’ embrace of the 
managerial revolution influenced it to accept the notion of a general staff even if it could not 
come to a consensus on the proper form, role, and scope of the General Staff as it was 
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established in 1903.2  Furthermore, the army’s embrace of the managerial revolution marked the 
beginning of a long process of cultural change that would ultimately repair the schism between 
its institutional culture and institutional structures caused by the Root reforms.   
***** 
 Dreams of a canal in Panama were by no means new when George W. Goethals arrived 
in the Canal Zone as the newly appointed Chairman and Chief Engineer of the Isthmian Canal 
Commission (ICC) in 1907.  For centuries, the Isthmus of Panama had been viewed as a strategic 
conduit between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.  Prior to European contact, Mesoamerican 
societies made the isthmus the nexus of a robust regional trading network.  In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the king of Spain dreamed of building a canal across Panama.  His 
schemes were never realized due to the limitations of existing technology.  In place of an 
interoceanic waterway, Spanish officials settled for the construction of two major roads—the 
Camino de Cruces and the Camino Real—over which passed approximately one-third of all 
minerals and revenues extracted from Peru and bound for Madrid between 1600 and 1660.3   
Panama’s strategic value to Spain went neither unnoticed nor unchallenged.  English 
privateers and the Royal Navy sacked Spain’s colonial outposts at Portobelo in 1667 and 1739, 
as well as the city of Panama in 1671.  By the time of these attacks, however, Spain’s interest in 
Panama was fading.  The gradual collapse of the Peruvian silver economy, the viability of a 
competing overland route via Buenos Aires, the beginning of the slow decline of Spanish 
military and political power in the Americas, and improving maritime capabilities that made the 
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passage of Cape Horn more viable combined to render Panama insignificant to global trade in 
the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.4 
 That changed after the Mexican-American War.  Having taken California from Mexico, 
the United States had a decided interest in shortening and better securing its communications 
routes between port cities on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.  Lacking transcontinental telegraph 
or rail services, Congress authorized contracts for American steamship companies to carry mail 
between San Francisco and the isthmus via the Pacific, and between the isthmus and both New 
Orleans and New York via the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic.  William Henry Aspinwall, who 
won the contract for the Pacific route, also gained control of overland transportation connecting 
the Atlantic and Pacific routes, financing the construction of the Panama Railroad from 1850-
1858.  Fueled not only by government contracts to move mail between steamship packets and to 
move troops to western garrisons, but also by residual private demand from the California gold 
rush, the railroad became a profitable venture even before it was completed.  Passengers would 
use as much of the railroad as had been completed, and then complete their journey on foot, 
mules, and small boats navigating the Chagres River.5  
 Americans soon learned from painful experience that the environment in Panama was 
deadly, especially after tropical rains.  After concluding that American laborers were too 
expensive and too vulnerable to tropical diseases, the Panama Railroad Company opted instead 
to contract Chinese labor, who proved equally susceptible to environmental hazards.  Nearly 
eighty percent of contracted Chinese laborers deserted the railroad or perished from disease or 
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suicide, leading the company to bring in thousands of West Indian laborers to complete the job.  
Beyond the workforce, the unforgiving environment was also fatal for those merely passing 
through.  Even after the horrors of the Civil War, the memory of the 4th U.S. Infantry Regiment’s 
transit from New York to California in 1852 was visceral for Ulysses S. Grant, who noted in his 
memoirs decades later that “about one-seventh of those who left New York harbor with the 4th 
Infantry on the 5th of July, now lie buried on the Isthmus of Panama or on Flamingo island in 
Panama Bay.”6    
 Later in the nineteenth century, there emerged a growing consensus that technology had 
progressed to the point that an interoceanic canal across Central America was feasible.  While 
Americans devoted much energy to exploring possibilities in Nicaragua, the French Compagnie 
Universelle du Canal Interocéanique successfully negotiated a deal with the Colombian 
government to construct a canal across the province of Panama.  The company and the canal 
were pet projects of Ferdinand De Lesseps, who had previously led the construction of the Suez 
Canal.7   
Work on De Lesseps’s new project began in 1877, and quickly devolved into an 
unmitigated disaster.  De Lesseps’s plans called for a sea-level canal—an ill-advised concept 
given Panama’s rugged topography, geology, propensity for mud slides after tropical rains, and 
tidal patterns that create a twenty-foot difference between the sea level on Panama’s Pacific and 
Atlantic coasts.  Compounding these problems, De Lesseps’s engineers inadvertently invited 
mud slides and created large malarial swamps by dumping all the soil they removed from the 
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canal into valleys adjoining their work sites, effectively blocking natural courses for runoff water 
during the rainy season.  The pace of work slowed to a crawl and the incidence of disease among 
workers skyrocketed.  Between disease and accidents, at least 22,189 workers died during the 
French construction period in Panama. As its failures became a national scandal, the French 
government refused to intervene to save De Lesseps, his company, and the canal.  In 1889, the 
Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interocéanique went bankrupt.  Its assets and canal rights were 
acquired by a new French company that thereafter took the bare minimum actions required to 
prevent Colombia from seizing the French equipment and revoking the canal concession.8 
 While the French effort was underway, the United States explored options for a canal 
through Nicaragua to compete with and balance against a French canal in Panama.  American 
political leaders failed to achieve a consensus on the issue, and efforts to build a canal through 
Nicaragua were limited to an ill-supported private venture by the Maritime Canal Company.  
Construction began in 1887.  Enough Congressmen were persuaded of its potential by 1889 to 
officially charter the company and its canal.  By 1893, however, political and financial 
supporters realized that the Maritime Canal Company had wildly underestimated the amount of 
effort, resources, and money the project required.  With public and private investment drying up, 
the company dissolved.9   
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 The War with Spain in 1898 fundamentally altered the American outlook on the need for 
a canal across the isthmus.  Docked at San Francisco when the USS Maine sank in Havana 
harbor and war began to seem more likely, the battleship USS Oregon received orders to steam 
for the east coast and rendezvous with the Atlantic squadron for possible operations against 
Spain.  The Oregon set off on March 9, 1898.  The public watched breathlessly as the 12,000 
nautical-mile voyage of the Oregon played out in the newspapers.  There was much relief when 
the Oregon appeared off of Florida at the end of May—67 days and one declaration of war after 
it had left San Francisco.  If the long and tense journey of the Oregon conditioned Americans to 
begin to think of an isthmian canal as not only an economic ambition, but also a military 
necessity, the annexation of Hawaii and occupation of the Philippines completed the transition.  
Given its new possessions in the Pacific after the War with Spain, the United States considered a 
Central American canal to be a strategic imperative.10 
 Politically contentious issues surrounding the problem of exactly where and how to build 
a canal were resolved only after decisive interventions by Theodore Roosevelt.  Although the 
Maritime Canal Company’s Nicaraguan venture had failed, powerful financial and political 
backers continued to advocate for a canal in Nicaragua.  For a time, it seemed the Nicaragua 
route was the most likely outcome.  Because of his canal experience on the Tennessee River, one 
of then-Captain George W. Goethals’s duties while assigned to Washington as Assistant to the 
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Chief of Engineers from 1894-1898 was to provide technical advice to a Senate select committee 
investigating proposed routes and plans for a Nicaraguan canal.11  The appeal of Nicaragua, 
however, declined sharply after the turn of the century.  Phillipe Bunau-Varilla—one of the 
leading engineers of the French effort in Panama—persuaded his countrymen to sell their 
property, assets, and equipment in Panama to the United States at a significantly reduced price.  
Given this development, Theodore Roosevelt successfully lobbied the House of Representatives 
in January 1902 to authorize and appropriate funds to open negotiations with Colombia to build a 
canal across Panama.  But when the Colombians balked, Roosevelt acted swiftly.   
Giving assurances of American support to separatists in Panama through the keenly 
interested and apparently omnipresent Phillipe Bunau-Varilla, Roosevelt played a major part in 
prompting the Panamanian Revolution of 1903.  With American warships and a detachment of 
U.S. Marines preventing an effective Colombian military response, Panama declared 
independence in November 1903.  Honoring a prior agreement, the new republic appointed 
Phillipe Bunau-Varilla as its agent in Washington to begin negotiations for a canal treaty with 
the United States.  Rushing to complete negotiations before the Panamanian members of the new 
republic’s delegation could reach Washington, Bunau-Varilla and Secretary of State John Hay 
completed the Hay—Bunau-Varilla Treaty on November 18, 1903.  In return for an up-front 
payment of $10 million and an annual payment of $250,000 beginning in 1913, the treaty 
granted the United States political and legal control of the Panama Canal Zone.  It defined the 
Canal Zone as a swath of land twenty miles wide, with a ten-mile buffer zone on either side of 
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the canal along its entire 48-mile route, except for Panama City and Colón at its Pacific and 
Atlantic terminals, respectively.12   
Using a vague threat of severe consequences if Panama failed to act expeditiously, 
Secretary Hay successfully pressed the new Panamanian government to ratify the treaty before it 
had even been translated into Spanish.  Thus, American dreams of an isthmian canal became real 
and tangible.  And although he would write in his autobiography that “no one connected with the 
American Government had any part in preparing, inciting, or encouraging the revolution,” 
Roosevelt privately considered his role in the affair to be his most significant foreign policy 
achievement.  Moreover, he believed that the vast majority of Americans approved.  The only 
opposition, he wrote to a friend, came from “a small body of shrill eunuchs” who failed to 
recognize the invaluable opportunity that he had seized.13  Vivid metaphors notwithstanding, 
Roosevelt’s perception of popular opinion was generally correct.  Although many were 
uncomfortable with Roosevelt’s methods, the notion of an American canal in Panama was 
overwhelmingly appealing.  Accordingly, the U.S. Senate ratified the Hay—Bunau-Varilla 
Treaty on February 23, 1904 by a lopsided vote of 66-14.14   
 Until Goethals’s arrival in Panama in March 1907, the Isthmian Canal Commission’s 
record in Panama was mixed at best.  Led throughout much of 1904 and 1905 by Rear Admiral 
John G. Walker as chairman and John Findlay Wallace as chief engineer, the Americans fared 
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13 The first quotation is from Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography (New York: Charles 
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little better than their French predecessors.  Where the French canal suffered from an infeasible 
plan, a lack of understanding of the disease environment, and immature technology, the Walker 
Commission was plagued by a refusal to acknowledge the emerging medical consensus about the 
disease environment and poor leadership.   
The most significant problem was Walker’s and Wallace’s refusal to believe that yellow 
fever was a mosquito-borne illness.  Yellow fever had been attributed to poor sanitary conditions 
until Cuban and American doctors demonstrated the link between yellow fever and the aëdes 
egypti mosquito during the American occupation of Cuba after the War with Spain.  Many 
laymen were unconvinced, Walker and Wallace among them.  They denied requests from 
Colonel William C. Gorgas—the commission’s Chief Sanitary Officer and an army doctor with 
considerable experience fighting the disease in Cuba—for adequate supplies, funding, and 
manpower for a mosquito eradication campaign.  Instead, they ordered the well-known doctor to 
direct his efforts toward general sanitation of the Canal Zone.  An entirely avoidable, but 
relatively mild epidemic then hit the Canal Zone in late 1904 and early 1905.  As deaths and 
fears of a return to the nightmarish epidemics during the French construction period mounted, 
American employees in the Zone panicked.  In April, May, and June 1905, three quarters of the 
American employees fled the Canal Zone.  That exodus included Chief Engineer Wallace, whose 
resignation was accepted by a thoroughly disgusted Secretary of War William Howard Taft on 
June 25, 1905.  As Admiral Walker had resigned a few months earlier, the Isthmian Canal 
Commission was adrift and rudderless, and work in Panama ground to a halt.15 
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 Succeeding Wallace as the ICC’s chief engineer, John Stevens set a firm foundation for 
the successful completion of the canal.  His tenure in Panama was marked by two distinct 
achievements:  the practical elimination of yellow fever from the isthmus and the completion of 
the critically important railroad phase of the canal construction.  Success on the yellow fever 
front required Theodore Roosevelt’s intervention.  Stevens and Theodore Shonts—who had 
succeeded Admiral Walker as chairman of the ICC in April 1905—also did not subscribe to the 
emerging scientific consensus that yellow fever was a mosquito-borne illness.  Much like their 
predecessors, they were ill-disposed to support Gorgas in his efforts to fight yellow fever by 
eradicating the aëdes egypti mosquito.  After the outbreak of 1904-1905, however, Roosevelt 
consulted with his most trusted medical advisors.  Their persuasive arguments and 
recommendations led him to order Shonts and Stevens to fully support Gorgas and his 
Department of Sanitation, sparing no expense or resource.  Beginning in July 1905, Gorgas’s 
teams meticulously worked their way through the Canal Zone fumigating and screening 
buildings, and attacking the aëdes egypti in its larval stage by removing as much standing water 
as possible, and spraying kerosene over pools of standing water that could not be removed.  The 
campaign was astonishingly successful—the ICC recorded no deaths from yellow fever after 
November 11, 1905.16 
 With the most deadly disease on the isthmus tamed, Stevens successfully organized, 
planned, and completed the railroad phase of the construction of the Panama Canal in just under 
a year and a half.  With experience building railroads throughout the American West, Canada, 
and Mexico, Stevens was arguably the foremost American railroad engineer of his time.  That 
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expertise served him well.  Shortly after arriving in Panama, Stevens assessed that whatever the 
result of the sea-level canal vs. lock canal debates in Washington would be, work could proceed 
on building the logistical infrastructure needed to sustain construction for years to come, and 
attacking the Culebra Cut—a gorge nine miles long that would have to be carved out of the 
Panamanian landscape for either type of canal.   
Stevens set conditions for a lengthy construction effort.  His construction crews built 
living quarters, docks, and storehouses; moved the Panama Railroad; and created an intricate 
railroad system to bring supplies from the storehouses to construction sites throughout the Canal 
Zone.  Perhaps most importantly, Stevens established an ingenious rail system inside the Culebra 
Cut.  The experienced railroad engineer intuitively understood that moving millions of cubic 
yards of earth out of the Culebra Cut was at least as important as the digging operation inside the 
Cut.  In later years, Stevens could justifiably claim that he had “handed over to the army 
engineers a well-planned and well-built machine,” that “ran, comparatively speaking, like a high-
grade watch.”17   
George W. Goethals agreed.  During his first weeks in the Canal Zone, he wrote home 
that “Mr. Stevens has done an amount of work for which he will never get any credit—or if he 
gets any, will not get enough.”  Goethals was relieved that Stevens had accomplished so much.  
He reported that the railroad “part of the problem is practically solved, and being the part with 
which we are least familiar, it is going to be an advantage that he has been here in advance and 
taken hold as he has done.”  Continuing, Goethals explained that “Mr. Stevens has perfected 
such an organization so far as the R.R. part of the proposition is concerned, that there is nothing 
                                                          
17 John F. Stevens, An Engineer’s Recollections (New York: McGraw Hill, 1936), 1-53.  Quotation from page 52.  
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left for us to do but just have the organization continue in the good work it has done and is 
doing.”18  A year after the canal opened to commercial traffic, Goethals remained grateful.  He 
wrote in Scribner’s Magazine that he had been “fortunate in falling heir to the organization that 
had been perfected for excavating the Culebra Cut, for no one not thoroughly familiar with 
railroad transportation and not possessed of organizing ability could have succeeded in this part 
of the work.”19 
 By the end of January 1907, however, all was not well with Stevens.  Cracking under the 
strain of the job, he sent the extraordinarily morose letter to President Roosevelt that prompted 
his resignation and Goethals’s appointment.20  Although he had accomplished much during his 
short tenure, Stevens departed at the right moment.  He was an experienced railroad engineer 
with little knowledge of and no experience in canal engineering.  Once the railroad phase of the 
construction was over, Stevens was no longer had the technical expertise needed to lead the 
effort.  The administration had decided upon a lock canal in February 1906, and Congress 
approved four months later.21  The project needed to be led by an engineer knowledgeable  of 
and experienced in the construction of lock canals.  Moreover, as his letter to Roosevelt clearly 
revealed, Stevens was burned out and near his breaking point.  Just as he was ill-equipped for the 
technical problems of canal’s construction moving forward, he was not in the proper mental state 
                                                          
18 George W. Goethals to “Toodles” [George R. Goethals], March 10, 1907, Container 3, George W. Goethals 
Papers, LC. 
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to handle its problems of leadership and management.  And it was the problem of management 
that defined Goethals’s tenure in Panama.  
 Theodore Roosevelt, who felt a keen sense of ownership and personal investment in the 
Panama Canal, had come to frame the canal as a managerial problem well before appointing 
Goethals to lead the effort.22  In 1906, the President had complained to Secretary of War William 
H. Taft that although Chairman Shonts and Chief Engineer Stevens were “the very best men we 
could get for actually digging the canal,” he believed that “their phenomenal administrative and 
engineering qualities are not accompanied by any appreciation of the exact qualities necessary in 
dealing either with a foreign power, and especially a small Spanish American power, or with 
Congress or with the labor situation.”  Despite his famous admonitions to “make the dirt fly,” 
Roosevelt believed that “actually digging the canal” was but one of several complicated issues 
with which the leadership of the ICC had to contend.23  He became even more convinced of this 
when Stevens resigned, and likely emphasized managerial issues in his subsequent meetings with 
Goethals.   
Seizing the opportunity to repair an organizational problem he believed the other 
commissions had suffered from, Roosevelt appointed Goethals to serve as Chairman and Chief 
Engineer of the ICC.  He had floated a more radical idea one year earlier, testing among his close 
associates an idea that would reduce the commission to just one member, and would fill all other 
significant positions in the Canal Zone with appointees serving at the president’s discretion who 
                                                          
22 On Roosevelt’s perception that the problem was more managerial than technical, see Alfred D. Chandler, 
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would report to rather than serve with the sole commissioner.24  Although Roosevelt’s inner 
circle advised that such a policy was politically infeasible, Stevens’s resignation prompted 
Roosevelt to reorganize the ICC to make one commissioner—George W. Goethals—much more 
powerful than the others.  In doing so, he did not intend to facilitate Goethals’s work as an 
engineer, but to facilitate his work as an executive managing a mammoth undertaking.  As 
Roosevelt later explained in his autobiography, “I tried faithfully to get good work out of the 
commission, and found it quite impossible; for a many-headed commission is an extremely poor 
executive instrument.”25  As would his successors in subsequent reorganizations of the ICC until 
the canal was complete, Roosevelt opted to concentrate power in Goethals’s hands.  He took this 
course neither for power’s sake nor to satisfy Goethals’s ego, but to improve the efficiency of the 
executive management of the construction effort.26 
Assessing progress in the Canal Zone shortly after his arrival in March 1907, Goethals 
identified management as the largest and most critical problem he faced, and surmised that it was 
the problem that broke John Stevens.  “The magnitude of the work grows on me; it seems to get 
bigger all the time,” he wrote home in the middle of March.  Goethals found the chief engineer’s 
work to be “lonely and isolated,” and concluded that Stevens had “broken down with the 
responsibilities and an evident desire to look after too many of the details himself.”  He confided 
to his son that Stevens lacked “any assistants on whom he can throw off matters, preferring, as I 
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understand the situation, to decide everything himself, and in this respect the job is too great.”27  
The problem of management was still looming foremost in Goethals’s mind in his next letter 
home.  “The work,” he wrote, “is all absorbing and its magnitude enormous.”  Reflecting on the 
task ahead, he described to his family exactly how he perceived his role as the newly appointed 
chairman and chief engineer of the Isthmian Canal Commission.  He wrote, “As the head of 
everything here, I will not be able to do much with the details of the engineering, but I’m going 
to make the others work.”28  By the end of his first month in the Canal Zone, Goethals had also 
come to frame the construction of the Panama Canal exactly as Roosevelt had—not as a 
technical engineering problem, but as a managerial problem. 
 None of his subsequent experiences in the Canal Zone changed his mind.  Goethals 
maintained this view for the rest of his life.  His retrospective writings and statements insist that 
the Panama Canal was more of a managerial triumph than an engineering or technological 
triumph.  A year after the canal opened, Goethals wrote, “The construction of the canal involved 
the solution of no new engineering problems—simply the application of known principles and 
methods which experience had shown would give satisfactory results, for the very magnitude of 
the work precluded trying out anything new or experimental.”  Continuing, he asserted that “the 
task was a formidable one, therefore, because of its size, rather than because of the engineering 
difficulties overcome.”29  In a different forum, he claimed that when comparing the managerial 
problems of the canal to its engineering problems, “they made the latter appear relatively 
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small.”30  Goethals addressed this point most clearly in a 1922 interview in which he insisted that 
his “chief interest at Panama was not in the engineering, but in the men,” because he firmly 
believed “that the canal would be built if the men could be managed.”  Explaining his success, 
Goethals stated with characteristic curtness, “We managed the men and the canal was built.”  He 
went on to opine that the greatness of the Panama Canal was not in its massive locks, but rather 
“in the forming of a good-sized principality solely devoted to fighting the jungle, the Culebra 
Slide, and the Chagres River—and having them finish the fight on time.”31 
While such statements were somewhat too extreme and certainly unfair to his subordinate 
engineers whose excellent work at the canal involved a daily struggle with monumental technical 
difficulties, Goethals was right to focus above all on the problem of management.  The scale of 
the project was immense.  Although it had to be led by an engineer who was an expert in the 
technical aspects of canal construction, the engineer in charge could not afford to dive into the 
technical work, and had to act in an executive capacity.  When Goethals arrived on the isthmus, 
the workforce in the Panama Canal Zone was over 29,000 strong and the Isthmian Canal 
Commission had an operating budget that exceeded $79 million.32  By contrast, the entire United 
States Army consisted of just under 54,000 soldiers and had an operating budget of over $143 
million.33   
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Upon his appointment as Chairman and Chief Engineer of the ICC, then, Goethals 
assumed control of an organization that was roughly equivalent to half of the United States Army 
in both manpower and operating budget. At its peak, the workforce would swell to slightly less 
than 45,000 employees and contractors—a force roughly three quarters the size of the army.34  
While his limited training and extensive professional experiences to that point had given him the 
technical knowledge to lead the construction effort, nothing in his training and experience had 
prepared Goethals to manage an organization that large.  After all, he was at the time of his 
appointment only a lieutenant colonel.  The turn-of-the-century army certainly did not train its 
lieutenant colonels to be able to assume command of organizations roughly the size of an army 
corps.  It lacked a system to train even its general officers to do so.35 
 Goethals intuitively framed the construction of the Panama Canal in managerial terms 
that would have been familiar in any corporate boardroom at that time.  The managerial 
revolution had taken hold of American society in the late-nineteenth century.  It was a process 
that took place in the decades after the Civil War in which large, multi-unit, and multifunctional 
businesses supplanted traditionally small, individual enterprises as the major driving force of the 
American economy, generating an expanding class of managers to fill the administrative and 
executive apparatuses at the heart of these new businesses and corporations.36  The jobs that 
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were a part of these managerial hierarchies were increasingly professional and technical, and 
came with respectable status and remuneration.  The growth of such positions fueled a 
considerable expansion of a middle class that was increasingly enamored with concepts of 
efficiency and “scientific management.”37  As the reformist spirit of the Progressive Era swept 
over the country in the 1890s and early 1900s, such concepts were applied to problems beyond 
the economic sector, extending their influence to many aspects of American society.38  
 The U.S. Army was not immune from the reach managerial revolution.  In part, this was 
because of the naturally symbiotic relationship between an army and the society it serves.  It is 
unsurprising to see that as the American economy became increasingly corporate and the middle 
class expanded, many of its values and trends found their way into the army by way of its largely 
middle-class officer corps.  More importantly and less obviously, the values and trends of the 
managerial revolution were easily transferred to the army because they did not clash with its 
institutional culture.  In fact, they seemed strikingly familiar to the army, as the seeds of the 
managerial revolution were planted during the Civil War.39  
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Historians of American business have identified mid-nineteenth century railroads as the 
foundation upon which the managerial revolution was built.  They were the original large 
corporations that demanded sophisticated systems of management and administration.40  Many 
railroad managers and executives were veterans of the war in civil or military capacities, often 
having performed valuable service in mobilizing and supplying armies in the field.  The Union in 
particular made notable achievements in efficiently financing and resourcing its war effort, and 
crafting an intricate system to move supplies over an extensive rail network to sustain its armies.  
With a massive postwar demobilization, those who perfected the Union’s financial and logistical 
systems transitioned to civil society, bringing with them the ideas and concepts of organization 
the army put to such effective use during the war.41  With the growth of large corporations in the 
1870s to 1890s, these ideas and concepts—as well as plenty of new ones—were repeatedly 
tested and improved upon in corporate America.  Meanwhile, the organizational concepts and 
skills developed during the Civil War atrophied and faded in the postwar army.  They were 
neither used nor needed in the peacetime routine of a traditionally small army.42   
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After the turn of the century, however, the army officers were particularly receptive to 
managerial trends that had antecedents in the Civil War, and were becoming increasingly popular 
within middle-class American society.  The Corps of Engineers was especially attuned to these 
developments, as its mission necessarily brought its officers into more frequent and direct 
contact with the business community than their colleagues in the line.43  In the absence of any 
other relevant frame of reference from his previous training and experience, then, it was natural 
for George W. Goethals to think of the Panama Canal as a complex and multifaceted managerial 
problem.   
In addition to influencing how he thought about the canal, the managerial revolution 
shaped how Goethals organized the work in Panama.  In the late-nineteenth century, corporate 
mergers and consolidation gave rise to large, multifunctional firms.  Seeking maximum profit, 
executives developed thoroughly integrated systems of management defined by both centralized 
power and decentralized operations.  Executives retained all power and responsibility, but 
delegated considerable authority to managers of subordinate organizations formed along well-
defined functional or geographic lines, as circumstances dictated.44   
Goethals saw merit in that approach to management.  He demonstrated as much at the 
Florence District from 1891-1894, when he divided his district into four divisions, each 
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organized to work on one of the district’s major lines of effort.45  Having succeeded with that 
approach before, Goethals instinctively adopted it in Panama.  Because “the work is all 
absorbing and its magnitude is enormous,” he wrote to his son, “I will not be able to do much 
with the details of the engineering, but I’m going to make the others work.”46  In a different 
letter, he explained, “I am going to divide up the supervision of the work among the other three 
Engineers on the commission, let them look after the details of the work, and just maintain 
general supervision over the whole.”47  In the end, that is exactly how Goethals organized the 
ICC workforce.  When he assumed control, the ICC’s construction department was in disarray, 
having been organized in twelve divisions, each with independent clerical, administrative, and 
logistical apparatuses.  Goethals did not make immediate changes, “recalling the President’s 
desire to continue intact the existing organization,” and convinced “that it would be madness to 
attempt any change” until he had a firmer understanding of the job.  He believed that premature 
change “would have resulted in nothing short of chaos.”48   
Goethals settled on a scheme of organization in 1908 that would remain in place, for the 
most part, until construction was complete.  He divided the canal into three segments and created 
three corresponding engineering divisions.  The Atlantic, Central, and Pacific Divisions were 
each responsible for one segment of the canal.  Additionally, because he considered the locks to 
be complex enough to require one senior engineer’s full attention, he created a separate division 
responsible only for planning and designing locks.  The same general principle informed how he 
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organized portions of the workforce dedicated to the various administrative and logistical tasks 
that supported the work.  Goethals ensured he had a body of employees and a supervisor 
dedicated to each of the Canal Zone’s many functions, and assumed a role that was more closely 
akin to an executive of a large corporation than a general leading his troops.49   
 The Atlantic Division was responsible for all canal construction work from deep water in 
Limón Bay at Colón to the Gatún Dam.  Goethals placed this division under the charge of 
William L. Sibert, an army engineer who had considerable canal experience.  Assisting Sibert 
were several other officers from the Corps of Engineers.  The Atlantic Division was responsible 
for constructing breakwaters to protect the Atlantic entrance to the canal from storms, dredging a 
channel from Limón Bay to Gatún Dam, emplacing three flights of double locks known as the 
Gatún Locks, and building the Gatún Dam.  The dam was the most important project assigned to 
the Atlantic Division, and consumed the bulk of its resources and effort until early 1912.  Over 
100 feet high and approximately a mile and a half long, its size was unprecedented for its time.  
The dam was designed to block the powerful Chagres River, thereby flooding 162 miles of 
jungle to make Gatun Lake large enough and consistently deep enough to serve as both a 21-
mile-long section of the Panama Canal and a reservoir to provide water for the canal’s locks.50 
Goethals assigned the Central Division responsibility for all construction from a point 
just south of the Gatún Dam to the continental divide at Pedro Miguel.  David du Bose Gaillard, 
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a well-regarded officer of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, led the Central Division.  The 
division’s principle tasks were to dig and dredge a channel through what would become the 
expanded Gatún Lake after the completion of the Gatún Dam, and to excavate the Culebra Cut.  
The latter was the most technically difficult project on the isthmus, even more difficult than 
designing and building the canal’s monumental locks.  The Culebra Cut—renamed the Gaillard 
Cut after that engineer’s untimely death from a brain tumor in December 1913—was a nine-mile 
stretch of the canal that had to be blasted and dug out of mountains near the continental divide.  
Although the initial estimates figured that the excavating the Cut would involve removing 53 
million cubic yards of earth, Gaillard’s division had excavated over 100 million cubic yards by 
the time the canal opened in 1914, nearly half of the total volume of excavation in the entire 
Canal Zone during the decade-long construction effort.  The volume of excavation in the Culebra 
Cut was significantly greater than expected because the cut’s topography, soil, and weather 
combined to produce frequent catastrophic mud slides throughout the construction period, and 
even after the canal opened in 1914.  These slides bedeviled Goethals, Gaillard, and the entire 
Central Division, accounting for nearly one-third of excavation in the Cut.51 
The Pacific Division’s area of responsibility began at the end of the Culebra Cut and 
stretched to the canal’s Pacific terminus near Flaminco Island south of Panama City.  This 
division’s major tasks included digging, blasting, and dredging a channel from the Culebra Cut 
to the Pacific, and constructing locks at Pedro Miguel and Miraflores.   Goethals placed his close 
                                                          
51 Annual Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1909, 10; Sydney B. 
Williamson, Untitled Manuscript, January 16, 1934, Box 1, Folder 2, Sydney B. Williamson Papers, VMI, 41; 
Goethals, “The Building of the Panama Canal: Organization of the Force,” 544; D.D. Gailliard, “Culebra Cut and 
the Problem of the Slides,” Scientific American, November 9, 1912, 388-390, located in Folder 52, Box 6, David D. 
Gaillard Papers, USACE; McCullough, The Path Between the Seas, 541, 543-554, and 611; and Parker, Panama 
Fever, 402-403 and 420-429. 
 
181 
 
friend and associate Sidney B. Williamson in charge of the Pacific Division, and appointed other 
civilian engineers to serve as his assistants.  In doing so, Goethals fostered a productive rivalry 
between the Atlantic and Pacific Divisions.  Because the former was led and staffed by army 
engineers and the latter by civilian engineers—and because the two had very similar scopes of 
work—the Atlantic and Pacific Divisions competed to outperform each other, especially after 
Goethals decided to publish the statistics of each division’s progress in excavation and concrete 
emplacement in the weekly ICC newspaper, the Canal Record.52 
While the three engineering divisions would build their foundations and manage their 
physical construction, Goethals considered the canal’s massive locks to be complex enough to 
demand an independent department equal in stature, if not in size, to the engineering divisions.  
When President Roosevelt and Congress decided in favor of a lock canal, John Stevens had 
opened an office in Washington to design the locks.  Goethals moved that office and its staff to 
the isthmus as a subordinate organization within the office of the Chairman and Chief Engineer, 
placing Harry Foote Hodges at its head.  Hodges was an army engineer who had graduated from 
West Point one year later than Goethals, and who enjoyed an excellent reputation from previous 
work on the Soo River.  He and his staff were responsible for designing not only the massive 
lock gates, but also—and more importantly—the intricate array of valves and conduits needed to 
make the locks electrically powered and capable of raising and lowering ships 28 feet in fifteen 
minutes or less.  Hodges was also responsible for monitoring the manufacture of the lock gates, 
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which was the only major aspect of the construction of the Panama Canal that was subcontracted 
to a private firm.53 
Goethals applied the same organizational principles to the medical, administrative, and 
logistical dimensions of the work.  He left the Sanitary Department in William C. Gorgas’s 
hands.  By the time Goethals arrived, the problem of yellow fever on the isthmus had been 
resolved.  According to Gorgas, “By the fall of 1907 . . . our fight against disease in Panama had 
been won, and from that time on, our attention was given to holding what had been 
accomplished.”54  But that blithe statement belied the scale of the medical work that remained.  
Although the commission recorded its last death from yellow fever on November 11, 1905, the 
Sanitary Department could not become complacent.  Gorgas’s inspection teams, oil slickers, and 
fumigation teams had to continue their work in order to keep the yellow-fever-bearing aëdes 
egypti mosquito at bay.   
But since 1905, Gorgas’s principal nemeses were the anopheles mosquito and malaria.  
The anopheles presented a much more difficult problem, as it was far more resilient than the 
aëdes egypti, and was impervious to attempts to eradicate it at the larval stage.  While it could 
not be eliminated, Gorgas thought it could be reduced drastically.  His teams drained swamps, 
spread oil in standing water that could not be drained, cleared overgrown land near the canal and 
the cities and camps along the line of the canal, treated the entire Canal Zone with insecticide 
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deemed so essential that the ICC built a special plant to produce it locally, and even imported 
and introduced throughout the Canal Zone natural predators of the anopheles mosquito.  
Additionally, Gorgas’s Sanitary Department administered roughly 40,000 doses of quinine per 
day in the hopes of mitigating the incidence of malaria in an environment in which the very best 
efforts could only reduce the anopheles population, not eradicate it altogether.55  The 
department’s work brought significant results.  In June 1907, the Isthmian Canal Commission 
reported an average daily sick rate of 31.1 per thousand employees and an annual total of 205 
deaths from malaria.  By June 1912, the average daily sick rate was down to 22.91 per thousand 
employees, and an annual total of only 21 deaths from malaria.56 
Goethals used a similar departmental structure to address the administrative and logistical 
functions of the Isthmian Canal Commission.  He charged the Quartermaster Department with 
recruiting skilled and unskilled labor; assigning all quarters for ICC employees; constructing, 
furnishing, and maintaining residential and office buildings; and acquiring and distributing fuel, 
food, distilled water, and supplies throughout the Canal Zone.  He organized the Department of 
Commissary and Subsistence to manage the ICC’s commissaries, hotels, kitchens, and messes.  
Goethals also assembled an office and staff for the Examiner of Accounts and Disbursements to 
manage finances and claims throughout the construction of the canal.  Finally, he organized the 
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Department of Civil Government, which managed the Canal Zone’s post offices, police force, 
prisons, schools, fire department, and courts.57 
In part, Goethals relied upon a departmental system of organization because it was the 
only way he could attempt, to varying degrees of success—to keep his workload down to a 
manageable level.  Even though he was conscious of the need to delegate and accordingly 
organized the work in geographic and functional divisions and departments, Goethals’s personal 
share of the work was still enormous.  In his second month on the job, he reported to his family, 
“Since I came here, I have been confined to the office almost continuously from 7:30AM to 10 
PM.”58  A few days later, he reported that his office hours began at the same early hour, and 
lasted “till we shut up, and though I have stopped for lunch & dinner, I have been spending 
evenings at it as well.”  He then expressed a determination to set an office routine that allowed 
him to get out to personally observe “some part of the work” at least every other day.59   
By all accounts, he succeeded in setting such a routine, and even increased the frequency 
of his inspection tours along the line of the canal to six mornings a week.  But that did not in any 
way alleviate the length of his work days or the weight of his duties.  Observers throughout his 
tenure in Panama commented on his almost ubiquitous presence in the Canal Zone, the 
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consistently late hours he kept at his office, and the eventually fatal chain-smoking habit he 
developed in Panama as a means of dealing with the stress of the job.60 
   The departmental system was absolutely essential to the successful completion of the 
canal.  Goethals realized that he needed to harness the expertise and creativity of his subordinate 
engineers and officers in order to get the job done.  Goethals immediately perceived the 
advantage of the organization he adopted in 1908 and generally maintained for the rest of the 
construction period.  “The more I think of this organization the more it appeals to me,” Goethals 
wrote to David du Bose Gaillard at the Central Division.  He believed that such an organization 
would “throw responsibility” on those subordinate leaders in charge of the various new divisions 
who had been designated members of the Isthmian Canal Commission “to a greater extent than 
they now have.”61   
Later, and in a more public forum, Goethals explained what he believed were the most 
important virtues of the mode of organization he used in Panama.  “In addition to definitely 
fixing the work in charge of each subordinate,” Goethals wrote in Scribner’s Magazine, “an 
effort was made to give him full authority and hold him responsible, thus securing the best that 
was in him.”  And in his view, it worked.  He reported, “As a consequence, each individual took 
a personal interest and pride in the work, feeling that the particular work on which he was 
engaged was the important piece; it therefore became our Canal and we were doing it.”62  In this 
way, managing leaders was a critical piece of Goethals’s solution to the managerial problem that 
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he perceived the Panama Canal to be.  Managing leaders, however, was a particularly thorny 
issue for Goethals. 
 On this point, many commentators have depicted Goethals as an all-powerful czar or a 
despot concerned at least as much with increasing or preserving his own power and authority 
within the Canal Zone as with completing the canal.63  Such interpretations are founded upon a 
misinterpretation of contemporary commentary.   Goethals’s own friends referred to him as “the 
Czar of Panama.”64  A reporter’s remark that Goethals, “with his immense capacity for work and 
the restricted area of his domain . . . succeeds in the role of an autocrat after a fashion that must 
cause no little envy to Nicholas II,” was representative of depictions of Goethals that appeared in 
the press during the construction period.65  Goethals himself agreed, writing in his account of 
governing the Canal Zone that President Roosevelt’s executive order of January 8, 1908 that 
unquestionably declared that all other members of the Isthmian Canal Commission were 
subordinate to the Chairman and Chief Engineer “permitted the subordination of everything” and 
placed him at the head of “an autocratic form of government for the Canal Zone.”66   
But as Goethals’s statement shows, these characterizations referred to the form and extent 
of Goethals’s power and authority, not to the manner in which he exercised power and authority.  
In referring to him as a czar, Goethals’s friends were remarking on the fact that he controlled not 
only the construction of the canal, but also the “civil government, courts, schools, post office, 
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municipal governments that are scattered all along the line, the police, [and] the battalion of 
marines.”67  The reporter who characterized Goethals as a successful autocrat also wrote that 
“such an absolutism would not be endured except for the almost universal feeling that Goethals 
is just.”68  Although that claim slightly overstates the case, it accurately captures a widely-held 
contemporary opinion that Goethals did not abuse the vast power and responsibility with which 
he was entrusted.  While he was given autocratic powers, he did not behave as an autocrat. 
In fact, Goethals delegated considerably more authority to his subordinate leaders than 
one could have reasonably expected from an army officer of his generation.  As Williamson 
recalled, “While Col. Goethals was always willing to discuss the work with his Division 
Engineers in any or all of its phases and was thoroughly familiar with it from the ground up, he 
left the administration and details of the work to the respective division heads and held them 
strictly responsible for the results.”69  Goethals retained responsibility for planning the canal’s 
locks and the Gatun Dam within his office, delegating that considerable task to Harry F. Hodges 
and his department staff.  Otherwise, according to Williamson, “other features such as the 
smaller dams, municipal improvements, docks and foundation plans for the locks were prepared 
in the division offices, and approved by” Goethals.70   
An example of this style of management occurred in 1908 when Goethals and the 
military engineers on the ICC determined that the original plan for the locks on the Pacific side 
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of the canal placed the locks in a location that would be unacceptably vulnerable to naval gunfire 
in the event of war.  Sydney B. Williamson surveyed and selected new locations for the locks, 
and forwarded his findings and recommendations to Goethals for approval.  Williamson then 
created the general schematics for a flight of two locks at Miraflores, and a single, final lock at 
Pedro Miguel.  When a disagreement arose among the three division engineers as to the 
feasibility of Williamson’s plan, Goethals asked Sibert, Gaillard, and Williamson to conduct a 
technical study of the issue and forward their written opinions to him.  Unsurprisingly, 
Williamson argued in favor of his plan.  Sibert and Gaillard advocated for a triple lock at 
Miraflores and the elimination of the Pedro Miguel lock.  After studying both options, Goethals 
approved Williamson’s plan, which informed the Pacific Division’s work through 1913.71   
On this issue, Goethals allowed his subordinates much discretion.  At no point did he 
unilaterally direct any action or create technical plans of his own.  His interventions into the 
matter occurred at only two points:  the initial identification of the problem and the final decision 
on its resolution.  In between those interventions, his subordinates enjoyed broad discretion to 
develop and advocate for their own plans.  This is particularly notable on an issue as important to 
the construction of the Panama Canal as the location and general plan for three of its six locks.             
Although he delegated considerable authority to his subordinates, Goethals was by no 
means an easy person to work for.  He was an incredibly demanding boss, especially to his 
principal subordinates.  Intensely focused on the work, some of those who reported directly to 
Goethals found him to be an acerbic and demanding taskmaster.  Robert E. Wood served in 
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Panama throughout Goethals’s tenure as the ICC’s assistant chief quartermaster, and eventually 
as its chief quartermaster.  Later in 1918, he served as the Acting Quartermaster General of the 
U.S. Army.  After leaving the army, Wood became a successful businessman who held the 
presidency of Sears & Roebuck from 1928-1939 before serving as chairman of the board from 
1939-1954.  Reflecting upon his many experiences and accomplishments, Wood remarked of 
Goethals in 1963, “I was his assistant for seven years, and I might say that everything in my life 
since has seemed comparatively easy.”  To Wood, Goethals was “stern and unbending—you 
might say a typical Prussian.”72  Williamson remembered that while Goethals’s leadership style 
was to delegate authority and then hold subordinate leaders “strictly responsible for the results,” 
his personality was such that “this made a man do his best and carry on his work so that he was 
damned certain of the results.”73  
In holding his principle subordinates “strictly responsible for the results,” Goethals 
spared no feelings and took little account of pride or ego.  He did not attempt to rule by 
committee, or to achieve consensus once he had made up his mind.  As he said after the 
successful completion and opening of the canal, “I doubt if this result could have been 
accomplished in any other way than by a single responsible head.”74  While he delegated and 
consulted freely, Goethals was quite firm and unbending when he came to a definite decision.  
He was equally firm and unbending when he felt a subordinate was underperforming, or when he 
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was not satisfied by the results attained by a particular department or division.  At times, this 
caused friction with some of his principal subordinates.   
Although they maintained a functioning professional relationship, Goethals and Gorgas 
had a major falling out on the isthmus that affected their personal relationship for the rest of 
Gorgas’s life—and beyond, as it influenced a particularly villainous depiction of Goethals in 
Marie Gorgas’s 1924 biography of her late husband.75  At first, Goethals and Gorgas got on 
amicably enough.  For all of March 1907, while Goethals was on the isthmus getting acquainted 
with the work and John Stevens had not yet departed, the Gorgas family cheerfully hosted the 
Goethals and his wife Effie their home.76  In late 1907 and early 1908, however, Goethals grew 
concerned with the way Gorgas managed the Sanitary Department.  Brilliant as he was as a 
doctor and a scientist, Gorgas’s organizational skills were not his best trait.  Not only Goethals, 
but also Williamson, Sibert, Gaillard, and Secretary of War Taft noticed that Sanitary 
Department operations lagged somewhat in efficiency, suffered from inadequate coordination 
with the engineering and quartermaster divisions, and most importantly, reported expenditures 
that appeared to be unreasonably high.  As Williamson put it in a characteristically colorful way, 
Gorgas was “too easy going and of too pleasant a disposition to be a good executive . . . and his 
subordinates took advantage of this and spent money like drunken sailors.”77 
Taking action, Goethals decided to redistribute certain Sanitary Department functions.  
While the Sanitary Department retained direct responsibility for the hospitals and the sanitary 
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inspectors, the crews that performed the drainage, ditching, and fumigation work related to the 
anti-malarial campaign would be managed by the Atlantic, Central, and Pacific Divisions.  This 
was more a matter of redistributing control of work crews, supply management, and 
disbursement of funds than it was a matter of redistributing responsibility for the fight against 
malaria.  Gorgas and his sanitary inspectors still maintained full control over directing what anti-
malarial work had to be done throughout the isthmus.  Nevertheless, Gorgas interpreted the new 
measures as a personal and professional affront.  Goethals consulted him on the decision and 
secured Gorgas’s acquiescence to a six-month test period of the new system.  At the end of the 
trial period, Gorgas requested a return to the old system.  Observing a reduction in both sick rates 
due to malaria and expenditures, Goethals rejected that request.  Whenever Gorgas revisited the 
issue, as he did in both 1909 and 1910, Goethals’s curt reactions betrayed rising levels of 
frustration and commensurately decreasing levels of patience.  As the two drifted further apart, 
he came to view Gorgas’s continued objections to his decision to be a sign of disloyalty.78   
Relations with Atlantic and Central Division Engineers Sibert and Gaillard were similarly 
strained.  Sibert was a member of West Point’s class of 1884 whose subsequent canal and river 
work was both well known within the Corps of Engineers and a source of great pride for Sibert.  
In fact, Sibert believed his background made him more qualified than Goethals to lead the 
construction effort in Panama.  He resented his subordinate status to an engineer whom he 
considered to be less adept at canal work, and rarely lost an opportunity to directly or indirectly 
communicate his frustration to Goethals and others, including members of Congress whom he 
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thought he could influence to arrange for Goethals’s removal.79  As early as June 1907, after 
then-Major Sibert made a petty issue of seniority in rank with then-Major Gaillard because an 
executive order had mistakenly listed his name before Gaillard’s, Goethals reported home that 
“Sibert . . . gets cantankerous and hard to hold at times.”80  His opinion hardened after years of 
Sibert’s scheming.  In the summer of 1911, Goethals wrote in a response to a congratulatory 
letter from Colonel Albert Todd, the U.S. Army attaché to the American legation in Berlin, “I 
was somewhat amused by your remark that I am ‘seconded so efficiently and loyally by Gorgas 
and Sibert.’”  He remarked, “This is neither true in spirit nor in fact.”81  
David du Bose Gaillard was also a member of the class of 1884 at West Point, where he 
had been Sibert’s roommate.  Gaillard was a brilliant engineer who struggled mightily with the 
problems in the Culebra Cut, especially the slides.  He too bristled under Goethals, believing that 
Goethals lacked confidence in him and was too demanding.  Goethals had full confidence in 
Gaillard’s engineering abilities, but he did have some concerns about Gaillard’s management of 
his division.  The problem, as Goethals reported in a letter to his son in April 1907, was that 
Gaillard alienated his workers almost immediately after arriving on the isthmus.  “For some 
reason or other, the men don’t take kindly to Gaillard,” he noted.  Because of the nature of the 
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Adamson, the chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and considering an attempt 
to orchestrate a wider circulation of their position in the press.  Katherine Gaillaird to Pierre Gaillard, September 19 
[no year listed—presumably 1912], Folder 90, David D. Gaillard Papers, USACE shows that Sibert, Gaillard, and 
Gorgas sent direct and indirect appeals all the way to the Secretary of War. 
80 George W. Goethals to “Toodles” [George R. Goethals], June 13, 1907, Container 3, George W. Goethals Papers, 
LC.  Goethals explained the seniority issue more completely in Goethals, “The Building of the Panama Canal: 
Organization of the Force,” 540. 
81 George W. Goethals to Albert Todd, August 12, 1911, Container 13, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
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work in the Culebra Cut, he explained, most of Gaillard’s workers were railroad men who were 
“rough and outspoken & they are all anxious to deal directly with me.”  Given the circumstances, 
Goethals concluded, “if things don’t improve—as I hope they will when the men find that his 
talk is after all harmless, I shall ask to have him relieved.”82   
Goethals therefore gave extra attention to Gaillard, which Gaillard perceived to be 
undeserved micromanagement.  Between Goethals holding him “strictly responsible for the 
results” in the Culebra Cut and within the Central Division, and the mounting strain of the 
recurring slides in the Cut, Gaillard was constantly stressed.  Although he died tragically from a 
brain tumor on December 5, 1913, his wife believed his demise was due to the pressure Goethals 
had put on Gaillard.  Upon encountering Goethals’s youngest son Tom, who as a medical student 
had been invited to observe the unsuccessful procedure on Gaillard’s brain, Katherine Gaillard 
remarked coldly, “Your father has killed my husband.”83  
While Goethals was in no way responsible for Gaillard’s death, he was not exactly 
blameless in these disputes.  He maintained functioning professional relationships with his 
detractors, but at the same time, he took some amount of vindictive pleasure in frustrating them 
on relatively insignificant matters that did not impact work in the Canal Zone.  Disapproving 
requests for leave appears to have a preferred way of getting back at them.  Gorgas was on the 
receiving end of this tactic at least twice.  And Katherine Gaillard at one point felt compelled to 
                                                          
82 George W. Goethals to “Toodles” [George R. Goethals], April 22, 1907, Container 3, George W. Goethals Papers, 
LC. 
83 Quoted in McCullough, The Path Between the Seas, 574.  Katherine Gaillard never swayed from her belief that it 
was the work and not a brain tumor that killed her husband, whom she described as “a man, who in the 
accomplishment of the conquest of the slides, absorbing their cost into that of the regular excavation, finishing the 
work ahead of scheduled time—did so at the cost of his life.”  See Katherine Gaillard to Frederic J. Esskin, August 
21, 1935, Folder 90, David D. Gaillard Papers, USACE. 
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travel to visit the Secretary of War in order to preempt Goethals’s rejection of her husband’s 
request for leave.84     
Despite such tension, Goethals continued to work effectively with and delegate authority 
to his subordinates—even those in the decidedly anti-Goethals faction in the Canal Zone—until 
the construction was complete.  However much he was tempted to do so, he did not lobby for the 
relief of Sibert, Gaillard, or Gorgas until he began to make plans for the post-construction 
organization of the Canal Zone, when the remaining work would no longer justify their positions.  
In fact, he intervened in 1908 and persuaded then-Secretary of War Taft to avoid relieving either 
Sibert or Gaillard in order to make room on the commission for the newly-designated head of the 
ICC Quartermaster Department, Major C.A. Devol.  According to Goethals, “Such a course 
would have discredited the officer suggested for relief by the secretary, and this I wished to 
avoid.”85  Similarly, “the question of getting rid of Gorgas,” according to Pacific Division 
Engineer Williamson, “never entered Goethals’ head.”86  
Goethals’s professional and personal relationships with his principal subordinates in the 
Canal Zone were not all fraught with such tension.  Williamson remained a friend to and 
defender of Goethals for the rest of his life.  Harry F. Hodges and his naval counterpart in the 
Canal Zone, Rear Admiral H.H. Rousseau, remained close and eventually served as honorary 
pallbearers at Goethals’s funeral.87  And Robert E. Wood admired the man he had described as a 
                                                          
84 George W. Goethals to Jacob M. Dickinson, April 2, 1910, Container 10, George W. Goethals Papers, LC; 
George W. Goethals to Lindley M. Garrison, May 15, 1913, Container 20, George W. Goethals Papers, LC; 
Katherine Gaillaird to Pierre Gaillard, September 19 [no year listed—presumably 1912], Folder 90, David D. 
Gaillard Papers, USACE. 
85 Goethals, “The Building of the Panama Canal: Organization of the Force,” 543. 
86 Sydney B. Williamson, Untitled Manuscript, January 16, 1934, Box 1, Folder 2, Sydney B. Williamson Papers, 
VMI, 43. 
87 “Goethals Buried Beside the Hudson,” New York Times, January 25, 1928. 
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tough and demanding boss, remarking almost fifty years after the canal’s opening that Goethals’s 
“iron will and energy were responsible for driving the work to conclusion in record time.”88  
Wood’s view was shared by many of the rank-and-file workers in the Canal Zone.  For 
Goethals, the problem of management in the Canal Zone extended beyond the principal 
subordinates to whom he delegated various aspects of the work.  In addition to managing his 
deputies, Goethals devoted considerable time and energy to managing the entire workforce.  
Although he recognized this as one of his two most significant managerial problems, Goethals 
had no consistent example from the managerial revolution to guide his approach to managing the 
workforce.  Some civilian executives were strict disciplinarians, either out of an obsession with 
efficiency rooted in a belief that maximum efficiency led to maximum profits, or because new 
technologies demanded firm discipline in order to minimize accidents and stoppages of work.  
Others were more benevolent, focusing more intently on workers’ morale out of a belief that a 
content workforce was more productive, and therefore was good for business.89  Goethals was 
more inclined toward the morale-centric approach.  He firmly believed that “contentment leads 
to efficiency,” and that “the best results are secured through co-operation of men who are 
contented and who have respect for and confidence in their leader.”90  But as his inclusion of 
“respect for and confidence in their leader” vaguely suggests, Goethals saw value in the 
disciplinarian approach as well. 
                                                          
88 Wood, Monument for the World, 34. 
89 An excellent, though brief, overview of the general state of labor management during the managerial revolution 
can be found in Perrow, Organizing America, 173-175.  Perrow characterizes labor policies at that time to have been 
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The common theme in these two distinct approaches to labor management is that they 
were informed by perceptions of what was best for business.  Similarly, Goethals subordinated 
all other concerns to the completion of the canal, and it informed his approach to labor 
management.  He alternated between being a stern disciplinarian wielding absolute power and 
authority in the Canal Zone, and being a conscientious steward of workers’ morale as he felt the 
good of the canal required.  At his core, Goethals firmly believed that “everything should be 
subordinated to the construction of the canal.”  More than anything else, that singular notion 
informed his management of labor in the Canal Zone.91 
The workforce under Goethals’s charge was enormous and diverse.  When he arrived in 
1907, it consisted of 29,446 employees of the ICC and the Panama Railroad Company.  Just 
under nineteen percent of them came from the United States.  Almost fifteen percent came from 
Europe, while the remainder—approximately two-thirds of the entire workforce—came from the 
West Indies.92  Three years later, in March 1910, the workforce in the Canal Zone included 
38,676 employees of the ICC and the Panama Railroad Company, with roughly the same 
demographic composition.93  Goethals quickly realized that in such a large and diverse 
                                                          
91 Quoted in Goethals, Government of the Canal Zone, 46.  Unquestionably, Julie Greene has done the best work on 
labor in the Canal Zone.  See especially Greene, The Canal Builders; Julie Greene, “Spaniards on the Silver Roll: 
Liminality and Labor Troubles in the Panama Canal Zone, 1904-1914,” International Labor and Working-Class 
History 66 (Fall 2004): 78-98; and Julie Greene, “Movable Empire: Labor, Migration, and U.S. Global Power,” 
Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 15, no. 1 (January 2016): 4-20.  Greene, however, views racism, 
patriarchy, and imperialism as the major elements that influenced Goethals’s management of labor.  I disagree.  
While Goethals’s views on race and the imperial context of the Panama Canal certainly influenced his thinking and 
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concern for completing the canal. 
92 Annual Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1907, 139.  All figures 
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30, 1910, 61st Cong., 3rd sess., 1910, House Document No. 1030 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
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197 
 
workforce was an equally diverse set of cultures, norms, and expectations of how the work 
should be conducted and how labor should be managed.  He wrote in 1915 that the presence of 
“40,000 men gathered from all parts of the world” in the Canal Zone, “many miles from home 
and away from the ties and associations which have more or less guided and restrained them,” 
made the “human element” of his job “charged with uncertainties and difficulties.”94  To 
Goethals, managing the workforce as significant and complicated as the technical aspects of 
canal construction.   
Goethals believed that the first step to managing the workforce was to assert his authority 
decisively.  He chose to do so over the issue of unions on the isthmus.  In March 1907, Goethals 
arrived in Panama in the midst of an ongoing labor dispute over wages for steam shovel and 
locomotive engineers and conductors.  In order to strengthen their negotiating position, these 
men pressed their demands through their union leadership.  The International Brotherhood of 
Steam-Shovel and Dredge Men took the issue straight to the White House in January 1907.  
When President Roosevelt referred the matter to the ICC, the local chapters of the unions 
representing steam shovel and locomotive engineers and conductors in the Canal Zone took up 
the issue with John Stevens.  While Stevens offered to meet a few of their demands, the deal he 
offered fell far short of their expectations.  Still unsatisfied, they formed a committee to approach 
Goethals, who refused to take any action on the grounds that the International Brotherhood of 
                                                          
origin for the 15,045 employees enumerated as “laborers” to conclude the demographics in March 1910 closely 
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94 Goethals, “The Building of the Panama Canal: The Human Element in Administration,” 724. 
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Steam-Shovel and Dredge Men had already brought the matter directly to the Roosevelt 
administration, thus requiring a decision from Secretary of War Taft.95 
News of Taft’s decision arrived on the isthmus on May 6, 1907.  Based on changes to the 
average wages in the United States, Taft agreed to raises for both the locomotive engineers and 
conductors, but refused all of the steam shovel crews’ demands.  Furthermore, Taft decreed that 
future labor disputes would be addressed to and adjudicated by Isthmian Canal Commission 
officials in the Canal Zone.  Goethals applauded the decision, writing that “so long as recourse 
could be had to the authorities in Washington, it would be useless to attempt an adjustment with 
a view to prompt settlement unless the men were given what they demanded, for, if denied, they 
would immediately take it to Washington.”  Taft’s decision bolstered his ability to manage the 
workforce, not only avoiding a repetition of the labor dispute with the steam shovel and 
locomotive engineers and conductors, but also “materially strengthening the hands of the isthmus 
authorities.”96 
Goethals wasted no time in leveraging his newly-strengthened position.  The steam 
shovel crews were particularly displeased with Taft’s decision and decided to escalate the 
situation.  Union leaders planned to force the issue through mass resignations.  Assuming that 
their services were too important to the construction effort, the steam union leaders reasoned that 
the threat of mass resignations would move the ICC to meet their demands.  Most crews adhered 
                                                          
95 George W. Goethals, “The Building of the Panama Canal: Labor Problems Connected with the Work,” Scribner’s 
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to the plan.  As Goethals recalled, “out of a total of forty-eight steam-shovels that had been at 
work, in two days’ time only thirteen shovels were left with crews.”   
To the surprise of his disaffected crews, Goethals refused to negotiate and allowed them 
to leave the isthmus.  He filled many of the vacancies on the steam shovels with mechanics and 
junior clerks who had listed some amount of previous mechanical training on their employment 
records.  Having given the equivalent of promotions and pay raises to the replacement steam 
shovel crews, and with the locomotive engineers and conductors having received part of the 
increase in wages they had demanded, Goethals created a situation in which “the sentiment was 
against the steam-shovel men.”  He assessed that “the disturbance affected the work and reduced 
the output for the time being, but the action taken had a wholesome effect on all classes of 
employees, for the steam-shovel crews had appeared to be indispensable, yet the outcome 
showed conclusively that the defection by them or any other one class of men would not tie up 
the whole work.”97  He put it more bluntly in a letter home shortly after the ordeal, reporting that 
the resolution of the issue left the workforce “so tame that they now meekly eat out of our 
hands,” and that “the men have learned that it doesn’t pay to bluff.”98 
After the dust settled, a committee of locomotive engineers and conductors requested a 
meeting with Goethals.  They hoped to persuade Goethals to sign a written agreement 
guaranteeing them not only the concessions which Taft had granted them, but also the right to 
collectively represent any individual engineer or conductor with grievances in the future.  
Goethals refused.  He chose to make a stand on this issue not to challenge Taft or Roosevelt, but 
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to keep unions out of the Canal Zone and strengthen his own authority in resolving future labor 
grievances.  Goethals told the committee that their proposed agreement was not “in accord with 
government practice, and the Canal, as government work, so far as concerned the various classes 
of employees, was an ‘open shop.’”   
He also curtly informed the committee that “it was ill-advised to make demands,” and 
“thereafter none would be given any consideration.”  Making what he considered to be the all-
important distinction, he explained that “requests, if properly made, would be received and acted 
on according to their merits.”  Finally, he “declined to take up with any committee a grievance of 
any individual of the order that it represented, for the best party to present it and with whom to 
discuss it was the person aggrieved.”  He promised the committee that any member of the 
workforce could raise any grievance to their immediate supervisor—and if that failed to bring a 
resolution that satisfied the aggrieved worker, he could then see Goethals about it, confident that 
the matter would be investigated and adjudicated if the investigation showed that the complaint 
had merit.99 
Through these early decisions and actions, Goethals successfully strengthened his 
authority and ability to manage the workforce.  By keeping unions out of the Canal Zone and 
rejecting collective bargaining, Goethals simultaneously removed the mechanism by which 
Zone-wide strikes could occur, and averted subsequent incidents in which local chapters could 
appeal over his head by pushing national and international trade unions to lobby the White 
House directly.  Perhaps most importantly, by denying individual workers any recourse other 
than appealing directly to him to resolve labor disputes, Goethals exponentially increased his 
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influence over the workforce by maximizing both his contact with individual workers and the 
extent to which workers felt he was invested in them personally.  In this way, the policy 
increased not only Goethals’s authority, but also the morale of the workforce, which appreciated 
the quick access to the ultimate authority in the Canal Zone the policy promised in the event of 
labor disputes and grievances. 
Goethals consistently strove to maintain his authority, which he considered to be 
critically important to the construction effort.  When Taft, as President-elect in 1909, ordered 
him to adjust his stance on unions and “receive committees,” Goethals persuaded Taft to modify 
the order.  Taft’s revised directive mandated that Goethals permit collective representation for 
collective issues affecting any “class of labor,” but granted him the authority to refuse collective 
representation for any individual worker.100  Subsequently, there were few large-scale labor 
disputes in the Canal Zone, and those that did arise failed to effect the work substantially. 
Although discouraging collective bargaining played a significant role in the relative 
absence of major labor disputes in the Canal Zone between 1907 and 1914, a more important 
factor was the well-publicized campaign to improve and sustain the morale of his workforce.  
This is certainly not to say that the ICC rank and file worked in an idyllic paradise.  Most toiled 
for little pay in extraordinarily austere conditions, and all were subjected to a hostile disease 
environment.  As Gorgas’s efforts bore fruit, deaths from disease decreased.  However, as 
improving sanitary conditions allowed more attention to be paid to excavation, deaths from 
preventable accidents increased dramatically.  But at no point did an exodus of labor occur as it 
did during the yellow fever epidemic in 1904-1905.  In fact, so much of the workforce opted to 
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remain on the job that Goethals’s labor agents had to suspend recruiting unskilled laborers in 
1910.  Despite glaring injustices in the pay and privileges afforded to different groups of 
workers—particularly nonwhites—the workforce remained generally content and committed to 
building the canal.101  
Although the vast majority of the workers who built the Panama Canal were people of 
color, racial discrimination was rampant in the Canal Zone.  From the beginning of the American 
construction period, attitudes and perceptions about race shaped ICC labor polices to an 
incredible extent.  Aware of the comparatively high wages in the United States, canal officials 
made a deliberate decision to fill nearly all of its unskilled labor force, which was by far the most 
sizable class of work on the isthmus, with foreign workers.  Pseudo-scientific theories about the 
work ethic, strength, subservience, honesty, and relative immunity to tropical diseases of various 
races and ethnicities informed officials’ decisions on where and whom to recruit to build the 
canal.  During his tenure as Chief Engineer, John Stevens was frustrated that he failed to 
convince officials to send Chinese laborers, whom he believed were highly efficient workers and 
immune to all tropical diseases.  While he had immediate access to a pool of willing West Indian 
laborers, he was unable to reconcile his prejudices and accept them.  In fact, he wrote that it was 
“useless to think of building the Panama Canal with native West Indian labor,” and did not 
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“believe the average West Indian nigger is more than equivalent to one-third of an ordinary 
white northern laborer.”102 
Stevens’s prejudices influenced the racialization of the silver and gold system—the 
hallmark of structural and officially-sanctioned discrimination in the Canal Zone.103  “Silver” 
and “gold” referred to the ICC’s two payrolls:  the gold roll and the silver roll.  The distinction 
between the two was implied by their terms.  Gold roll employees were paid in American gold 
currency.  Silver roll employees were paid in local silver currency.  Originally, a laborer’s 
classification was determined by the distinction between skilled and unskilled labor, with the 
former filling the gold roll and the latter relegated to the silver roll.  Although the most of those 
listed on the gold roll were white Americans or Europeans, nearly a thousand West Indians were 
classified as skilled laborers and were listed on the gold roll.104   
Stevens, however, brought Jim Crow laws to the Canal Zone.  As he built housing, 
hospitals, hotels, and kitchens to prepare the Zone for construction, Stevens wanted to avoid 
racial intermingling.  Accordingly, the distinction between the gold and silver rolls was gradually 
racialized, with “gold” becoming a euphemism for white Americans and northern Europeans, 
and “silver” becoming a euphemism for workers of color.  Those familiar with the means and 
modes of segregation in the United States in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries felt 
quite at home with the implications of separate commissary entrances labeled “gold” and 
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“silver,” gold-only hotels, and silver-only kitchens.105  One astute observer noted that through 
the silver and gold system, “the I.C.C. has very dexterously dodged the necessity of lining the 
Zone with the offensive signs ‘Black’ and ‘White.’”106   
Goethals inherited this system from Stevens, and did nothing at all to change it during his 
tenure.  He convinced himself that the silver and gold system continued to be defined by class of 
labor and not by color.  He maintained that position even after construction was complete, going 
so far as to say that the silver and gold system “was found not only convenient but politic, since 
it avoided all reference to the color line.”  This was no mere rhetoric; Goethals genuinely 
believed that the silver and gold system was colorblind.  He even made some attempts to enforce 
distinctions along classes of labor rather than color, going so far as to reprimand commissary 
clerks who clearly treated African Americans differently than white Americans.  But while he 
would from time to time address the grievances of individuals who had been discriminated 
against because of their race, he neither took steps to repair a system that enshrined inequality 
and segregation in the Canal Zone, nor recognized that the system was consciously designed to 
preserve inequality and segregation.107 
Goethals’s cognitive dissonance on this issue was rooted in racism.  Longtime friend and 
colleague Sydney B. Williamson, who was profoundly racist himself, accurately described 
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George Goethals as “a man of strong prejudices.”108  Evidence of such prejudices is readily 
apparent in surviving correspondence from various stages in his career.  In 1877, he exchanged 
letters with a friend in which he referred to Cadet Johnson C. Whittaker—an African American 
member of Goethals’s class who was brutally assaulted two months before graduation in 1880 
and, in one of West Point’s worst chapters, subsequently expelled under false charges of feigning 
the entire incident—as “the Darkey.”  In addition to the label, Goethals wrote to a friend and to 
applaud an incident in which a fellow cadet had assaulted Whittaker prior to a formation, and 
reported that he and his colleagues were watching Whittaker’s progress in mathematics, rooting 
for him to fail and be dismissed by the academic board.109   
His views did not temper over time.  In response to the army’s decision to station an all-
black cavalry detachment at West Point in 1907, Goethals wrote to his son, “I am sorry that they 
have sent the negro troopers to West Point.”  He explained, “I can appreciate the feeling of the 
Southerners on that score, and the powers that be ought to have considered that point.”110  Later 
still, and despite their vitally important contributions as the vast majority of his workforce in 
Panama, Goethals publicly claimed that “West Indian laborers were never entirely satisfactory.”  
Goethals recalled, “Their standard of living is low, and as a class they are sluggish and lack 
vitality; but their efficiency was increased by introducing competition through the European 
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laborer, by supplying them with proper food, by training, and by familiarizing American foreman 
with their peculiarities.”111 
In his racism, Goethals was unexceptional for his time.  Where he was exceptional, 
however, was in his capacity to move beyond deeply-held racial prejudices to deal fairly on an 
individual basis with those against whom he was prejudiced.  As with his racism, this was a trait 
that Goethals carried throughout his career after his cadet years at West Point.  Later, his ability 
to deal fairly on an individual basis without regard to his prejudices was a hallmark of his tenure 
in Panama, and was one of the most significant factors in his ability to keep the canal workforce 
content and stable enough to finish the canal. 
Goethals demonstrated it most clearly by intervening in Cadet Charles Young’s case at 
the West Point in 1889 while serving as an instructor in the Department of Civil and Mechanical 
Engineering.  Never gifted in the technical subjects, Young finished the first semester of his final 
year at West Point ranked 48th out of 49 in civil and military engineering, which was taught by 
then-Captain George W. Goethals.  He continued to struggle in Goethals’s class.  In the spring 
examinations at the end of his final semester, Goethals declared him deficient in engineering, 
endangering Young’s ability to graduate and receive a commission.  In its initial deliberations in 
June 1889, the Academic Board reviewed Young’s files, found him deficient in engineering and 
recommended him for dismissal.  At that moment, Goethals’s “sympathy was aroused.”112   
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He intervened and prevailed upon the board to grant Cadet Young a reprieve to study 
further and face re-examination prior to September 1, 1889.  While preparing to leave West Point 
at the end of the summer for his next assignment, Goethals set aside one or two hours every day 
for the entire summer to tutor Young and assist him in preparing for his re-examination.  Two 
days after Goethals left West Point, Young passed the examination and was awarded a 
commission as a second lieutenant of cavalry, the last cadet in the class of 1889 to graduate—
and also last African American to graduate from West Point until Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. 
graduated with the class of 1936.113  Young was profoundly grateful for Goethals’s efforts.  He 
would proclaim in later years that he could never forget “the disinterested help of . . . General 
Goethals.”  Thinking about those who treated him well during his cadet years, Young went on to 
say that “the world is better and only worth living perhaps, because it has its Skerretts, Bethels, 
Goethals, Gordons, Barnums, Haans, and Langhornes with the others of that stripe.”114   
Goethals made a point of offering both access and similar “disinterested help” to workers 
of all races in Panama.  In his weekly routine, he set aside five hours on Sunday mornings to hear 
their complaints and grievances.  Frequently, he launched formal investigations to determine the 
validity of what he heard, and took swift and decisive action when his investigators determined 
that a worker had been wronged.  “Sunday court,” as it came to be known, attracted so many 
visitors that in order to allow all to be seen, Goethals had to devise a system in which “gold” 
                                                          
examination which he was to take the last of August.  This I did and subsequently learned that he successfully 
passed it.”  See also the entry on June 8, 1889 in Private Notebook, Secretary of the Academic Board, “Extracts 
from the Proceedings of the Academic Board Private Sessions,” 1880-1908, USMA; and Brian G. Shellum, Black 
Cadet in a White Bastion: Charles Young at West Point (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 2006), 116 and 123-125 
113 Theodore J. Crackel,  West Point:  A Bicentennial History (Lawrence, KS:  University Press of Kansas, 2002), 
147-149; Shellum, Black Cadet in a White Bastion, 125-128; and “Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the 
U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., June, 1889,” Official Registers of Officers and Cadets, USMA, 11. 
114 Charles Young to Delamere Skerrett, July 13, 1915, reprinted in Shellum, Black Cadet in a White Bastion, 131-
132. 
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employees could go straight to Goethals’s office and “silver” employees only reached Goethals 
if they first met with his secretary or chief clerk and remained unsatisfied after that meeting.  
Despite this extra hurdle, nonwhite workers regularly got through to air their grievances to 
Goethals, who proved just as willing to investigate their claims and redress legitimate grievances 
as he was with white American workers.  That Goethals accommodated such diverse groups in 
his Sunday morning sessions stood out as worthy of notice and commentary to his admirers and 
critics alike.115     
 Some of Goethals’s contemporaries ascribed his commitment to holding court every 
Sunday that he was on the isthmus to a strong sense of fairness.   Pacific Division Engineer 
Sydney B. Williamson insisted that Goethals was “absolutely fair in his dealings with his 
organization from the highest to the lowest laborer on the work.”116  While Goethals prided 
himself on treating his workers fairly, he would not have agreed that this was the underlying 
motivation for his Sunday routine.  Although he did have a strong sense of and commitment to 
                                                          
115 Goethals described “Sunday court” in Goethals, “The Building of the Panama Canal: The Human Element in 
Administration,” 725-728.  Some interesting and unvarnished records of investigations resulting from Sunday 
mornings and other encounters with employees can be found in Box 1 of the T.B. Miskimon Papers at the Booth 
Family Center for Special Collections, Georgetown University Library, Washington, DC.  Journalist Albert Edwards 
described one such Sunday morning in which “the first callers were a Negro couple from Jamaica” arguing about 
money, after which “came a Spanish laborer who had been maimed in an accident,” who was followed, respectively, 
by a man who had been recently fired, a committee of machinists, a nurse, a foreman, and then an African American 
laborer before there have been so many visitors that Edwards stopped taking note of individual cases.  “It is as 
remarkable a sight as I have ever seen to watch him at it,” Edwards wrote, explaining that Goethals was “a good 
listener until he is quite sure he has got to the nubbin of the matter, and then, like a flash, the decision is made and 
given.”  See Albert Edwards, “The Boss of the Job,” The Outlook, June 24, 1911.  A similarly glowing report can be 
found in Joseph Bucklin Bishop and Farnham Bishop, Goethals: Genius of the Panama Canal (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1930), 241-249.  While I avoid relying too heavily on this source due to its extreme bias that borders 
upon hero-worship, it can be given some weight on this issue as Joseph Bucklin Bishop was a regular observer of 
“Sunday court” sessions as a member of the ICC.  Marie Gorgas, however, saw Goethals’s Sunday routine as an 
exercise in paternalism carried out by a “Venetian doge” and a “patriarchal despot.”  See Gorgas and Hendrick, 
William Crawford Gorgas, 218-219.  Given the preponderance of assessments that disagree with hers, it is safe to 
assume that her view was heavily influenced by the personal animosity she felt toward Goethals for what she 
perceived to be the wrongful treatment of her husband, William C. Gorgas. 
116 Sydney B. Williamson, Untitled Manuscript, January 16, 1934, Box 1, Folder 2, Sydney B. Williamson Papers, 
VMI, 42-43. 
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fairness when dealing with people on an individual basis—the quality that allowed him to move 
beyond his racial prejudices in one-on-one interactions—his Sunday morning sessions were 
motivated more by his interpretation of the relationship between the morale of the workforce and 
workers’ efficiency than by any sense of empathy for his workers.  According to Goethals, 
conditions in Panama “were not conducive to contentment; on the whole, a general clearing-
house became an important factor in the common desire to secure harmony, and the ‘Sunday 
court,’ which seems to have attracted attention, was established more for this purpose than with 
the idea of meting out justice.”117 
The relationship between workers’ morale and efficiency informed all of the actions 
Goethals took on behalf of the workforce.  “That contentment leads to efficiency was fully 
recognized at the beginning of the enterprise,” he wrote in 1915, “and had resulted in the 
adoption of a broad, generous, and what seemed to me a very wise policy in regard to the force.”  
That belief influenced Goethals’s decisions to improve housing, improve the quality of food 
served to the workforce, and open Y.M.C.A. clubhouses in all of the ICC towns along the line of 
the canal.  It even inspired the establishment of a baseball league in the Canal Zone that became 
so popular and competitive that Goethals at one point had to launch an investigation to find out if 
various divisions and departments were giving temporary contracts to professional baseball 
players during their offseason in order to gain a competitive advantage.  Goethals’s concern for 
and actions on behalf of the morale of the workforce extended to workers’ families as well.  “If 
Mrs. Smith were dissatisfied,” he explained, “Mr. Smith was apt to be dissatisfied also, with a 
consequent loss of interest in his work and lack of efficiency.”  Going further, Goethals wrote 
                                                          
117 Goethals, “The Building of the Panama Canal: The Human Element in Administration,” 725-726. 
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that “if these little grievances and dissatisfactions had been allowed to smoulder, they would 
have spread and become general throughout the force, seriously affecting the whole human 
machine.”118 
Goethals succeeded in sustaining the morale of his workforce, though not necessarily in 
the ways that he had intended.  Most of his efforts to improve workers’ morale in order to 
generate a stable and efficient workforce were directed at the gold workers.  His housing 
initiatives were generally limited to gold towns—silver workers and families lived in barracks, 
dormitories, or ramshackle settlements along the line of the canal.  The Y.M.C.A. clubhouses 
that were established throughout the Canal Zone were gold establishments.  And while silver 
workers could watch baseball games put on by the Canal Zone’s league, they could not play.  
Yet, although it was generally efficient, the gold force was never stable, constantly subject to 
high turnover as its workers grew restless or homesick and left the isthmus.  The silver force, 
however, proved far more stable.119   
This indicates that of all the actions Goethals took on behalf of workers’ morale, his 
“Sunday court” and his accessibility to workers as he made his rounds along the canal were the 
most effective.  Of all the initiatives he launched for the benefit of workers’ morale, his Sunday 
morning sessions certainly were the most colorblind, and the most applicable to the entire 
workforce.  Much celebrated during the construction period, and long remembered afterwards, 
                                                          
118 See Goethals, “The Building of the Panama Canal: The Human Element in Administration,” 724-734.  Quotation 
on page 727.   
119 The comparative stability of the two sides of the workforce is well documented in the annual reports of the ICC.  
See especially Annual Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1910, 37; 
Annual Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1911, 42; Annual Report of 
the Isthmian Canal Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1912, 50; and Annual Report of the Isthmian 
Canal Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1913, 54.  All of these document relative stability in the 
“silver” force and explicitly characterize the “gold” force as unstable due to high personnel turnover. 
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“Sunday court” was immensely popular with canal workers, among whom a song called “Tell 
the Colonel” had become popular by 1911.  “Don’t hesitate to state your case, the boss will here 
you through;” the third stanza began, “it’s true he’s sometimes busy, and has other things to do, 
but come on Sunday morning, and line up with the rest—you’ll maybe feel some better with that 
grievance off your chest.”120 
Ultimately, Goethals’s belief “the canal would be built if the men could be managed” was 
correct.  His management of the work on the Isthmus—improving the organization of the work, 
managing his principal subordinates, and managing the workforce—was an absolute success.  In 
his first year on the job, Goethals pushed the Isthmian Canal Commission to excavate an amount 
of material that tripled what had been excavated previously between 1904 and 1907.  The output 
of Goethals’s organization only became more impressive over time. Under his leadership, the 
Panama Canal opened to commercial traffic in August 1914—a result that was very much in 
doubt when Goethals arrived on the isthmus in 1907.121 
His management of the work on the isthmus reflected popular contemporary managerial 
practices in corporate America, and what American society at the time celebrated as “scientific 
management.”  Like the major railroads of the mid- and late-nineteenth century, Goethals 
organized his major engineering divisions geographically.  Like the large multidivisional 
corporations that succeeded the railroads as the largest private enterprises in the United States in 
                                                          
120 Albert Edwards, “The Boss of the Job,” The Outlook, June 24, 1911, 395. 
121 Quotation from Samuel Crowther, “Don’t Fear to Attempt a Thing Just Because it Looks Big,” American 
Magazine, January 1922, 92.  On excavation, 8,076,327 cubic yards were excavated between 1904 and 1907.  
24,792,703 cubic yards of material were excavated between July 1, 1907 and June 30, 1908.  See Annual Report of 
the Isthmian Canal Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1907, 39; and Isthmian Canal Commission, 
Annual Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1908, 60th Cong., 2nd sess., 
1908, House Document No. 1054 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1908), 35. 
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the late-nineteenth century, Goethals organized supporting engineering, medical, administrative, 
and logistical departments and divisions along functional lines.    
Just as executives ran their corporations, Goethals delegated considerable authority to 
subordinates he selected to lead departments and divisions, while at the same time closely 
monitoring their progress.  He maintained firm control over the general direction of the entire 
project, and retained enough power to be the final arbiter of major decisions in order to keep all 
divisions and departments functioning coherently and cohesively along schedules and plans he 
established or approved.   With the work organized in that manner and a system in place that 
simultaneously facilitated centralized control and decentralized operations, Goethals focused on 
supervising his principal subordinates and maintaining the morale of his workforce in the hopes 
of maximizing its efficiency.  Such managerial principles were not new to Goethals.  He had 
applied them to a more limited extent at Florence, Alabama from 1891-1894, and instinctively 
returned to them when confronted with similar problems on a much larger scale. 
***** 
Goethals’s embrace of the managerial revolution was by no means unusual in the military 
during the Progressive Era.  His leadership and style of management in Panama were widely 
applauded throughout the army, not just the Corps of Engineers.  In personal letters received in a 
two-month span in 1910 alone—four years before the canal was completed—Goethals received 
high praise from a general commanding a division in the Philippines, the U.S. Army 
Quartermaster General, two majors of cavalry, and the general then serving as the president of 
the U.S. Army War College. Anti-reform stalwart Nelson A. Miles expressed similar sentiments 
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as early as 1908, suggesting that even those officers who most actively resisted the Root Reforms 
saw merit in new managerial theories and techniques.122   
Furthermore, army officers revealed an increasing investment in the managerial 
revolution by using its language in a military context and advocating for its methods in 
professional military journals during the early-twentieth century.  Brigadier General Robert K. 
Evans argued that the army needed to adopt more “businesslike” recruiting practices in the 
Infantry Journal in 1911.123  A year earlier, another infantryman described the armies of the 
great powers as “huge machines” which had rendered war “a scientific affair” that could only be 
managed efficiently by professional soldiers.124  It is significant that such thoughts and language 
appear in works produced by line officers.  The army’s acceptance of the managerial revolution 
was not limited to the Corps of Engineers, whose mission necessarily involved frequent contact 
and cooperation with American industry.  The influence of the managerial revolution upon the 
army was much broader and cannot be ascribed to one branch alone. 
 Embracing the managerial revolution was the first stage of a gradual process that would 
eventually realign the army’s institutional culture with its institutional structures, ultimately 
fulfilling the promise of the Root reforms.   Subscribing to contemporary managerial theories 
allowed the officer corps to accept the notion of a general staff—even if it could not agree on the 
form and function of the General Staff as established in the General Staff Act of 1903.  Most 
                                                          
122 J.B. Aleshire to George W. Goethals, March 1, 1910, Container 9, Goethals Papers, LC; W.P. Duvall to George 
W. Goethals, February 7, 1910, Container 9, George W. Goethals Papers, LC; Daniel L. Tate to George W. 
Goethals, March 19, 1910, Container 10, George W. Goethals Papers, LC; J.W. Watson to George W. Goethals, 
Container 10, George W. Goethals Papers, LC; W.W. Wotherspoon to George W. Goethals, April 18, 1910; Nelson 
A. Miles to George W. Goethals, March 11, 1908, Container 7, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
123 Robert K. Evans, “National Enlistment,” Infantry Journal VIII (July-August 1911): 4. 
124 Lieutenant Colonel Collin H. Hall, “War and Public Opinion,” Infantry Journal VII (July 1910): 823-827.  
Quotations on pages 824 and 826 
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importantly, the managerial revolution provided the U.S. Army with an effective theoretical 
framework to conceptualize and resolve many of its systemic weaknesses and failures that the 
first year of the American intervention in the First World War revealed.
215 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Crisis:  
1917 and the Origins of Cultural Change 
 
In his room at the Hotel Astor on the night of May 11, 1917, George W. Goethals 
attempted to exorcise a gloomy mood by writing a letter to his oldest son George.  A trip to New 
York City should have allowed brief respite from his demanding and immensely frustrating work 
on the U.S. Emergency Fleet Corporation in Washington.  But he had travelled north to see off to 
war his youngest son Tom, a Harvard-trained and Boston-based doctor who was also an officer 
in a reserve medical unit.  In New York, he was surprised to discover that Tom was newly 
engaged to a young woman named Mary Webb, whom he had never met.  She did not make a 
strong first impression—Goethals reported to George only that “she seems very quiet and I hope 
they will be happy together.”  He was similarly succinct in describing his farewell to Tom.  “I 
didn’t linger long,” he wrote; “[I] bade him goodbye and he’s off to England, enthusiastic over 
the prospect and the future.”  The elder Goethals, however, while outwardly cavalier about his 
son’s opportunity for wartime service, was less enthusiastic.  Something had unsettled him at the 
dock.  Ruminating over what he saw of Tom’s unit, he wrote, “They are illy [sic] prepared and 
equipped and yet better so than some of the outfits that are going I guess.”1   
 Goethals’s assessment was accurate.  Despite Elihu Root’s series of reforms in the wake 
of the War Department’s scandalous performance in mobilizing for and managing the War with 
                                                          
1 George W. Goethals to “Dody” [George R. Goethals], May 11, 1917, Box 4, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
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Spain, the U.S. Army’s readiness for war in 1917 was only marginally better.  The army’s 
troubled mobilization to enter the First World War made this abundantly clear.  Short of training 
camps, supplies, and ships, comparatively few American soldiers crossed the Atlantic in 1917.  
In fact, by April 1918—a full twelve months after declaring war—only 320,000 soldiers had 
been shipped overseas to join the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF).  Among these, 
approximately 4,600 had engaged in combat on the Western Front.  At that time, the Germans 
had approximately 1,569,000 riflemen fit for service on the Western Front.  Opposing them, the 
Allies mustered 1,245,000 riflemen.  By lending only 4,600 soldiers to front-line combat by the 
end of its first year of belligerency, the United States contributed only 0.37% of Allied combat 
power on the Western Front as the final major German offensives in the war were getting 
underway.2   
Given such sparse numbers, it is difficult to conclude that the first year of the American 
war effort was particularly successful.  Few contemporary observers thought so.  In addition to 
being too small to bring significant forces to bear on the battlefield, the AEF at the beginning of 
1918 was still reliant upon France and Britain for essential equipment like helmets and artillery 
pieces.  Additionally, it was poorly trained and wedded to a tactical doctrine that blithely ignored 
many of the lessons learned by the Allies at great cost since 1914.  Although both the AEF and 
the War Department proved to be learning organizations that were capable of resolving enough 
shortcomings to influence the course of the war in the latter half of 1918, their experience in 
1917 was at best a long stumble into war.  
                                                          
2 All data comes from official War Department statistics compiled in Leonard P. Ayres, The War with Germany: A 
Statistical Summary, 2nd edition (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), on pages 15, 104, and 105, 
respectively. 
 
217 
 
 There were three principal causes for that stumble.  First, institutional dysfunction 
stemming from the schism between the U.S. Army’s institutional structures and institutional 
culture in the wake of the Root reforms degraded the effect of those reforms and did considerable 
harm to the U.S. Army’s ability to prepare for war, mobilize forces, and sustain them throughout 
a modern industrialized war.  Second, and stemming from this dysfunction, Congressional 
politics rendered the General Staff insignificant and ineffective immediately before its first major 
test.  Finally, and most significantly, President Woodrow Wilson failed to develop and 
communicate an effective grand strategy, despite having claimed strategic planning exclusively 
as his own prerogative.  In short, conditions were ripe for a problematic mobilization for war.3 
The army’s shortcomings in 1917 served as a seminally important shock to its system.  
Although it did not identify all of its weaknesses and shortcomings, the army had, by the winter 
of 1917-1918, recognized that its war effort was in danger of failing.  This was a frightening 
thought, given the state the Allies’ prospects for 1918 after Russia withdrew from the war, 
allowing Germany to focus almost exclusively on the Western Front.   Significantly, the points 
of failure in the American war effort that both army officers and the wider public identified and 
addressed were weaknesses in War Department organization and logistics.  By its first winter, 
the AEF had not yet seen enough combat for flawed doctrine and training to surface.  But 
inadequate stocks of war materiel, ill-supplied units and training camps, congestion on the 
                                                          
3 The best definition of grand strategy is offered by B.H. Liddell Hart:  “While practically synonymous with the 
policy which guides the conduct of war, as distinct from the more fundamental policy which should govern its 
object, the term ‘grand strategy’ serves to bring out the sense of ‘policy in execution.’”  Grand strategy, then, “is to 
co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object 
of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.”  See B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd revised edition (New 
York: Praeger, 1967), 335-336.   
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railroads, and a critical shortage of coal were failures that both soldiers and civilians could see 
and understand.  
On an institutional level, the army perceived its own shortcomings to be failures of 
management.  Because the managerial revolution was well infused into the army’s institutional 
culture, War Department officials and army officers alike framed shortcomings and considered 
solutions in terms of prevailing theories and systems of management.  From this perspective, and 
with the added weight of the prospect of failure and defeat in the First World War, key officers 
and officials finally realized that the army’s systems and structures were wholly inefficient and 
inadequate for the complexities of modern industrial warfare.  Thus, the American experience of 
war in 1917 created a crisis severe enough to shock the army to a degree that made possible the 
cultural shift needed to realign the army’s institutional culture with its structures. 
***** 
 A significant cause of the army’s lack of preparedness was more than a decade of 
institutional dysfunction related to the General Staff.  During and after Root’s tenure in the War 
Department, reformers failed decisively to influence not only the extremely powerful and well-
connected chiefs of administrative and logistics bureaus, but also, more generally, Goethals’s 
generation of officers.  Although they acknowledged and accepted modern managerial theories 
and techniques, most officers from that generation continued to cling to their traditional systems 
and structures.  Many would have preferred considerably more moderate reforms to the existing 
bureau system than to create a General Staff endowed with the power to synchronize and 
coordinate the efforts of the several bureaus.  Consequently, Goethals and many of his peers—
including some of those who, like Goethals, served on the General Staff in its earliest years—
harbored attitudes about the General Staff that fell somewhere between apathy and contempt.  
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Under pressure from the bureau chiefs and their Congressional allies, and lacking clear support 
from the generation of officers that had risen to lead the officer corps, the General Staff in 1917 
was a faint shadow of what Root had envisioned in 1903.4 
 Root vacated the office a year after passing the General Staff Act, leaving the War 
Department in the hands of William Howard Taft.  Ever the amiable diplomat, Taft placed more 
value in consensus than decision and preferred to allow the Chief of Staff and the bureau chiefs 
to mold their own working relationships.  Without firm backing from the Secretary of War, the 
General Staff could only exercise its planning and coordinating functions if the Chief of Staff 
could overcome the resistance of the bureau chiefs.    None of the first three Chiefs of Staff 
overcame them. The fourth, Major General J. Franklin Bell, was much more willing to confront 
the bureaus, but still could not preserve the authority of the General Staff.5   
 In this power struggle, the pendulum swung briefly in favor of the General Staff during 
Major General Leonard Wood’s tenure as Chief of Staff from 1910-1914. The bureau chiefs, led 
predominantly by Adjutant General Fred C. Ainsworth, vigorously reasserted their claims to 
power by resisting what they perceived to be Wood’s encroachments upon their rightful 
prerogatives.  Secretary of War Henry Stimson, a former law partner of Root, sided with the 
Chief of Staff in a much-publicized struggle over muster roll procedures in 1912 and forced 
Ainsworth’s retirement under the threat of court martial for insubordination.   
                                                          
4 Daniel Beaver emphasizes continuity as well as change in the wake of the Root reforms—see Daniel R. Beaver, 
Modernizing the American War Department: Change and Continuity in a Turbulent Era, 1885-1920 (Kent, OH: 
Kent State University Press, 2006).  This theme and an emphasis on change as a somewhat turbulent and 
incremental process are also readily apparent in J.P. Clark, Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. 
Army, 1815-1917 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). 
5See Clark, Preparing for War, 240-241. 
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Within the War Department, prospects for the new General Staff seemed promising.  
Ainsworth, however, proved to be as stubborn and energetic as Wood.6  Having been forced out 
of the War Department, he enlisted Congressional allies to continue his efforts to diminish the 
power of the Chief of Staff, and to sharply restrict the size and scope of the General Staff.  
Prompted by Ainsworth, the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee drafted legislation to 
protect the authority and independence of the bureau chiefs.  Parts of the National Defense Act 
of 1916 constituted the apogee of attacks by the bureau chiefs and their allies in Congress.  
While the act authorized an increase to the total number of officers assigned to the General Staff 
Corps, it sharply limited the number of General Staff officers that could be assigned to duties in 
or near Washington, D.C. 7 
Institutional resistance to the General Staff envisioned by Root, however, was not limited 
to bureau chiefs and their Congressional patrons.  Although officers of Goethals’s generation 
generally agreed on the need for a general staff, they failed to achieve consensus on its form and 
place within the institution prior to the passage of the General Staff Act of 1903.  The debate that 
played out in professional journals offered a wide range of options.  Some officers had long 
advocated for a general staff corps similar to what Root’s General Staff Act created.8  Many 
                                                          
6 James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara, Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 10-50; Otto Nelson, Jr., National Security and the General Staff 
(Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 73-273; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 
Enlarged edition (Bloomington, IN:  Indiana University Press, 1984), 326-341; and Clark, Preparing for War, 241-
244. 
7 As a result of this legislation, only nineteen General Staff officers were assigned to the War Department in 
Washington, D.C. in the spring of 1917.  Of these nineteen, only eleven were duty positions dedicated to shaping 
operational plans and coordinating mobilization efforts.  By comparison, Germany and England went to war in 1914 
with 650 and 232 officers assigned to their General Staffs, respectively.  The National Defense Act of 1916 
essentially gutted the General Staff, leaving it drastically undermanned at the beginning of its first major test.  See 
Clark, Preparing for War, 253-254; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 350-353; Coffman, The War to End 
all Wars, 23-24. 
8 T.A. Bingham, “The Prussian Great General Staff and What it Contains that is Practical from an American 
Standpoint,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States vol. 13, no. 58 (July 1892): 666-676. 
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thought that rather than create a new entity altogether, the War Department should simply 
modify the existing bureau system to assign general staff responsibilities to the Adjutant General 
Corps and the supply bureaus.9   
The officer corps remained ambivalent about the new system even after the passage of 
the General Staff Act.  The editors of the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United 
States felt compelled to publish an editorial in the fall of 1903 to persuade a skeptical officer 
corps that the General Staff was compatible with army traditions and habits.  “The general staff 
idea,” they wrote, “is not a suddenly discovered and flippant innovation, but a broadly conceived 
and wise business proposition worthy of the honest and fair minded support of all military men.”  
More tellingly, they argued that the new General Staff was not intended “to tear down the system 
which brought ultimate victory over the armies of the Confederacy, but to improve and render 
more elastic the methods which, during a long era of peace, had grown to be sufficiently 
unworkable to be distasteful to many of the general officers who have commanded troops in 
recent years.”10  As this editorial suggests, significant parts of the officer corps remained 
obstinately ambivalent about the new General Staff.  In the absence of a zealous commitment to 
reform, officers’ perceptions, attitudes, and actions continued to be shaped above all by 
comfortably familiar traditions.  
                                                          
9 Henry T. Allen, “Proposed Reorganization for our Central Staff,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the 
United States vol. 27, no. 106 (July 1900): 26-30; and Henry T. Allen, “The Organization of a Staff Best Adapted to 
the United States Army,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States vol. 28, no. 110 (March 
1901): 169-183.  The popularity of this view can be inferred by the fact that the latter article earned first honorable 
mention in journal’s essay contest on the need for a general staff.  The lack of consensus, however, can be inferred 
from the fact that the editors considered no entry worthy of first prize, and Allen’s first honorable mention was the 
highest award given.   
10 Vaulx 8, “The Evolution of a General Staff,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States vol. 
33, no. 125 (September-October 1903): 200-206.  Quotations on pages 206 and 200, respectively. 
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 Consequently, officers of Goethals’s generation often acted in a manner that undermined 
the General Staff in its early years.  Aside from its stalwart partisans, many company and field 
grade officers did not look upon general staff duty as a particularly desirable professional 
experience.  John J. Pershing recalled that the new General Staff “did not meet at once with the 
full favor of the army,” and that some officers “especially took exception to what they called a 
usurpation of authority,” on the part of the General Staff, “and in several instances they had 
reason for complaint.”  Neither did Pershing view the early General Staff as a particularly 
prestigious assignment.  “The mere designation of members of the General Staff, including the 
chief,” he opined, “is no guarantee of their infallibility; in fact, the first General Staff could have 
been duplicated several times over from the commissioned personnel of the army, to its 
improvement in several instances.”11  
Although Pershing joined Goethals as one of the first officers assigned to the General 
Staff, Pershing fled as soon as possible to serve as an observer of the Russo-Japanese War, and 
never returned to General Staff duty until he became the Chief of Staff after the First World War.  
His skepticism of the new organization influenced his view of it for the rest of his career.  From 
its inception through World War I, Pershing found fault with the General Staff’s organization 
and operation, describing it as “too much the inarticulate instrument of the Chief of Staff, who 
often erroneously assumed the role of Commanding General of the Army.”12   Goethals’s own 
attitude about and interactions with the General Staff had much in common with Pershing’s.  He 
                                                          
11 John J. Pershing, My Life Before the World War, 1860-1917, ed. John T. Greenwood (Lexington, KY: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2013), 214.  Pershing drafted this manuscript in the 1930s.  His disdain for his time on the early 
General Staff is evident in the fact that he devoted only four paragraphs to the subject in a memoir that is 362 pages 
long. 
12 The quotation is from John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes 
Company, 1931), 17. 
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was only too happy when duty with the Taft Board pulled him away from the rest of the General 
Staff, and he never again sought to work with the new coordinating agency.13  By habitually 
working around the General Staff, Goethals revealed a preference for the traditional but 
increasingly outdated bureau system.14  
In part, Goethals, Pershing, and their contemporaries maintained such traditional attitudes 
because they experienced no significant impetus for change prior to World War I.  Goethals 
succeeded at Panama by working around, rather than with, the General Staff.  If anything, this 
reinforced his confidence in the bureau system.  Similarly, Pershing relied upon traditional 
systems when he commanded the Punitive Expedition in Mexico.  The logistics effort to sustain 
Pershing’s campaign showed considerable strain from the very beginning of the operation.  But 
although these significant difficulties should have prompted institutional introspection, the 
expedition itself did not present a shock substantial enough to force changes upon obsolete 
systems of supplying armies and waging war.  In a spirit of self-congratulation at its end, the 
army’s experiences in Mexico served instead to perpetuate confidence in the continued relevance 
of the bureau system.15   
Neither Goethals nor his contemporaries anticipated that the First World War would 
provide just such a shock.  When war broke out in 1914, the U.S. Army had just over 98,000 
                                                          
13 This is discussed in chapter 3. 
14 Goethals’s official and personal correspondence from the Canal Zone is compiled in boxes 5-39, George W. 
Goethals Papers, LC.  For evidence of coordination with the General Staff regarding the defense of the Canal Zone, 
see W.W. Wotherspoon to George W. Goethals, June 23, 1911 and W.W. Wotherspoon to Leonard Wood, June 20, 
1911, Box 13, George W. Goethals Papers, LC.  It is worth noting, however, that even on this issue, Goethals was 
not working with the General Staff per se, but with a board comprised of the Chief of Staff, the President of the War 
College, and several bureau chiefs. 
15 Supply shortages and a lack of logistical planning were most readily apparent when the U.S. mobilized National 
Guard units to support the Punitive Expedition.  See U.S. Army Center for Military History, History of Military 
Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 196-201; 
and Weigley, History of the United States Army, 350-351. 
 
224 
 
soldiers on its rolls.  By 1916, the army had increased by approximately ten percent, reporting a 
total strength of 108,399.  Although it expected to rely upon augmentation from the National 
Guard in time of war, the mobilization of the National Guard in 1916 brought only 158,664 
additional men under arms.  Given the mobilization of millions by European belligerents in 
1914, it was clear that the U.S. Army was not prepared to play a role in the First World War.16  
Nor did the army anticipate participating in the war during its early stages.  Although the United 
States clearly sympathized with and supported Britain and France, neither the American public 
nor the administration favored joining the war in its first two years, even after the attack against 
the Lusitania in May 1915.  Given this, the army had little reason and fewer resources to prepare 
for its eventual role in the First World War.17   
Although the Panama Canal opened as the war in Europe was just beginning, Goethals 
clearly did not anticipate going to war.  In recognition of his achievements in Panama, he had 
been promoted to major general with the thanks of Congress.  Rather than maneuvering for a 
command or senior duty in the War Department that would position him well for significant 
service if the United States entered the war, Goethals remained in Panama.  He served as 
governor of the Panama Canal Zone from 1914 until September 1916, when he returned to the 
United States to retire from the army.  As governor, Goethals focused above all on transitioning 
the Canal Zone workforce from a construction organization to a smaller maintenance and 
operations organization, digging out from continuing landslides in the Culebra Cut significant 
enough to close the canal for up to six months at a time, and completing the construction of 
                                                          
16 Figures drawn from Weigley, History of the United States Army, 599 and 350, respectively. 
17 On political and public attitudes about the war, Michael S. Neiberg’s recent work has no peer.  See Michael S. 
Neiberg, The Path to War: How the First World War Created Modern America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), chapters 1-3. 
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fortifications to defend the canal.  Beyond the possibility of a hostile European power attacking 
the canal, war did not weigh heavily on his mind.  He was focused on the next chapter of his life, 
organizing a private engineering firm based in New York City that he would lead in retirement.  
He was placed on the army’s retired list on November 15, 1916, and expected to remain a 
civilian from that point forward.18 
Although the army was more attuned to the war than Goethals was, its experience of 
neutrality from 1914 through March 1917 did not produce a clear recognition of the imperative 
for institutional change.  The army continued to grapple with the proper role and composition of 
the general staff, even as it deployed troops to the Mexican border and organized an 
expeditionary force to pursue Pancho Villa within Mexico.  While the Preparedness 
Movement—a national campaign for improved military readiness—became more popular in 
1916, it had little impact on the army.  Consequently, the army neither updated its tactical 
doctrine to account for lessons coming out of the war in Europe, nor seriously prepared to 
mobilize and deploy an expanded army capable enough to make a rapid impact on the battlefield 
should the United States be drawn into war.  Goethals put it best when he astutely observed at 
the end of February 1917, “Washington is in a state of unrest as to the future, but there seems to 
be little doing in the way of preparedness for the army.”19 
                                                          
18 War Department Special Orders No. 263, November 9, 1916, File # 3644-ACP-1880, RG 94, NARA I.  
Goethals’s service as governor of the Canal Zone is covered in Joseph Bucklin Bishop and Farnham Bishop, 
Goethals: Genius of the Panama Canal (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1930), 250-270.  Researchers looking into 
Goethals’s service as governor should look first at folders 11-12 in box 3, and folders 1-2 in box 4, George W. 
Goethals Papers, LC. 
19 Weigley, History of the United States Army, 342-354; Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army, 
1898-1941 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard, 2004), 140 and 195-201.  Quotation from George W. Goethals to 
“Dody” [George R. Goethals], February 25, 1917, Box 4, George W. Goethals Papers, LC.   
Ultimately, the Preparedness Movement was more of a political tool than an effective means for preparing either the 
nation or its army for war.  It helped convince Congress to more than double the size of the army through the 
National Defense Act of 1916.  But the increase was to happen in increments spread over five years—the army 
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The most significant step the army took to prepare itself for war was drafting and 
successfully lobbying for the Selective Service Act.  Passed in February 1917, thanks in large 
part to the considerable efforts of Judge Advocate General Enoch Crowder, Chief of Staff of the 
Army Hugh Scott, and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, the act committed the nation, in the 
event of war, to raising an army through selective national conscription rather than through a 
nationwide call for states to raise volunteer regiments.  This was a significant success for military 
reformers, who were still working against the grain of both public perceptions of how to 
mobilize for war and the army’s institutional culture.  Since the American Revolution, the army 
had relied upon state volunteers to meet wartime demands for military manpower.  The volunteer 
system continued to bear much weight in the officer corps up and down the chain of command. 
Junior and senior officers alike saw them as the avenue for promotion and glory in war.20   
Even after the passage of the Selective Service Act, the matter was not completely 
settled.  Theodore Roosevelt, ever the active and vocal ex-president, lobbied strenuously for the 
right to raise a volunteer division and bring it to France as one of the first American divisions 
committed to the war. 21   Although many officers denounced the idea as arcane, dangerous, and 
completely inappropriate for modern warfare, many officers still applied to serve in Roosevelt’s 
division.  George W. Goethals pushed his oldest son, a 1907 graduate of West Point then serving 
as a captain of engineers, to interview for a position in the division and may also have leveraged 
                                                          
would be only marginally larger when the United States entered the war in April 1917.  In the meantime, both the 
institutional struggle over the General Staff and the operational deployment in Mexico and along the border 
consumed the army’s attention.  For more, see John Patrick Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon: The 
Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914-1917 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974). 
20 John Whiteclay Chambers, II, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York: Free Press, 
1987), 6-7 and 13-71.  See also Clark, Preparing for War, 256. 
21 Chambers, To Raise an Army, 136-141; J. Lee Thompson, Never Call Retreat: Theodore Roosevelt and the Great 
War (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 171-185. 
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his connection with the former president to secure his son a position on Roosevelt’s division.22  
Even a young Captain George C. Marshall—who would soon serve with great distinction on the 
Western Front with the 1st Infantry Division and the AEF’s 1st Army Headquarters—applied, 
interviewed, and was identified as a regimental commander in Roosevelt’s proposed division.  
Marshall, Goethals, and others like them, presumably including George R. Goethals, required 
formal releases from Roosevelt when it became apparent that Woodrow Wilson had accepted the 
advice of Baker, Scott, and Crowder, and would not authorize the volunteer division.23 
Despite setting conditions for the first national draft since the Civil War, the U.S. Army 
remained egregiously unprepared for war in 1917.  The army itself bore a significant amount of 
responsibility for its poor state of readiness.  Institutional dysfunction and related Congressional 
politics gutted the general staff, leaving it far too small to plan and coordinate the myriad aspects 
of mobilization for the type of mass industrialized warfare that characterized World War I.  
Furthermore, lingering traditionalism within the officer corps also influenced the retention of 
arcane tactical doctrine and friction over the best model for expanding the army in the event of 
war.   
                                                          
22 Goethals mentioned that he and his friend and colleague Harry Hodges gave his son “a good send off to Teddy, 
but I very much question if the present administration gives him the opportunity should war eventuate.”  He 
qualified that doubt, however, by noting that the administration “may have nothing to say about the matter” due to 
Roosevelt’s many friends in Congress.  See George W. Goethals to “Dody,” February 25, 1917, Box 4, George W. 
Goethals Papers, LC.  Later letters, however, reveal that while army officers were more than happy to take 
advantage of the opportunity presented by a volunteer division under Roosevelt, they did not necessarily agree with 
the principle of raising such a division.  In April, Goethals reported that “the inconsistency of Teddy advocating 
conscription and then wanting his volunteers has been irritating to a great many.”  One month later, Goethals wrote, 
“Sentiment among army men seems divided on the subject of sending Teddy, the majority inclined against him.”  
See George W. Goethals to “Dodie” [George R. Goethals], April 29, 1917, and George W. Goethals to “Dody” 
[George R. Goethals], May 18, 1917, Box 4, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
23 Marshall’s role in Roosevelt’s volunteer division is revealed in Forrest Pogue’s notes of an interview with him on 
September 28, 1956.  See Larry I. Bland, ed., George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. 
Pogue, Revised edition (Lexington, VA: Marshall Foundation, 1991), 584.  
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Furthermore, the army’s ability to plan and coordinate a large-scale mobilization for a 
major war in Europe was severely limited by inadequate strategic direction and communication 
from the White House.  Famously mistrustful of career soldiers and committed to keeping his 
pre-decisional thoughts to himself and a very small circle of close friends and advisors, Wilson 
offered little clarity on whether he would commit the nation to war until a few days before his 
war address to Congress.  Even after the country was at war, few in or out of the army knew 
what the American contribution to the war would be.  Some anticipated a large army fighting in 
Europe, while others saw the United States providing only naval and financial assistance to the 
Allies.  Firm plans for the deployment of a major American army did not mature until the 
summer of 1917, and they did not receive the President’s final approval until the fall.  Such 
delays also retarded the equally important development of an industrial base efficient and 
expansive enough to sustain a rapid mobilization and a protracted war effort.  What ultimately 
became a four million-man army would need millions and millions of helmets, rifles, bayonets, 
bandoliers, and uniform sets; many more millions of bullets; thousands of machine guns, artillery 
pieces, trucks, wagons, and train cars; hundreds of airplanes; dozens of tanks; and food, fuel, and 
fodder to feed all parts of the army.24  And it would need enough ships to move soldiers and 
supplies across the Atlantic—a commodity in shockingly short supply in the United States upon 
its entry into the war.25   
 Shipping presented an immediate problem at the outset of American intervention, and the 
administration called Goethals back into public service to address it.  Few reliable American 
                                                          
24 For more on Wilson’s shortcomings in strategy and communications, and their impact on the army in 1917, see 
Rory McGovern, “‘We Will All be Wiser in a Few Days:’ Woodrow Wilson, Grand Strategy, and the U.S. Army in 
1917,” Journal for the Liberal Arts and Sciences 20, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 6-26.  
25 Statistics for American shipping, industrial production, and logistics operations in support of the war effort is 
found in Ayers, The War with Germany, 37-100. 
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ships were available for use as transatlantic military transports in 1917, largely because of a half-
century of decline and neglect in the U.S. merchant marine.  Navigation acts signed into law by 
George Washington in 1789 and kept in place with little modification throughout the nineteenth 
century prohibited the registration of foreign-built ships into the nation’s merchant marine fleet.  
While a superabundance of American timber drove down the costs of shipbuilding in the United 
States and made American ships attractive options in the maritime market prior to the Civil War, 
European shipbuilders produced ships made of iron—and later, steel—that were superior in 
quality and priced competitively with wooden American competitors after the war.  Even when a 
robust steel industry developed in the United States, its monopolistic practices ensured prices 
remained considerably higher than its European competition.26   
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, then, American merchants increasingly opted 
for European-built ships.  Accordingly, they were forced to register their ships under foreign 
flags, and the American merchant marine withered away.  Having carried 65 percent of U.S. 
imports and exports in the middle of the nineteenth century, the merchant marine carried less 
than ten percent by 1914.  Shipbuilders reconfigured their yards to take part in the massive naval 
modernization program that the United States undertook in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries.  While this allowed the navy to prepare more adequately for industrialized 
warfare by producing more and better battleships, destroyers, and eventually submarines—it did 
little for the army in a war that required transports to ship soldiers and supplies overseas.27 
                                                          
26 William J. Williams, The Wilson Administration and the Shipbuilding Crisis of 1917 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1992), 1-4. 
27 Williams, The Wilson Administration and the Shipbuilding Crisis of 1917, 4-11; and David M. Kennedy, Over 
Here: The First World War and American Society, Twenty-fifth anniversary edition (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 301. On naval modernization, see Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis 
and the Emergence of American Navalism (New York: Free Press, 1972), chapters 6-8. 
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 The Wilson administration recognized the problem of a depleted merchant marine.  When 
the Panama Canal was nearly complete, administration officials agreed that the United States had 
a vested interest in rebuilding a federally owned and operated merchant marine.  That sentiment 
gained momentum with the outbreak of war in 1914.  Still committed to peace, Wilson sensed an 
opportunity to dominate Latin American trade as the war consumed the attention and resources 
of European competitors.  With the passage of the Ship Registry Act of 1914, foreign-built ships 
could be transferred to the American registry.  Further momentum stalled for a time due to 
formidable political resistance from friends of American shipping companies that feared being 
pushed out of business by a more robust U.S. merchant marine equipped with vessels built 
abroad.  By September 1916, however, Congressional factions with nagging fears of economic 
isolation united with Congressional advocates of preparedness to pass the Shipping Act in 
September 1916.  The law established the United States Shipping Board, granting it both 
regulatory and statutory powers to own and operate a merchant fleet.  Additionally, it authorized 
the board to create the Emergency Fleet Corporation, a public-private corporation established 
under the Shipping Board to purchase and contract for the construction of merchant vessels.28 
 When the Shipping Act passed, Goethals thought his service to the nation was nearing its 
end.  First as Chairman and Chief Engineer of the Isthmian Canal Commission and then as 
Governor of the Panama Canal Zone, nearly a decade in Panama had taken its toll.  The job was 
wearing, and Goethals was eager to move on to the next chapter in his life, opening his own 
engineering firm.  By June 1916, he alerted his family that he planned to request relief from the 
Canal Zone and retirement from the army in July.29   
                                                          
28 Kennedy, Over Here, 302-305. 
29 George W. Goethals to “Dody,” June 5, 1916, Box 4, George W. Goethals Papers, LC.   
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That was unrealistic.  Owing in part to the difficulty in appointing a replacement so 
quickly, and in part to Goethals’s well-known connections to Roosevelt, Taft, and prominent 
Republicans, Wilson persuaded Goethals to delay the effective date of his resignation until after 
the election in November.  Goethals departed the Canal Zone, never to return, in September 1916 
and began to set up a new home and business in New York City.  Placed on the retired list two 
months later, his engineering firm opened for business in January.  His retirement from public 
service, however, was short lived.  Goethals re-entered public life in April 1917 when called to 
serve as chairman of the newly constituted Emergency Fleet Corporation.30   
He was far from happy to serve in such a capacity.  Goethals had been approached in 
February and March 1917 by members of the U.S. Shipping Board who hoped to gain not only 
his endorsement for the emergency construction of a fleet of wooden ships in the event of an 
American entry into the war, but also his consent to manage the construction of the wooden fleet.  
For the Shipping Board, this was a public relations stunt intended to influence policymakers and 
the American public to accept the wooden ship plan.  At no time did they intend to give him 
complete control of shipbuilding efforts.  In any case, they failed to gain either the general’s 
endorsement or his willingness to join the effort.  Goethals did not believe that wooden ships 
could be built strong enough withstand the forces of waves on the open ocean while being 
propelled by the relatively advanced steam engines called for in the Shipping Board’s plans.  
Furthermore, he had “no desire whatever to handle” the Emergency Fleet Corporation.  “If we 
were to enter the war,” Goethals later explained, “I preferred military duty.”31   
                                                          
30 George W. Goethals to “Dody,” July 12, 1916; September 13, 1916; October 20, 1916; and January 22, 1917, Box 
4, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
31 “General Goethals and the U.S. Shipping Board (as told by General Goethals himself),” Box 43, George W. 
Goethals Papers, LC, 1-2.  Although undated and unattributed, this source is a first-person account written less than 
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 As it was attempting to repair a shipping crisis at least a half-century in the making with 
plans developed by a lawyer and a nautical hobbyist, Goethals was justifiably skeptical of the 
Shipping Board.  In an example of a flaw replicated too often on other boards organized to assist 
in the management and direction of mobilization for war in 1917, officials who lacked expertise 
in shipping and shipbuilding dominated the Shipping Board.  The chairman of the board was 
William J. Denman, a member of Harvard Law School’s class of 1897 who had made a name for 
himself as a specialist in maritime and admiralty law, and as one of San Francisco’s leading 
progressive Democrats.  One of his most trusted subordinates was Frederic A. Eustisan, the 
amateur yachtsman and Harvard-educated scion of a wealthy Massachusetts family who 
developed and persuaded Denman of the merits of the wooden ship plan.  In fact, only one 
member of the U.S. Shipping Board in the spring of 1917 had a legitimate maritime background.  
The rest were merely political appointees and their friends.32   
Goethals was also rightly skeptical of his own fitness for the job.  Although he could 
bring his experiences at the Panama Canal and his considerable organizational and managerial 
talents to the table, he lacked expertise in shipping and shipbuilding.  He was sufficiently self-
aware to know that ship construction was not his natural element.  And as a lifelong soldier, 
                                                          
nine months after the events occurred.  According to the secretary who typed it, this document “was written in the 
first person” and “was dicated to me by General Goethals, at my request, in January, 1918.”  She insisted that the 
manuscript was a “transcription of my shorthand notes” that “was seen and O.K.’ed by General Goethals.”  See 
Martha Wellington to Farnham Bishop, August 12, 1929, Box 43, George W. Goethals Papers, LC.  On the 
Shipping Board’s design to use Goethals for public relations purposes, see Williams, The Wilson Administration and 
the Shipbuilding Crisis of 1917, 75-77. 
32 Williams, The Wilson Administration and the Shipbuilding Crisis of 1917, 53-57 and 67.  The sole member of the 
board with true expertise in shipping and shibuilding was John A. Donald. 
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Goethals longed for wartime service in France, not to waste away on a board that he considered 
to be full of “some excellent hot air artists.”33 
Having been very clear with the Shipping Board officials who approached him, Goethals 
was surprised to receive a letter from Wilson on April 11, 1917 that informed him of his 
appointment to lead the construction of the Shipping Board’s wooden fleet.  In it, Wilson told 
Goethals that he had approved the Shipping Board’s plans, and had been reliably informed that 
the wooden ship plan had received Goethals’s “enthusiastic endorsement,” and that Goethals had 
intimated to the Shipping Board that he “would be willing to accept in directing the enterprise in 
cooperation with them.”34  Apoplectic, Goethals took a train to Washington and demanded a 
meeting with the Shipping Board in which he bluntly called its chairman a liar.  He then 
requested an appointment with President Wilson to clarify the situation.  As a major general on 
the U.S. Army’s retired list, he acknowledged, “If this was a military duty which the President 
desired me to take hold of, there was nothing for me to do but accept.”  Wilson stonewalled 
Goethals.  On his third unsuccessful attempt to see the president, he was informed by Wilson’s 
personal secretary, as he later recalled, “that the President could not see me but expected me to 
take hold of the work, as I was subject to orders and he had decided that this should be my task 
in the war.”35 
 Although his sense of duty compelled him to accept the president’s decision without 
public complaint, Goethals did not assume control of the project intending to put aside his 
                                                          
33 George W. Goethals to “Dody” [George R. Goethals], April 19, 1917, Box 4, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
34 Woodrow Wilson to George W. Goethals, April 11, 1917, Box 43, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
35  “General Goethals and the U.S. Shipping Board (as told by General Goethals himself),” Box 43, George W. 
Goethals Papers, LC, 3. 
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differences with the Shipping Board.  The duplicitous manner in which William Denman and 
other members of the board secured Goethals’s appointment ensured a dysfunctional relationship 
with Goethals for as long as he was associated with them.  In letters to his son, Goethals 
regularly referred to the Shipping Board as “the fool board.”36  Even its first meeting with 
Goethals quickly degenerated into mutual recrimination.  “I found the air still hot,” Goethals 
wrote in the aftermath, “but I increased the temperature by giving them my opinion of them, 
from which they gathered that I couldn’t serve under them or with them and I assured them they 
had drawn correct conclusions.”37   
Despite this, the Shipping Board exercised its right to create a public-private corporation 
as a separate but subordinate entity to procure and contract for the construction of merchant and 
transport ships, and named Goethals as its general manager.  The Emergency Fleet Corporation 
was thus created on April 16, 1917.  In a bid to maintain control over Goethals despite the 
general’s insistence that he would be given full control, Denman named himself as the president 
of the corporation.  Goethals, however, did not acknowledge any degree of subordination in his 
new position.  After the articles of incorporation were signed, Goethals told his son, “A separate 
corporation was formed and I am it.”  Friction between Goethals and Denman was bound to 
continue.38 
 The two men became embroiled in a major feud over the nature of the shipbuilding 
program.  Goethals adamantly opposed Eustis’s wooden ship plan and moved quickly to thwart 
                                                          
36 George W. Goethals to “Dodie” [George R. Goethals], April 29, 1917, Box 4, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
37 George W. Goethals to “Dodie” [George R. Goethals], April 19, 1917, Box 4, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
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it.  Discovering upon his arrival that Eustis had arranged for the board to authorize firms in 
Georgia to construct yards for building wooden ships, Goethals “flew into the air” and 
countermanded the authorizations, demanding that no further orders for shipbuilding were to 
leave the offices of the Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation without his 
endorsement.   “There were objections,” recounted Goethals, who told the board that his 
demands “would stand until they discharged me or secured my relief.”39   
 Goethals preferred a steel shipbuilding program to the wooden program that Eustis and 
Denman had attempted to force upon him through secret deals and arrangements before he 
arrived in Washington.  He believed steel ships were more seaworthy, better able to escape or 
survive submarine attacks, and would be more useful in a merchant capacity after the war.  
Accordingly, he developed and advocated for a shipbuilding plan “stipulating the construction of 
steel vessels, with wooden ships limited to the number that could be turned out by already 
established yards.”  Such a program would contract existing firms and yards to construct a small 
number of wooden ships, but divert the preponderance of funds appropriated to the Shipping 
Board and the Emergency Fleet Corporation to orders for the construction of new steel ships and 
new yards capable of building steel ships.40 
His proposals met considerable resistance from the Shipping Board, which was already 
pushing forward with the wooden program.  Goethals complained to his son that his new “job is 
the most strenuous one I have struck yet,” a telling complaint in light of his career to that point.  
“I am so handicapped,” he elaborated, “by the promises that have been made to every Tom, 
                                                          
39 George W. Goethals to “Dodie” [George R. Goethals], April 29, 1917, Box 4, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
40 General Goethals and the U.S. Shipping Board (as told by General Goethals himself),” Box 43, George W. 
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Dick, and Harry who has lumber that contracts would be given them.”  Continuing, he wrote, “I 
can’t get the Fool Board to ask for permission to build steel ships as well as wood, and though I 
have been asking for money enough to do something, they haven’t submitted their estimates, 
promising each day that they would do so tomorrow—and as tomorrow never comes neither do 
the estimates.” 41  As Goethals’s bitterness grew, his willingness to work with Denman in any 
constructive manner vanished.  The feeling was mutual for Denman, who was more than able 
and willing to match Goethals’s assertiveness and combativeness.  This influenced a tit-for-tat 
escalation of acrimony in which lay the true nature of their feud.   
From early May onward, their inability to cooperate was much more about authority and 
control than it was about the relative merits of wooden and steel ships.  Simply put, Goethals 
resented what he perceived to be an intrusion upon his prerogatives as the General Manager of 
the Emergency Fleet Corporation.  In one memorable and particularly tense meeting of the 
Shipping Board, Goethals “drew forth a letter of instructions which Denman had sent” to him, 
telling Denman and the rest of the board that he would “flatly refuse complying with the 
instructions.”  According to Goethals, the instructions “were at variance with the understanding 
that I was in supreme control, that I was there by order of the President, that I could be dictated 
to by no one but the President and would maintain this position until relieved by him.”42  
Similarly, Denman resented Goethals’s intransigence and frequent challenges to his authority as 
chairman of the U.S. Shipping Board and president of the Emergency Fleet Corporation.43   
                                                          
41 George W. Goethals to “Dody” [George R. Goethals], May 4, 1917, Box 4, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
42 General Goethals and the U.S. Shipping Board (as told by General Goethals himself),” Box 43, George W. 
Goethals Papers, LC, 5. 
43 Denman’s resentment played out largely in his conversations with reporters and his lobbying of Woodrow Wilson 
for support.  It became most apparent in May and June 1917 when he systematically attacked contracts that Goethals 
had negotiated with steel firms, charging that Goethals had accepted artificially high prices for steel plates, 
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 Mutual animosity blinded both men to the fact that they had gradually arrived at positions 
that were actually quite similar.  Denman began the affair as a stalwart proponent of Eustis’s 
wooden ship plan.  But Goethals’s skepticism and a spring 1917 revelation that wartime 
demands were leading steel shipyards to significantly increase their capacity pushed Denman to 
adopt a more moderate position that allowed for both steel and wooden ship construction.  
Similarly, while Goethals was adamantly opposed to the wooden ship program, he came to 
accept the inclusion of some wooden ships within his own plans due to both fiscal constraints 
and the existence of contracts already executed before he arrived in Washington.  Both Goethals 
and Denman, then, had come to accept the notion of a hybrid steel and wooden shipbuilding 
program by the middle of May 1917.  The only difference between their two positions was in the 
ratios of wooden ships to steel ships that they envisioned.  They were already on common 
ground and should have been able to resolve their remaining differences to work together and 
contribute something constructive to the war effort.44 
Unfortunately, they did not.  The feud between Goethals and Denman played out in an 
ugly and public manner from May through July 1917.  Both men did much to add fuel to the fire.  
Goethals was unable to keep the dispute confined to the offices of the Shipping Board and the 
Emergency Fleet Corporation.  He allowed it to become a press sensation, with journalists, 
editorialists, and cartoonists routinely calling attention to the escalating feud.  He also aired his 
grievances in a very public setting in late May when asked to deliver an impromptu speech at the 
annual banquet of the American Iron and Steel Institute in New York City, in which he 
                                                          
attempting to force a final showdown with Goethals through President Wilson by implicitly arguing that Goethals’s 
continued management of shipbuilding would lead to considerable financial waste.  See Williams, The Wilson 
Administration and the Shipbuilding Crisis of 1917, chapter 4, especially pages 123-128. 
44 Williams, The Wilson Administration and the Shipbuilding Crisis of 1917, 96-98 and 154-155. 
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proclaimed that the task he inherited was “simply hopeless.”  He joked that he resented his 
association with the Shipping Board because he regarded “all boards as long, narrow, and 
wooden,” and because it denied him what he believed to be the necessity of “absolute authority 
in carrying out any important work.”   For his part, Denman escalated the situation by lobbying 
incessantly for President Wilson’s support in sustaining his authority at the expense of 
Goethals’s, and in systematically working to undermine his general managers contracting 
initiatives.  Their relationship irreparably poisoned, both men appealed to President Wilson for 
full authority in merchant and transport shipbuilding.45  
 The President supported Denman in the dispute.  It is possible that he was never quite 
comfortable with Goethals at the helm of the Emergency Fleet Corporation.  Given his 
inclinations against career soldiers and associates of Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson likely would 
not have appointed Goethals to serve with the Shipping Board without Denman’s lobbying to 
attach Goethals’s name to the wooden ship program to improve public perception of and support 
for the plan.  When both Goethals and Denman appealed to him to intervene in the feud, the 
President did not agonize for long over whom to support.  Wilson composed a diplomatic 
response to Goethals on July 19, 1917, stating decisively but politely that Goethals and the 
Emergency Fleet Corporation were subordinate to Denman and the Shipping Board.46   
                                                          
45 Goethals’s speech is reprinted in full in “The Goethals Plan for Shipbuilding,” The Lumber World Review XXXII, 
no. 11 (June 10, 1917): 41.  See also George W. Goethals to “Dodie” [George R. Goethals], May 28, 1917, Box 4, 
George W. Goethals Papers, LC—which demonstrates clearly that Goethals courted not only the press, but 
influential officials and business leaders in his public advocacy for his shipbuilding program; General Goethals and 
the U.S. Shipping Board (as told by General Goethals himself),” Box 43, George W. Goethals Papers, LC, 5; and 
Williams, The Wilson Administration and the Shipbuilding Crisis of 1917, 108-128, 137-148, and 163-173.   
46 Woodrow Wilson to George W. Goethals, July 19, 1917, Box 43, George W. Goethals Papers, LC.  See also 
Williams, The Wilson Administration and the Shipbuilding Crisis of 1917, 170-174. 
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Goethals, however, refused to accept this subordinate position.  In a reply the next day, 
he explained that he had accepted his appointment in April believing that it came with assurances 
that he would enjoy “absolute and complete authority for the administration on the constructing 
side; that everything the Board could do would be done, and that it would act on” his “suggestion 
and initiative.”  Goethals then explained, “Believing that a centralization of authority in one man 
is necessary to carry out the shipbuilding program rapidly and successfully, after mature 
consideration of the whole subject, I am satisfied that I cannot secure efficient results under the 
conditions of your letter.”  Concluding his resignation on a candid note, Goethals wrote, “I am 
convinced, therefore, that the best interests of the public welfare would be served if I were 
replaced by someone on whom full authority can be centered and whose personality will not be a 
stumbling block.”47  Finding that sentiment compelling, Wilson then asked Denman to also 
resign from the Shipping Board, hoping to wipe the slate entirely clean and allow officials 
untainted by public controversy to address the critical shortage of American shipping.48 
 Goethals’s nearly four months of service with the U.S. Shipping Board thus proved to be 
fruitless.  As newspapers reported on the growing acrimony between Denman and Goethals, the 
Shipping Board made no progress whatsoever in resolving the shipping crisis.  The Emergency 
Fleet Corporation eventually became a reasonably effective organization, working with the U.S. 
Shipping Board to facilitate the production of enough new ships to increase the gross troop and 
cargo capacity of American shipping by nearly one million deadweight tons, but the majority of 
those new ships entered service between June 1918 and January 1919.49  As the war ended in 
                                                          
47 George W. Goethals to Woodrow Wilson, July 20, 1917, Box 43, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
48 General Goethals and the U.S. Shipping Board (as told by General Goethals himself),” Box 43, George W. 
Goethals Papers, LC, 6; Williams, The Wilson Administration and the Shipbuilding Crisis of 1917, 175-180. 
49 Ayers, The War with Germany, 39-40. 
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November 1918, these new ships had but a limited impact on the American war effort.  Almost 
four months of marking time while Goethals and Denman bickered over authority and the 
Wilson administration stood idly by cost the American war effort much in lost time and 
opportunity. 
 Goethals’s experience with the U.S. Shipping Board was generally representative of the 
management and direction of the mobilization for war throughout the first year of the American 
war effort.  Progressives went to war in 1917, carrying with them the managerial theories and 
faith in bureaucratic structures that were important features of early-twentieth-century American 
society.  Aware that industrialized warfare on a vast scale required degrees of a controlled 
economy and coordination between industry and the military that the country had not previously 
experienced, Wilson commissioned a number of boards, councils, and committees staffed by 
civilians to assist in coordinating the military, economic, and industrial mobilization for war.  
The President, however, granted these boards, councils, and committees vague instructions and 
ill-defined authority.  The effectiveness of such agencies was entirely contingent upon both their 
ability to forge amicable and effective working relationships, and the willingness of civilian and 
military officials to cooperate with each other voluntarily.  As administration-appointed council, 
board, and committee members scrambled to define their roles and authorities, the management 
of the war effort took on a confused and improvisational air throughout the first year of the 
American intervention.50   
                                                          
50 Examples include the Council of National Defense, the War Industries Board, the Committee on Public 
Information, the National War Labor Relations Board, etc.  See especially Kennedy, Over Here, chapters 1 and 2.  
The ill-defined authority of such boards becomes particularly clear in the records of the Council of National 
Defense.  The minutes of a joint meeting of the Council of National Defense and the Advisory Commission on 
March 31 and April 26, 1917 show that the CND was completely, and unknowingly, replicating the work of the U.S. 
Shipping Board at that time.  Minutes from July 8, 1917 note that “The Commission, being apart from and not a part 
of the Government is probably not fully advised concerning the progress actually being made in connection with the 
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 Such was the case with even the War Industries Board (WIB), generally considered to be 
among the more effective civil advisory and coordinating agencies established during the war.  
Wilson intended the WIB to coordinate the mobilization of American industry.  Prior to 1918, 
however, the WIB was largely unsuccessful in its mission.  Its mandate was unclear—some saw 
it as a temporary agency organized to meet a wartime emergency, while others assumed its 
purpose was to establish the systems necessary for the federal government to oversee a planned 
and coordinated national economy on a permanent basis.  Additionally, the military did not 
perceive a need to listen to or work closely with the War Industries Board prior to April 1918.51   
With the internal dynamics of the WIB and its dysfunctional relationship with the army 
and navy in 1917, even the formidable Bernard Baruch, who would revitalize the WIB in 1918, 
was sidelined and unable to aid the war effort in any substantial way.  Baruch spent much of the 
last few months in 1917 hounding military and civil officials alike about the need to extract 
saltpeter from Chile to produce enough gunpowder to sustain the war through 1919 and 1920, 
and the need to devote shipping to transport that saltpeter to American plants.  It was a fool’s 
errand.  Military officers had more immediately pressing issues to deal with, and the Shipping 
                                                          
war program,” and that it is unsure whether the ultimate goal was to “raise, equip, and train 500,000 or 1,000,000 
soldiers.”  See Minutes of Special Joint Meeting of the Council of National Defense and the Advisory Commission, 
March 31, 1917; Minutes of Meeting of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, April 26, 
1917; and Minutes of Meeting of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, July 8, 1917 in 
Volume 413, Bernard Baruch Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ. 
51 The best, if perhaps overly laudatory account of the WIB is still Robert D. Cuff, The War Industries Board: 
Business-Government Relations during World War I (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).  
Valuable firsthand accounts may be found in Bernard M. Baruch, American Industry in the War: A Report of the 
War Industries Board (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1941); and Bernard M. Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), chapters 3-4; and Hugh S. Johnson, The Blue Eagle: From Egg to Earth 
(New York: Doubleday, 1935), chapter 10.  These accounts are subject to the bias of authors whose personal 
investment in the WIB and its legacy were considerable.  Daniel R. Beaver, “The Problem of American Military 
Supply, 1890-1920,” in War Business, and American Society: Historical Perspectives of the Military-Industrial 
Complex, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1977): 73-92 offers a moderate 
corrective, especially on pages 78-81, which succinctly highlights the problems the WIB and similar agencies 
experienced throughout 1917 and early 1918.  
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Board could not find enough tonnage to meet the War Department’s needs, let alone dedicate 
ships to satisfy Baruch’s plans.  Such was the confused state of the management of the war 
effort.  Baruch angrily spun his wheels over saltpeter, blind to the fact that although he had a 
point about the need for saltpeter if the war were to last into late 1919 and 1920, the government 
and military were deluged with much more immediate needs and problems.52 
Shortcomings in the civilian boards and agencies were not the only problems in the 
American mobilization in 1917.  The army’s performance was similarly improvisational and 
lackluster.  With the General Staff so sharply restricted and the bureaus once again ascendant, 
many of the conditions that led to a problematic mobilization in 1898 still existed in 1917.  Bliss, 
then serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff, foresaw the complications ahead.  He wrote a 
memorandum to the Chief of Staff on March 31, 1917, recommending immediate changes to the 
War Department’s management of logistics in order to avert disaster should the army be called 
upon to mobilize for war with Germany.  Bliss foresaw a situation in which “the War 
Department may be placing huge orders for supplies of all kinds,” but that the several bureaus of 
the department could inadvertently compete with each other for the same limited resources.  “If 
the matter is not properly coordinated,” he explained, “it may result that one bureau of the War 
Department requiring great quantities of such material will find that the manufacturers supplying 
it have tied themselves up for a long time in contracts with another bureau of the War 
Department.”  Bliss recommended “that this matter should be brought to the attention of bureau 
                                                          
52 See entries from October 31; November 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 14; December 5, 11, 12, 17, and 21 in Diary for 1917, 
Volume 654, Bernard Baruch Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.  
Baruch was almost obsessively focused on the nitrate issue, noting on November 8, 1917, “When I think how this 
matter has been handled, I could commit murder.” 
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chiefs with the view to their arranging some sort of a ‘steering committee’ among themselves to 
insure an orderly and uniform acquisition of supplies.”53 
Although it was not acted upon at the time, Bliss’s warning was remarkably prescient.  
Only weeks later, the well-meaning commanding officer of the arsenal at Rock Island, Illinois 
cornered the market on the nation’s leather supply, without regard for the needs of other arsenals 
or other supply bureaus.  “Well that was wrong, you know,” he explained after the war, “but I 
went on the proposition that it was up to me to look after my particular job, and I proceeded to 
do so.”54 The major problem with the American war effort in its early months was that many 
people were looking after their particular jobs, and nobody was coordinating them.  By the 
summer of 1917, a national draft was in progress and more than 150 distinct committees, 
agencies, and bureaus were requisitioning, purchasing, and transporting supplies in support of 
the mobilization.  Each zealously seized the initiative and went about their work.   As the War 
Department was organized in 1917, it was impossible for the Secretary of War and the Chief of 
Staff of the Army to be aware of all of the independent initiatives and efforts, let alone to 
synchronize and coordinate them.55 
Part of the problem was Secretary of War Newton D. Baker’s failure to identify the 
ultimate responsible party for shaping the army’s war program in 1917.  Baker was not the most 
obvious choice for Secretary of War.  He had earned an excellent reputation among progressives 
as the highly successful city solicitor, and later mayor of Cleveland.  Little in his background or 
                                                          
53 Tasker H. Bliss, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 26, 1917, Volume 211, Tasker H. Bliss Papers, LC. 
54 Quotation from Daniel R. Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917-1919 (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 62.   
55 See Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917-1919, 50-62; Coffman, The War to End All 
Wars, 34-35. 
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temperament made him a likely candidate for Secretary of War.  That did not stop Woodrow 
Wilson from nominating Baker when Secretary Lindley Garrison tendered his resignation in 
1916 because he felt the President’s belated and rather tepid support of the Preparedness 
Movement risked national security for domestic political gain.  To a significant extent, the 
president nominated Baker because of his known antimilitarism and rumored pacifism.  Wilson 
had long admired Baker, whose achievements in Cleveland had made him a rising star in the 
Democratic Party, and had considered nominating the mayor for a cabinet position earlier in his 
administration.  More importantly in 1916, however, Wilson calculated that nominating Baker to 
serve as Secretary of War would signal to domestic and international audiences alike that his late 
nod to the Preparedness Movement did not constitute a decision to enter the war. 56   
While Baker was an excellent choice for that purpose, he had much to learn before he 
would earn his reputation as an effective Secretary of War.  In 1916 and 1917, however, Baker 
steered an ineffectively moderate course in the War Department.  Accordingly, he supported the 
National Defense Act of 1916, which simultaneously ensured the continued existence of the 
General Staff and severely restricted its strength and authority to plan and prepare for war, as it 
was created to do.  In the absence of a policy framework based on past experience or study of 
military problems, Baker’s natural inclinations were to either serve as a conduit for President 
Wilson’s opinions, attempt to satisfy all interested parties, or to be guided by the traditionalist 
arguments of senior officers who were products of a traditionalist institutional culture.57 
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The Secretary of War’s relative passivity in managing the army during the first year in 
the war set conditions for many of the most significant problems that plagued the American war 
effort until the armistice in November 1918.  Baker gave considerable latitude to General John J. 
Pershing when he was appointed to command the American Expeditionary Forces in France, 
vesting him with “all necessary authority to carry on the war vigorously.”  Accordingly, Pershing 
believed that he could dictate all of the terms of the American war effort and expect the War 
Department to instantaneously support his every demand.58  
Pershing and 191 members of the AEF headquarters embarked on the S.S. Baltic on May 
28, 1917.  During the twelve-day transit, Pershing’s staff convened a number of planning boards 
to consider all-important questions.  Those answers would fundamentally shape the American 
war effort.  Topics included the eventual size of the AEF, the theater of operations in which the 
AEF should be employed, when American troops could commit to battle, and whether or not any 
amalgamation of American units with British and French units should be permitted.  Pershing 
and his principal staff officers determined that the AEF should eventually grow to 1,000,000 
soldiers, would be employed along the southern portion of the Western Front in the Lombardy 
region, would remain a distinct national force rather than be committed piecemeal as 
reinforcements for larger British and French units, and would be committed as soon as sufficient 
shipping could be arranged to transport divisions to France.59 
Such questions, however, were not the proper purview of a field commander.  All dealt 
with problems of national politics, national economics, and coalition warfare.  The 
                                                          
58 From Newton D. Baker to John J. Pershing, May 26, 1917, reprinted in Pershing, My Experiences in the World 
War, I: 39. 
59 Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 13-18. 
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administration and the War Department should have provided Pershing with specific guidance 
for most of the questions his staff considered during its voyage to Europe.  At the very least, 
AEF planners should have worked with staff officers in the War Department to verify that their 
plans were realistic and their requests were feasible.  By planning while isolated in the hold of 
the Baltic for nearly two weeks, however, Pershing and his staff created their vision and 
expectations in a vacuum, with meaningful input from neither the War Department that had to 
mobilize, train, and ship forces to Pershing, nor the Allied armies alongside whom the AEF 
would fight.  Unsurprisingly, then, Pershing’s plans and expectations were not entirely feasible.  
The first and most significant obstacle was the lack of shipping.  The tonnage required for 
the forces envisioned by AEF planners on board the S.S. Baltic did not exist.  Pershing’s plans 
relied upon more American tonnage than was available.  As Pershing’s staff crafted its plans, the 
feud between Goethals and Denman was relegating the Emergency Fleet Corporation and the 
U.S. Shipping Board to a painfully ineffective and irrelevant existence from which it would not 
recover until 1918.  With all appropriate ships available in the United States in the summer of 
1917, the War Department estimated that it could only ship 650,000 soldiers to France prior to 
July 1918, assuming minimal losses at sea.  That did not stop Pershing and his staff from drafting 
plans that called for over 1.3 million soldiers in France by July 1918. With no significant tonnage 
of new American shipping forthcoming, the army had to rely on substantial British assistance to 
transport sustain the AEF.  But Pershing soon learned that German U-boats had sunk over 1.5 
million tons of British shipping in April and May 1917 alone.  The United Kingdom could not 
afford to dedicate any of its ships to support the AEF until it reduced its monthly losses.  
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Consequently, the army only managed to send 194,000 soldiers to France by December 1917, 
despite having swelled to a total strength of 1.1 million soldiers.60 
Even before troops could move to their ports of embarkation for transit to France, 
however, Pershing’s plans made significant problems for the ongoing mobilization back in the 
United States.  The War Department was already hard-pressed to construct training camps in 
time to receive the first round of draftees.  It contracted camp construction based on the 
assumption that the strength of American divisions would be approximately 21,000 soldiers, as 
called outlined in existing U.S. Army tables of organization.  Pershing and his staff, however, 
decided that the AEF would deviate from established doctrine and field divisions that were each 
approximately 28,000 soldiers strong. This was no small administrative problem.  Divisions over 
thirty percent larger than anticipated necessarily required over thirty percent more barracks, 
latrines, uniforms, food, and equipment than anticipated.  Because Baker had empowered 
Pershing with such authority, the War Department had to mobilize divisions at the strength that 
Pershing wanted.  But it could not react in time to adjust the construction and supply contracts 
that had been crafted to build and sustain camps designed to mobilize smaller divisions.  
Although it was not the only factor, this contributed to chronic shortages of supplies at Army 
training camps throughout 1917 and well into 1918.61    
                                                          
60 See Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies, 16-18.  The discrepancy between War Department estimates and 
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Short of billets, supplies, and ships, the army mobilized and deployed to France at a 
painfully slow pace.  By the end of 1917, the United States had little to show from its war effort.  
Eight months after declaring war, less than 200,000 American soldiers were in France, and most 
of those were either rear-echelon troops or in training and not yet committed to the front lines.  
Although elements of the 1st Infantry Division began serving “training” rotations in the trenches 
on October 21 and suffered its first combat losses on November 3, Pershing’s staff reported on 
November 6, 1917 that none of the four American infantry divisions then in France were ready 
for frontline service for any purpose other than training.  American and Allied officials alike 
wondered whether the U.S. Army would be able to field forces of sufficient quality and quantity 
to play any role in stopping anticipated German offensives in 1918.62 
Goethals was unwillingly idle as the war effort sputtered and stalled.  “I would give 
anything to go to France,” he wrote to his son in July 1917, “but I see no hope of that.”  With the 
dust just then settling from his feud with Denman and subsequent resignation from the Shipping 
Board, Goethals observed, accurately for the time being, “The President isn’t going to give me 
anything to do, that’s certain.”  Disappointed but well aware of his place on the sidelines, 
Goethals returned to his engineering firm, resigned to “go to road work and whatever else may 
turn up.”63  Ever persistent, Goethals kept trying to convince anyone who would lend a 
sympathetic ear to an eager, if aged, soldier.  In August, he met with Secretary of War Baker and 
cabled General Pershing in France requesting command of engineers overseas.  Pershing 
neglected to respond, and Baker politely declined, arguing that such a move would be impolitic 
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because Goethals had retired as a major general, and would therefore outrank the Chief of 
Engineers, who was then still a brigadier general.  In October, Goethals reported, somewhat 
despondently, that a friend was “kind enough to say that he is going to try and influence Pershing 
to send for me, but I haven’t any hopes.”64 
There were a few motivations for these rejections.  Politically, Goethals’s name was 
tarnished.  A highly-regarded public figure linked to Theodore Roosevelt since his 1907 
appointment as Chairman and Chief Engineer of the Isthmian Canal Commission, Wilson and 
Baker were already reluctant to place Goethals in any position where he could achieve 
prominence unless absolutely necessary.  The public fiasco with the Emergency Fleet 
Corporation left Wilson feeling burned and exasperated.  It would take much for him to allow 
Goethals to serve in any meaningful capacity.  Meanwhile, simultaneously convinced that 
modern war was a younger man’s business and jealously mindful of his position and prerogatives 
as commander of the AEF, Pershing was reluctant to allow older, well-known generals to serve 
in the AEF.65   
While in limbo, Goethals was the object of some suspicion rooted in the nativist 
sentiment pervasive in the United States during the First World War.  Since at least the early-
nineteenth century, American nativism had ebbed and flowed in cycles that generally 
corresponded with economic boom and bust cycles.  During the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 
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however, nativist sentiments increased as mass industrialization and urbanization generated a 
significant increase in immigration.  Tensions related to this increase in immigration intersected 
with ethnocentrism and a popular and pseudoscientific eugenics movement to produce a unique 
phase in the history of American nativism in which Americans began to view Europeans in 
highly racialized terms.66   
The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 increased nativist sentiment in the United States.  
Popular leaders like Theodore Roosevelt added fuel to the fire by declaring their hatred for all 
“hyphenated Americans” and demanding “100% Americanization” as a necessary precondition 
of wartime readiness.  When the United States entered the war in 1917, nativist sentiment easily 
transitioned to anti-German sentiment.  Paranoid about German spies and sabotage within the 
U.S., average Americans mobilized against anything that looked, sounded, or seemed German.  
Vigilante organizations popped up throughout the country to monitor their communities and 
enforce patriotism.  One such organization, the American Protective League, boasted over 
250,000 members nationwide.  More than a grassroots vigilante organization, it gained official 
sanction from both the Justice Department and the War Department to serve as a domestic 
espionage agency working closely with both the Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation—
predecessor to the modern F.B.I.—and the War Department’s Military Information Division.67   
In such an environment, Goethals fell under suspicion from some quarters.  Although his 
ancestry was Flemish and Dutch, some assumed from his last name that he was of German 
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descent.  Furthermore, as the Panama Canal neared completion in 1913, Goethals took a well-
publicized European tour during which he met with and was received warmly by Kaiser Wilhelm 
II.  In May 1917, an anonymous citizen referring to himself only as “A TRUE AMERICAN” 
sent a memorandum to the Providence Journal alleging that Goethals had worked closely with a 
German agent in the Canal Zone, surreptitiously communicating with German naval officers by 
flashing lights out to sea from a room in the Tivoli Hotel.  The author of the memorandum also 
alleged that Goethals had exaggerated the effect of the slides in 1915 and 1916 in order to 
redirect ships carrying munitions bound for Russia around Cape Horn, consequently denying the 
Russian army the timely arrival of munitions needed to defend against German offensives on the 
Eastern Front.  The editor of the Providence Journal wrote to the Bureau of Investigation, an 
action which suggests that the editor was part of the American Protective League.  The chief of 
the Bureau of Investigation thought the accusations were likely false, but forwarded them to the 
Military Information Division anyway.  The Military Information Division pursued the 
accusations only so far as to determine whether the German agent named in the memorandum 
was in the Panama Canal Zone.  While it does not appear that these accusations carried much 
weight in military and political circles, they could have planted seeds of doubt about Goethals 
among the more paranoid.68 
Regardless of how he came to be sidelined, Goethals stewed unhappily as a passive 
observer of the war.  In August, he noted that efforts to resolve the shipping crisis were “getting 
nowhere.” In September, he was becoming more overtly critical of the war effort, telling his 
family that he wished Elihu Root were back “in Washington at the helm.”  Succinctly assessing 
                                                          
68 All correspondence related to this accusation and investigation are located in File 6370-85, Box 1901, Military 
Intelligence Division General Correspondence, 1917-1941,RG165, NARA II.  Many thanks to Tim Nenninger for 
his assistance in locating this file. 
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the state of the war effort at home, Goethals commented acidly, “Confusion still reigns here.”  
By October, his correspondence pulled no punches.  Noting that the papers announced that Major 
General John Biddle was likely to succeed Tasker Bliss as Acting Chief of Staff of the U.S. 
Army, Goethals remarked, “I am glad they are going to have brains and good judgment there at 
last.” Finally, in November, Goethals reported that a friend had complained that “everything is 
confusion in Washington,” and that “the regiments he has charge of are seriously handicapped by 
lack of chow, clothing, rifles, and equipment of all kinds.”69 
 Goethals’s criticism of the War Department was consistent with the opinions and 
observations of many long-serving military officers early in the war.  Then-Colonel Robert L. 
Bullard—a veteran officer of over three decades of service who would command at the division, 
corps, and army level in 1918—jotted in his diary in June 1917, “Of my stay in Washington the 
great impression left is that if we really have a great war, the War Department will quickly break 
down.”  Peyton C. March, who would become the Chief of Staff in 1918, found that “the War 
Department, including the General Staff, had no conception of what we were entering upon” as 
the United States entered the war.  Pershing himself described the War Department in 1917 as 
“suffering from a kind of inertia.”70 
These officers were justifiably critical of the war effort up to that point.  It was no major 
exaggeration to claim, as Senator George E. Chamberlain of Oregon did on January 19, 1918, 
                                                          
69 See, respectively, George W. Goethals to “Dody” [George R. Goethals], August 19, 1917; George W. Goethals to 
“Dody” and Priscilla, September 18, 1917; George W. Goethals to Priscilla and “Dody” [George R. Goethals], 
September 23, 1917; George W. Goethals to “Dody” [George R. Goethals] and Priscilla, October 29, 1917; and  
George W. Goethals to “Dody” [George R. Goethals], November 4, 1917, Box 4, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
70  March’s remark is in Peyton C. March, The Nation at War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, & Co., 1932), 
3.  Bullard and Pershing are quoted in Coffman, The War to End All Wars, 49-50. 
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that “the military establishment of America has fallen down.”71  Much was wrong with the 
American war effort in the first year of its intervention in the First World War.  Cultural and 
political resistance to the Root reforms had ensured the survival and preeminence of the War 
Department’s anachronistic supply bureaus.  Meant to procure and distribute supplies for a small 
peacetime army dispersed throughout the continental United States, the bureaus could not 
possibly manage the demands of mobilizing and supplying millions of men.  They tried their 
utmost, but they could not keep pace with the enormous demands of modern industrialized 
warfare.  They simply could not produce, procure, and distribute supplies at the same rate that 
the War Department inducted soldiers drafted under the auspices of the Selective Service Act.72   
Beyond failures of logistics, the American war effort in 1917 suffered from many other 
shortcomings.  It lacked coherence and unity in communication and coordination between the 
AEF and the War Department. Pershing’s rapidly changing plans and demands in France tended 
to upset or render irrelevant plans and initiatives the War Department had initiated in the United 
States, further compounding the problems plaguing the American mobilization for war.73  
                                                          
71 “Declares America Has Fallen Down in its War Work,” New York Times, January 20, 1918, 1. 
72 Recently, some scholars have defended the performance of the War Department bureaus in 1917.  Daniel R. 
Beaver offers a limited defense, suggesting that the bureaus did about as well as could be expected reasonably, but 
that the conditions the bureaus faced were beyond the ability of the United States government to handle with limited 
preparation.  His critique admits that the bureau system itself was ill suited for the war, but he seems to not find fault 
with the institution itself for producing such a system.  James Charles Fischer takes that argument a step further, 
arguing that the bureaus turned in an excellent performance in 1917, conducting business exactly as they were 
designed.  According to Fischer, the problem was that the realities of 1917-1918 did not match pre-war assumptions, 
which caused the bureaus to be flooded, through no fault of their own, by unforeseen requirements.  See Daniel R. 
Beaver, Modernizing the American War Department: Change and Continuity in a Turbulent Era, 1885-1920 (Kent, 
OH: Kent State University Press, 2006); and James Charles Fischer, “Not Fallen, but Flooded: The War Department 
Supply Bureaus in 1917” (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2003).  
While it would be unfair to charge the officers manning the bureaus, as Pershing did, with not caring about or 
putting enormous effort into supporting the AEF, it is similarly unfair to soften the characterization of the bureaus’ 
failure in 1917.  Failure due to anachronistic organizing principles and assumptions is still a failure.  It is not too 
harsh to say that the War Department had stumbled or fallen down in 1917.  It had.  And that makes its recovery in 
1918 all the more interesting. 
73 Not just while in transit to Europe aboard the Baltic, but throughout the war, Pershing rarely consulted with the 
War Department when developing his plans.  For a good discussion of Pershing’s belief that the AEF was an 
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Furthermore, in rushing to meet Pershing’s demands, the War Department dispatched severely 
undertrained units to France.  What stateside training they did receive was based on faulty 
doctrine that failed to appreciate the extent to which modern artillery and machine guns had 
changed warfare.  This was due to Pershing’s abiding belief that stagnation on the Western Front 
was a product of European failures, and that the war could be won with bayonets and the 
American spirit.74  Officers like Goethals, Bullard, March, and Pershing, however, did not 
recognize all of these problems by December 1917.  They focused specifically on supply failures 
and the War Department’s evident mismanagement of the war effort. 
Politicians and the public at large also focused on problems of logistics and management.  
These problems stood out most clearly because the army’s experience of the war by December 
1917 was almost entirely limited to mobilization.  Shortcomings in tactical doctrine would not 
reveal themselves until the AEF was more heavily engaged in combat in 1918.  Similarly, many 
of the problems generated by Pershing’s changing plans and demands would not be readily 
apparent until he outlined a program that called for fielding one hundred American divisions in 
France by summer 1919, an expectation that defied any realistic appraisal of the country’s ability 
to raise, equip, train, ship, and sustain a force of that strength.75   
                                                          
autonomous entity from (and perhaps even superior to) the War Department, see Smythe, Pershing: General of the 
Armies, 46-49.  In another example, Pershing and his planners kept altering their artillery requirements, without ever 
ascertaining what was actually available in quantity in the U.S.  The only field piece that was manufactured in the 
U.S. that the AEF requested in significant quantity was a 4.7-inch field gun that was so new as to still be considered 
experimental.  Further changes to the artillery program made by the AEF staff paralyzed the Ordnance Department, 
rendering it unable to initiate production until December 1917.  See Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American 
War Effort, 56.  
74 The best source for AEF tactical doctrine in 1917 and adaptation in 1918 is Mark Ethan Grotelueschen, The AEF 
Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  For 
very effective and very brief discussions and critique of Pershing’s “open warfare doctrine,” see Grotelueschen, The 
AEF Way of War, 30-38; and Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies, 72-73. 
75 See Woodward, The American Army and the First World War, 191-193; and Smythe, Pershing: General of the 
Armies, 142-151. 
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Conversely, mismanagement and supply shortages were obvious that winter to even the 
most casual observers of the war.  Reports of unacceptably high rates of illness at mobilization 
camps that were undersupplied for adverse weather shocked an American society that expected 
more from its government and military.  Reports such as one coming out of Camp Custer, 
Michigan, that soldiers were splitting into two groups to alternate between their barracks and 
outdoor training sites because a shoe shortage forced them to share footwear, triggered troubling 
memories of the scandals surrounding the mobilization for the War with Spain in 1898.  
Mismanagement of railroad shipments caused an energy crisis in the Northeast as coal cars 
stacked up beyond Philadelphia on the thoroughly clogged rail lines leading to New York.  And 
in France, the AEF received some newly-arrived artillery batteries and machine gun companies 
that had gone through their mobilization training in the United States without ever having seen or 
used a howitzer or a machine gun.  Such reports shocked and embarrassed soldiers and civilians 
alike.  This was no way to win a war.76    
Both the army and the American public blamed these problems on poor management.  In 
his speech proclaiming that the war effort had “fallen down,” Senator Chamberlain blamed 
“inefficiency in every bureau and department of the Government of the United States.”77 Facing 
Congressional inquiries and a rising tide of negative press, Secretary Baker fell under increasing 
pressure to make a substantial course correction.  As the supply crisis became more severe, some 
politicians and newspaper editors began to call for his resignation.  Baker needed to find a 
solution quickly.  Seeking an officer of proven managerial expertise to solve the most readily 
                                                          
76 For the supply crisis of the winter of 1917-1918 and its many consequences, see Woodward, The American Army 
and the First World War, 134-143; Coffman, The War to End All Wars, 160-161; Kennedy, Over Here, 123-126. 
77 “Declares America Has Fallen Down in its War Work,” New York Times, January 20, 1918, 1. 
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apparent problems in a troubled mobilization, he advised President Wilson to recall Goethals 
from the retired list to serve as Acting Quartermaster General of the U.S. Army.78   
Coinciding with changes in leadership within the Ordnance and Coast Artillery 
Departments, this first step in a thorough shaking up and reorganization of the War Department 
met with widespread approval.  As the agency responsible for supplying all of the basic items 
that an army needed to survive, the Quartermaster General shouldered much of the blame for the 
mounting supply crisis.  Installing Goethals comforted the army and the general public alike.  It 
was widely believed that if anyone could successfully organize supply efforts on behalf of the 
army, the “Czar of Panama” could.  Shortly after hearing the news, Pershing wrote a 
congratulatory letter to Goethals.  “If anything in our army needs rehabilitation by a man of 
ability and affairs,” he mused, “it is the Quartermaster’s Department, and we all look for great 
improvement in its management.”  Not to be outdone, Theodore Roosevelt sent Goethals a brief 
note.  With characteristic simplicity and enthusiasm, the former President wrote, “I congratulate 
you, and thrice over I congratulate the Country!”79 
Goethals maintained a modest, business-as-usual reaction to the news.  “I notice by the 
morning paper,” he wrote his son, “that the order is to issue placing me on active duty and 
assigning me as Acting Quartermaster General, so I am cleaning up here so as to be ready to go 
to Washington.”  Rather than dwell upon the news or the task ahead, he continued, “Among 
other things, I am sending out my Xmas remittances, so I am including yours, not knowing what 
                                                          
78  See Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917-1919, 79-95. 
79 Quotations from John J. Pershing to George W. Goethals, December 19, 1917 and Theodore Roosevelt to George 
W. Goethals, December 19, 1917, Box 40, George W. Goethals Papers, LC.  See also “Wants Goethals to Supply 
Army,” New York Times, December 18, 1917, 1; and “Goethals to Head Army Supplies,” New York Times, 
December 19, 1917, 1. 
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my plans to be,” making sure to give specific instructions for his daughter-in-law to receive half 
of the money.  In his reply to Pershing, Goethals claimed to “need condolences more than 
congratulations,” and went on to declare, “I am going to do the best I can and trust that we will 
succeed in keeping you supplied.”80   
Deep down, however, he was elated to be free from what he considered to have been an 
exile to a state of helpless and useless obscurity.  He looked forward to 1918, enthusiastic that he 
would no longer merely mark time as a passive observer of the war.  And he was hopeful that he 
could give new energy and efficiency to the American war effort, so that it too would no longer 
be stalled and marking time.  From Washington, he wrote to Theodore Roosevelt with a 
determined air, “How long I am going to last here depends upon the support received and the 
lack of interference.”81  Bringing the same attitude and energy that sustained him through his 
years in Panama, Goethals would fundamentally reorganize U.S. Army logistics in 1918.  In 
doing so, he helped not only to successfully sustain the AEF until the end of the war, but also to 
usher in a sea change in the army’s institutional culture. 
***** 
 The year 1917 proved nearly disastrous for the army.  With heady optimism, the United 
States entered the war in April.  By the end of the year, it had mobilized more soldiers than it 
could supply, and it had yet to deploy enough forces to the Western Front to make a substantial 
impact on the battlefield.  Institutional dysfunction and poor strategic direction collectively 
brought the American war effort to the brink of failure.  Civil boards composed of zealous 
                                                          
80 George W. Goethals to “Dody” [George R. Goethals], December 19, 1917, Box 4, George W. Goethals Papers, 
LC; and George W. Goethals to John J. Pershing, December 31, 1917, Box 40, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
81 George W. Goethals to Theordore Roosevelt, December 28, 1917, Box 40, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
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citizens of varying levels of qualification had failed to ameliorate the shortages of shipping and 
supplies that so plagued the war effort.  Through it all, the army learned painfully and publicly 
that the habits and preferences deeply ingrained within the fabric of the institution were wholly 
unequal to the problems posed by modern industrial warfare.   
The managerial revolution provided both the army and the American public with a 
conceptual framework to diagnose and attempt to repair the army’s ills.  Americans in and out of 
uniform believed that their war machine was malfunctioning because of poor management and 
faulty organization within the War Department.  Accordingly, the War Department fell under 
intense scrutiny.  Under mounting pressure and facing the distinct possibility of a failing war 
effort, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker made important changes in December 1917 to set 
conditions for a radical course correction in 1918.  The most significant of those changes was the 
appointment of George W. Goethals as Acting Quartermaster General.  In 1918, Goethals was at 
the forefront of those who challenged the old assumptions, systems, and processes that defined 
the army by implementing a series of short-term solutions meant to resolve crises immediately at 
hand.  Accepting that change was necessary on the near term conditioned the institution to 
permanently abandon its anachronisms and adapt to meet twentieth-century challenges.
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CHAPTER 6 
Resolution:  
Shifting the Paradigm in 1918 
 
In late October and early November 1918, Major General George W. Goethals was 
anxious for the war to end.  Exhausted and somewhat embittered from his experiences managing 
the War Department’s massive logistics operation, Goethals knew that the American war effort 
would rest on an unstable foundation if the war continued into 1919.  German offensives in the 
spring and summer had forced the army to expend enormous energy filling transports with more 
soldiers in an effort to help the Allies blunt the attacks and seize the initiative.  They succeeded.  
American infantrymen and machine gunners crossed the Atlantic in unprecedented numbers in 
the summer and early fall of 1918. Hundreds of thousands of doughboys disembarking in French 
ports suggested to many that a powerful American war machine had finally kicked into high 
gear.  But Goethals, while justifiably proud of the troop shipment program, worried much about 
what was missing as the doughboys disembarked in France.  To build up its forces abroad more 
rapidly, the army curtailed its newly-inducted soldiers’ training at home.  More ominously, 
because the War Department had succeeded in increasing its troop shipments at the expense of 
cargo shipments, the American Expeditionary Forces began to register a gross imbalance 
between the number of troops it had in France and the supplies it had on hand to sustain their 
operations.  To a discerning eye, all signs suggested a crippling supply crisis loomed in 1919.1   
                                                          
1 Goethals conveyed his concerns candidly to his oldest son in George W. Goethals to “Dody” [George R. Goethals], 
October 27, November 3, and November 10, 1918, Box 4, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
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Goethals’s pessimism festered in a job that was both crucial and thankless.   Although he 
longed for service in France, he remained tethered to a desk performing duties for which he felt 
ill-qualified.  Having been appointed to serve as the Acting Quartermaster General in December 
1917, he was promoted the following spring to Assistant Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army—the 
second-highest ranking officer in the War Department.  Simultaneously appointed as Director of 
the newly-organized Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division of the General Staff, he was 
responsible for repairing and managing War Department’s logistics systems and operations in the 
midst of the largest war the U.S. Army had fought to that point.  Expected to work magic, 
Goethals clearly and painfully understood that he was not a magician.  His ability to repair 
broken and failed logistics systems was severely limited by resistance from within the War 
Department in Washington and changing requirements generated by the AEF General 
Headquarters in France. 
Although critically important to both the U.S. Army’s contribution to and the outcome of 
the war, Goethals’s successes and achievements in 1918 seemed decidedly incomplete.  Charged 
with shipping and sustaining millions of soldiers intended to participate in a massive offensive in 
1919, Goethals was convinced by the armistice in November 1918 that the supply system would 
break down if the war continued.  He had lobbied strenuously since July 1918 to make War 
Department logistics more rational, efficient, and economical by empowering a single staff entity 
to manage and coordinate all aspects of War Department logistics.  But delays in action meant 
that his vision was only beginning to be realized when the war ended.  Ultimately, Goethals’s 
greatest contribution to the war effort was not in the final realization of his forward-thinking 
plans and recommendations, but in finding enough short-term solutions to allow the army to 
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move enough soldiers and supplies to France in 1918 to influence Germany’s strategic calculus 
on how to wage the war and when to accept the terms of the armistice.2 
Of greater significance to the U.S. Army, however, Goethals’s service during the First 
World War helped the forces of cultural change within the U.S. Army achieve critical mass.  The 
adaptations the army embraced in 1918 demonstrated a recognition that traditional systems and 
practices were antiquated and inadequate for the challenges modern industrialized warfare. That 
recognition was far from universal and there was some reactionary resistance to even the most 
sensible measures taken in 1918.  Nevertheless, lessons learned and measures adopted in 1918 
fueled a spirit of adaptation and innovation during the U.S. Army’s interwar years that ultimately 
closed the gap between institution’s culture and its structures that had been created by the Root 
reforms.  Through his considerable efforts in 1918, Goethals played a prominent role in bringing 
to an end the long and somewhat tortured process of army reform that had begun in the late-
nineteenth century. 
***** 
Goethals’s appointment as Acting Quartermaster General in December 1917 was the first 
of Newton Baker’s moves to shake up the War Department.  His appointment came with a clear 
expectation that he would lead the troubled Quartermaster Department in a new direction.  When 
the United States entered the war, the department was responsible for paying the army and 
procuring and distributing its food, uniforms, and non-technical supplies and equipment.  In 
                                                          
2 This interpretation is fundamentally at odds with the conclusions presented in Phyllis A. Zimmerman, The Neck of 
the Bottle: George W. Goethals and the Reorganization of the U.S. Army Supply System, 1917-1918 (College 
Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1992).  The book is an excellent factual resource—one upon which I 
have relied heavily for secondary material.  However, Zimmerman concludes that Goethals did little more than 
unnecessarily complicate the bureaucracy of U.S. Army supply.  I believe the evidence shows that Goethals’s work 
in 1918 had a much more significant impact. 
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wartime, its portfolio swelled to include the construction of cantonments and training camps, 
shipping troops and supplies overseas, and partial responsibility for transporting supplies within 
the United States—a responsibility it shared with other bureaus.  As the months passed, however, 
it was apparent to even the most casual observers that the Quartermaster Department was adrift 
and unable to meet its responsibilities.   
Civilian agencies and War Department bureaus alike assumed responsibility for several 
quartermaster functions.  Although the department retained a branch devoted to subsistence, 
purchasing food became the purview of a wartime civilian agency—the Food Administration.  
Similarly, the Council of National Defense divested the Quartermaster Department of much of 
the procurement of material for uniforms and non-technical equipment.  The General Staff then 
sliced off the Transport Service, renamed it the Embarkation Service, and claimed ownership of 
it.  Collectively, these changes further confused lines of authority and responsibility and led to 
considerable duplication of effort.  Instead of relieving the burden, they caused the 
Quartermaster Department to flounder even more than it already had.3  
A major part of the problem was that the traditional organization of the War Department 
was wholly inappropriate for modern industrialized warfare.  While the industrial economy that 
produced the supplies the army needed was organized by commodities, the War Department was 
organized strictly by military function, with several bureaus independently responsible for the 
procurement and distribution of supplies related to their army functions.  Theoretically, this 
made perfect sense.  Ordnance officers were ideally suited to purchase weapons and munitions; 
quartermaster officers were experts on clothing and subsistence; engineers were experts on their 
                                                          
3 U.S. War Department, War Department Annual Reports, 66th Congress, 2nd sess., 1919, House Document 426, vol. 
I (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 714-715.   
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specialized equipment; and medical officers knew best how to supply field hospitals.  In practice, 
however, the bureaus competed for the same resources.  For example, ordnance officers 
purchasing shoulder straps and ammunition carriers, medical officers gathering supplies for 
hospital tents, and quartermasters gathering material to clothe the army all drew upon the same 
cloth and leather markets. 
Such overlapping demand existed for all commodities and many finished goods.  Upon 
his arrival at the War Department, Goethals found “that the Quartermaster General was buying 
clothing; that the Signal Corps was buying clothing; that the Medical Department was buying 
some clothing; that the Ordnance Department was furnishing blankets, so that we were all 
competing with each other.”  Continuing, he reported that the Quartermaster Department was 
“furnishing harness and saddles for mules, and also furnishing wagons; the Ordnance 
Department was furnishing saddles and harness for horses.”4  Similar competition existed for 
trucks.  Although the Quartermaster Department had designed and started building Liberty 
Trucks, the Ordnance Department and Signal Corps were purchasing trucks and truck parts in 
bulk on the private market.  Designed to operate independently, the supply bureaus’ lack of 
coordination made for a horribly inefficient procurement process characterized by a lack of 
standardization, system-wide shortages, delays, and artificially high costs resulting from 
significant competition over increasingly scarce resources.5 
Leadership was another part of the problem.  Throughout 1917, Henry G. Sharpe served 
as Quartermaster General.  A member of the same West Point class as Goethals, Sharpe had 
                                                          
4 U.S. House of Representatives, War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the 
War Department, 66th Congress, 1st-3rd sess., serial 1 (Washington:  Government Printing Office, 1921), 522. 
5 War Department Annual Reports, 66th Congress, 2nd sess., 1919, House Document 426, vol. I , 245-246.  See also 
Zimmerman The Neck of the Bottle, 36 and 46.  
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spent over three decades in the Commissary and Quartermaster Departments.  In fairness, this 
dedicated officer had some notable achievements in 1917, especially establishing a Warehousing 
Division within the Quartermaster Department and developing a standard truck for army service.  
But his shortcomings far outweighed his successes.  He contributed to confusion in the logistics 
system by allowing key duties to be stripped from his purview and was slow to reorganize his 
department to address more efficiently those missions for which he continued to be responsible.  
Most importantly, he failed to centralize control over his bureau’s procurement efforts.  Under 
Sharpe’s lax style management, individual department and depot quartermasters throughout the 
United States held considerable purchasing prerogatives with no oversight from Washington.  
This exacerbated the major problem inherent in the bureau system by fostering competition for 
resources within a bureau that already competed with other bureaus for the same resources.6 
Sharpe had nothing to do with the final part of the problem.  He had been seriously 
handicapped by personnel turnover among his headquarters staff.  In the small peacetime army, 
much of the Quartermaster General’s headquarters staff were long-serving civilians, not 
uniformed officers.  As the army began to expand in 1917, Sharpe “commissioned a great many 
of the more efficient men in the department, with the expectation that they would remain in the 
department and perform their former functions.”  Inexplicably, however, Chief of Staff Bliss 
“decided that they should be transferred elsewhere.”  This ill-considered decision stripped the 
department of its most knowledgeable and experienced personnel, leaving it, in Goethals’s 
estimation, “in bad condition as far as its organization was concerned.”7 
                                                          
6 Steve R. Waddell, United States Army Logistics from the American Revolution to 9/11 (Santa Barbara, CA: 
Praeger, 2010), 113-114; Zimmerman, The Neck of the Bottle, 34-37. 
7 War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66th Congress, 
1st-3rd sess., serial 1, 519-520. 
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From the day he arrived in the War Department, Goethals approached the work before 
him with the same managerial philosophy that had served him so well in Panama.  He 
endeavored put the right organization, systems, and people in place to facilitate centralized 
authority and decentralized operations.  He had considerable leeway to make whatever changes 
he deemed necessary.  Despite his very public failure at the helm of the Emergency Fleet 
Corporation, Goethals was appointed Acting Quartermaster General with a clear mandate for 
change.  “I went there with the understanding that I was to have a free hand,” he later told a 
Congressional committee.  “It was accorded me throughout,” he added.8  Although this 
characterization was not entirely true—conservative factions within the War Department 
frustrated Goethals’s initiatives throughout 1918—he was considerably more empowered than 
his classmate and predecessor ever was.  “When Goethals took over the work,” Sharpe later 
recalled, “he could do a great many things that no one else could do.”9 
Taking advantage of this leverage, Goethals moved quickly to resolve the personnel 
problem in the Washington office.  Absent a robust headquarters staff, he could not hope to 
affect positive change in the department at large, with its depots, warehouses, officers, and 
agents spread throughout the country busily conducting the bureau’s business.  He leaned heavily 
on the private sector to furnish him with much-needed expertise and manpower.  Understanding 
that he did not have the luxury of time to develop adequate expertise in expeditionary logistics 
and the industrial economy within the army, Goethals recruited successful civilian managers and 
executives to fill key positions within the department.  He hired some in entirely civilian 
                                                          
8 War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66th Congress, 
1st-3rd sess., serial 1, 522. 
9 Quoted in Zimmerman, The Neck of the Bottle, 48. 
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capacities.  Robert J. Thorne—formerly the head of Montgomery, Ward, and Company, one of 
the two largest mail-order and merchandising corporations in the country—was a “dollar-a-year 
man” who served in the War Department with neither a commission nor a salary whom Goethals 
appointed to serve as the Assistant Quartermaster General.  Sometimes, Goethals arranged direct 
commissions for civilians to join his department, reasoning that “there was something about the 
uniform which when a man puts it on seems to change his entire attitude.”10 
This tended to civilianize the Quartermaster Department.  Such an outcome was not 
inadvertent.  As an adherent to the principles and practices of the managerial revolution, 
Goethals believed that civilian businessmen and executives possessed the most relevant and 
applicable experience and expertise that he needed to inject into the Quartermaster Corps.  More 
importantly, however, civilianizing the department was the opening gambit in a much more 
ambitious endeavor to consolidate War Department procurement under one responsible agency.  
He later explained that he hired so many civilians because the Quartermaster Department was “a 
large purchasing organization.”  Still convinced of the experiential model of officer 
development, Goethals believed that the U.S. Army’s utter lack of relevant experience in large-
scale procurement within an industrial economy meant that there were few, if any, officers 
competent to handle the work.  Accordingly, he “thought it could be handled better by civilians 
than by military men.”11 
                                                          
10 See War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66th 
Congress, 1st-3rd sess., serial 1, 520; and Zimmerman, The Neck of the Bottle, 46-47.  The quotation is from the 
former. 
11 War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66th Congress, 
1st-3rd sess., serial 1, 520. 
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Goethals’s characterization of the Quartermaster Department as “a large purchasing 
organization” reflected not the state of the department when he assumed control of it, but what 
he wanted it to become.  Goethals abhorred the inefficient multi-bureau approach to purchasing 
military supplies.  As early as January 1918, he met with Major General John Biddle—who 
served as the army’s Acting Chief of Staff after Bliss went to Europe to serve on the Supreme 
War Council—to propose consolidating under the Quartermaster Department procurement of all 
supplies other than major parts and end items related to ordnance and aircraft.  Biddle, who was 
not a particularly forceful personality, agreed in principle but refused to order it.  Instead, he 
encouraged Goethals to build a consensus among the bureau chiefs “so that it might be worked 
out satisfactorily with them.”12  As Goethals’s proposal did not significantly affect the Ordnance 
Department, he received that bureau’s acquiescence.  Aghast at the prospect of losing their 
traditional prerogatives, the other bureaus mounted a stiff resistance. 
Parochialism and traditionalism motivated their opposition.  Their arguments supporting 
the army’s traditional multi-bureau procurement system were specious at best.  The Medical 
Corps argued that Goethals and the Quartermaster Department were “not competent to buy 
medicines.”  “Neither were the doctors,” retorted Goethals, as “they would have to get chemists, 
and I could get chemists to buy medicines the same as the doctors would have to do.”  Absurdly, 
the Corps of Engineers rejected Goethals’s proposal on the grounds that he, as Acting 
Quartermaster General, lacked the requisite expertise to “buy the various varieties of rope” that 
army engineers required.   Having become the most renowned army engineer of his generation 
through more than three decades of exemplary service and the successful completion of the 
                                                          
12 War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66th Congress, 
1st-3rd sess., serial 1, 523. 
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Panama Canal, Goethals must have been surprised to learn that the Corps of Engineers held such 
doubts about his knowledge of rope and other material required for engineer work.13 
Stymied in his campaign for immediate and wholesale change, Goethals adopted an 
incremental approach.  He began with a functional reorganization of the Quartermaster 
Department intended to maximize its purchasing capabilities.  Between January and April 1918, 
he adjusted the department’s organization no less than nineteen times.  He endeavored to 
centralize control over purchases within the Quartermaster General’s office in Washington.  At 
the same time, he decentralized operations related to the production and distribution of supplies, 
delegating these responsibilities to the various depot quartermasters stationed throughout the 
country.  By doing so, Goethals created a much more effective organization.  His office assessed 
requirements, prioritized the allocation of finite resources, approved contracts, and scheduled 
distribution of military supplies to all of the army’s camps and cantonments.  Depot 
quartermasters coordinated with contracted suppliers in their respective areas and oversaw the 
storage and distribution of supplies within their assigned regions.14  Reorganizing the 
Quartermaster Department along these lines was an indirect means of attacking the traditional 
bureau system.  Having failed to generate momentum for his proposal to consolidate 
procurement under a single responsible entity, Goethals sought to make the Quartermaster 
Department the dominant purchasing agency in the War Department.  He was not giving up on 
                                                          
13 War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66th Congress, 
1st-3rd sess., serial 1, 524. 
14 War Department Annual Reports, 66th Congress, 2nd sess., 1919, House Document 426, vol. I, 718-721; 
Zimmerman, The Neck of the Bottle, 54-55. 
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his proposal at all.  Rather, he was attempting to position the Quartermaster Department as the 
nucleus of a future consolidated procurement agency.15 
At the same time, Biddle had committed the War Department to an intermediate step.  By 
agreeing in principle with Goethals’s procurement proposal, Biddle acknowledged that the 
army’s purchasing systems were inadequate for the war effort.  Although he stopped short of 
creating an organization powerful enough to control and coordinate bureau activities, Biddle 
recognized that there were major problems in his supply operations that needed to be addressed.  
He also saw clearly that there were major problems in the movement of troops and supplies from 
divisional camps to ports, and ultimately overseas.  To address these issues, Biddle created two 
new General Staff divisions:  Purchases and Supply, and Storage and Traffic.16   
The Storage and Traffic Division was born of the winter supply crisis in late 1917.  Not 
only were the Quartermaster, Ordnance, Signal Corps, Engineers, and Medical Departments each 
purchasing their own supplies, but they were also independently shipping supplies to ports on the 
eastern seaboard and attempting to arrange for shipment of those supplies overseas.  Thoroughly 
uncoordinated, their efforts created massive problems along rail lines, in warehouses, and at the 
ports, particularly around the ports of New York and New Orleans.  There, the Quartermaster 
Department discovered food meant for shipment overseas was beginning to spoil, having sat in 
                                                          
15 See War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66th 
Congress, 1st-3rd sess., serial 1, 531; and War Department Annual Reports, 66th Congress, 2nd sess., 1919, House 
Document 426, vol. I, 720.  Goethals found Biddle’s successor, General Peyton C. March, to be extremely receptive 
to his ideas. 
16 Zimmerman, The Neck of the Bottle, 68. 
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the warehouse for too long because the War Department had lost track of where much of its 
outbound supplies were while trying to clear the congestion on the railroads and at the ports.17   
Such reports hit a nerve in a War Department sensitive to anything reminiscent of the 
scandals surrounding its mobilization for the War with Spain in 1898.  As it noted in a postwar 
report, “The lack of an effective system of traffic control resulted in such a competition for 
transportation and in such a congestion of railroad equipment . . . as to result in rendering 
inoperative a large part of the available railroad equipment of the country.”  The Chief of Staff 
reported that the massive congestion on the railroads contributed “to the fuel shortage which at 
one time threatened seriously to interfere with the sailing of our transports.”  Of equal 
significance, it caused the misuse of valuable “storage facilities at the ports and piers,” which, in 
an effort to clear the congested railroads, were filled to capacity “with unessential materials,” 
preventing the timely “shipment of essential materials and supplies.”  This was a complex 
problem that appeared to demand “a central controlling agency to control every shipment of 
materials and supplies from its point of origin in the United States” to ports in France.18 
Having spent part of the fall and winter of 1917 as a consulting engineer for commissions 
developing the harbor in New York and exploring a Hudson River tunnel project, Goethals was 
intimately familiar with the problems related to congestion at the seaboard.  They were, in fact, 
the first issues he took up with Biddle as Acting Quartermaster General.  Shortly after these 
                                                          
17 War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66th Congress, 
1st-3rd sess., serial 1, 530-531. 
18 War Department Annual Reports, 66th Congress, 2nd sess., 1919, House Document 426, vol. I, 246-247. 
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discussions, Biddle organized the Division of Storage and Traffic, and assigned Goethals to lead 
it, granting him additional authority by appointing him as an Assistant Chief of Staff.19 
The Storage and Traffic Division was meant to bring order to chaos on the railroads and 
at the ports.  According to Goethals, “all transportation matters in the United States for the Army 
were concentrated in my hands.”  The War Department quickly expanded that mandate “so that 
all shipments made to contractors and by contractors to the various bureaus” were also assigned 
to Goethals and the Storage and Traffic Division.  Going further, the Chief of Staff attached the 
Embarkation Service as a subdivision of the Storage and Traffic Division, and gave Goethals the 
authority to construct and purchase warehouses and storage facilities at rail hubs and ports.  
Effectively, Goethals and the Storage and Traffic Division were responsible for moving troops 
and supplies from their points of origin—production centers or training camps—to France as 
expeditiously as possible.20  This was no easy task, compounded by the fact that Goethals’s 
appointment as Director of Storage and Traffic did not bring relief from his already significant 
duties as Acting Quartermaster General.     
In that capacity, at the same time that he was organizing the Storage and Traffic Division, 
Goethals was also working to resolve a critical shortage of uniforms.  By January 1, 1918, the 
U.S. Army had swelled to a strength of 1,149,000 soldiers.21  Clothing them adequately placed 
enormous strain on both the War Department and the nation’s wool industry—in one revealing 
statistic, the army alone purchased more wool socks in 1918 than the total of number of wool 
                                                          
19 War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66th Congress, 
1st-3rd sess., serial 1, 518.  See also Zimmerman, The Neck of the Bottle, 68. 
20 War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66th Congress, 
1st-3rd sess., serial 1, 518. 
21 Leonard P. Ayres, The War With Germany: A Statistical Summary (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1919), 15. 
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socks produced in the United States in all of 1914.22   The Council of National Defense had 
stripped the struggling Quartermaster Department of responsibility for purchasing uniforms for 
the army in 1917, but had proven to be no more effective in getting the job done.   
Goethals convinced the Council of National Defense to give responsibility for uniforms 
back to the Quartermaster Department.  He then worked through that council to fix prices for 
cloth purchases and commandeer the nation’s wool supply.  The department then arranged 
contracts for uniform production with various plants throughout the country, moving to 
commandeer any plant that failed to produce the number of items for which it had contracted.23  
Going out on a limb, Goethals ordered triple the amount of supplies that he was authorized.  The 
official army program adopted in 1917 called for raising 1.3 million soldiers.  Goethals correctly 
anticipated that the program would expand dramatically in 1918, and planned for an army of 3 
million in Quartermaster Department orders and contracts.24  The combined effect of these 
measures resolved the army’s clothing problem.  Enough supplies made it to France so that the 
average AEF soldier could boast new blankets, shirts, and trousers every two months; a new 
overcoat every five months; a new underwear issue every month; and new socks every three 
weeks.25 
                                                          
22 The army purchased 96,000,000 pairs of wool socks in 1918 while the country produced 61,000,000 pairs of wool 
socks in 1914.  See Ayres, The War with Germany, 50. 
23 War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66th Congress, 
1st-3rd sess., serial 1, 525-526. 
24 War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66th Congress, 
1st-3rd sess., serial 1, 519 and 535. 
25 Ayres, The War with Germany, 61.  Of course, any given doughboy’s ability to receive these supplies depended 
upon the ability of the AEF Services of Supply to move and distribute supplies effectively, which became a problem 
in the summer and fall of 1918, as will be discussed later. 
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Goethals could not have resolved the clothing supply issue without concurrent progress 
on the problem of congestion on the railroads and at the ports.  If the materials and supplies 
could not move to the ports, they could not be shipped to France.  Once again, Goethals 
approached this problem as he approached the Panama Canal.  He centralized control and 
decentralized operations.  He sought the right people to put in charge of functional sub-divisions 
in the new organization and empowered them to take considerable initiative to meet his intent.  
He placed Colonel Briant Wells in charge of the Storage Division, giving him the responsibility 
of building and running a storage system based on a series of warehousing recommendations 
provided by an executive of the Western Electric Company.  To manage War Department 
railroad transportation, he appointed Harry M. Adams, formerly a vice president of the Missouri 
Pacific Railroad, to serve as the Director of Inland Transportation.   Charged with moving troops 
and supplies by rail to the ports, Adams quickly resolved many of the problems that had 
previously hampered War Department efforts.  Army officers and railroad officials alike 
respected his authority and expertise and usually cooperated with his efforts.  At the same time, 
Goethals placed the Embarkation service in the capable hands of Major Frank T. Hines, who had 
begun the war as an obscure captain of coast artillery.  Hines succeeded in developing a much 
more efficient operation at the ports.   
Synchronizing their efforts, Goethals had instituted a system by March 1918 that ensured 
adherence to planned priorities for the rail shipments to ports in which no War Department 
freight could move by rail without releases from both the Inland Transportation Service and the 
Embarkation Service.  Further, he ensured that the Storage Division was tied into the process, 
storing goods and equipment by priority to more efficiently load and unload trains and ships. 
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This system ensured that the chaos wrought by uncoordinated shipments arranged by 
independent bureaus in 1917 would not be repeated in 1918.26 
Despite these improvements, the Storage and Traffic Division faced considerable 
complications and obstacles.  It was an experimental organization conceived in the midst of 
crisis.  As such, its authority was unclear in its first weeks, and Goethals had a difficult time 
compelling the bureau chiefs to cooperate.  In their eyes, he was just another bureau chief who 
deserved no special deference.  Their perception only became more negative when the Secretary 
of War endorsed War Department General Order 14 on February 9, 1918, making Goethals an 
Assistant Chief of Staff leading one of the General Staff’s five divisions.27  The bureau chiefs 
then saw him as part of an overactive General Staff encroaching upon their traditional 
prerogatives.   
In the context of resistance from other bureau chiefs, Goethals’s system of requiring 
releases from both the Inland Transportation Service and the Embarkation Service takes on a 
different light.  It was not the product of consensus within the War Department over the best way 
forward.  Rather, it was a last-resort measure meant to compel the cooperation of unwilling 
bureaus in his attempt to better coordinate the movement of troops and supplies to the seaboard.  
The bureaus had no choice but to cooperate.  The Railway Administration, which administered 
the nation’s railroads under the leadership of Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo since 
President Wilson federalized the railroads on January 1, 1918, would not allow anything to move 
without the Storage and Traffic Division’s documented approval. 
                                                          
26 “The History of the Development of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division, its Duties and Functions,” pages 
13-14, Box 1, Entry 444, RG 165, NARA II.  See also Zimmerman, The Neck of the Bottle, 68-72. 
27 War Department Annual Reports, 66th Congress, 2nd sess., 1919, House Document 426, vol. I, 249. 
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Additionally, Goethals’s efforts were sometimes delayed and frustrated not by the 
bureaus, but by civil boards and agencies that helped administer the war effort.  A project that 
Goethals considered to be critically important was delayed for months by resistance from 
Bernard Baruch, first as a member of the Council of National Defense, and later from his 
position as chairman of the War Industries Board.  Goethals wanted the army to purchase land 
and build a terminal and storage facility in South Brooklyn.  He considered the location ideal 
because New York was the principal port of embarkation for troops and supplies bound for 
France.  Baruch, however, strenuously objected.  Baruch advocated instead for temporary storage 
facilities along New York’s West Side.  He assailed Goethals’s proposal, questioning the size of 
the project, the materials needed to carry it out, the quality of the cement produced at the plant 
designated to support the project, the impact on steel production, and the ability of the railroads 
to carry enough construction material into Brooklyn to complete the project.  Baruch’s 
determined resistance lasted from February to June 1918, when Secretary Baker decided in 
Goethals’s favor.  It was a hollow victory—Baruch’s prolonged resistance delayed construction 
so much that the project was not completed before the war ended.28 
Furthermore, persistent shipping shortages muted the effect of the Storage and Traffic 
Division’s achievements.  As early as January, Goethals “called attention to the fact that we were 
getting more men overseas than the available shipping at the disposal of the War Department 
would supply.”29  He raised the alarm again in February, this time convincing Secretary Baker to 
                                                          
28 The topic dominates minutes of War Industries Board meetings in May 1918.  See Minutes, Special Meeting of 
the War Industries Board, May 1, 1918; Minutes, Meeting of the War Industries Board, May 2, 1918; and Minutes, 
Meeting of the War Industries Board, May 21, 1918 in Volume 454, Bernard Baruch Papers, Seeley G. Mudd 
Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.  See also Zimmerman, The Neck of the Bottle, 73-75. 
29 War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66th Congress, 
1st-3rd sess., serial 1, 532. 
 
276 
 
appoint a Shipping Control Committee to work with the War Department to maximize the 
capacity of available tonnage.30  Even so, nothing could change the fact that the U.S. entered the 
war with a fraction of the shipping it needed for the war, or that the U.S. Shipping Board’s 
shipbuilding program was proceeding very slowly.  As the War Department noted in its official 
report on the war effort, “The carrying capacity of the available ocean tonnage was at all times 
the neck of the bottle of supply.”31 
By the spring of 1918, then, the army had not yet found a solution to its logistics woes.  
From his position as Acting Quartermaster General and Director of Storage and Traffic, though, 
Goethals’s options for improving the situation were limited.  He could not argue his way out of 
jurisdictional disputes with the civil boards and committees involved in managing the war effort.  
And he certainly could not influence the pace of American shipbuilding.  Goethals could, 
however, use his influence to push for further reform of War Department logistics systems and 
processes. 
The Purchases and Supply Division’s performance to that point lent weight to Goethals’s 
argument for radical change.  Organized at the same time as the Storage and Traffic Division, the 
Purchases and Supply Division was charged to “have cognizance and supervision of the purchase 
and production of all munitions and other supplies.”  It was also responsible for “the supervision 
and direction of all purchases, procurement and production activities of the several bureaus, 
corps, and other agencies of the War Department.”32  The division failed on both fronts.  While 
                                                          
30 Goethals went so far as to defend the Shipping Control Committee from what he perceived to be limiting 
encroachments upon “functions properly belonging them.”  See Entry for March 1, 1918, Desk Diary No. 1, Box 1, 
George W. Goethals Papers, LC.  For a general outline of the relationship between the Storage and Traffic Division 
and the Shipping Control Committee, see Zimmerman, The Neck of the Bottle, 70-71. 
31 War Department Annual Reports, 66th Congress, 2nd sess., 1919, House Document 426, vol. I, 342. 
32 War Department Annual Reports, 66th Congress, 2nd sess., 1919, House Document 426, vol. I, 249. 
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the bureaus found the Storage and Traffic Division annoying, they saw the Purchases and Supply 
Division as a significant threat to their prerogatives.  Viewing it with suspicion and hostility, 
they refused to cooperate and actively worked to undermine it.33   
With considerably less fame and force of personality than Goethals, Brigadier General 
Palmer Pierce was unable to create an organization strong enough to overcome resistance from 
the various bureau chiefs, who wedded themselves to the traditional model of independent 
production and procurement.  According to a postwar analysis, the Purchases and Supply 
Division’s authority was only “supervisory,” giving it only “overhead functions with the power 
to interfere but not to remodel.”  It concluded that the division “gave rise to a great deal of 
duplication and complication.”34  Unlike congestion on the railroads and at the ports, production 
and procurement were problems that were at least as acute in the spring as they had been in the 
winter.35 
Once again, Goethals raised the issue of consolidating War Department logistics 
functions under one responsible agency in February and March 1918.  Taking his supply 
apparatus in Panama as a model, Goethals argued that “there should be one central purchasing 
bureau which would get the supplies, and supplies would be shipped by that same agency to the 
seaboard, and then shipped from the seaboard overseas by the same agency.”  He reasoned that 
                                                          
33 The problems and problematic nature of the Purchase and Supply Division are well laid out in Zimmerman, The 
Neck of the Bottle, 79-81. 
34 The War Department’s official report stated simply that the Purchase and Supply Division’s authority was 
“supervisory,” with “overhead functions with the power to interfere but not remodel.”  Continuing, it noted, “This 
organization gave rise to a great deal of duplication and complication.”  See War Department Annual Reports, 66th 
Congress, 2nd sess., 1919, House Document 426, vol. I, 720. 
35 See Charles R. Day, T.N. Perkins, and Hugh S. Johnson, “Report of the Committee Appointed by the Assistant 
Secretary of War to Plan an Organization for the Office of the Director of Purchase and Supplies,” April 1918, Box 
1, Entry 442, RG 165, NARA II.  This memorandum is commonly referred to in secondary literature as the final 
report of the “Committee of Three.” 
 
278 
 
under such a system, “there could not be any friction; there could not be any interference.”  
Getting to the heart of the matter in terms similar to his arguments for centralized control in the 
Canal Zone, Goethals opined, “If you have a job to do, you want to give it to one man and let 
him do it.”36  Reflecting the principles of the managerial revolution to which he subscribed and 
the practices of some of the largest trusts and corporations that dominated the Gilded Age and 
Progressive Era, Goethals was advocating for the vertical integration of War Department 
logistics.  He firmly believed that the same organization should control army supply from the 
point of production to the point of delivery to the end user, in this case the AEF in France.37  
Goethals had a receptive audience in the new Chief of Staff, Major General Peyton C. 
March.  Under pressure from Congress to revitalize a sluggish war effort, Baker cabled Pershing 
on January 26 to request March’s service.  March had gone to France the previous summer as the 
commander of the 1st Infantry Division’s artillery brigade.  In the meantime, he had been named 
Chief of AEF Artillery, and had organized a rigorous training program for all American artillery 
units arriving in France.  Pershing was reluctant to give up such an effective commander, but saw 
the value in having an officer with a reputation for ruthless efficiency serving as Chief of Staff.38   
The War Department’s troubled performance in the first year of the American war effort 
was partially due to absentee and ineffective Chiefs of Staff.  Officially, Hugh Scott was the 
Chief of Staff until he retired on September 22, 1917.  But he was absent for the vast majority of 
                                                          
36 War Expenditures: Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66th Congress, 
1st-3rd sess., serial 1, 526. 
37 On vertical integration, see Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American 
Business (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1977), chapters 9 and 11. 
38 Fifty years after it was written, the definitive biography of Peyton C. March is still Edward M. Coffman, The Hilt 
of the Sword: Peyton C. March (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966).  Coffman outlines March’s 
path to Chief of Staff in chapter 4. 
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his wartime tenure because the Wilson administration elected to send him on a diplomatic 
mission to Russia from May through August of that year.  Tasker Bliss filled the role in his 
absence, and officially became the Chief of Staff upon Scott’s retirement.  Bliss was a dedicated 
and talented officer, yet too detail-oriented to be an effective Chief of Staff.  Often lost in 
minutiae, Bliss’s plodding pace in sorting through official business delayed action on urgent 
matters and did considerable harm to the war effort.  Furthermore, he was sent to France for six 
of the eight months that he was the Chief of Staff, leaving John Biddle to serve as Acting Chief 
of Staff.  Prior to the war, Biddle had been the superintendent of West Point.  He had no business 
leading the War Department, and his own awareness of that fact defined his approach to the job.  
Biddle considered himself a caretaker who was waiting for his replacement to arrive, and 
hesitated to make decisions of any significant weight.39 
March brought renewed focus and energy to the War Department.  Some assumed that 
March and Goethals were too alike, and that their strong personalities would inevitably clash.  
Such assumptions were incorrect.  Goethals and March knew each other not only from General 
Staff service more than a decade prior, but also from West Point, where Goethals had been one 
of March’s engineering instructors.  The two were on friendly terms prior to serving together in 
1918, and became close friends during the war.  March respected Goethals’s abilities, 
considering him to be “one of the ablest officers of the Army.”  For his part, Goethals was 
thrilled to have a Chief of Staff who was attentive, decisive, and perfectly willing to upset old 
army traditions if he thought they were doing harm to the war effort.40     
                                                          
39 Coffman, The Hilt of the Sword, 40-44 and 53; Waddell, United States Army Logistics from the American 
Revolution to 9/11, 198n39. 
40 See Peyton C. March, The Nation at War (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1932), 187; Coffman, Hilt 
of the Sword, 52-54 and 62-63.  On their friendship, see especially Peyton March to George W. Goethals, September 
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Intensely focused on improving the War Department’s efficiency, March was keen to put 
an end to the division of authority in army logistics.  He spent much of his first month in the War 
Department observing it in action.  In the process, March confirmed his high opinion of 
Goethals, and concluded that Pierce “wasn’t any good.”41  On April 9, he called Goethals into 
his office to discuss dismissing Pierce and merging the two supply divisions of the General Staff 
into one.  Surprisingly, Goethals demurred; he was concerned that he was too taxed to take on 
any more responsibility.   
The previous month, March had also concluded that Goethals was overworked as both 
the Director of Storage and Traffic and the Acting Quartermaster General.  He agreed to recall 
Robert E. Wood from service with the 42nd Division in France to relieve Goethals from his 
quartermaster duties.  March had been deeply impressed with Wood while serving with the AEF 
and Goethals was excited to work once again with Wood, who had rendered excellent service in 
Panama as the Chief Quartermaster of the Isthmian Canal Commission.  Wood’s return had been 
delayed, however, and Goethals felt overburdened and unable to absorb the Purchase and Supply 
Division until Wood could take over the Quartermaster Department.  March ended the meeting, 
assuring Goethals that he understood and that the two would discuss the matter further later.  
Later that week, and without the promised second meeting, Goethals was surprised to learn that 
March was pressing forward anyway.42 
                                                          
18, 1919; George W. Goethals to Julius Kahn, September 19, 1919; George W. Goethals to Peyton C. March, March 
24, 1923; and Peyton C. March to George W. Goethals, April 10, 1923, Box 40, George W. Goethals Papers, LC.  
March eventually served as an honorary pallbearer at Goethals’s funeral.  See “Goethals Buried Beside the Hudson,” 
New York Times, January 25, 1928, 23. 
41 See March, A Nation at War, 187 and George W. Goethals to “Dody” [George R. Goethals], April 14, 1918, Box 
4, George W. Goethals Papers, LC, respectively. 
42 George W. Goethals to “Dody” [George R. Goethals], April 14, 1918, Box 4, George W. Goethals Papers, LC; 
and George W. Goethals to S.E. Tillman, April 20, 1918, Box 40, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
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March acted with characteristic bluntness.  He decided that Pierce would leave the War 
Department and devote “such abilities as he may have to the War Industries Board.”  The War 
Council official given the unpleasant task of breaking the news to Pierce stayed up half the night 
“trying to paint a picture of gold, tinsel, and gold lace of his new duties with the War Industries 
Board.”  He “was just starting in to paint it to Pierce,” when March walked by.  Annoyed at 
seeing Pierce still in the War Department, the Chief of Staff snapped, “Pierce, I have cut your 
head off and ordered you out of the War Department.”43  In an order that took effect on April 16, 
March merged the Pierce’s Purchase and Supply Division with Goethals’s Storage and Traffic 
Division, creating the new Division of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic.  Appointing Goethals to 
lead it, his instructions to Goethals were simple and direct.  “You are given complete charge of 
all matters of supply,” he told Goethals.  “You can make any changes in personnel, methods, and 
general set-up necessary to get results, and don’t bother me with details,” he added.  Pointedly, 
he also told the general, “I hold you responsible for results, and I will take all the responsibility 
for anything you have to do to get them.” 44   
Thus began one of the most effective partnerships in the U.S. Army during the First 
World War.  As March’s actions and instructions show, he and Goethals not only agreed upon 
what the major problem of the American war effort to that point had been—but also shared both 
a ruthless commitment to getting results and similar managerial philosophies and techniques in 
leading organizations to achieve those results.  As March would recall years later, his 
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and George W. Goethals to S.E. Tillman, April 20, 1918, Box 40, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
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instructions to Goethals in April 1918 served as the foundation upon which the two “worked 
together in utmost harmony.”45 
Notwithstanding March’s heady instructions and excellent working relationship with 
Goethals, the creation of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic did not constitute a sharp break from 
past practices.  Organizationally, the new agency looked much like the old Storage and Traffic 
Division, with Purchase and Supply appended as a new subdivision rather than as a separate and 
distinct division of the General Staff.  Additionally, the nascent Purchase, Storage, and Traffic 
Division was not empowered to control bureau procurement.  As with Pierce’s Purchase and 
Supply Division, Goethals held only supervisory and coordinating authority, while the bureaus 
maintained executive and operating control over their own functionally-divided lines of 
procurement.  The War Department did not permit wholesale reorganization in the spring of 
1918 because it feared that drastic measures risked interrupting the flow of troops and supplies to 
France.46  Therefore, while the April 1918 reorganization of the War Department certainly 
sprang from a recognition that the existing system was inadequate, it did little immediate harm to 
the bureau system. 
 Rather, the creation of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division in April 1918 was 
another intermediate step in the evolution of the War Department.  Goethals found his new 
position to be confusing and frustrating.  Divided lines of authority meant that he answered to the 
Chief of Staff for all matters related specifically to the military, but reported to Assistant 
Secretary of War Benedict Crowell for commercial and industrial issues.  More frustratingly, 
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Goethals was surrounded by agencies and people—with March being the notable exception—
who challenged his ability to do anything.  The bureaus jealously guarded their traditional 
prerogatives and resisted, to varying degrees of success, Goethals’s attempts to coordinate 
stateside logistics.  Crowell was a bureaucratic empire builder who believed that logistics and 
mobilization should be managed by civilian officials and businessmen, not military officers.  
Furthermore, the newly reorganized and empowered War Industries Board, now under the 
capable chairmanship of Bernard S. Baruch, aggressively asserted itself in Purchase, Storage, 
and Traffic business.  By the end of May, Goethals admitted to former Secretary of War Henry 
L. Stimson that although he had entered the job with a mental “picture of a smooth-running 
machine,” he had “gotten to that pessimistic state” in which he doubted “if this ideal will be even 
be even approached, let alone realized.”  Fearing that Goethals was thinking of resigning, 
Stimson urged in his reply, “However that may be, you simply must hold yourself in and hold 
on, no matter what your discouragements.”47 
While Goethals was discouraged, he was certainly hanging on.  He had encountered 
similar organizational and bureaucratic challenges in Panama.  Unsurprisingly, he turned to 
familiar practices and techniques to overcome them, endeavoring first to put his division on a 
sound organizational footing.  He sought reliable subordinates and demanded that they rise to the 
occasion.  Wood’s assumption of duties as Acting Quartermaster General in early May helped in 
no small measure by not only relieving Goethals of a job he considered “the most vexatious one I 
have ever tackled,” but also giving Goethals an energetic, capable, and loyal chief in the bureau 
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most intricately connected to the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division.48  Goethals retained 
the energetic services of the heads of Storage, Inland Traffic, and Embarkation whom he had 
installed while leading the Storage and Traffic Division.  He also brought in the very capable 
Brigadier General Hugh S. Johnson to rebuild and lead Pierce’s old Purchases and Supply 
Division.  Johnson admired and respected Goethals, and the sentiments became mutual.  He 
quickly became Goethals’s most important uniformed subordinate.49  Finally, Goethals 
appointed Gerard Swope, formerly an executive with Western Electric, to serve as his civilian 
assistant.  He came to rely just as heavily as he relied upon Johnson.50 
Next, arranging an effective working relationship with the War Industries Board was 
imperative.  Goethals’s efforts on this issue were uncharacteristically ambivalent.  Partially 
because of his ongoing clash with Baruch over storage facilities in Brooklyn, and partially 
because of the profound mistrust of committee-rule over large projects that he had nurtured since 
his first year in Panama, Goethals did not trust the War Industries Board.  Like March and many 
others in the War Department, Goethals believed the board inappropriately asserted itself in 
military matters.51  While he recognized that the War Department must have representation on 
the War Industries Board, he did everything he could to avoid being the representative.  He 
proposed that Second Assistant Secretary of War Edward R. Stettinius be sent to serve as both a 
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liaison and a buffer between the War Industries Board and the army.52  In early May, March 
informed Goethals that because Palmer Pierce had been assigned to lead a brigade bound for 
France, he had recommended that Goethals replace Pierce as the army’s representative to the 
War Industries Board.  “I didn’t thank March for this because it’s a duty which doesn’t appeal to 
me, and I had expressed myself very strongly against it some days ago when he approached me 
on the subject,” Goethals remarked.  Fully aware that Baruch and Goethals had already clashed 
over facilities in Brooklyn, and remembering the Goethals-Denman fiasco, the President rejected 
March’s recommendation.  Delighted, Goethals remarked sardonically, “So I have escaped a job 
for which I am even less fitted that the one which I have now.”53 
Instead, Hugh Johnson became the War Department’s representative on the War 
Industries Board.  This was entirely fitting, as Johnson’s work as the Director of Purchase and 
Supply necessarily brought him into the most contact with Baruch and the WIB.  It was also in 
keeping with the recommendations of a General Staff study of problems associated with the 
Purchase and Storage Division.54  Johnson was an excellent choice.  He quickly established a 
much closer and more effective relationship with Baruch than Goethals ever could, and ensured 
that the WIB’s work with industry aligned as closely as possible with the army’s requirements 
and priorities.  As Baruch recalled, “When General Hugh Johnson began to sit in for Goethals, 
things improved considerably—as they always did where Johnson was involved.”55  Together, 
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the two did much to synchronize army procurement with industrial production for the anticipated 
campaign of 1919.  The relationship was so effective that it smoothed over some of the tensions 
between Goethals and Baruch, to the extent that the Wall Street financier occasionally attended 
postwar reunions of Goethals’s Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division.56 
At the same time, Goethals focused on making the War Department’s internal 
procurement processes more rational and efficient.  To that end, the Overman Act allowed 
Goethals to begin to establish an inter-bureau procurement system in May.  Signed into law on 
May 21, the Overman Act gave the administration discretionary authority to reorganize 
executive agencies to better support the war effort without seeking Congressional approval.57  
This had profound implications for Goethals and his vision for a consolidated supply agency 
within the War Department.  Fundamental changes were now possible if he could persuade 
March that a change needed to be made, and March could then persuade the Secretary of War.  
At least until months after the war’s conclusion, the Overman Act denied the bureau chiefs 
redress to their most important patrons, negating the influence of Congressional politics that had 
done so much to facilitate bureau resistance to the Root reforms since 1903.  Only after the 
passage of the Overman Act could the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division take any concrete 
measures to consolidate War Department procurement.58   
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The first measures were necessarily cautious and incremental.  Even with the Overman 
Act, Goethals could not change War Department logistics by fiat.  He still had neither executive 
nor operating authority in procurement.   He had only supervisory and coordinating authority—
the bureaus were still the operative agencies in War Department procurement.  To minimize 
competition and inefficiency, Goethals and Johnson worked to consolidate procurement 
processes “article by article as a conscious and deliberate preparation for the more drastic 
unification which was later affected.”59  First, they established a clearance process in which no 
bureau supply request could go to the War Industries Board or to a private contractor without 
going through the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division.  Then, they set up an inter-bureau 
procurement system meant to eliminate unnecessary competition between bureaus.60   
The inter-bureau procurement system resolved some of the problems created by 
competitive bureau purchasing.  In the new system, bureaus had to submit to Goethals’s division 
their requirements for commodities or items that multiple bureaus needed.  The Purchase, 
Storage, and Traffic staff then identified the bureau that required the greatest quantity of any 
given commodity or item and assigned it the responsibility of purchasing in sufficient bulk to 
account for all bureaus’ needs.  Goethals’s division would then apportion to each bureau its share 
of the commodity or item.  Gradually, this took a relatively cautious approach to procurement 
                                                          
59 “The History of the Development of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division, its Duties and Functions,” page 
23, Box 1, Entry 444, RG 165, NARA II.  See also War Department Annual Reports, 66th Congress, 2nd sess., 1919, 
House Document 426, vol. I , 353. 
60 See George W. Goethals, Supply Circular No. 1, April 24, 1918, and Supply Circular No. 2, May 8, 1918, Box 
208, Entry 441, RG 165, NARA II.  See also Zimmerman, The Neck of the Bottle, 103. 
 
288 
 
reform that centralized procurement of individual articles within individual agencies while 
stopping short of centralizing procurement of all supplies within any one agency.61      
Goethals took this cautious approach to avoid alienating the bureaus.  He attempted to 
assuage bureau concerns by granting exceptions to the inter-bureau procurement system for 
items and commodities that the bureaus considered technical or specialized.  For example, 
although he assigned procurement and distribution of cotton and products derived from it to the 
Quartermaster Corps, he allowed the Signal Corps to continue purchasing cloth for airplanes and 
balloons and aviators’ uniforms.  He also consented to the Medical Department retaining 
responsibility for purchasing and distributing material for surgical dressings and gas masks.62 
His proposals and actions alienated the bureaus anyway.  As Hugh Johnson recalled well 
after the war, the inter-bureau procurement system generated “agonized writhings and enmities, 
some of which have never entirely disappeared.”63  Writing to his son in France at the end of 
May, Goethals noted that he was making progress in procurement reform, but reported that 
“opposition crops out on the part of the bureaus at every attempt to consolidate purchases.”64  In 
his own postwar report, March accurately noted that “there were many complaints,” and that “the 
inter-bureau procurement requisition [process] became a point of complaint around which could 
center the widespread opposition to the general process of supervision and centralization that 
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was going on.”65  Nevertheless, in the wake of the Overman Act, this amounted to nothing more 
than sour grapes.  As long as Goethals maintained March’s support—which he did—the bureaus 
could complain but not effectively resist. 
Although pleased with the progress he had made, Goethals was not satisfied with the 
state of army logistics.  He still envisioned a single War Department agency responsible for all 
army procurement, and all army logistics in general.  Every measure he took was meant to serve 
as an incremental step toward that goal.  He put it plainly in a letter to his son while in the midst 
of establishing the inter-bureau procurement system.  “What I am arriving at,” he wrote, “is what 
I believe should be brought about, a single purchasing agency for the War Dept.”66  The course 
of the war in France, however, interrupted his patient and persistent campaign for procurement 
reform and consolidation of responsibility for War Department logistics. 
Although fully aware of the problems hindering the American war effort, the German 
high command saw that the United States was a vast reservoir of manpower that could eventually 
tip the military balance on the Western Front in favor of the Allies.  The German high command 
opted to launch a series of bold offensives against the French and British in 1918 in an attempt to 
conclude the war before the AEF grew and developed enough to ensure the war would end in an 
Allied victory.  Using innovative new assault tactics, the Germans launched their first offensive 
on March 21, overrunning nearly one hundred square miles of territory that day alone.  This was 
the first of five significant German offensives between March and July.  In reality, however, the 
German army was impaling itself, expending critical manpower and resources that it could not 
do without later that fall.  But in the moment, the Germans saw great opportunity and the Allies 
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perceived a severe crisis as both Paris and critical rail lines were threatened by the German 
onslaughts.   Scrambling to blunt the offensives and contain German gains to a few large salients, 
the Allies rushed reserves to the front—including untried American divisions in the AEF’s first 
experiences with major combat.67  They also called for the United States to send more troops, 
specifically infantrymen and machine gunners.  Given the perceived emergency, the Secretary of 
War agreed to increase the pace of troop shipments, and to devote a disproportionally greater 
amount of shipping tonnage to infantrymen and machine gunners than to support personnel and 
supplies.68 
In the late spring and early summer, then, troop shipments became the Purchase, Storage, 
and Traffic Division’s main effort.  Succinctly summarizing the War Department’s priorities, 
Goethals announced in early May, “We must get men over as rapidly as possible and everything 
must give way to this.”  Accordingly, Goethals devoted more and more of his time to moving 
troops to the seaboard and shipping them to France.  While he continued to give some attention 
to procurement reform, it necessarily took a back seat to ferrying troops to France.69 
Procurement reform received less emphasis because increasing the rate of American 
soldiers to France consumed every subdivision of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division 
except for Johnson’s Purchase and Supply Division.  Much of the burden rested on Brigadier 
General Frank T. Hines, Goethals’s energetic and able chief of the Embarkation Service.  Hines 
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and his subordinates worked wonders.  They ripped out the cabin walls from the interior of ships 
and placed tiered bunks in all berths, doubling passenger capacity in some ships.  Going further, 
they refined dockside procedures and fashioned double-deck gangplanks to speed up the process 
of boarding transports, reducing the time it took to board 10,000 soldiers onto a single transport 
to less than two hours.  They became so efficient that on August 31, 1918, the Embarkation 
Service personnel at Hoboken embarked 51,356 soldiers—more than two divisions worth—on 
seventeen ships in a single day.70 
With the Embarkation Service operating at maximum capacity, an additional burden was 
placed on the Inland Traffic and Storage subdivisions.  Coordinating the movement to the 
seaboard of supplies and entire divisions of troops to and from production centers, storage 
facilities, camps, and mobilization centers all across the country effectively enough to avoid 
traffic jams on the rail lines and delays at the ports was an enormous undertaking.  Like an 
orchestra conductor, Goethals had to synchronize the disparate efforts of all of his subdivisions 
to prevent a replication of the confusion and congestion from the previous winter.  Having done 
that on a large scale years earlier in Panama, Goethals was well equipped to handle the job.71 
Goethals and the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division were astoundingly successful in 
revitalizing the American troop shipment program.  In March 1918, some 85,000 troops sailed to 
France, most of whom departing prior to the opening of the German spring and summer 
offensives on March 21.  In April, the Embarkation Service placed 118,642 soldiers on transports 
bound for France, a forty percent increase.  In May, 245,945 doughboys sailed across the 
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Atlantic.  The Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division’s greatest output came in August 1918, 
when it shipped 306,350 soldiers to Pershing and the AEF.  Altogether, 1.5 million of the 
approximately two million American soldiers who served in France during the First World War 
made the journey in the last six months of the war.  This was not the outcome the Germans had 
intended.  Ironically, offensives designed to force an end to the war before the United States 
could field a sizable army in France caused that army’s most significant growth.  But the rapid 
expansion of the AEF revealed cracks in the foundation of the American war effort.72 
Despite its considerable achievements, Goethals saw systemic weaknesses in the troop 
shipment program.  He correctly noted that the increased numbers of outbound troops correlated 
with a decrease in the amount of training those troops received prior to embarkation.  
“Manpower is needed, but untrained manpower is not desired, and just herein lies our 
weakness,” he noted.  Further, he accurately observed that the massive increase in troop 
shipments was largely dependent upon “British ships placed at our disposal for the purpose, and 
we’re bragging about this to such an extent that there is bound to be disappointment later.”73  
Critical shipping shortages continued to hobble the American war effort. While the Purchase, 
Storage, and Traffic Division more than tripled the War Department’s troop shipment rates, 
approximately forty-eight percent of those troops sailed on British tonnage.  Goethals knew that 
if the British saw cause to be less generous—which they did later that fall—the army’s designs 
for the anticipated campaign of 1919 would be at grave risk.  Finally, the War Department’s 
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capacity to ship cargo to France did not increase proportionally to its capacity to ship troops, 
setting conditions for significant logistical problems in the AEF later in the year.74 
Before he could address these issues, Goethals became mired in a controversy rooted in 
the nagging and unanswered questions about the proper relationship between March as the Chief 
of Staff and Pershing as a field army commander.  March rightly believed that the Chief of Staff 
led the entire U.S. Army, and that a field army commander led only a part of it.  Pershing, on the 
other hand, believed that everything and everyone was subordinate to the commander in the 
field.  Although he recognized that he was subordinate to the Secretary of War, he viewed the 
War Department as an auxiliary organization that had no responsibility other than to adhere 
strictly to his requests and recommendations.75  The tension inherent in these conflicting views 
came to a head in the summer of 1918 over issues related to army logistics and administration. 
Goethals’s successes in increasing the monthly totals of soldiers and supplies bound for 
Europe in response to Germany’s offensives exposed a critical weakness in the AEF’s logistics 
organization, the Services of Supply.  Operating eleven ports, hundreds of miles of railroads, and 
dozens of depots and distribution centers, the Services of Supply had an enormous mission that 
was only getting larger as the revitalized troop shipment program swelled the ranks of the AEF.  
As spring turned to summer, the War Department had actually outpaced the AEF’s ability to 
receive men and materiel.  Ships arriving at AEF ports in France waited an over two weeks to be 
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unloaded and sent back across the Atlantic.  Supplies piled up on the docks awaiting movement 
to forward depots.  Units at the front and in training behind the lines began to experience supply 
shortages that were simply inexcusable given the amount of supplies that had already been 
shipped to France.76 
As reports of such conditions made it back to Washington, there was a growing 
consensus among key decision makers that something must be done.  It had already occurred to 
some that Pershing was overburdened.  This had influenced, in part, the decision to send Bliss to 
France that winter to represent the United States on the Supreme Allied War Council, relieving 
Pershing of some diplomatic responsibilities.  Logistics problems in France suggested to some 
that Pershing’s job was too big for one person.  On June 3, the President’s close friend and 
advisor Edward M. House proposed that Pershing “be relieved from all responsibility except the 
training and fighting of our troops.”77  March had come to the same conclusion, and felt that the 
best possible solution was to separate the Services of Supply from the AEF and send Goethals to 
France to lead it, making Goethals a coordinate authority to Pershing who answered directly to 
the War Department, rather than a subordinate of Pershing’s in the AEF.78   
Increasingly confident in his position as Chief of Staff, March assumed this plan would 
be accepted, and acted accordingly. He discussed the matter with Baker, who in turn briefed the 
President.  Both agreed that it would be best to postpone a decision until Pershing could be 
consulted.  March wrote Pershing in on July 5, informing him that “the Administration is very 
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much concerned about the responsibilities that have hitherto been put on your shoulders,” and 
that it was “inevitable that a subdivision of your work must be made in the near future.”79   
Pershing, however, wanted nothing of it.  Justifiably, he was disturbed by the notion of 
losing control over his own lines of communication.  It would have been difficult to find a good 
field army commander who would accept such a scheme.  Moreover, urged on by James G. 
Harbord—a fiercely loyal subordinate who began the war as the AEF Chief of Staff and had 
since advanced to command the 2nd Division—Pershing interpreted the proposal as an opening 
gambit in what he assumed was a deliberate campaign by March to seize control of the AEF.  In 
letters and cables to Baker, Pershing opposed Goethals’s transfer to the AEF Services of Supply 
in the strongest possible terms.  To address problems that invited scrutiny in the first place, 
Pershing relieved the commander of the Services of Supply and replaced him with Harbord, who 
promptly and effectively breathed new life into that organization.  This satisfied Baker and 
Wilson, and averted the divorce of the Services of Supply from the AEF.  By the first week of 
August, it was a dead issue.  Goethals would remain in Washington.80 
But March and Goethals had been operating under the assumption that the War 
Department’s chief logistician would soon sail for France.  In a letter to his son on June 9, 
Goethals wrote, “March sent for me and said he thought he had arranged matters so that he could 
send me over, if the reorganization he has in mind could be put through.”  The prospect of 
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service abroad excited Goethals.  “I do hope that there is going to be no slip up,” he mused, “for 
a desk job isn’t to my liking when I know I can do useful work over there along lines which I 
feel competent to handle.”81  March was certain enough that the transfer and reorganization of 
the Services of Supply would be approved that he designated a successor to lead the Purchase, 
Storage, and Traffic Division and ordered him to shadow Goethals in his remaining days in the 
War Department to ensure the transition went smoothly.   
By the end of June, however, Goethals found his uncertain prospects for service in France 
to be painfully distracting.  “Another week has gone by with no new developments, my matters 
resting in status quo, much to my disgust and to the detriment of my patience and nervous 
system,” Goethals wrote.  He reported that he had been “advised that it’s coming out all right 
though this gives no relief from the strain that uncertainty always imposes on me.”  While he 
kept working to hasten troop shipments, proudly noting that the rapid expansion of the troop 
shipment program had swelled the AEF ranks to over 900,000, Goethals delayed any further 
actions related to procurement reform, focusing instead on morale issues in the Services of 
Supply that he felt he would have to address.  “I gather that there is considerable discontent 
among the Q.M.’s [quartermasters] over there due to a feeling that they haven’t received the 
recognition in the way of promotion they feel they merit,” he reported.  Echoing ideas he put into 
practice in Panama, he remarked, “I am sorry to hear it, for a disgruntled force isn’t an efficient 
one,” and resolved that “there will have to be a change in this respect.”82 
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Although March considered the matter an open question until its definitive resolution in 
early August, Goethals gave up hope of service in France in mid-July.  Told that his orders to sail 
for France were imminent, Goethals packed his field equipment and let Hugh Johnson know that 
he expected to be gone any day.  Shortly afterwards, however, he was told to wait until the 
President and the Secretary of War heard from Pershing.  At this point, Goethals lost hope.  As 
Pershing had turned down his requests for service in the AEF in 1917, he saw no reason to 
expect a different response in 1918, especially since the proposal involved making Goethals and 
the Services of Supply independent of Pershing’s control.  He attempted to once again focus 
completely on Purchase, Storage, and Traffic, but was hampered by the constant and awkwardly 
distracting presence of his replacement.  “Now I have lapsed back and am trying to take up my 
work,” he wrote, “but it’s a difficult thing to do with a successor at my elbow ready to take it up, 
but who may not care to follow along the lines I am laying down.”83 
Goethals was dejected.  He described the whole affair as “a great and bitter 
disappointment.”  Venting to his son about the way the matter was handled, he wrote, “I had not 
been looking forward to anything of the kind, it came out of a clear sky, and I wish now that 
March hadn’t mentioned the subject at all until it was consummated.”84  While he certainly 
grasped the importance of his work in the War Department, Goethals believed that he could 
render more important service abroad.  Such a reaction was representative of his generation’s 
broader struggle to grasp the realities, demands, and implications of modern industrialized 
warfare.  Old and deeply-ingrained values proved remarkably resilient.  Throughout the war, he 
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remained partially blind to the importance of his work, denigrating it because it took place in the 
United States, not in France.85 
Despite his disappointment, Goethals saw that there was “nothing to do but grin and bear 
it,” and resolved to re-focus solely the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division.86  The War 
Department had kicked into high gear after the German offensives in the spring, but it still did 
not run smoothly.  Lingering questions over the proper relationship between the General Staff 
and the bureaus continued to slow and even threaten the American war effort.  On July 18, 
Goethals submitted a lengthy memorandum to the Chief of Staff urging another reorganization of 
the U.S. Army supply system.87  Summarizing his principle justification for another 
reorganization, Goethals argued, “The present system is organically unsound in sufficient degree 
to render it doubtful, or at least uncertain, whether it can carry the load a year hence.”  
Goethals’s long and detailed memo contained a strong indictment of the organization and 
operation of War Department logistics and a well-considered proposal for a new supply 
organization intended to place the army on a better footing for the anticipated climatic campaign 
of 1919. 88 
Although the establishment of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division was a step in 
the right direction, Goethals believed the weaknesses remaining within the army supply system 
were so significant that they threatened the system itself.  His memo offered a twelve-point 
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critique of the existing system.  Even after the limited consolidation of supply as the Purchase, 
Storage, and Traffic Division was established, Goethals argued that the War Department still 
treated supply as “divided and subsidiary functions” of the bureaus rather than as a major task 
requiring the attention of a single “grand division” of the War Department.  More 
problematically, the War Department continued to organize its logistics operations by end-user 
function, despite the fact that the industrial base upon which it relied was organized by 
commodity.  This led to the same duplication of effort, competition between the several 
purchasing and procurement agencies within the War Department, and artificially high prices 
due to competitive non-bulk orders by these agencies that had plagued the department earlier.89 
Furthermore, Goethals argued that although the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division 
had been granted supervisory and coordinating authority, the existing system could not be 
supervised or coordinated effectively.  By that point in the war, he counted nine different 
agencies with some degree of responsibility for supplying the army and pointed out that this had 
generated nine distinct systems of generating requirements, procurement, distribution, and 
accounting of both finances and property.  Additionally, Goethals assessed that there were “at 
least five independent conduits of supply reaching from primary sources to ultimate points of 
use, so completely segregated that there can be no certainty of synchronization although they 
furnish articles of related use.”  Anticipating bureaus’ objections, Goethals wrote, “The theory on 
which the technical supply bureaus were built (to supply highly technical material for technical 
troops) is lost in practice since we find each of them procuring some supplies for the Army as a 
whole,” and that even small units “must look to each of the bureaus for some necessary part of 
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its equipment.”  Finally, Goethals argued that granting the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic 
Division supervisory authority over a system with such pronounced divisions of responsibility 
“duplicate[d] executive control” and caused “conflicts of authority” between himself and the 
bureau chiefs.90      
To remedy these problems, Goethals proposed that the Chief of Staff grant the Director 
of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division “executive—not supervisory” authority over army 
supply.  He argued that the War Department had two chief functions—operations and supply—
and that all other War Department tasks were subsidiary to one of these two primary functions.  
According to Goethals, those managing operations should generate requirements.  Except for 
purchasing and inspecting ordnance systems and aircraft, the consolidated supply division would 
take it from there.  In practical terms, this proposal required no major reorganization of the 
Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division beyond adding a Facilities Division to manage all U.S. 
Army real estate and a more robust Accounts Division to manage War Department finances.  
Goethals believed he could accomplish the reorganization by October 1 if March expeditiously 
reviewed and approved the proposal.  More importantly, though, Goethals’s proposal required a 
paradigm shift that entirely removed most bureaus—all bureaus except than Quartermaster, 
Ordnance, and Aircraft—from the army supply system.91 
To Goethals’s mounting frustration, March was extremely slow to make a decision on the 
recommendation.  Just over a week after submitting the memo, Goethals complained that “the 
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wills of the Gods certainly grind exceeding slow,” and that he was growing “impatient over the 
delays in getting action.”   One month later, he was still waiting.  On August 18, he reported to 
his son, “March said he would let me go ahead and would write me a letter ‘tomorrow’ but as it 
hasn’t yet come, I presume ‘tomorrow’ is still in the future.”  Exasperated, he vented that he felt 
he was “just sawing wood.”  In another letter written one week later, Goethals was hopeful that a 
cable from Pershing sounding the alarm over urgent supply requests going unfilled would spur 
action on his recommended reorganization.92 
It is difficult to explain March’s uncharacteristic indecisiveness on Goethals’s proposed 
reorganization of War Department logistics.  Possibly, he did not agree with the proposal in the 
first place.  This may have been the issue to which March referred when he wrote in his memoir, 
“I could not see my way clear to approve certain of his [Goethals’s] proposed schemes, but we 
thrashed them out amicably, and my disapproval made no difference in our relations.”93  In 
August, March sent the proposal to the bureau chiefs for their recommendations, knowing full 
well that they would recommend disapproval.  Unsurprisingly, the bureau chiefs reactions “were, 
in the main, strongly adverse,” with the Chief of Engineers “being particularly vigorous in 
opposition.”94  March had a reputation for decisiveness, and was not afraid to make significant 
decisions without first building consensus.  He was, according to one of his subordinates in the 
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War Department, “a twentieth-century Richelieu.”95  By sending the proposal to the bureau 
chiefs, March may have hoped to kill it. 
It is also entirely possible that March was too overburdened to give the proposal due 
attention.  In June, Pershing radically revised his projections for the ultimate size of the AEF, 
upending all assumptions that had informed the War Department’s program.  Since the spring of 
1918, the War Department had planned on sending a total of 54 divisions to France by the end of 
1919.  On June 19, Pershing cabled the War Department that his minimum requirement would be 
66 divisions in France by May 1919.  Four days later, he cabled the War Department to revise 
those numbers, calling for 100 divisions by July 1919.  To those managing mobilization in the 
War Department, the resources required to raise and sustain an army of that strength were mind-
boggling.  March needed time to assess whether or not the program was possible.96 
Goethals and Swope studied Pershing’s proposal and found it to be completely 
unrealistic.  They believed the War Department could definitely raise and sustain sixty divisions, 
and possibly eighty divisions.  Shipping remained the critical limiting factor.  Even at eighty 
divisions, Goethals and Swope forecasted significant deficiencies in cargo tonnage.  They could 
move the soldiers the program demanded, but not the supplies the soldiers needed.97  March and 
Baker weighed these concerns, and adopted the eighty-division plan as the army’s new program.  
Understanding that there would be cargo deficiencies, March revised sustainment requirements 
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so that the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division would ship an average of thirty pounds of 
supplies per AEF soldier per day, down from approximately fifty pounds per soldier per day.98   
The process by which the army adopted the eighty-division program showed that the 
General Staff was just beginning to function according to Elihu Root’s original conception of it.  
Despite resistance from the bureaus and from Pershing himself, the Chief of Staff and parts of 
the General Staff had received a plan from a field army commander, performed an analysis, 
revised the plan to a more reasonable—if still overly optimistic—assessment of resources and 
infrastructure available to carry out the plan, and made it the U.S. Army’s official program.  
Nevertheless, resistance to the Chief of Staff and his General Staff was still significant.  The 
bureaus continued to resist any perceived encroachment onto their traditional prerogatives, 
seeing Goethals’s proposed reorganization army of supply as the latest threat.  Furthermore, 
Pershing refused to accept that his 100-division program could be overruled by March, and 
continued to develop plans for an AEF that would be 100-divisions strong in 1919.99  
As time passed, March saw a connection between such resistance and lingering problems 
in the American war effort.  By producing plans based on an anticipated 100-divisions, Pershing 
was generating requirements that did not match the official army program, disrupting plans set 
according to priorities set by the War Department based on the eighty-division program.  
Furthermore, the inefficient bureau system struggled, and failed in some areas, to meet even the 
requirements generated by the more limited 54-division program that informed the War 
Department’s efforts earlier in the summer.  Hearing reports in August that the AEF’s supply 
                                                          
98 War Department Annual Reports, 66th Congress, 2nd sess., 1919, House Document 426, vol. I, 240-241; Cable No. 
74, July 23, 1918, USAWW 2:544. 
99 Neumann, “A Question of Authority: Reassessing the March-Pershing Feud in the First World War,” 1137-1138; 
Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies, 210. 
 
304 
 
situation was gradually getting worse, not better, March assessed that the traditional bureau 
system was not up to the task of sustaining a seemingly ever-increasing war effort.  He 
concluded that the Chief of Staff and the General Staff required more explicit authority to 
formulate and execute army programs and missions.100   
On August 26, 1918, March acted.  With Baker’s approval, he issued War Department 
General Order 80, which stated, in part, “The Chief of the General Staff is the immediate advisor 
of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment, and is charged by 
the Secretary of War with the planning, development, and execution of the Army program.”  
Going a step further, the order stipulated that the Chief of Staff “takes rank and precedence over 
all officers of the Army,” and was charged with ensuring “that the policies of the War 
Department are harmoniously executed by the several corps, bureaus, and other agencies of the 
Military Establishment and that the Army program is carried out speedily and efficiently.”101  
This clarification of authority was the paradigm shift that was necessary for Goethals’s proposed 
reorganization to be approved.  It is no coincidence that on the same day that March issued 
General Order 80, he approved the reorganization of army supply proposed by Goethals nearly 
six weeks earlier.102   
Goethals dedicated himself completely to the reorganization.  His weekly letters to his 
eldest son lapsed for an entire month after March finally gave his approval.103   He focused on 
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little else, perhaps because it seemed to be the only part of the war effort he could definitively 
control and influence.  By the fall, Goethals no longer believed he could fix what he perceived to 
be significant, perhaps fatal flaws in the war effort.  Compounded by Allied calls in the spring 
and summer to send only infantrymen and machine gunners and the upward revision of the army 
program to eighty divisions, there was a gross imbalance between troops and supplies shipped to 
France in the last months of the war.  As the British withdrew some of the tonnage they had 
dedicated to American troop and supply shipments in the critical summer months, Goethals 
scrambled to find enough shipping to sustain the war effort into 1919, but found that the 
Shipping Board was nowhere near to meeting the levels of ship production it had promised.   By 
late October, Goethals felt as though he was minding a dam that would burst if the war 
continued.  In a strikingly pessimistic letter to his son on October 27, Goethals admitted, “We are 
hustling men over while the cargo end gets worse and worse . . . I shouldn’t be surprised to see 
the whole shipping situation collapse.”104 
Unable to do anything about shipping shortages, Goethals set about refashioning the 
Purchase, Storage, and Traffic as the War Department’s central supply agency.  He moved 
deliberately, first addressing organizational adjustments to prepare the division for its expanded 
scope and responsibilities, including creating a new subdivision for finances.  Next, he 
consolidated the storage activities of those bureaus that had retained independent storage 
authority under the old system.  He then ordered the transfer of procurement functions from the 
Corps of Engineers, Signal Corps, and Medical Department to the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic 
Division, effective November 1, 5, and 15, respectively.  Concurrently, Goethals issued a 
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directive on November 7 formally announcing that “the function of the Director of Purchase, 
Storage, and Traffic is executive and not supervisory only,” and that “the Director is in command 
of the supply organizations of the Army.”105 
 The armistice of November 11, 1918 halted his efforts.  With the war over, Secretary of 
War Baker suspended any further reorganization of the War Department.  Acknowledging that 
the Overman Act gave blanket authority to reorganize executive agencies during the war, Baker 
thought it was best to delay any further reorganization until Congress passed legislation on the 
size and structure of the postwar U.S. Army.  Thus interrupted, Goethals’s efforts to make army 
logistics more rational and efficient, much like his efforts set the American war effort on a stable 
logistical foundation to sustain an anticipated campaign in 1919, were incomplete.   
***** 
All in all, Goethals’s work was resoundingly successful.  The major shortcomings that 
Goethals correctly identified at various points in 1918 were not his own.  Instead, they were 
related to a shortage in shipping that he could not affect, and to an obsolete War Department 
organization that he ultimately helped to overturn, although too late to have any practical impact 
on the war.  While those who went abroad received considerably more publicity for their service, 
many of those who were in a position to have observed what Goethals had achieved strongly 
praised his performance.  Several argued that the significance of Goethals’s contributions to the 
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American war effort was equal to or greater than his accomplishments at the Panama Canal.106  
Peyton March was particularly in awe of what Goethals had done with the Purchase, Storage, 
and Traffic Division.  In a letter to Goethals five years after the war ended, he wrote, “I was 
asked by some responsible people what my solution would be of the problem of putting Austria 
on its feet, and I replied that I would make you the General Manager of Austria, under whatever 
title they pleased, at your own price, and give you carte blanche.”107 
Within the context of the war, the most important achievement of Goethals’s Purchase, 
Storage, and Traffic Division was its impressive troop shipment program in the summer and fall 
of 1918.  The rapid buildup of American troops on the continent affected German decisions at 
both the operational and strategic levels of war.  Ultimately, estimates of American troop 
shipments bore some influence upon the German decision to seek an armistice in 1918 rather 
than remain on the defensive into 1919.108  Although Goethals had not succeeded in setting up a 
logistics system that could sustain the anticipated climatic campaign of 1919, he had done much 
to help end the war in 1918 before the system could fail. 
In the larger context of army reform, however, the achievements of Goethals and the 
Purchase, Storage, Traffic Division were of immense significance.  They helped complete a 
cultural shift within the U.S. Army that bridged the divide between the army’s institutional 
                                                          
106 See, for example, Charles M. Schwab to George W. Goethals, July 29, 1919, Box 40, George W. Goethals 
Papers, LC; March, The Nation at War, 196; and Donald Wilhelm, “The Master of Mobilization,” The Independent 
95 (September 7, 1918): 316 and 333. 
107 Peyton C. March to George W. Goethals, April 10, 1923, Box 40, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
108 Erich von Ludendorff, Quartermaster General of the German army, wrote that in 1918, the American troops 
shipment program “weighed heavily in the balance against us.”  He described it as an issue “of the greatest 
importance,” before stating categorically, “It was for this reason that America became the deciding factor in the 
war.”  See Erich von Ludendorff, Ludendorff’s Own Story, August 1914-November 1918: The Great War from the 
Siege of Liege to the Signing of the Armistice as viewed from the Grand Headquarters of the German Army, vol. 2 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1919), 276. 
 
308 
 
culture and its structures that were created by the Root Reforms.  But such change was not 
immediate.  Although Goethals and March agreed that the reorganized Purchase, Storage, and 
Traffic Division should be a permanent feature of an army led by a powerful Chief of Staff and a 
robust General Staff, theirs was a minority opinion within the War Department at the end of the 
war.  The general sense of emergency vanished when the war ended, taking with it the immediate 
impetus for change.  Goethals’s generation of officers succumbed once again to the appeal of 
comfortable tradition.  When Goethals retired from the service on March 1, 1919, his 
replacement—a career quartermaster officer—immediately rolled back the most important 
features of the fall 1918 reorganization of army supply by resurrecting bureau autonomy and 
restoring the division’s earlier status as a coordinating agency rather than an executive one.   
As the Overman Act expired six months after the end of the war, bureau chiefs attacked 
Goethals’s methods in Congressional hearings.  Major General Clarence C. Williams of the 
Ordnance Department testified that “not one single constructive thing has come out of the 
Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division.”  The Chief of Engineers reported to Congress that it 
was “providential” that Goethals’s reorganization had not fully matured until the first week of 
November, and therefore was “not actually tested by war,” insisting that such a test would have 
revealed that the reorganization had merely broken a well-functioning system.  Other bureau 
chiefs echoed similar sentiments, arguing that Goethals and the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic 
Division were unwanted interlocutors in their domains, and that the reorganized postwar army 
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should confine the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division—and any division of the General 
Staff, for that matter—to a purely supervisory and coordinating role.109          
Such pushback was a function of the larger debate over the role of the Chief of Staff and 
General Staff.  Among career officers, two points of view were most prevalent.  One school of 
thought held that the Chief of Staff and the General Staff assumed too much power in the 
summer and fall of 1918.  Another argued that a strong CSA and empowered General Staff 
divisions like Goethals’s were far superior to old methods and were the way of the future.  Those 
most publicly and vociferously participating in the debate were the army’s senior leaders, the 
long-serving stalwarts of Goethals’s generation.  In effect, then, this generation of officers was at 
war with itself over the future of the army.  A failure to achieve consensus, budgetary shortfalls, 
and a sharp postwar reduction of forces tipped the scales in favor of the more traditionalist view.  
The National Defense Act of 1920 limited the General Staff to a Chief of Staff, four assistants, 
and 88 other officers—less than a third of the amount advocated by March and other advocates 
for a robust General Staff—and defined its role as a planning and coordinating agency.110 
 That regressive turn, however, proved temporary.  The fact that it was contested within a 
generation of officers that had, throughout their careers, tended to instinctively embrace 
nineteenth century traditions revealed cracks in the foundation of traditionalism.  As the last 
holdouts of Goethals’s generation left the ranks, and officers from the generation that 
experienced the First World War at more middling ranks were promoted to positions of 
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significant responsibility, traditional forms and practices began to hold a considerably less robust 
appeal.  The next generation rising to lead the institution believed that their experiences in the 
war had confirmed the value of formal training and education, and the need for a powerful and 
active Chief of Staff and General Staff.111 
 Accordingly, the army’s interwar years were marked by adaptation and innovation, 
despite the necessarily limited resources of the Depression years.  Ultimately, Goethals won the 
argument.  U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall overhauled the War Department in 
early 1942 to organize a robust and active General Staff and Service Organizations imbued with 
nearly total authority over all parts of the army.  Bureau chiefs filled important roles, but were 
clearly subordinate to the Army Service Forces, whose leader was granted not only executive 
authority, but also command authority.  Revealing that the pendulum had swung largely because 
of his generation’s experiences in the First World War, Marshall created the Army Service 
Forces in the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division’s image, organizing it to serve as the single 
executive agency responsible for managing army logistics. With some important modifications 
that significantly expanded the scope of its mission, the Army Service Forces functioned almost 
exactly as Goethals had envisioned, providing invaluable service throughout the Second World 
War.112  It had taken nearly forty years, but the U.S. Army’s institutional culture had finally 
caught up to its structures.
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CONCLUSION 
 
Goethals never saw the impact he had on the U.S. Army.  After retiring from the service 
in March 1919, he returned to private engineering business, opening a firm of his own.  
Reluctant to use his name and fame for profit, however, Goethals’s firm was never very 
successful.  After the war, he was at his best when pulled into public service.  He served quite 
effectively as New York’s coal administrator, helping the state manage its shortage of coal 
caused by the anthracite coal miners’ strike of 1922.  Never a successful business venture, his 
firm dissolved in 1923.  Afterwards, Goethals worked alone as a consulting engineer, providing 
particularly useful service to the Port of New York Authority in several bridge, tunnel, and 
harbor improvement projects.  With a variable work schedule, Goethals kept an apartment in 
New York at which he lived when working out of his office in Lower Manhattan.  When not 
working, he went to the house he built decades earlier on Martha’s Vineyard, where he spent 
much of his leisure time gardening, admiring the ocean views from his front porch, or taking 
long walks around the island, frequently joined by a growing brood of grandchildren.1 
A chain-smoker since his time at the Panama Canal, Goethals grew ill in 1927.  He had 
developed a powerful addiction to cigarettes as a way of dealing with the stress of his work in 
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Joseph Bucklin Bishop and Farnham Bishop, Goethals: Genius of the Panama Canal (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1930), 402-441. 
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Panama.  Unaware of its health risks, he maintained the habit for the rest of his life.  In the 
summer of 1917, he gave his public endorsement to a campaign to raise money to ship tobacco 
and cigarettes to American soldiers in France, declaring, “Tobacco will be the greatest solace 
during the long vigils of trench warfare, and it is almost as essential, in many cases, as food 
itself.”2  A year later, a journalist observed Goethals at work in the War Department making 
“such short shift of obstacles, callers, cigarettes, lunch, and other incidentals” while intensely 
focused on his work in the War Department.  After nagging illnesses kept him inactive for most 
of the year, Goethals finally followed his son Tom’s advice and went in for a full medical 
examination in September 1927.  The examination revealed that he was suffering from lung 
cancer, and it was terminal.  Nevertheless, Goethals decided to fight the illness.  He moved into 
his New York apartment to have access to more specialized care, undergoing experimental 
treatment when opportunities were presented to him.  Nothing worked.  Goethals died in his 
apartment on January 21, 1928, surrounded by his wife and two sons.3   
Obituaries understandably focused on and celebrated his achievements at the Panama 
Canal.4  Some officers, however, suggested that his service during the First World War was of 
equal or greater significance.  Major General Charles P. Summerall, then serving the army’s 
Chief of Staff, remarked that Goethals’s “epochal achievement in completing the waterways 
which unites the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans at the Isthmus of Panama has obscured the 
brilliance of many similar accomplishments throughout a period of over forty years as a military 
                                                          
2 George W. Goethals to S.M. Reynolds, July 5, 1917, Box 40, George W. Goethals Papers, LC; Donald Wilhelm, 
“The Master of Mobilization,” The Independent 95 (September 7, 1918): 316. 
3 “Gen. Goethals Dies After Long Illness,” New York Times, January 22, 1928, 1 and 30; Bishop and Bishop, 
Goethals: Genius of the Panama Canal, 442-460. 
4 See, for example, “George W. Goethals,” The Nation 126, February 1, 1928, 111; “When Goethals Made the Dirt 
Fly,” The Literary Digest 96, February 11, 1928, 45-52; and “Gen. Goethals Dies After Long Illness,” New York 
Times, January 22, 1928, 1 and 30. 
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engineer, military supply officer and military administrator.”5  One of the honorary pallbearers at 
Goethals’s funeral, General Peyton C. March, went even further.  In his memoir, March wrote, 
“The work that he did as the virtual Chief of Supply of the Army far transcended in magnitude, 
and certainly equaled in importance in its effect on world history, the construction of the Panama 
Canal.”6 
In weighing Goethals’s influence on the nation and even the world, such sentiments seem 
hyperbolic.  But in assessing Goethals’s lasting impact upon United States Army, Summerall and 
March were correct.  Goethals’s work in Panama was a feather in the army’s cap, but did little to 
influence the institution.  Through his service during the First World War, however, Goethals 
played a substantial role in bringing to a conclusion a decades-long process of military reform 
that stretched from late-nineteenth century experiments with postgraduate military education, 
through the Root Reforms, and to the ultimate realization of the potential of those reforms 
immediately before and during World War II.  It is because of his interactions with and influence 
upon the U.S. Army that Goethals’s story is more than just an individual narrative.   
Goethals’s experiences in the U.S. Army closely reflect, in a general sense, the collective 
experiences of his generation of officers.  Attending West Point when it was stagnant as an 
educational institution, he was introduced to the military profession.  Deliberately designed to 
reflect traditional modes of education and interpretations of professionalism, West Point sparked 
his ambition and inspired a deep, personal commitment to the army.  Due to its small size and 
frontier disposition, the army was inclined to ignore the consensus emerging in American society 
that favored formal training and education as an important component of occupational and 
                                                          
5 “Army Men Pay Tribute,” New York Times, January 22, 1928, 30. 
6 Peyton C. March, The  Nation at War (New York: Doubleday, Doran, and Company, 1932), 196. 
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professional specialization.  Accordingly, his years at West Point were one of the last periods of 
time the army took pains to deliberately train and educate him.   
Thereafter, he served in an army that expected him to learn and develop through 
experience from his various duty assignments.  At the same time, the army took few measures to 
standardize its assignments process to ensure that it systematically exposed him to jobs that 
offered enriching experiences.  Meandering through an unsystematic process of assignments and 
officer development, he came upon and took advantage of several excellent opportunities to learn 
and excel as he advanced through the ranks.  In the process, he earned a reputation as one of his 
generation’s best and brightest officers.  Although he was attuned to and willing to subscribe to 
some of the changes taking place in society at large—especially modern theories and practices of 
management—he generally perceived his own success to be a validation of traditional systems of 
thought and practice in the army, even well after the conditions that made them necessary ceased 
to exist.  Because of the problems he observed and experienced in the War with Spain in 1898, 
he tolerated the new institutional structures imposed by the Root Reforms, but continued to cling 
and adhere to comfortably traditional norms, values, and behaviors.   
In the crucible of the First World War, however, severe crises in the American war effort 
shook his faith in tradition.  As a senior army leader, he responded to crises by deviating from 
tradition to create and implement short-term solutions to problems immediately at hand.   It 
worked, but only because the war ended in 1918.  From his vantage point, he knew that the 
American war effort would be in jeopardy in 1919.  And in that knowledge lay at last a tacit 
recognition of the inadequacy and obsolescence of the systems and practices of the nineteenth-
century U.S. Army.   
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This description of Goethals’s career could be applied with equal accuracy to summarize 
the careers of Tasker H. Bliss, John J. Pershing, Hunter Liggett, Peyton C. March, and many 
others from that generation.  The only significant point of variance for individual members of 
that generation is in the conclusions drawn from the experience of the First World War.  On this 
point, Goethals’s generation was deeply divided.  Ultimately, the army’s institutional culture 
changed after the war because the next generation of officers achieved a consensus about the 
war’s implications that Goethals’s generation could not. 
The collective experience of Goethals’s generation of officers reveals a long-neglected 
aspect of military reform in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries:  the slow shift in 
the army’s institutional culture.  Turn-of-the-century military reform is too often treated solely as 
the story of the Elihu Root’s program of reforms and the efforts of a few exceptionally dedicated 
military thinkers.  Such a narrative oversimplifies and drastically shortens the process of 
institutional change, which was and is equal parts structural and cultural.  In the case of army 
reform as the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, the structural changes wrought by the 
Root Reforms happened relatively quickly, from 1899-1903.  But the pace of cultural change 
was much slower.  It took more than three decades and a world war to change the army’s 
institutional culture to such an extent that it realigned with the army’s institutional structures. 
The dynamics of cultural change in the U.S. Army during this period are instructive.  
They offer four general and interconnected implications about cultural change in any human 
organization or institution, military or civil.  First, the army’s experience of cultural change 
suggests that it happens slowly within large institutions because the conditions that shape human 
institutions change faster than the institutions themselves can change.   Practices born of 
necessity become enshrined as tradition and outlive the conditions that made them necessary, as 
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the realization that a given value, belief, or practice is outdated almost inevitably comes long 
after the point at which it is no longer relevant.  The army’s passive reliance upon experiential 
learning was rooted in its traditionally small size, mission, and frontier disposition.  When the 
frontier vanished, the need for the army to be dispersed in small-unit outposts scattered 
throughout the American West similarly disappeared.  As larger units consolidated on larger 
posts, the army fell into a true peacetime routine during which it was not in constant operational 
use.  This held enormous possibilities for the emergence of more robust systems of training and 
education.  Despite the occurrence of some large-unit maneuvers, those possibilities were largely 
unrealized as officers clung to traditional, but now outmoded beliefs about training and 
education.  That perception, and the practices derived from it, had long outlived the conditions 
that made them necessary.   
Stemming from this, the second implication is that cultural change happens slowly in 
human institutions because people have a tendency to resist change.  Goethals’s story shows that 
even an agent of change can still resist change.  The gap between the army’s institutional culture 
and its structures closed when the army and its officer corps fully embraced both a rigorous 
military education system and an active General Staff.  Goethals resisted both until the last year 
of his career.  In the end, he only supported the latter half of that equation.  Even as late as 1922, 
he extolled the virtues of experiential learning as superior to formal, classroom-oriented 
education.  Goethals’s embrace of only part change was the mirror image of Pershing’s.  As 
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army from 1921-1924, Pershing did much to foster the growth of the 
army’s educational system.  At the same time, he confined the General Staff to administration, 
allowed the bureau chiefs to reign supreme in logistics, and attempted to redefine the role of the 
Chief of Staff in the image of the nineteenth-century Commanding General.  In their belated and 
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half-hearted embrace of change, Goethals and Pershing were closely aligned with their 
generation’s response to the Root Reforms.  Uncomfortably new structures that departed from 
tradition inspired resistance through the First World War.  Although the war provided ample 
evidence that traditional systems and practices were inadequate for modern warfare, this 
generation of officers moved only from resistance to ambivalence.  After decades of service, the 
force of tradition was too powerful to overcome.7 
Third, changes in organizational and institutional culture are not simply generational.  
The mere existence of generations and transitions between generations do not necessarily mean 
that cultural change will occur.  Goethals’s peers and colleagues idealized the Civil War 
generation that came before them.  They borrowed much and deviated little from the values and 
practices bequeathed to them by their predecessors.  Furthermore, officers of the generation that 
succeeded Goethals’s did not complete the army’s slow process of cultural change simply 
because they were a new generation.  They did so because the experience of the First World War 
had fundamentally altered their perceptions at a point in time when they were still relative 
newcomers to the institution, and therefore less deeply attached to its traditional norms, values, 
and behaviors. 
Finally, and related to the point above, crisis is the most important and reliable stimulus 
for shifts in organizational and institutional culture.  The force and effect of crisis far outweighs 
possibilities presented by generational transition alone.  Absent the troubled mobilization for the 
                                                          
7 See Samuel Crowther, “Don’t Fear to Attempt a Thing Just Because it Looks Big,” American Magazine, January 
1922, 16 for Goethals’s views on training and education in 1922.  Pershing’s Chief of Staff years are covered in 
Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 275-280.  
Although in a more technological context, this type of resistance to change is a major theme in Elting E. Morrison, 
Men, Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1966).  See especially pages 37-44 and 76 for 
Morrison’s best treatment of resistance to change. 
 
318 
 
War with Spain in 1898, it is unlikely that Goethals’s generation would have tolerated the new 
institutional structures imposed by the Root Reforms.  They may not have even had to, as it is 
equally unlikely that the legislation that enacted the reforms would have passed through 
Congress without the scandals surrounding mobilization in 1898.  Two decades later, it was the 
crisis of a stalled and strained war effort in 1917-1918 that broke the traditional consensus 
among Goethals’s generation and set the conditions needed for real change in the army’s 
institutional culture. 
George W. Goethals dedicated his entire adult life to the United States Army and the 
improvement and efficiency of vast organizations.  It is entirely fitting, then, that his life reveals 
so much about both the army he served and the dynamics of organizational and institutional 
change. 
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